

# NUCLEAR WEAPONS **BAN** MONITOR 2020

Tracking progress towards a world without nuclear weapons



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# Executive Summary

**The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is the only legally binding global treaty that outlaws nuclear weapons. The Treaty constitutes an explicit challenge to the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence and asks states to end inconsistent stances and choose: nuclear weapons, yes or no.**

The facts and figures below summarise the main findings of the 2020 *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*, with respect to the context and status of the TPNW as at the end of the year, and regarding compliance and compatibility during 2020 with the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty. Also

outlined are the main points in the report's discussion of the positive obligations contained in the TPNW. Evaluation of states' compliance or compatibility with the positive obligations will begin in the next edition of the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*.

**197**  
**states evaluated**

The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* evaluates the nuclear-weapons-related policies and practices of each of the 197 states that can become party to global treaties for which the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) is the depositary. This means all 193 UN member states, the two UN observer states (the Holy See and the State of Palestine), and two other states (Cook Islands and Niue).

**156**  
**states with  
nuclear-free  
security policies**

156 states, or four fifths of all 197 states, have excluded any role for nuclear weapons in their security policies. They not only support nuclear disarmament in principle, but reject nuclear weapons in practice.

**41**  
**states with  
nuclear-based  
security policies**

But 41 states—the 9 nuclear-armed states and 32 'umbrella states'—continue to base their security strategies on the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons, despite their longstanding, declared commitment to nuclear disarmament. Of the umbrella states, 2 (Armenia and Belarus) are allies of Russia, while the other 30 are allies of the United States. The role of umbrella states in enabling nuclear armament and preventing progress towards nuclear disarmament received little attention before the negotiation of the TPNW.

**0**  
**states changed  
security policies**

No nuclear-armed state or umbrella state opted to discontinue its reliance on nuclear weapons in 2020, as the TPNW requires of its states parties. Some of the umbrella states, however, were more internally conflicted than others on the Treaty.

**22 Jan 2021**  
**entry into force**

The TPNW reached the requisite 50 ratifications and accessions to trigger entry into force on 24 October 2020, and enters into force 90 days later: on 22 January 2021.

**1MSP**  
**within one year**

The First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW is to be held within one year after the Treaty's entry into force. Austria will host the meeting, where the first states parties will start taking important decisions that will shape the long-term implementation, institutionalisation, and universalisation of the Treaty.

**88**

**states parties and signatories**

A total of 88 states had accepted international legal obligations under the TPNW as of 31 December 2020: 51 states had signed and ratified or acceded and will be the first states parties. (The first 50 will be party from 22 January 2021, and the 51st from 11 March). 37 other states had signed but not yet ratified. In the course of 2020, 17 states ratified or acceded to the TPNW, and six signed.

**138**

**TPNW supporters**

A total of 138 states, or 70% of all states, were supportive of the TPNW. In addition to the 51 states parties and 37 signatories a further 50 states were categorised as 'other supporters' based on their voting in the UN. Many of the other supporters had already started the process to adhere to the Treaty.

**42**

**opposed states**

A further 42 states were opposed to the TPNW: the 9 nuclear-armed states, all of the 30 states with arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with the United States, and 3 states with nuclear-weapon-free security strategies (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Micronesia, and Monaco).

**17**

**undecided states**

A total of 17 states, spread out across all regions, were undecided on the TPNW. Fifteen already have nuclear-weapon-free security policies, while the remaining two undecided states – Armenia and Belarus – are the only states that have arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with Russia.

**Africa**

**96% supportive**

Breaking down the 138 TPNW supporters by region, support for the TPNW was by the end of 2020 already high in all regions of the world apart from Europe. Africa was the region with the highest degree of support. Among African nations, 96% were either states parties or signatories, or were classified as 'other supporters'. This level of support was followed by the Americas, with more than 91%; Oceania with 75%; and Asia with 73%.

**Europe**

**66% opposed**

In Europe, two thirds (66%) of the 47 states were opposed to the TPNW.

**Average**

**ratification speed**

The TPNW's speed of ratification and accession was – even with targeted obstruction from nuclear-armed states – on average the same as for the other treaties on weapons of mass destruction, although significantly slower than for the NPT.

**Lower**

**number of signatures**

As of 31 December 2020, the number of states that had signed the TPNW was still low compared to the other treaties on weapons of mass destruction.

**Interpretations**

**of prohibitions and positive obligations**

The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* sets out clear interpretations of each of the prohibitions in Article 1 and each of the so-called positive obligations contained in the TPNW.

**77.7%**

**of states in line with all TPNW prohibitions**

The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* evaluates the extent to which all states – regardless of whether they have consented to be bound by the Treaty – act in accordance with the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW or not. Globally, 77.7%, or 153 of all 197 states, maintained policies and practices in 2020 that were either compliant (for states parties and signatories) or compatible (for states not party) with all the prohibitions.

**Compliant**

**all states parties and all signatories**

All 88 adhering states (states parties and signatories to the TPNW) were compliant with all the prohibitions in 2020.

## Not compatible

42 states not party

Globally, 42 states not party engaged in conduct that was not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions. Every state may lawfully sign and ratify the TPNW, but states that are categorised as not compliant or not compatible would have to make varying degrees of changes to their policies and practices in order to respect the obligations and norms of the Treaty.

## Europe

has the most states with conduct that is not compatible

A total of 30 of the 47 states in Europe (63%) maintained policies and practices in 2020 that were not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. In the other regions, compliance and compatibility with the TPNW were generally high. In Africa, all states were found to be fully compliant or compatible.

13,410

nuclear warheads

Combined, the nine nuclear-armed states (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) retained 13,410 nuclear warheads in 2020, contravening the TPNW's prohibition in Article 1(1)(a) on the possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia together possess about 91% of the world's nuclear arsenal.

## Development

ongoing in all nuclear-armed states

All of the nine nuclear-armed states also engaged in conduct in 2020 that was not compatible with the prohibition in Article 1(1)(a) on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. Most nuclear-armed states brand their ongoing development and production efforts as 'modernisation', but all continue to be actively engaged in development and production of new nuclear delivery vehicles and/or warheads, upgrading and perpetuating their nuclear capabilities.

2

states 'of concern'

In addition, the situation in Iran and Saudi Arabia warrants close attention and they were therefore recorded by the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* as states 'of concern'. If Iran and Saudi Arabia were today parties to the TPNW, possible compliance issues related to the prohibition on development of nuclear weapons would need to be raised in a meeting of states parties.

5

host states

The specific prohibition in Article 1(1)(g) on allowing the 'hosting' (stationing, installation, or deployment) of nuclear weapons belonging to another state was contradicted by five states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey).

## Article 1(1)(e)

most frequently contravened

Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, which prohibits assisting, encouraging, or inducing prohibited acts, stands out as the one where the greatest number of states had policies and practices that were not compatible with the TPNW. The nuclear-armed states' retention of nuclear weapons was aided and abetted in many ways. A total of 36 states were found to have assisted or encouraged acts in 2020 that are prohibited by the TPNW. Of these, 33 are non-nuclear-armed states and 3 are nuclear-armed states.

## Cooperation

with nuclear-armed states

States parties to the TPNW can remain in alliances and military cooperation arrangements with nuclear-armed states, and can continue to execute all operations, exercises, and other military activities together with them in so far as they do not involve nuclear weapons. While politically difficult, combining alliance membership and adherence to the TPNW is entirely feasible.

21 Feb 2021

declaration deadline

21 February 2021 is the date upon which the 30-day Treaty-imposed deadline for submission of a declaration under Article 2 expires for the first states parties to the TPNW.

## **Stronger requirements for IAEA safeguards**

The legal requirements for safeguards to verify non-proliferation undertakings are stronger in the TPNW than in the NPT. The TPNW makes a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mandatory for all states parties and an Additional Protocol (AP) mandatory for almost three quarters of all potential states parties, including for all nuclear-armed states that join the Treaty. The TPNW is an additional forum where diplomats, civil society, and the IAEA can advocate for the last remaining states to bring CSAs and APs into force with the Agency. As recalled below, The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* also recommends that 1MSP adopts a non-binding recommendation similar to that agreed on in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan, urging all states parties that have not yet done so to adopt and bring into force an AP.

## **Elimination of nuclear weapons**

The TPNW is the first and only legally binding multilateral instrument that requires verification of nuclear disarmament and elimination. As yet, no internationally agreed measures exist for verification of destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons, under any treaty. The TPNW provides a framework within which such a regime for nuclear disarmament can emerge. It is important now to lay the ground work so that, as soon as possible, the Treaty can accommodate one or more nuclear-armed states that may come to conclude that their national security would not be jeopardised by decreasing and finally eliminating their arsenal, and that taking such steps within the framework of the TPNW would provide assurance to the world of its actions.

## **VA & ER global survey needed**

Past use and testing of nuclear weapons have caused multigenerational harm to people and persistent environmental damage. The consequences of testing are insufficiently communicated and understood and are an under-addressed humanitarian challenge. The international community must urgently strengthen operational efforts to assist the victims and remediate contaminated areas. The obligations in the TPNW's Article 6 to assist victims and remediate the environment will function as a catalyst for this. A key step will be to establish a baseline by implementing a long overdue global survey of the harm from nuclear weapons and the associated needs for victim assistance (VA) and environmental remediation (ER).

## **Sharing burden cooperation and assistance**

The TPNW's states parties will share the burden of addressing the effects of nuclear-weapons use and testing, through a mechanism for cooperation and assistance. Article 7 of the Treaty requires all states parties 'in a position to do so' to provide assistance to help affected states meet their victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations.

## **8 recommendations to 1MSP**

The 2020 *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* sets out the following eight recommendations for states parties at 1MSP:

- 1) A Declaration of the States Parties and a Plan of Action to promote the full implementation and universalisation of the TPNW and to further stigmatise nuclear weapons;
- 2) The setting of deadlines for the destruction of a state's party's nuclear weapons and for the removal of a foreign state's nuclear weapons from a state party's territory;
- 3) Beginning consideration of the mandate and capacities of the competent international authority or authorities for verification of nuclear disarmament required by the Treaty;
- 4) Encouraging all states parties and signatories to the TPNW that has not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA;
- 5) Encouraging all states to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty;
- 6) Establishing standing committees to address issues related to victim assistance and environmental remediation;
- 7) Addressing possible issues of compliance; and
- 8) Calling on states to submit voluntary reports on progress in implementing the TPNW, beyond the specific reporting required by the Treaty.

# 1 Introduction

**The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* tracks progress towards a safer world: one without nuclear weapons. It is a non-governmental research programme and *de facto* monitoring regime for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).**

As long as nuclear weapons are seen as legitimate by some states, humankind will live under the combined threats of nuclear war, nuclear accidents, and nuclear terrorism, and the vision of a world without nuclear weapons will remain just that: a vision. The TPNW codifies the norms and actions that are needed to create and maintain this world free of nuclear weapons. The impact of the Treaty will be built gradually and will depend on how its provisions are accepted and applied by each and every state.

Established in 2018, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* is produced and published by Norwegian People's Aid, a partner organisation of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Data collection and analysis are assisted by a wide range of research institutes and independent experts on international humanitarian law, international human rights law, disarmament law, and nuclear disarmament.

The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* evaluates the nuclear-weapons-related policies and practices of each of the 197 states that can become party to global treaties for which the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) is the depositary.<sup>1</sup> It aims to be an accessible and trusted long-term source of accurate information on progress in nuclear disarmament and analysis of the key challenges. Its central purpose is to highlight activities that stand between the international community and the fulfilment of one of its most urgent and universally accepted goals: the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Using the TPNW as a yardstick against which the progress towards a world without nuclear weapons can be measured, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* records developments related to the universalisation of the Treaty. It also tracks the status of all states in relation to other relevant treaties and regimes dealing with weapons of mass destruction, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Partial Nuclear-Test-

Ban Treaty (PTBT), Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Finally, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* sets out clear interpretations of each of the prohibitions and positive obligations of the TPNW, and assesses the extent to which the world's states – regardless of whether they have consented to be bound the Treaty – act in accordance with them or not. This is done with a view to providing guidance to states that have already ratified or acceded to the Treaty, those that are currently considering whether to do so, and those that could do so in the future.

In this edition of the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*, compliance and compatibility with the prohibitions is assessed on the basis of active policies, practices, and actions carried out in 2020, while reference is also made to certain significant earlier events. Assessment of compliance and compatibility with the positive obligations will start in the 2021 edition.

The entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021 is a milestone in the global community's efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. The 2020 *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* is geared to helping the TPNW's first states parties prepare for implementation and starting the process of institutionalising the Treaty.

## THE TPNW

- The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted on 7 July 2017 at a diplomatic conference established by the UN General Assembly.
- A total of 122 states voted in favour of the Treaty's adoption.<sup>2</sup>
- The Treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017.
- Article 15 (1) of the TPNW stipulates that the Treaty enters into force 90 days after the 50th state has ratified or acceded to it. The Treaty received its 50th ratification on 24 October 2020 and thus enters into force on 22 January 2021.

<sup>1</sup> As of 31 December 2020, the Secretary-General of the UN considered that the following 197 states could become party to global treaties for which he is the depositary: all 193 UN member states, the two UN observer states (the Holy See and the State of Palestine), and two other states (Cook Islands and Niue).  
<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, the delegation of the Maldives informed the Secretariat that it too had intended to vote in favour of the Treaty's adoption. This was noted in the report of the conference. See: [undocs.org/A/72/206](https://undocs.org/A/72/206).

## 2 The Context of the TPNW

**The political dynamic around the TPNW in 2020 has been one of deep contestation, not just *within* the politics of nuclear disarmament, but of nuclear disarmament as a collective security strategy. The Treaty poses a significant challenge to a minority of states that have fundamentally inconsistent stances on nuclear weapons. Despite obstructionism from nuclear powers, the TPNW will enter into force in 2021.**

The elaboration of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has taken place at a time characterised by deep uncertainty about the direction of world politics and the rules and institutions of global order, including the 'nuclear order' – the system of institutions, rules, and practices that says who can do what with nuclear technologies.<sup>3</sup> In this period, the ideals and practices of multilateralism have been eroded, and deteriorating power relationships between the United States/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation (Russia) and between the United States and China have returned as central concerns. The system of East-West nuclear arms control built during the 1980s and 1990s is now in tatters, with the INF Treaty and the ABM Treaty defunct, and New START, the CFE Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty under severe strain. In addition, in 2018 the United States withdrew its support to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the 'Iran nuclear deal'.

These major setbacks are compounded by the phenomenon of 'vertical proliferation': the development of new nuclear-weapon systems and improvements of existing systems in the nuclear-armed states.<sup>4</sup> Vertical proliferation in Russia and the United States is now framed as a new and unexpected nuclear arms race, rather than a systemic feature of living in a nuclear-armed world. Moreover, the ways in which cyber warfare, advanced missile defences, and an artificial intelligence revolution could enhance the possibility of nuclear violence in future confrontations, has all added to a sense of emergent nuclear *disorder*.<sup>5</sup>

### Universal commitment to nuclear disarmament

The TPNW represents the further development and consolidation of a universal commitment to nuclear disarmament. Seventy-five years after the first use of nuclear weapons, all the world's states still claim to support nuclear disarmament and the pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons. This goal was first formulated when, on 24 January 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted its first resolution.<sup>6</sup> It was institutionalised in the NPT in 1968, when its states parties agreed 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'.<sup>7</sup> In 2000, all the NPT's states parties, including the five nuclear-weapon states designated under that Treaty (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States), agreed to 'an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament'.<sup>8</sup> This pledge was reaffirmed at the Eighth Review Conference in 2010.<sup>9</sup>

Of the other four nuclear-armed states, India and Pakistan have longstanding and frequently referenced policies in favour of global nuclear disarmament, formulated in similar terms to those of the NPT nuclear-weapon states.<sup>10</sup> The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) intermittently expresses support for a nuclear-weapon-free world<sup>11</sup> and joins statements and policy documents of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) that call for nuclear

3 N. Ritchie, 'A hegemonic nuclear order: Understanding the ban treaty and the power politics of nuclear weapons', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 40: 4, 2019, pp. 409–434.

4 A. Pytlak and R. Acheson (eds.) *Assuring Destruction Forever*, Reaching Critical Will, June 2020, at: [bit.ly/3lfs5Sq](https://bit.ly/3lfs5Sq).

5 J. Acton, 'Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War', *International Security* 43: 1, 2018, pp. 56–99.

6 UN General Assembly, Resolution 1(I): 'Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy', London (1946).

7 Art. VI, NPT.

8 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28, Part I, p. 14, para. 6.

9 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, NPT/CONF.2010/50, Vol. 1, para. 79.

10 See, e.g. India's statement to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 14 October 2019, at: [bit.ly/3kNGBzG](https://bit.ly/3kNGBzG), and Pakistan's statement to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 16 October 2019, at: [bit.ly/360HhZU](https://bit.ly/360HhZU).

11 See, e.g., North Korea's statement to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 22 October 2019, at: [bit.ly/3fgKR9P](https://bit.ly/3fgKR9P).



disarmament.<sup>12</sup> Israel too is on record as supporting nuclear disarmament,<sup>13</sup> although it does so in abstract terms since it does not officially acknowledge its own possession of nuclear weapons.

The commitment to nuclear disarmament has also been institutionalised at regional, national, and local levels. States have declared vast swathes of the planet nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) that cover Latin America and the Caribbean (1967), the South Pacific (1985), South-east Asia (1995), Africa (1996), and Central Asia (2006). Additional treaties have established the Antarctic (1959), outer space (1967), and the seabed (1971) as NWFZs. Individual states have also institutionalised their non-nuclear status through their national constitutions, including Mongolia (internationally recognised as a single state NWFZ in 2001), Austria, New Zealand, and the Philippines. In some ways, the TPNW can be understood as a globalisation of NWFZs.

At the local level, this has extended to towns and cities formally declaring themselves non-nuclear through the Mayors for Peace organisation<sup>14</sup> and ICAN's Cities Appeal. A total of 7,961 towns and cities across 164 countries and regions have joined Mayors for Peace to date and signed up to its programme for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. In addition, more than 370 cities and local and regional authorities have subscribed to ICAN's Cities Appeal in support of the TPNW. They include Barcelona, Berlin, Geneva, Hiroshima, Los Angeles, Manchester, Oslo, Paris, Sydney, Toronto, and Washington DC.<sup>15</sup>

### A minority committed to nuclear weapons

The clear majority of states not only support nuclear disarmament in principle, but also reject nuclear weapons in practice.<sup>16</sup> The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* finds that, as of 2020, 156 states – four-fifths of all states – have excluded any role for nuclear weapons in their security policies, as shown in Figure 1 and Table A overleaf.


Despite their longstanding commitment to disarmament, however, a minority of 41 states continue to base their security strategies on the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons, perpetuating nuclear risks and undermining the international community's work towards nuclear disarmament. Nine of these forty-one states are themselves nuclear-armed: China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The remaining 32 states are non-

nuclear-armed states with arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with nuclear-armed states (sometimes called a 'nuclear umbrella'). These 'umbrella states' do not possess nuclear weapons themselves, but have outsourced their nuclear postures to their nuclear-armed allies and have endorsed or acquiesced in the possession, and potentially also the use, of nuclear weapons on their behalf.

A nuclear-armed state is, though, exceedingly unlikely to risk nuclear war for anything other than serious or even existential threats to its own national security.<sup>17</sup> But even with the credibility problems inherent in policies of extended nuclear deterrence, umbrella states are complicit in the retention of nuclear weapons. Their role in both enabling nuclear armament and preventing progress towards nuclear disarmament received little attention before the negotiation of the TPNW.

Of the 32 umbrella states, 2 (Armenia and Belarus) are allies of Russia, while the other 30 are allies of the United States. Of the latter 30, 27 are members of NATO while the remaining three (Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea)) have made bilateral nuclear defence arrangements with the United States.

Figure 1: All states by their national security policies



12 See, e.g., the G21 statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 31 July 2014, which was delivered by North Korea, at: [bit.ly/3nFQTDL](http://bit.ly/3nFQTDL).

13 See, e.g., Israel's statement to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 15 October 2012, at: [bit.ly/333LKOa](http://bit.ly/333LKOa).

14 See Mayors for Peace, at: [bit.ly/2lkPDXy](http://bit.ly/2lkPDXy).

15 See the ICAN website for the updated list of cities, at: [bit.ly/3ptRMKT](http://bit.ly/3ptRMKT).

16 See H. Muller and A. Schmidt, 'The Little Known Story of Deproliferation: Why States Give up Nuclear Weapons Activities', in W. Potter & G. Mukhatzhanova (eds.), *Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 124–58.

17 See, e.g. H. A. Kissinger, *For the record: Selected statements, 1977–1980* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1981), p. 240.

**Table A: All states by their national security policies**

Category	States
States with nuclear-free security policies (156 states)	Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Oman, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Umbrella states (32 states)	Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey.
Nuclear-armed states (9 states)	China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.

## Challenging inconsistent stances on nuclear weapons

The nuclear-armed states and the umbrella states' commitment to nuclear disarmament has been found wanting. For decades before the TPNW was adopted in 2017, the focus of the international community was not on nuclear disarmament, but rather on non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and arms control measures, where the underlying logic is that nuclear weapons have value and that nuclear deterrence as a system will, and indeed must, continue. The promise of nuclear disarmament has often been used to legitimise these measures not in order to advance nuclear disarmament, but to sustain a status quo.<sup>18</sup>

The TPNW was a product of profound concern about this apparent permanence of nuclear weapons in world politics. Opponents of the Treaty have framed it as a destabilising act that threatens an established but precarious nuclear order and its rules. The commitment to *realise* nuclear disarmament (and by extension the TPNW) has been rejected as a desirable objective, in favour of an open-ended commitment to work *towards* it, seemingly in perpetuity. The *possibility* of eliminating nuclear weapons from world politics, in the way that for example chemical and biological weapons can be, has also been rejected, on the basis that nuclear weapons cannot be 'uninvented' and

nuclear disarmament is only possible through a radical transformation of global politics. Since the system of international politics in which nuclear weapons were invented is unlikely to change, it is claimed that they will have to stay, whether we like it or not. This is presented as *the* reality of world politics. Nuclear weapons remain *permanently* relevant based on this world view. Moreover, they are framed as the solution to the security dilemmas they themselves produce. In this context, nuclear deterrence is depicted as necessary while alternative views are derided as unrealistic and dangerous.<sup>19</sup>

The TPNW reflects a different view, insisting that nuclear weapons *can* be eliminated from world politics without a wholesale transformation of the current system of states in an era of complex global interdependence. Over the longer term, the TPNW represents a significant challenge to the power structures of global nuclear politics by explicitly challenging the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. It is an expression of collective resistance to the practices and ideas that continue to legitimise and perpetuate the existence of nuclear weapons and the risks of catastrophic nuclear violence. In this context, the TPNW challenges the deeper structures of global nuclear order, whether or not its supporters intend it to be so.

<sup>18</sup> A. Harrington, 'The Strategy of Non-proliferation: Maintaining the Credibility of an Incredible Pledge to Disarm', *Millennium*, 40: 1, 2011, pp. 3–19.

<sup>19</sup> See, e.g. 'North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force', NATO press release, 15 December 2020, at: [bit.ly/2K6giIV](https://bit.ly/2K6giIV).

Supporters of the TPNW do not claim it will ‘magically’ cause nuclear disarmament, as critics of the Treaty suggest. They recognise that it must be complemented by many more steps and agreements. They do, however, argue that the global legal-normative context of nuclear weapons *matters* and that changing this context in support of nuclear disarmament is an essential process. A prohibition treaty has often preceded the elimination of unacceptable weapons, such as chemical weapons (whose use was first banned in warfare at the Hague Peace Conference in 1899, 93 years before the adoption of the Chemical Weapons Convention). From this standpoint, the TPNW is also part of a wider process of re-legitimising multilateralism, reinforcing the importance of institutions and norms in shaping world politics (especially the politics of violence), and demonstrating the possibilities of collective action on issues of global import.

The TPNW requires nuclear-armed states and umbrella states to end their inconsistent stances and choose: nuclear weapons, yes or no. So far, they have all opted for the continuance of nuclear weapons. Some of the umbrella states, however, are more internally conflicted than others on the TPNW. This was manifested in an open letter in support of the TPNW, published on 21 September 2020 and signed by 56 former presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and defence ministers from 20 such states in NATO as well as Japan and South Korea.<sup>20</sup>

The entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021 as binding international law will be the next step in the process of establishing the authority of the Treaty and its norms and rules in world politics. Further signatories up to and then beyond the 122 that voted in support of adopting the Treaty at the UN in 2017 and further ratifications will continue the process of accruing global authority.

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20 Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (21 September 2020), at: [bit.ly/2Vf1Ekq](https://bit.ly/2Vf1Ekq).

### 3 The Status of the TPNW

**As of 31 December 2020, the TPNW had 51 states parties while a further 37 states had signed but not yet ratified. Thus, in total, 88 states (or 44.7% of all states) were either states parties or signatories to the Treaty. This means that we are approaching a situation where half of all states will have accepted binding obligations in international law under the TPNW.**


Of the 109 states that at the end of 2020 were not states parties<sup>21</sup> or signatories<sup>22</sup> to the TPNW, 50 states are identified by the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* as ‘other supporters’, on the basis that their most recent vote in the United Nations (UN) on the TPNW was in favour of the Treaty. Grouped together as ‘TPNW supporters’, the states parties, signatories, and other supporters total 138 states, or exactly 70% of all states.

In the course of 2020, 17 states<sup>23</sup> ratified or acceded to the TPNW, and six states<sup>24</sup> signed. The TPNW will enter into force and become international law on 22 January 2021,

90 days after it reached the requisite 50 ratifications/ accessions.<sup>25</sup> Honduras became the 50<sup>th</sup> state to bring the TPNW into force, when it deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General on the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the organization’s establishment: 24 October 2020.

The criteria for the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*’s categorisation of states by their position on the TPNW are explained in Table B overleaf, and the distribution of support is illustrated by Figure 2 here and Table C overleaf.

Figure 2: Global distribution of support for the TPNW



21 Under international law a state only becomes party to a treaty once the treaty as a whole enters into force, but the term ‘state party’ is nevertheless used here for states that have signed and ratified or acceded to the TPNW, since the Treaty’s entry into force was imminent at the time of writing. Of the 51 states that were party to the TPNW as at 31 December 2020, 49 states signed and ratified, while two (Cook Islands and Niue) acceded.

22 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary law provide that a signatory state or, before it becomes a state party, a ratifying or acceding state, must not engage in conduct that frustrates the object and purpose of a treaty.

23 Belize, Benin, Botswana, Fiji, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Lesotho, Malta, Malaysia, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Tuvalu.

24 Belize, Malta, Mozambique, Niger, Sudan, Zimbabwe.

25 The requirement in Article 15(1) of the TPNW for 50 ratifications or accessions to trigger entry into force is relatively high, compared to other treaties. For instance, the BWC required 22, the CCM required 30, the APMBC required 40, and the NPT required 43. The CCW, however, required 65 ratifications or accessions for entry into force.

## THE 50 STATES BRINGING THE TPNW INTO FORCE

In alphabetical order, the following states were the first 50 states ratifying or acceding to the TPNW, thereby triggering the Treaty's entry into force: *Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Fiji, Gambia, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.*

**Table B: Criteria for TPNW support categories**

Number	Category	Criterion
1	States parties	States that have either signed and ratified or have acceded to the TPNW.
2	Signatories	States that have signed the TPNW but not yet ratified it.
3	Other supporters	States that are not in category 1 or 2 but whose most recent vote in the UN on the TPNW (adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017 or on the subsequent annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW) was 'yes'.
4	Undecided	All states that are not in category 1 or 2 and whose most recent vote in the UN on the TPNW (adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017 or on the subsequent annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW) was an abstention, or that never participated in such a vote.
5	Opposed	All states that are not in category 1 or 2 and whose most recent vote in the UN on the TPNW (adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017 or on the subsequent annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW) was 'no'.

**Table C: All states by their position on the TPNW**

Category	States
States parties (51 states)	Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam.
Signatories (37 states)	Algeria, Angola, Brazil, Brunei, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Other supporters (50 states)	Afghanistan, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
Undecided (17 states)	Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Finland, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Serbia, Singapore, Somalia, South Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tonga, Ukraine.
Opposed (42 states)	Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Korea, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

## WHAT DID THE ADOPTING STATES DO?

- Of the 122 states that voted yes on the adoption of the TPNW at the end of the negotiations in the UN on 7 July 2017, **62.3%** (76 states) had by the end of 2020 proceeded to become either a state party or a signatory to the TPNW and thus accepted legally binding obligations under the Treaty.
- Of the remaining 37.7%, all but five (see below) have continued to vote yes on the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW and are therefore listed by the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* as other supporters.
- Five states (Argentina, Marshall Islands, Sweden, Switzerland, and Tonga) have abstained on all or the latest of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW and are therefore listed as undecided.
- None of the states that adopted the TPNW in 2017 has ever voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW.
- Thus far, a total of 12 states that did **not** take part in the adoption of the TPNW in 2017 have also joined the Treaty as states parties or have signed it: Central African Republic, Comoros, Cook Islands, Dominica, Libya, Maldives, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, Tuvalu, and Zambia.

## Other supporters

The 'other supporters' category consists, for the most part, of states that have not yet signed or adhered to the Treaty but which voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN diplomatic conference in July 2017 and have continued to vote in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW.<sup>26</sup> The category also includes nine states<sup>27</sup> that did not participate in the negotiations or did not vote when the Treaty was adopted in 2017, but which have subsequently expressed their support by voting in favour of the annual resolution. The 50 states in the other-supporters category make up the most immediate potential for new signatories to the TPNW. Indeed, many of this group have already started the process to adhere to the Treaty, including Andorra, Eritrea, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, and Sierra Leone.

For details about the level of backing for the TPNW in the respective states in the other-supporters category, see the state profiles in Chapter 7.

## Undecided states

A total of 17 states (8.6% of the global total) are categorised as 'undecided'. This category contains a mixed group of states, spread out across all five continents. Some of the undecided states have the Treaty under review domestically. Certain other states seem to be choosing to stay neutral on the TPNW for the time being. Finally, some states are for various reasons, including internal challenges, currently not considering whether to join the Treaty.

Of the 17 undecided states, 15 already have nuclear-weapon-free security policies. The remaining two undecided states – Armenia and Belarus – are the only states that have arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with Russia. Both states abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.<sup>28</sup> By contrast, all the umbrella states in NATO and the three states with bilateral arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with the United States (Australia, Japan, South Korea) have thus far consistently voted against the TPNW resolution in the UN General Assembly.

Since the 2019 edition of the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*, Mali, Nauru, Niue, and Uzbekistan were moved from the 'Undecided' category. Mali and Uzbekistan were moved to

the other-supporters category because they started voting in favour of the UN General Assembly Resolution on the TPNW after previously having abstained. Nauru signed and ratified the Treaty and Niue acceded to it, and both were thus moved to the states-parties category.

Argentina, the Marshall Islands, and Switzerland all voted in favour of adopting the TPNW in 2017, but they are in the undecided category after having abstained on the TPNW Resolution at the UN General Assembly in 2018, 2019, and 2020. All three states are in protracted processes to arrive at a final national position. Argentina stated after its abstention on the TPNW resolution in 2020 that it is continuing its analysis of the Treaty.<sup>29</sup> The Marshall Islands' President, David Kabua, said in October 2020 that his country 'is not currently prepared to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and we will continue to study it', citing concerns about the Treaty's provisions on victim assistance and environmental remediation.<sup>30</sup> In Switzerland, the government decided in 2018 not to join the TPNW 'at the present time' and that it would participate as an observer at the Treaty's meetings of states parties.<sup>31</sup> However, both chambers of the Swiss Parliament subsequently instructed the government to sign and ratify without delay. In response, the government has committed to review its decision after the NPT Review Conference (now postponed until 2021 because of COVID-19) has taken place.<sup>32</sup>

Also in the undecided category is Sweden. After first having voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the diplomatic conference in the UN in 2017, the Swedish government announced in July 2019 that it would not adhere to the TPNW at the present time. It also indicated that Sweden might reassess its position following the next NPT Review Conference, and said that it would participate as an observer at the meetings of states parties to the TPNW when it enters into force.<sup>33</sup> Sweden abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Opposed states

Based on their voting in the UN General Assembly, 42 states (21.3%) are categorised as 'opposed' to the TPNW. This category consists of the nine nuclear-armed states and all of the 30 states with arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with the United States (while, as

26 2018, A/RES/73/48; 2019, A/RES/74/41; and 2020, A/75/399 DR II. The annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW was first introduced in 2018. The voting records are an important indicator when analysing the trend in support for the TPNW and can also constitute *opinio juris* towards a customary law prohibition of nuclear weapons.

27 Andorra, Barbados, Cameroon, Eswatini, Guinea, Mali, Rwanda, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

28 Armenia also participated in the negotiations on the TPNW in 2017 but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty.

29 Reaching Critical Will, tweet, at: [bit.ly/35EiFKI](https://bit.ly/35EiFKI).

30 Statement at: [bit.ly/32Y2eaF](https://bit.ly/32Y2eaF).

31 Press release, at: [bit.ly/2TprdhJ](https://bit.ly/2TprdhJ).

32 Press release, at: [bit.ly/3orcnWm](https://bit.ly/3orcnWm).

33 Article from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: [bit.ly/2Gc1IzR](https://bit.ly/2Gc1IzR).



mentioned above, the two states with arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with Russia – Belarus and Armenia – are in the undecided category). It also comprises the only three states with nuclear-weapon-free security strategies that have voted against the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, in both 2018, 2019, and 2020: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Micronesia, and Monaco.

Political debate about the merits of the TPNW is ongoing in several of the opposed states.<sup>34</sup> In Australia, the opposition Labor Party has committed to ‘sign and ratify the Ban Treaty’ when in government, after taking into account the need to ensure complementarity with the NPT and an effective verification and enforcement architecture.<sup>35</sup> The Labor leader, Anthony Albanese, and shadow foreign minister, Penny Wong, reaffirmed this commitment in October 2020 upon the 50th ratification of the TPNW.<sup>36</sup> In France, an information enquiry set up by the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee concluded in July 2018 that France should ‘mitigate its criticism of the [TPNW] and the countries that have contributed to its adoption, to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of States and their desire for more balanced global governance’.<sup>37</sup> In the Netherlands, the House of Representatives adopted a series of motions in November 2018 calling on the government to intensify its advocacy for nuclear disarmament, including to champion the TPNW within NATO and investigate the compatibility of the TPNW with existing Dutch legislation.<sup>38</sup>

There are also signs that there are divisions *within* some governments. In September 2020, Belgium’s new coalition government agreed on a government declaration<sup>39</sup> which states that ‘Belgium will play a proactive role in the 2021 NPT Review Conference and, together with European NATO allies, will explore how to strengthen the multilateral non-proliferation framework and how the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons can give new impetus to multilateral nuclear disarmament’.<sup>40</sup> Earlier in the year, a resolution urging the Belgian government to remove the US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory and join the TPNW had been narrowly rejected by parliament (74 votes against and 66 votes in favour).<sup>41</sup> In Spain, the left-wing party Podemos obtained a commitment from the Spanish government in 2018 that it would sign the TPNW, in exchange for Podemos’ support for the 2019 national budget.<sup>42</sup> The government has not commented on how or

when it will implement this agreement. The Italian parliament in September 2017 adopted a resolution committing the government to ‘pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world’ and ‘in a way compatible with its NATO obligations and with the positioning of allied states, to explore the possibility of becoming a party to the legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination, as adopted on 7 July 2017’.<sup>43</sup>

More information on the latest developments in the states in the opposed category can be found in their respective state profiles in Chapter 7.

## Regional distribution of support

Breaking down the 138 TPNW supporters by region, Figure 3 overleaf shows that by the end of 2020, support for the TPNW was already high in all regions of the world apart from Europe, with 96.3% of the states in Africa supporting it by becoming states parties, signing, or voting in favour in the UN General Assembly. Africa was followed by the Americas with more than 91%, Oceania with 75%, and Asia with 73%. In Europe only five states (Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Malta, and San Marino) had signed and ratified, and one (Liechtenstein) had signed but not yet ratified. Another three (Andorra, Cyprus, and the Republic of Moldova (Moldova)) had voted in favour of the TPNW at the UN and were in the category of other supporters.

All regions have a small group of undecided states. There is just one undecided state in the Americas (Argentina), one (Marshall Islands) in Oceania, two (Somalia and South Sudan) in Africa, five in Asia, and seven in Europe. The highest number of opposed states is in Europe, where 31 states (66%) currently are opposed to the TPNW. There are two opposed states in the Americas, two in Oceania, and seven in Asia, but none in Africa.

For more details, see Figures 4 to 8 overleaf.

34 See, e.g. Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (21 September 2020), at: [bit.ly/2Vf1Ekq](https://bit.ly/2Vf1Ekq).

35 ICAN news article, at: [bit.ly/2mmfEdT](https://bit.ly/2mmfEdT).

36 Statement, at: [bit.ly/36Y1CCR](https://bit.ly/36Y1CCR).

37 Report from the French Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, at: [bit.ly/2mtx3l2](https://bit.ly/2mtx3l2).

38 PAX news article, at: [bit.ly/2P730d7](https://bit.ly/2P730d7).

39 Resolution, at: [bit.ly/31JwyF5](https://bit.ly/31JwyF5).

40 ICAN news article, at: [bit.ly/2TnhgkU](https://bit.ly/2TnhgkU).

41 ICAN news article, at: [bit.ly/31DJsEL](https://bit.ly/31DJsEL).

42 ICAN news article, at: [bit.ly/2koi0gA](https://bit.ly/2koi0gA).

43 ICAN news article, at: [bit.ly/2lY88FY](https://bit.ly/2lY88FY).

Figure 3: TPNW support by region




Figure 4: TPNW support in Africa




Figure 5: TPNW support in the Americas




Figure 6: TPNW support in Asia




Figure 7: TPNW support in Europe





Figure 8: TPNW support in Oceania



## Rate of ratification and level of signatures

As Figures 9 and 10 demonstrate, the TPNW's speed of ratification and accession is – despite obstructionism from nuclear-armed states<sup>44</sup> – on average the same as for the other treaties on weapons of mass destruction (WMD): the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). As of 20 December 2020, exactly three years and three months after the TPNW opened for signature, 51 states had ratified or acceded to the TPNW. The NPT had 66 ratifications and accessions in the same time period, the BWC 53, the CWC 49, and the CTBT 51.

Figure 10 also shows that the number of states that had signed the TPNW at 39 months after opening for signature was still low compared to all of the other WMD treaties.

According to ICAN, which works directly with states on their plans for signature and ratification of and accession to the TPNW, the COVID-19 pandemic has certainly caused delays in adherence in some states.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, for a few months, signature of the Treaty was not possible due to COVID-19 restrictions at UN Headquarters. Consideration

of the Treaty by cabinets of ministers and by legislatures has, in many cases, been put on hold while the impacts of the pandemic are addressed. Many parliaments have been meeting virtually, and in some cases only for the purpose of addressing the pandemic.

Figure 10: Signatures and ratifications/accessions 39 months after opening for signature - WMD treaties compared<sup>46</sup>





Figure 9: Speed of ratification – WMD treaties



<sup>44</sup> In 2017, US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis wrote to his Swedish counterpart to dissuade Sweden from signing the Treaty. C. Woody, 'Mattis reportedly threatened Sweden with retaliation over signing a nuclear-weapons ban', *Business Insider*, 5 September 2017, at: [bit.ly/2ltqcU2](https://bit.ly/2ltqcU2). In October 2020, the United States called on states that had ratified the TPNW to withdraw from the Treaty. M. Lederer, 'US urges countries to withdraw from UN nuke ban treaty', *Associated Press*, 22 October 2020, at: [bit.ly/3lswFgm](https://bit.ly/3lswFgm).

<sup>45</sup> Email to the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* from ICAN's Treaty Coordinator Tim Wright, 22 July 2020.

<sup>46</sup> Under Article IX(1) of the NPT, signature of the treaty was only possible until its entry into force. The same applies to the BWC (Article XIV(1)), the CWC (Article XVIII), and the CTBT (Article XI). The CTBT of course is not yet in force so signature continues to be possible.

## 4 The Prohibitions of the TPNW

**In 2020, 153 states maintained policies and practices that were consistent with all the prohibitions of the TPNW, including all of the 88 states parties and signatories to the Treaty. A total of 42 states not party, however, engaged in conduct that was not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions. In addition, Iran and Saudi Arabia are recorded as states of concern.**

The heart of the TPNW is its Article 1, which contains the Treaty's prohibitions. These prohibitions apply at all places and in all circumstances, including during armed conflict. In the following sections, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* sets out clear interpretations of each of the prohibitions and evaluates the extent to which all states – regardless of whether they have consented to be bound by the Treaty – act in accordance with them or not. States parties and signatories are categorised as either 'compliant' or 'not compliant', whereas states not party are categorised as either 'compatible' or 'not compatible'.

Where a state has been assessed to be 'of concern', this means that worrying developments in the state warrant close attention.

Every state may lawfully sign and ratify the TPNW, but states that are categorised as not compliant or not compatible would have to make varying degrees of changes to their policies and practices in order to respect the obligations and norms of the Treaty.

Figure 11 and Table D summarise the overall compliance and compatibility findings for all states.

The 42 states shown in red in Figure 11 are first and foremost the nine nuclear-armed states and the thirty-two umbrella states, but also includes one state that has a nuclear-weapon-free security policy (Marshall Islands).


For an overview of the prohibitions in the TPNW and a comparison with the core provisions in the NPT, see Annex I.

### ARTICLE 1(1) PROHIBITIONS

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

- Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

Figure 11: Overall compliance or compatibility with the TPNW prohibitions among all states





**Table D: Overall compliance or compatibility with the TPNW prohibitions among all states**

Status of overall compliance/compatibility	States
Compliant/Compatible (153 states)	Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Oman, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Not compliant/Not compatible (42 states)	Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Korea, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Of concern (2 states)	Iran, Saudi Arabia

As set out in Figure 12, Europe is the region with the most states whose conduct conflicts with the TPNW. A total of 30 of the 47 states in Europe (63%) currently maintain policies and practices that are not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. In the other regions, compliance and compatibility with the TPNW is generally high. In Africa, all states have been found to be fully compliant or compatible. In the Americas, only 2 of the 35 states across the region (Canada and the United States) engage in conduct which is not compatible with the Treaty. In Asia, where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of the 45 states maintain policies and practices that are not compatible: Armenia, China, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Korea. Two states in Asia – Iran and Saudi Arabia – are listed as of concern. In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands are the 2 states with policies and practices that are not fully compatible with the TPNW among the 16 states in the region.

*Figure 12: Compliance and compatibility by region*




Figure 13 disaggregates compliance and compatibility for each of the Article 1 prohibitions. Most importantly, the conduct of the nine nuclear-armed states was not compatible with either the prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or acquiring nuclear weapons, or the prohibition on possessing or stockpiling them. The prohibition in Article 1(1)(e) on assisting, encouraging, or inducing prohibited acts, however, stands out as the one where the greatest number of states have policies and practices that are not compatible. The nuclear-armed states' retention of nuclear weapons is aided and abetted in many ways. We find that a total of 36 states assisted, encouraged, or induced acts in 2020 that are prohibited by the TPNW: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The specific prohibition on allowing the 'hosting' (stationing, installation, or deployment) of nuclear weapons belonging to another state is contradicted by five states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey).

An overview of individual states' compliance or compatibility with respect to each of the prohibitions is contained in Tables E to I, broken down by region. Details for each respective state are also in the state profiles in Chapter 7.

Figure 13: Compliance and compatibility by prohibition




Table E: TPNW compliance and compatibility in Africa

TPNW Article	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(b)	Art 1(1)(c)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(e)	Art 1(1)(f)	Art 1(1)(g)
Prohibition	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist, encourage, or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation, or deployment
<i>Algeria</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Angola</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Benin</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Botswana</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Burundi</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Cabo Verde</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Cameroon</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Central African Republic</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Chad</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Comoros</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Congo</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Djibouti</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>DR Congo</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Egypt</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Equatorial Guinea</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Eritrea</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Eswatini</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Ethiopia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Gabon</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Gambia</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Ghana</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Guinea</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Kenya</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Lesotho</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Liberia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Libya</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Madagascar</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Malawi</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Mali</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Mauritania</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Mauritius</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Morocco</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Mozambique</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Namibia</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Niger</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Nigeria</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Rwanda</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Sao Tome and Principe</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Senegal</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Seychelles</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Somalia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>South Africa</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>South Sudan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Sudan</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Tanzania</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Togo</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Tunisia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Uganda</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Zambia</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Zimbabwe</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant

Table F: TPNW compliance and compatibility in the Americas

TPNW Article	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(b)	Art 1(1)(c)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(e)	Art 1(1)(f)	Art 1(1)(g)
Prohibition	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist, encourage, or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation, or deployment
<i>Antigua and Barbuda</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Argentina</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Bahamas</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Barbados</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Belize</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Bolivia</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Brazil</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Canada</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Chile</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Colombia</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Costa Rica</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Cuba</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Dominica</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Dominican Republic</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Ecuador</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>El Salvador</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Grenada</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Guatemala</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Guyana</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Haiti</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Honduras</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Jamaica</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Mexico</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Nicaragua</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Panama</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Paraguay</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Peru</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Saint Kitts and Nevis</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Saint Lucia</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Suriname</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Trinidad and Tobago</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>United States</i>	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Not compatible	Compatible
<i>Uruguay</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Venezuela</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant

Table G: TPNW compliance and compatibility in Asia

TPNW Article	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(b)	Art 1(1)(c)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(e)	Art 1(1)(f)	Art 1(1)(g)
Prohibition	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist, encourage, or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation, or deployment
<i>Afghanistan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Armenia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Bahrain</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Bangladesh</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Bhutan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Brunei</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Cambodia</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>China</i>	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>India</i>	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Indonesia</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Iran</i>	Of concern	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Iraq</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Israel</i>	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Japan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Jordan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Kazakhstan</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Kuwait</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Lao PDR</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Lebanon</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Malaysia</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Maldives</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Mongolia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Myanmar</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Nepal</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>North Korea</i>	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Oman</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Pakistan</i>	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Palestine</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Philippines</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Qatar</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	Of concern	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Singapore</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>South Korea</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Sri Lanka</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Syria</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Tajikistan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Thailand</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Timor-Leste</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Turkmenistan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Uzbekistan</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Viet Nam</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Yemen</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible

Table H: TPNW compliance and compatibility in Europe

TPNW Article	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(b)	Art 1(1)(c)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(e)	Art 1(1)(f)	Art 1(1)(g)
Prohibition	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist, encourage, or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation, or deployment
<i>Albania</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Andorra</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Austria</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Belarus</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Belgium</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible
<i>Bosnia and Herzegovina</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Bulgaria</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Croatia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Cyprus</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Czechia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Denmark</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Estonia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Finland</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>France</i>	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Not compatible	Compatible
<i>Georgia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Germany</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible
<i>Greece</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Holy See</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Hungary</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Iceland</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Ireland</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Italy</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible
<i>Latvia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Liechtenstein</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Lithuania</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Luxembourg</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Malta</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Moldova</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Monaco</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Montenegro</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Netherlands</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible
<i>North Macedonia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Norway</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Poland</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Portugal</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Romania</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Russia</i>	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible
<i>San Marino</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Serbia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Slovakia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Slovenia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Spain</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Sweden</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Switzerland</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Turkey</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible
<i>Ukraine</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>United Kingdom</i>	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Not compatible	Compatible



**Table I: TPNW compliance and compatibility in Oceania**

TPNW Article	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(b)	Art 1(1)(c)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(e)	Art 1(1)(f)	Art 1(1)(g)
Prohibition	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist, encourage, or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation, or deployment
<i>Australia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Cook Islands</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Fiji</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Kiribati</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Marshall Islands</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Not compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Micronesia</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Nauru</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>New Zealand</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Niue</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Palau</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Samoa</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Solomon Islands</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Tonga</i>	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible	Compatible
<i>Tuvalu</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant
<i>Vanuatu</i>	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant	Compliant

# The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons



Russia’s President Vladimir Putin boasted of a new array of nuclear-capable weapons during his annual speech to lawmakers in Moscow in 2018. Photo: Grigory Sysoev/Sputnik/NTB.

Compliance by states parties and signatories:	88		
Compatibility for states not party:	98		
		9	2

All of the nine nuclear-armed states – China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States – engaged in conduct in 2020 that was not compatible with the prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. Two states not party – Iran and Saudi Arabia – have been recorded as states of concern.

An overview of new nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition can be found in Annex II. Most nuclear-armed states brand their ongoing development and production efforts as ‘modernisation’, but all continue to be actively engaged in development and production of new nuclear delivery vehicles and/or warheads, upgrading and perpetuating their nuclear capabilities. Many weapon systems currently being developed and produced are set to remain operational into the 2070s and 2080s, meaning that the states in question are committing themselves to nuclear armament for at least half a century into the future. In other words, ongoing

modernisation projects ‘indicate that genuine progress towards nuclear disarmament will remain a distant goal’.<sup>47</sup>

As the UN High Representative for disarmament affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, stated in February 2020, a ‘qualitative nuclear arms race’ is currently underway. This arms race is ‘not based on numbers but on faster, stealthier and more accurate weapons’.<sup>48</sup> Although some features of the current modernisation projects are intended to increase the safety and security of existing nuclear weapons and ensure better command and control, they also involve an expansion in the present capabilities of nuclear-armed states, including by making the weapons smaller, lighter and more ‘useable’. Other aspects of ongoing modernisation efforts increase dependence on digital technologies, making nuclear weapons and their command-and-control systems vulnerable to cyber interference and malicious hacking by hostile states or even non-state actors, which may result in intentional nuclear detonations, false alerts, or fatal human errors.<sup>49</sup>

47 S. Kyle, ‘Modernization of nuclear weapons continues’, SIPRI (18 June 2018), at: [bit.ly/2MK3CHe](https://bit.ly/2MK3CHe).  
 48 ‘UN disarmament chief hopes upcoming conference will address current nuclear challenges’, UN News (26 February 2020).  
 49 For an overview, see: NTI, ‘Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age’ (26 September 2018), at: [bit.ly/2Ug00T7](https://bit.ly/2Ug00T7).

## INTERPRETATION

- Development, production, manufacture, and any other forms of acquisition of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device are prohibited under Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW.
- The prohibited 'development' of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device encompasses any of the actions and activities intended to prepare for its production. This covers relevant research, computer modelling of weapons, and the testing of key components, as well as sub-critical testing (i.e. experiments simulating aspects of nuclear explosions using conventional explosives and without achieving uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions).
- The concepts of 'production' and 'manufacture' overlap significantly, covering the processes that are intended to lead to a completed, useable weapon or device. In general parlance, 'production' is a broader term than 'manufacture': manufacture describes the use of machinery to transform inputs into outputs. Taken together, these concepts encompass not only any factory processes, but also any improvisation or adaptation of a nuclear explosive device.
- The prohibition on 'otherwise acquiring' a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is a catch-all provision that encompasses any means of obtaining nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices other than through production. This could be through import, lease, or borrowing from another source or, in theory, by recovering a lost nuclear weapon or capturing or stealing one. This prohibition overlaps with the one in Article 1(1)(c) not to receive the control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which is discussed below.
- As is the case with the NPT, the TPNW does not define 'nuclear weapons' or 'other nuclear explosive devices'. There is, though, a settled understanding among states of these terms. A nuclear explosive device is an explosive device whose effects are derived primarily from nuclear chain reactions. A nuclear weapon is a nuclear explosive device that has been weaponised, meaning that it is contained in and delivered by, for example, a missile, rocket, or bomb. Thus, all nuclear weapons are a form of nuclear explosive device but not all nuclear explosive devices are nuclear weapons.
- The prohibition on development, production, manufacturing and acquisition also covers key components. It is widely accepted that the missile, rocket, or other munition, including both the container and any means of propulsion, are key components in a nuclear weapon. Delivery platforms such as bombers and submarines are not key components of nuclear weapons as such, and are not captured by the prohibitions in Article 1, though they may be integral to a nuclear-weapon system.\*
- Key components are of course also the fissile material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) and the means of triggering the nuclear chain reaction. Production or procurement of fissile material constitutes prohibited development when this is done with the intent to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. To research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is permitted both under the NPT and the TPNW.
- Development and production of dual-use components, such as navigation or guidance systems, which could be used in both nuclear and conventional weapons, would only be prohibited under the TPNW when they were intended to be used in nuclear weapons.
- Under Article II of the NPT, a similar obligation is imposed not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but this applies only to non-nuclear-weapon states and does not prohibit nuclear-weapon states from continuing to develop, produce, and manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

\* Note that the most recent ethical framework for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund (as a major global investor) recommends exclusion not only of producers of nuclear weapons and their key components but also of producers of 'certain types of delivery platforms which can only be used for the delivery of nuclear weapons'. This applies primarily to submarines but could also relate to other platform types. See: 'Values and Responsibility – The Ethical Framework for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund' (NOU 2020:7), at: [bit.ly/35Owvch](https://bit.ly/35Owvch).

In a report published in May 2020, ICAN estimated that the nine nuclear-armed states spent US\$72.9 billion on their more than 13,000 nuclear weapons and delivery systems in 2019, a US\$7.1 billion increase on the previous year.<sup>50</sup> The United States led the way, with almost half of all global spending (US\$35.4 billion), followed by China with US\$10.4 billion (14%). Russia devoted an estimated US\$8.5 billion to its nuclear arsenal, while the United Kingdom devoted US\$8.9 billion to its nuclear arsenal.<sup>51</sup>

If Iran and Saudi Arabia were today parties to the TPNW, possible compliance issues would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties. The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* has therefore listed them as states of concern.

One year after the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran restarted uranium enrichment, moved to a slightly higher level than agreed (from 3.75% to 4.5% concentration of U-235), and introduced more advanced centrifuges. In early September 2020, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared that Iran's enriched uranium stockpile had reached 2,105kg, many times the amount permitted under the JCPOA.<sup>52</sup> Under the Agreement, it was estimated that it would take Iran at least a year to produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb. That has now been reduced to months. In August 2020, after 'intensive bilateral consultations', Iran and the IAEA agreed on the resolution of safeguards implementation issues raised by the Agency.

50 ICAN, *Enough is Enough: 2019 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending*, Geneva, May 2020, at: [bit.ly/2Ykv3ea](https://bit.ly/2Ykv3ea).

51 The estimates include the operating costs and development not only of nuclear warheads but also of nuclear-weapon delivery systems, such as submarines and military aircraft. Where detailed budget data were not publicly available ICAN based their estimates on 'a reasonable percentage of total military spending on nuclear weapons'. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

52 BBC, 'Iran's enriched uranium stockpile "10 times limit"', 5 September 2020, at: [bbc.in/2DEWp8z](https://bbc.in/2DEWp8z).

Iran gave the IAEA access to two locations specified by the Agency,<sup>53</sup> which in December 2020 still remained in a position to apply its most stringent verification methods in the country.

Saudi Arabia has explicitly and repeatedly threatened to swiftly acquire nuclear weapons should Iran do so. Its nuclear programme is in the early developmental stages, but at a conference in Abu Dhabi in September 2019, the energy minister announced an ambitious plan to extract and enrich uranium for two large power reactors. Saudi Arabia is already in talks with several reactor vendors, including from China, France, Russia, and South Korea, and is currently constructing its first research reactor. Saudi Arabia has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, but also has in place a so-called “Small Quantities Protocol”, which suspends most inspection and reporting requirements. In view of its ambitions, Saudi Arabia should rescind its Small Quantities Protocol and instead adopt an Additional Protocol allowing the Agency to search for undeclared materials and activities. However, Saudi Arabia seems in no hurry to do this. So far, it has been unwilling to sign any business contract that forbids them from enriching uranium and plutonium reprocessing.<sup>54</sup>

## Missile tests

Test launches of missiles that are either specifically designed to deliver nuclear warheads or which are ‘nuclear-capable’ constitute prohibited development of nuclear weapons under Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW (unless the purpose of the launch is to test the conventional capability of the missile). In many cases, however, the true purpose of such test launches may be sabre-rattling, which may amount to threatening to use nuclear weapons under the TPNW. Information from public reports,<sup>55</sup> which may not be exhaustive, shows that seven of the nine nuclear-armed states (China, France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States) tested missiles specifically designed for nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable missiles in 2020. (See Annex III.)

## Fissile material

Fissile material – plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)<sup>56</sup> – is essential in all nuclear weapons. Both military and civilian stocks of HEU and plutonium must be secured and reduced and further production limited, in order to achieve nuclear disarmament, halt proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensure that terrorists do not acquire them.<sup>57</sup> Production or procurement of fissile material constitutes prohibited development under the TPNW when this is done with the intent to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

According to the International Panel of Fissile Materials (IPFM), the global stockpile of HEU was estimated to be about 1,335 tonnes at the beginning of 2019, while the global stockpile of separated plutonium was about 530 tonnes, of which about 310 tonnes was civilian plutonium.<sup>58</sup> Russia and the United States, in particular, possess enormous quantities of both HEU and plutonium that could be used to produce tens of thousands of new nuclear explosive devices. Figure 14 overleaf converts the HEU and plutonium stocks of the nuclear-armed states into weapon equivalents. Combined, the nine nuclear-armed states have enough fissile material to produce more than 225,000 nuclear weapons.<sup>59</sup>

Enriched uranium is also used in civilian reactor fuel. A total of 13 non-nuclear-armed states (Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, and Syria) have at least 1kg of HEU in civilian stockpiles, and some of them between 1 and 10 tonnes.<sup>60</sup> One of these – Japan – also has a very large stockpile of 45.7 tonnes of separated plutonium, some in storage in the United Kingdom and in France, and some on its territory, sufficient for the production of thousands of nuclear weapons.<sup>61</sup>

Facilities that can produce fissile material (reprocessing plants and/or enrichment facilities) exist in 15 states (Argentina,<sup>62</sup> Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran,

53 IAEA, ‘Joint Statement by the Director General of the IAEA and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the AEOL’, 26 August 2020, at: [bit.ly/2ZdDj0z](https://bit.ly/2ZdDj0z).

54 See, e.g., P. Sabga, ‘Nuclear Gulf: Is Saudi Arabia pushing itself into a nuclear trap?’, *Aljazeera*, 21 July 2020, at: [bit.ly/3jVYfRL](https://bit.ly/3jVYfRL). See also V. Gilinsky and H. Sokolski, ‘To Prevent Proliferation, Stop Enrichment and Reprocessing in the Middle East’, FP, 15 October 2020, at: [bit.ly/2VhxrRH](https://bit.ly/2VhxrRH).

55 See, in particular, the news section of the Missile Threat website produced by the Missile Defense Project at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), at: [bit.ly/3ghd6ou](https://bit.ly/3ghd6ou).

56 Natural uranium consists mostly of the isotope U238 and very little U235. To enrich uranium is to increase the percentage of U235 it contains. Enrichment can be accomplished through a variety of methods, but centrifuges are today the standard technology. From 20% U235 the uranium is considered highly enriched (HEU). Standard nuclear power fuel has 3-5 per% U235. In nuclear weapons it is common to use HEU with at least 90% U235, but the enrichment level may also vary over a wide range.

57 International Panel on Fissile Materials, ‘About IPFM’, 16 August 2016, at: [bit.ly/2G69dpH](https://bit.ly/2G69dpH).

58 Ibid.

59 International Panel on Fissile Material, ‘Fissile material stocks’ (July 2020), at: [bit.ly/318DESB](https://bit.ly/318DESB). Pu=plutonium. The conversion into weapon equivalents assumes that 1 weapon = 3kg military Pu/5kg civilian Pu/15kg HEU. See International Panel on Fissile Material, ‘Global Fissile Material Report 2015’ (2015).


60 International Panel on Fissile Materials, ‘Materials: Highly enriched uranium’, May 2020, at: [bit.ly/374aF60](https://bit.ly/374aF60). All HEU has been removed from 34 countries plus Taiwan.

61 International Panel on Fissile Material, ‘Materials: Plutonium’, May 2020, at: [/bit.ly/3pBJcAk](https://bit.ly/3pBJcAk).

62 Argentina’s facility for enrichment of uranium is not currently operational.

Israel, Japan,<sup>63</sup> the Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States).<sup>64</sup> Of these, production of fissile material intended for nuclear weapons continues in India and Pakistan, and possibly also in Israel and North Korea.<sup>65</sup> In another four of the nuclear-armed states on the list (China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) fissile material is currently being produced which could potentially be used for nuclear weapons. The remaining states (the United States and the six non-nuclear-armed states Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Iran, Japan, and the Netherlands) have the technical capability to do so.<sup>66</sup>

Figure 14: Fissile material stocks in nuclear-armed states 2020, in weapon equivalents<sup>67</sup>



63 Japan has produced its own separated plutonium in the old (1970) Tokai Reprocessing Plant in Japan, but this is now not operational. A newer plant (the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant) has been under construction in Japan for decades, and has operated on test campaigns. Many are concerned that the Japanese production of separated plutonium serves no essential purpose, is enormously expensive, and will complicate nuclear disarmament. See, e.g., T. Keiichi (June 1, 2020), *Questions emerge over need for Japanese nuclear reprocessing plant*, NHK-World-Japan, at: [bit.ly/2NoHHno](https://www3.nhk.or.jp/world/japan/en/2020/06/01/20200601_01.html).

64 This list includes both plants and facilities that are at advanced stages of production, preparing for operations, or temporarily shut down.

65 International Panel on Fissile Materials, 'Fissile material stocks', 14 July 2020, at: [bit.ly/35FxETE](https://www.ipfissile.org/en/fissile-material-stocks); and SIPRI, 'SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security', at: [bit.ly/3kFGpU0](https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/armaments-disarmament-and-international-security).

66 International Panel on Fissile Materials, 'Enrichment facilities' (17 May 2020), at: [bit.ly/2TzY4kc](https://www.ipfissile.org/en/enrichment-facilities); and 'Reprocessing Plants' (17 May 2020), at: [bit.ly/3lrRw2r](https://www.ipfissile.org/en/reprocessing-plants), and SIPRI, 'SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security'.

67 Source: International Panel on Fissile Material, 'Fissile material stocks' (July 2020), at: [bit.ly/318DESB](https://www.ipfissile.org/en/fissile-material-stocks). Pu=plutonium. Assumes that 1 weapon = 3kg military Pu/5kg civilian Pu/15kg HEU. See International Panel on Fissile Material, 'Global Fissile Material Report 2015' (2015).



# The prohibition on possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons



A convoy with UK nuclear weapons was stopped by then 77 year-old Brian Quail, who laid down in front of it as it passed through Balloch in Scotland, 2016. Photo: John Ainslie, Scottish CND.

Compliance by states parties and signatories:	88	
Compatibility for states not party:	100	9

The nine nuclear-armed states – China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States – engaged in conduct in 2020 that was not compatible with the prohibition on possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Combined, they retained approximately 13,410 nuclear warheads as of September 2020, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Of these, around 9,320 warheads were either deployed or in storage, forming the active stockpile available for use by these states’ armed forces. The rest were retired nuclear warheads awaiting dismantlement.<sup>68</sup>

The United States and Russia together possess about 91% of the world’s nuclear arsenal. See Figure 15 for an overview and Annex IV for a list of nuclear-weapon inventories.


The world’s nuclear stockpiles pose a number of threats to human life and national and international security. In addition to the possible intentional or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons, their existence entails a risk of accidental detonations. They could also serve as targets for terrorists or be seized by other parties.

### INTERPRETATION

- The prohibition on possession of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device under Article 1(1)(a) makes it illegal to have a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.
- Possession does not require ownership.
- One nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is sufficient to constitute a stockpile.
- The prohibition on possession comprises activities such as maintenance and deployment of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Indirectly, it also acts to render deterrence practices unlawful.

68 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, ‘Status of World Nuclear Forces’, Federation of American Scientists (September 2020), at: [bit.ly/32n1QT4](https://bit.ly/32n1QT4).

Figure 15: The world's nuclear arsenals.



The deployed and stored warheads together constitute a state's military stockpile, available for use by its armed forces. The military stockpile and retired warheads awaiting dismantlement together constitute a state's total inventory of nuclear warheads. All numbers are approximate estimates.

Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda: 'Status of World Nuclear Forces', Federation of American Scientists (September 2020)



## Facilities and deployments

Nuclear weapons are currently believed to be stored or deployed at a minimum of 108 locations across the nine nuclear-armed states and the five host states.<sup>69</sup> Nuclear weapons are also frequently transported between these locations, for deployment, retirement, maintenance, or modification.

A significant number of nuclear weapons are also carried through the world's oceans on nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs<sup>70</sup>) on active patrol (often referred to as 'continuous-at-sea-deterrence'). Between them, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are believed to have around 15 SSBNs on active duty at any given time. Each of these submarines carries incredible nuclear firepower. For example, a single UK Vanguard-class submarine carries 40 nuclear warheads with estimated explosive yields equivalent to 100 kilotons of TNT each, meaning that a single UK SSBN carries firepower that is more than 250 times greater than the yield from the Hiroshima bomb. The United States has 14 SSBNs, Russia 10, the United Kingdom 4, and France 4. All are in the process of building or procuring a new generation of submarines.

## War games

The nuclear-armed states routinely engage in nuclear strike exercises, involving manoeuvres by nuclear-capable aircraft, submarines, and surface ships. They also routinely test their nuclear command-and-control infrastructure and missiles. For example, on 9 December 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin was reported to have directed an annual nuclear readiness drill.<sup>71</sup> In February 2020, the United States conducted a military exercise which simulated a limited nuclear war with Russia. The exercise was described as particularly notable because it embodied 'the controversial notion that it might be possible to fight, and win, a battle with nuclear weapons, without the exchange leading to an all-out world-ending conflict'.<sup>72</sup>

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69 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, 'Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 73: no. 5 (2017), at: [bit.ly/2NEA1yL](https://bit.ly/2NEA1yL).

70 SSBN stands for 'submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear powered'.

71 'Annual exercise of the strategic forces held later this year', Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (website), at: [bit.ly/3qVlhLW](https://bit.ly/3qVlhLW).

72 J. Borger, 'US staged 'limited' nuclear battle against Russia in war game', *The Guardian* (24 February 2020).

## The prohibition on testing of nuclear weapons



The world's last nuclear test explosion took place in North Korea in 2017. The test was carried out hours after state-run media released this and other images of Kim Jong-un inspecting what was said to be a thermonuclear bomb. Photo: Kcna/EPA/NTB.

Compliance by states parties and signatories:

88

Compatibility for states not party:

109

No state engaged in conduct in 2020 that contravened the prohibition on testing. North Korea is the only state that is known to have engaged in explosive nuclear testing since 1998, with its last test detonation occurring in September 2017. Concern was expressed at heightened seismic activity following the test and the risk of radiation escape.<sup>73</sup> Pyongyang announced a moratorium on nuclear testing in April 2018 (and destroyed the Punggye-ri test site in May 2018) but declared an end to this moratorium on 31 December 2019.

Since the first nuclear test explosion on 16 July 1945, at least eight states have conducted a total of at least 2,050 nuclear test explosions at dozens of test sites around the world.<sup>74</sup> India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear devices in 1998. The United Kingdom undertook its last explosive test in 1991. France completed its last nuclear explosive test in 1996 and completely dismantled its nuclear testing site in the Pacific. The United States conducted its last explosive tests in 1992, but in November 2017 the US

### INTERPRETATION

- The prohibition on testing in Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW bans the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. It is therefore limited to explosive testing.
- All non-explosive forms of testing are covered by the prohibition on development in the TPNW.
- All explosive testing also contravenes the CTBT (a treaty not yet in force) and, arguably, customary international law.
- The preamble of the TPNW recognises 'the vital importance' of the CTBT and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

government decided to shorten its testing readiness timeline from between 24 and 36 months to between 6 to 10 months 'for a simple test'.<sup>75</sup> Information disclosed by *The Washington Post* in May 2020 reported discussions by senior US national security officials about the option of a demonstration nuclear blast as a political signal to Russia and China.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>73</sup> See, e.g., B. Demick, 'The first casualty of North Korean nuclear tests? The country's environment', *Los Angeles Times*, 6 October 2017, at: [lat.ms/30iXdbu](https://lat.ms/30iXdbu).

<sup>74</sup> Arms Control Association, 'The Nuclear Testing Tally', Last updated July 2020, at: [bit.ly/34oa8vh](https://bit.ly/34oa8vh).

<sup>75</sup> Department of Energy, 'Fiscal Year 2018, Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan' (November 2017), pp. 3–26.

<sup>76</sup> 'Trump administration discussed conducting first U.S. nuclear test in decades', *Washington Post*, 22 May 2020 (subscription needed).

China's last explosive nuclear test was in July 1996, only a few months prior to the adoption of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly.<sup>77</sup> The Soviet Union/Russia undertook its last known explosive test in 1990. In late May 2019, a senior US official accused China and Russia of potentially having conducted low-yield explosive testing of nuclear weapons but did not adduce any evidence in support of this assertion. Other authorities within the US Government, however, contested the official's allegations, as did China and Russia. Furthermore Lassina Zerbo, head of the CTBTO, said that the 'international monitoring system has been operating as normal and has not detected any unusual event'.<sup>78</sup>

In September 1979, a flash over the Indian Ocean detected by a US satellite (Vela) was suspected of being a South African nuclear test, conducted in collaboration with Israel. This was never confirmed officially by either of these states.<sup>79</sup>

For information on the effects of nuclear testing please refer to the sections on the obligation to assist victims and the obligation to remediate affected territory.

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77 Government of China, Statement on the Moratorium of Nuclear Tests, *Xinhua*, 29 July 1996, via: [www.cnr.cn](http://www.cnr.cn); see NTI, China: Nuclear, Last updated April 2015, at: [bit.ly/3fmixRZ](http://bit.ly/3fmixRZ).

78 J. Borger, 'Nuclear watchdog says any US test would be "grave challenge to peace"', *The Guardian*, 28 May 2020, at: [bit.ly/3k5eKf5](http://bit.ly/3k5eKf5).

79 See, e.g., C. M. Wright and L.-E. De Geer, 'The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: The Detected Double-Flash', *Science & Global Security*, 25, no. 3 (2017), pp. 95–124; and A. Cohen and W. Burr, 'What the U.S. Government Really Thought of Israel's Apparent 1979 Nuclear Test', *Politico*, 8 December 2016, at: [politi.co/3gnmzL9](http://politi.co/3gnmzL9).

# The prohibition on transfer of nuclear weapons



A Trident missile being launched from the British submarine HMS Vengeance. The United Kingdom's nuclear-weapon system is in large measure imported from the United States.  
Photo: Science Photo Library/NTB.

Compliance by states parties and signatories:

88

Compatibility for states not party:

108

1

One state not party – the United States – engaged in conduct in 2020 which was not compatible with the prohibition on transfer of nuclear weapons, by virtue of its export of key components to the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom's nuclear-weapon system is in large measure imported from the United States: its nuclear warhead design (built in the UK) is based directly on the US W76; the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) guidance system and a number of Trident warhead components are imported directly from the United States; the Trident detonator is designed and built in the United States; and the United Kingdom's Trident II SLBMs are on lease from the United States.<sup>80</sup> Whether this arrangement is compliant with the corresponding prohibition on transfer by nuclear-weapon states under the NPT is also highly questionable.

As noted above in the section on the prohibition on development, UK officials have reportedly lobbied the US Congress to support the development of a new warhead, the W93, on which a new UK Trident warhead would presumably be based.<sup>81</sup>

## INTERPRETATION

- The transfer of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device or control over them 'to any recipient whatsoever' is prohibited under Article 1(1)(b) of the TPNW. This is so whether this occurs 'directly or indirectly'.
- This also makes it illegal to transmit possession or ownership to any other state or to any natural or legal person (e.g. a company or organisation) of key components of any nuclear explosive device in separate instalments or via intermediaries or third parties where there is knowledge they will be used to produce a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.
- Unlawful transfer does not necessarily involve payment or other form of consideration.
- Under Article I of the NPT, the five nuclear-weapon states parties have committed never to transfer nuclear weapons 'to any recipient whatsoever'. The NPT does not include a corresponding prohibition on non-nuclear-weapon states to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or to assist in a transfer.<sup>82</sup> These important lacunae are addressed by Article 1(1) (b) and (e) of the TPNW.

<sup>80</sup> D. Pleasch and J. Ainslie, 'Trident: Strategic Dependence & Sovereignty', School of Oriental and African Studies, London 2006, p. 10, at: [bit.ly/30Qa1j](http://bit.ly/30Qa1j); S. Jones, 'A wonk's guide to the Trident nuclear deterrent', *Financial Times*, 18 July 2018, at: [on.ft.com/30ShqDo](http://on.ft.com/30ShqDo).

<sup>81</sup> See J. Borger, 'UK lobbies US to support controversial new nuclear warheads', *The Guardian*, 1 August 2020, at: [bit.ly/3hRtqga](http://bit.ly/3hRtqga).

<sup>82</sup> Nuclear sharing was one of the key issues in the NPT negotiations. Several of the 18 participating states disagreed strongly about the degree to which allies should be allowed to share hardware and decision-making powers. In the end, a tacit agreement was made between key states that foreign deployment would be acceptable as long as the weapons were kept under the control of the owner/possessor state. However, any transfer of weapons to the control of the host state was deemed unacceptable. There may have been an informal agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union about nuclear sharing but this would only be an authoritative interpretation of the NPT under international law if this constituted an agreement between all the negotiating states. (See Art. 31(2)(a), 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.)

## The prohibition on receiving transfer or control of nuclear weapons



An inert B61 nuclear bomb is loaded on a US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle. Control over the US B61 nuclear bombs stored in Europe may be given to the host states, under a so-called dual-key arrangement. Photo: Screen grab from video filmed by Staff Sgt Cody Griffitt, 99th Air Base Wing Public Affairs.

Compliance by states parties and signatories:

88

Compatibility for states not party:

108

1

As discussed in the section above, one state not party – the United Kingdom – leases Trident missiles and imports other key nuclear components from the United States, which is not compatible with the prohibition on receiving the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

A potential future compatibility issue under this prohibition concerns the US B61 nuclear bombs stored in Europe.<sup>83</sup> Arrangements are reportedly in place for control over the bombs to be given by the United States to the host states Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, for use in their aircraft. If this were to occur, the receiving state would contravene Article 1(1)(c) (and potentially also the NPT).

Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands all have a nuclear role and retain nuclear-capable aircraft and pilots trained in the use of the weapons at the bases in question.

### INTERPRETATION

- Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW prohibits receiving the transfer of or control over any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly.
- To 'receive' a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to take possession or control over it. This broad notion does not require that ownership also pass to the recipient.
- The prohibition on indirect receipt covers accepting the key components of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device as well as an assembled version. This extends to transfers made through intermediaries.
- Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW follows a similarly worded provision in Article II of the NPT, but the corresponding prohibition in that Treaty applies only to those states that are designated as non-nuclear-weapon states.

<sup>83</sup> See the section on the prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons, for more information on the US nuclear weapons stored in Europe.

The aircraft are sometimes referred to as 'dual-key', as their employment of nuclear weapons would have to be approved both by the US government and the government of the respective host state. In the case of the B61 bombs stationed at Incirlik in Turkey, however, any use of the weapons would reportedly be carried out by aircraft stationed at other bases, and it is not clear whether Turkey's fighters maintain the capacity to drop nuclear bombs. There are ostensibly no nuclear-capable aircraft at Incirlik.<sup>84</sup>

Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands have recently, or are still, undergoing processes to procure new fighter aircraft. In October 2018, after years of debate, the Belgian government announced its decision to replace Belgium's nuclear-capable F-16 aircraft with nuclear-capable F-35s. Germany is due to replace its fleet of Tornado fighters over the next few decades. In January 2019, the German government announced that it would pick either the Eurofighter or Boeing's F/A-18. Sources reportedly specified that any replacement aircraft 'must be able to carry U.S. nuclear weapons'.<sup>85</sup> Italy was involved in the development of the F-35 from the mid-2000s and decided in 2012 to purchase 90 planes.<sup>86</sup> The F-35s will replace Italy's nuclear-capable Tornado fighters.

The Netherlands was also heavily involved in the development of the F-35 and decided in 2013 to buy 37 aircraft. However, a majority of Dutch MPs supported a motion in the Dutch parliament stating that the F-35s should have no nuclear role, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands' military doctrine.<sup>87</sup> The Dutch government decided to ignore the parliamentary vote, opting to procure nuclear-capable F-35s. In 2018, the government decided to increase the number of planes being ordered from 37 to 67.<sup>88</sup> The final technical adjustments necessary to enable the F-35 to employ nuclear weapons ('Block 4') are expected to be implemented across the relevant host states between 2020 and 2024.

84 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, 'Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 73, no. 5 (2017), at: [bit.ly/2NEA1yL](https://bit.ly/2NEA1yL).

85 A. Shalal, 'Germany drops F-35 from fighter tender; Boeing F/A-18 and Eurofighter to battle on', Reuters (31 January 2019).

86 Reuters, 'Italy cuts spending on F-35 fighter plane' (14 February 2012), at: [reut.rs/2ZjrsAe](https://reut.rs/2ZjrsAe).

87 *DutchNews.nl*, 'Ministers ignore vote, JSF jet fighter could carry nuclear weapons' (14 January 2014), at: [bit.ly/2Zp6NuS](https://bit.ly/2Zp6NuS).

88 *De Telegraaf*, 'Ruimer budget aanschaf F-35' (18 September 2019).



# The prohibition on using nuclear weapons



A military aide carries a briefcase containing launch codes for nuclear weapons as US President Donald Trump returns to the White House in Washington DC, 24 July 2018. Photo: Joshua Roberts/Reuters/NTB.

Compliance by states parties and signatories:

88

Compatibility for states not party:

109

Today's nine nuclear-armed states possess the unique capability to start or engage in a nuclear war, which could – under some extreme scenarios – end all human life on Earth. Nuclear weapons have not been used since August 1945 when the United States dropped a nuclear weapon first on Hiroshima and then, three days later, on Nagasaki. No state has therefore contravened the prohibition on use of nuclear weapons since the TPNW was adopted in 2017.

Other nuclear explosive devices have not been used in armed conflict, though so-called 'peaceful' nuclear explosions were conducted for civil engineering purposes between the second half of the 1950s and the end of the 1980s by the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>89</sup>

## INTERPRETATION

- Under Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW, states parties undertake never under any circumstances to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Preventing use of nuclear weapons is a central aim of the Treaty.
- To use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to launch, release, deliver, or detonate it with hostile intent or for so-called 'peaceful' use, such as in civil engineering. Intent can be discerned from the circumstances and does not have to be publicly declared.
- Possession or deployment of nuclear weapons for the purpose of 'deterrence' does not amount to their use under the TPNW but is caught by the prohibition on possession in Article 1(1)(a).
- The NPT does not address the use of nuclear weapons except in so far as it allows 'peaceful' detonation of nuclear explosive devices by nuclear-weapon states. The CTBT prohibits peaceful nuclear explosions.

<sup>89</sup> World Nuclear Association, 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosions', Updated December 2018, at: [bit.ly/2wGTC7z](https://bit.ly/2wGTC7z).



The world has already on several occasions been brought to the brink of nuclear war or nuclear accidents through miscommunication, misunderstandings, and technical malfunctions.<sup>90</sup> Luck has had an alarmingly significant role in the history of nuclear weapons.<sup>91</sup> Former US Defence Secretary William Perry stated in 2016 that the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe is 'greater than during the Cold War and rising'.<sup>92</sup> In April 2018, the UN Secretary-General informed the UN Security Council that the Cold War 'is back ... but with a difference. The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present'.<sup>93</sup>

The increasing risk of new use of nuclear weapons can be divided into the following four different scenarios:


- a) Doctrinal use of nuclear weapons, i.e. the use of nuclear weapons as outlined and envisaged in declared policies, doctrines, strategies and concepts;
- b) Escalatory use, i.e. the use of nuclear weapons in an ongoing situation of tension or conflict;
- c) Unauthorised use, i.e. the non-sanctioned use of nuclear weapons by a non-state actor;
- d) Accidental use, i.e. the use of nuclear weapons through error, such as might result from technical malfunction and human error.<sup>94</sup>

The trend towards 'smaller' and 'smarter' nuclear weapons is also believed to increase risk. A number of experts have argued that 'low-yield' capabilities such as the US W76-2 Trident warhead deployed in early 2020 are 'more usable as weapons of war, and therefore some president, in a crisis, might feel more tempted to use them'.<sup>95</sup>

Most nuclear weapons today have an explosive yield that is many times higher than that of the nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, whose explosive force was the equivalent of 15 kilotons of TNT and killed 140,000 people instantaneously or within five months.<sup>96</sup> For context, Figure 16 provides an overview of the immediate estimated fatalities and injuries which a typical nuclear weapon, with a yield of 100 kilotons, would cause if it were dropped today on Pyongyang, Tehran, New York City, Beijing, or Moscow.<sup>97</sup>

A study in *Science Advances*, published in early October 2019, examines a scenario of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. If India uses 100 nuclear weapons against urban targets and Pakistan uses 150, the two countries alone could suffer 50 to 125 million fatalities, depending on the yield of the weapons. Smoke from burning cities would spread globally within a matter of weeks, triggering severe short-term climate perturbations, with temperatures declining to values not seen on Earth since the middle of the last Ice Age. Food production worldwide would decline and mass starvation ensue. Every nation on Earth could be severely affected.<sup>98</sup>

Figure 16: Immediate fatalities and injuries from one 100 kiloton nuclear weapon



90 P. Lewis et al., 'Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy', Chatham House (2014), at: [bit.ly/2zxFAGE](https://bit.ly/2zxFAGE).

91 B. Pelopidas, 'The unbearable lightness of luck', *European Journal of International Security* 2, no. 2 (2017), and [wapo.st/36oMDmv](https://wapo.st/36oMDmv).

92 Cited in J. Borger, 'Nuclear weapons risk greater than in the cold war, says ex-Pentagon chief', *The Guardian* (7 January 2016), at: [bit.ly/2UgUfQd](https://bit.ly/2UgUfQd).

93 UN, 'UN Secretary-General Remarks to the Security Council' (13 April 2018), at: [bit.ly/2MJIC3i](https://bit.ly/2MJIC3i).

94 Wilfred Wan, presentation to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020; W. Wan (ed.), *Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use*, 2020, chapter one, at: [bit.ly/3k8KPBG](https://bit.ly/3k8KPBG).

95 F. Kaplan, 'The Senseless Danger of the Military's New "Low-Yield" Nuclear Warhead', *Slate* (18 February 2020).

96 M. Tomonaga, 'The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Summary of the Human Consequences, 1945-2018, and Lessons for Homo Sapiens to End the Nuclear Weapon Age', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 2, 2019, Issue 2, at: [bit.ly/36wXiLN](https://bit.ly/36wXiLN).

97 Statistics on the number of fatalities and injured are from NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein, using population density information and nuclear effects information, at: [bit.ly/2kTpBiH](https://bit.ly/2kTpBiH). Fatalities and injuries are based on the immediate impact of the detonation and do not account for long-term radiation deaths and injuries or the lasting environmental impact a large-scale nuclear detonation could cause. All of the detonations calculated were airbursts, not surface detonations.

98 O. B. Toon et al., 'Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and global catastrophe', *Science Advances*, 2 Oct 2019, Vol. 5, no. 10, at: [bit.ly/2VnRL3T](https://bit.ly/2VnRL3T).

## Policies on use

Five of the nine nuclear-armed states – France, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – maintain written nuclear doctrines that allow for the ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons. Two of the nine, India and China, have long maintained so-called no-first-use policies, declaring that they will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation to the use of such weapons by an adversary (Indian policy allowed for the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attack in 2003). Yet both are in the process of expanding their arsenals, which many analysts have interpreted as an indication that they might be envisioning pre-emptive use under certain circumstances.<sup>99</sup>

Kim Jong-un stated in 2016 and 2018 that North Korea will not use nuclear weapons unless ‘its sovereignty is encroached upon by any hostile force with nuclear weapons’.<sup>100</sup> However, other statements from his government, including threats of a ‘pre-emptive nuclear strike of justice’<sup>101</sup> against Japan and South Korea, have undercut the credibility of these comments.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s apparent claim in October 2018 that Russia would not use nuclear weapons first is not reflected in Russia’s official nuclear-weapons doctrine, which explicitly stipulates that Russia would consider using nuclear arms in response to the use of ‘weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy’.<sup>102</sup> The ninth nuclear-armed state, Israel, has not formally admitted to possessing nuclear weapons, and has thus not made clear its policy on their use.

Theorists and military planners often distinguish between strategies aimed at destroying the adversary’s missile bases and other nuclear assets (‘counter-force’) and strategies aimed at killing civilians and destroying the adversary’s population centres (‘counter-value’).<sup>103</sup> Counter-force strategies are commonly presumed to require larger nuclear arsenals and more sophisticated command-and-control structures than do counter-value strategies. Russia and the United States are believed to have maintained plans for both counter-value and counter-force strikes since the 1960s. The remaining seven nuclear-armed states have maintained smaller nuclear

arsenals primarily structured to facilitate counter-value strikes, or tactical, battlefield use. However, there are now signs that certain nuclear-armed states, China and India in particular, are expanding their arsenals in such a way as to enable counter-force strikes.

France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States all maintain nuclear weapons on alert, that is, warheads mated with means of delivery and ready to be launched on short notice. The United States and Russia continue to maintain large numbers of nuclear forces on high levels of alert, ready to launch within minutes. France and the United Kingdom also deploy nuclear forces, which can be quickly launched, though at lower levels of readiness.<sup>104</sup> Combined, these four states are estimated to deploy about 1,800 alert nuclear warheads between them, with Russia and the United States accounting for more than 90 per cent of that number.<sup>105</sup> As discussed above in the section on the prohibition on possession and stockpiling, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States all have SSBNs on duty at all times. Russia and the United States also deploy several hundred alert ground-launched nuclear missiles.

The remaining nuclear-armed states are thought not to maintain nuclear weapons on alert on a normal basis, storing their nuclear warheads separately from their respective delivery vehicles. However, it has been suggested that this might change as China, India, Israel, and Pakistan are in the process of fielding or upgrading their submarine forces. It is not clear whether China, which has already fielded a fleet of such submarines, equips its SSBNs with nuclear weapons in peacetime.<sup>106</sup>

99 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, ‘Chinese nuclear forces, 2019’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 75, no. 4 (2019), at: [bit.ly/2ZuCOYx](https://bit.ly/2ZuCOYx); H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, ‘Indian nuclear forces, 2018’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 74, no. 6 (2018), at: [bit.ly/32fNiS7](https://bit.ly/32fNiS7).

100 R. Smart, ‘North Korea will not use nuclear weapons first, says Kim Jong-un’, *The Guardian* (8 May 2016), at: [bit.ly/2mvie1C](https://bit.ly/2mvie1C).

101 ‘North Korea threatens pre-emptive nuclear strikes on South Korea and US’, *The Straits Times* (March 2016), at: [bit.ly/2KZxv6H](https://bit.ly/2KZxv6H).

102 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), at: [bit.ly/2Z8lakM](https://bit.ly/2Z8lakM), and Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (2020), at: [bit.ly/3i6vnWD](https://bit.ly/3i6vnWD).

103 See, e.g., S. P. Lee, ‘Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in P. Hayden (ed.), *The Ashgate Companion to Ethics and International Relations* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).

104 H. M. Kristensen and M. McKinzie, ‘Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons’, UNIDIR (2012), at: [bit.ly/2GAfR03](https://bit.ly/2GAfR03).

105 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, ‘Status of World Nuclear Forces’, Federation of American Scientists (September 2020), at: [bit.ly/32n1QT4](https://bit.ly/32n1QT4).

106 T. Zhao, *Tides of Change* (Washington DC: Carnegie, 2018), pp. 16–17.

# The prohibition on threatening to use nuclear weapons



India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi stoked the flames of nuclear war in a speech in April 2019.  
Photo: Amit Dave/Reuters/NTB.

Compliance by states parties and signatories:

88

Compatibility for states not party:

109

In 2020, there were, in the view of the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*, no clear instances of a threat to use nuclear weapons, as that term is understood in international law.

The most overt recent instance of a state threatening to use nuclear weapons was in mid-April 2019. As India and Pakistan then came close to the point of major conflict and the risk of actual use of nuclear weapons loomed large, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said publicly:

'In the past our people would weep, go around the world saying Pakistan did this, did that. It is now Pakistan's turn to weep.' He further said: 'We have the mother of nuclear bombs. I decided to tell [Pakistan], do whatever you want to do but we will retaliate.'<sup>107</sup>

The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* has not researched whether any of the known missile tests or nuclear strike exercises in 2020 might have amounted to threatening to use nuclear weapons as prohibited under the TPNW, but will prioritise this in future editions.

## INTERPRETATION

- Threatening to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is prohibited under Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW. This is the case whether such use would itself be a violation of international law or whether the device would be used in legitimate self-defence against foreign aggression. It is therefore broader in scope than the prohibition on threat of force within Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
- To violate the TPNW, a threat of use must be *credible* in the circumstances. This means that the threat must emanate from a person in a position to either effect or direct the use of a nuclear explosive device. Typically, therefore, such a threat would be made by a senior government official in a nuclear-armed state.
- The narrow wording in Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW with the active verb 'threaten to use' also requires that any signalled intention by a state to use nuclear weapons be *specific* as to the target of possible use.
- Prohibited threats may, however, be *implicit* as well as *explicit*. A stated threat does not, therefore, have to refer to use of nuclear weapons, though it would be more likely to violate the TPNW should it do so.
- In certain circumstances of tension, a show of force by means of missile testing, an explosive test of a nuclear weapon, or a nuclear strike exercise, could amount to unlawfully threatening to use nuclear weapons under the TPNW (along with other violations of the Treaty).
- Policies of nuclear 'deterrence' rest on willingness to use nuclear weapons. Accordingly, reflecting the severity of the danger, some experts take the view that a practice of nuclear 'deterrence' in and of itself constitutes an unlawful threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is the view of the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* that the broader concept of nuclear deterrence, where the threat to use nuclear weapons is general and not specific in nature, is not sufficient in itself to constitute threatening to use under the TPNW. Deterrence practices are, however, prohibited through the prohibition on possession and stockpiling.

<sup>107</sup> C. McGrath, 'Modi Warns Pakistan Against "Threats"', *Express* (18 April 2019), at: [bit.ly/2ZrqCl2](https://bit.ly/2ZrqCl2).

# The prohibition on assisting, encouraging, or inducing prohibited activities



Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Defence Minister General Nakatani visiting the USS Ronald Reagan in 2015. Japan is one of the states with conduct that is not compatible with the TPNW prohibition on assisting, encouraging, or inducing prohibited activities, through its involvement in the US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue, which comprises nuclear deterrence. Photo: Kyodo/Reuters/NTB.

Compliance by states parties and signatories:	88	
Compatibility for states not party:	73	36

The prohibition on assistance, encouragement, and inducement of prohibited activities is the provision of the TPNW which is contravened by the most states. Based on available information, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* has concluded that the following 36 states not party (of which 33 are non-nuclear-armed states and 3 are nuclear-armed states) were engaged in conduct in 2020 that was not compatible with this prohibition: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They enable other states’ nuclear armament in different ways, discussed under the headings a) to f) below.

- a) **Participation in nuclear-related military activities with nuclear-armed states**
- States parties to the TPNW can remain in alliances and military cooperation arrangements with nuclear-armed states, and can continue to execute all operations, exercises, and other military activities together with them in so far as they do not involve nuclear weapons.<sup>108</sup> Participation in ‘nuclear burden-sharing’<sup>109</sup> and other nuclear-related military activities, however, would need to be discontinued.
- Unlike the CWC, the TPNW (and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)) does not contain a broad restriction on ‘any military preparations to use’ nuclear weapons. The object and purpose of the TPNW, as well as its negotiating history, leave nothing to suggest that the non-inclusion of a provision on military preparations was meant to exclude

108 While the TPNW does not contain an express permission to engage in cooperation with states not party to the Treaty, along the lines of the CCM, there is nothing in the TPNW that suggests that such cooperation would be unlawful per se. The APMBC, the BWC, the CWC, and various protocols to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) similarly do not contain any such express formulations and have not been interpreted by their parties as proscribing participation in alliances with states that do not observe those agreements.

109 K. Egeland, ‘Spreading the Burden: How NATO became a ‘Nuclear’ Alliance’, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 31:1, 143-167, (2020), at: [bit.ly/39HS2Hd](https://bit.ly/39HS2Hd).



such activities from the scope of the Treaty. For the nuclear-armed states themselves, military preparations are generally comprised through the prohibition on possession and stockpiling. When non-nuclear-armed states participate in such activities together with nuclear-armed states, this is rendered unlawful by the prohibition on assisting or encouraging a prohibited activity. Depending on the context, the prohibited activities that umbrella states typically would assist or encourage through such nuclear-related military cooperation may be development, possession and stockpiling, or threatening to use.

In some cases, it may not be possible to conclude that a specific practice or capability in a given state *presently*

amounts to assistance or encouragement of a prohibited act, while it is clear that it may likely do so in the future. For umbrella states considering which changes they would need to implement in order to ensure compatibility with the TPNW, the central issue is whether maintaining a particular practice or capability would run counter to the object and purpose of the TPNW – which is to ensure that nuclear weapons are never again used under any circumstances and are completely eliminated.<sup>110</sup> Article 5 of the TPNW obligates each state party to take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to prevent and suppress prohibited activities undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control, and there is a general obligation under international law to implement the Treaty in good faith.

## INTERPRETATION

- Under Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, states parties undertake never under any circumstances to ‘assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party’ under the Treaty. This means that a state party is precluded from assisting any other state, alliance, or other international organisation, company, non-state group, or individual to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, stockpile, transfer, deploy, receive, threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- The TPNW does not preclude participation in security alliances or joint military operations with nuclear-armed states as long as this does not involve assistance, encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities.
- Several other longstanding disarmament treaties contain a similarly worded prohibition, and there is an established understanding of these concepts in international law.
- The term ‘in any way’ does not materially alter the scope of the provision. Conduct by action or omission would be covered by the prohibition irrespective of the words ‘in any way’.\*
- The effects of violating this prohibition are identical, regardless of which alternative has been violated. If an act is clearly assistance, it is superfluous to determine whether the act also constitutes encouragement, and vice versa.

## Assistance

- In order for a conduct to constitute assistance there must be a causal link between the conduct and a prohibited activity, where the conduct contributes significantly to this activity, even if it is not essential to its occurrence.\*\* Insignificant contributions would not constitute assistance. Inherent in the requirement that the contribution is significant, is that the prohibited activity which is assisted must be *ongoing or temporally proximate*. This means that it need not have happened or be ongoing, but cannot just be a theoretical possibility.
- The state must have acted with the *knowledge* that the conduct would, in the ordinary course of events, assist a prohibited activity.\*\*\* This effectively excludes temporally remote or incidental contributions.
- The forms of assistance that are unlawful can be, among others, financial (such as through economic assistance for nuclear-weapon production); technological (for example, by the export of equipment/components for such production); operational (for instance, by conventional military support for nuclear bombing); technical (through the provision of expert information); or human (such as by seconding nuclear scientists to assist in another state’s nuclear-weapon programme).

## Encouragement

- Encouraging in the context of the TPNW means persuading or seeking to persuade any other state or any legal or natural person to carry out a prohibited activity or continue an ongoing violation of any of the Article 1 prohibitions.
- The prohibited activity which is encouraged does not need to materialise as it is the act of encouragement that is prohibited and not the result.
- Encouragement could take the form of verbal, written, material, or institutional support, both from governments as a whole (such as by adoption of a particular policy) and from pertinent senior government or military officials. Where such support has been given, the encouragement is understood to be ongoing until the point at which it is clearly withdrawn.

## Inducement

- Inducing a prohibited activity means offering someone something in exchange for the performance of that activity. Thus, inducing will always involve encouragement.

\* See: Wiebe, Smyth and Casey-Maslen, ‘Art.1 General Obligations and Scope of Application’, in G. Nystuen and S. Casey-Maslen (eds.), *The Convention on Cluster Munitions: A Commentary* (2010), p. 127.

\*\* ICRC, ‘The prohibition to assist, encourage or induce prohibited activities under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, Briefing Note, Geneva, undated but 2019.

\*\*\* Ibid.

110 See TPNW, preambular paragraph 2.

Below follows information on typical nuclear-weapon-related military activities in which today's umbrella states are known to engage. Given the secrecy surrounding military operations and movements of military material, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* has little information about which and how individual states participated in such activities in 2020, but will continue to research this issue.

### **Nuclear strike exercises**

Of course, during a conflict, assisting nuclear bombing raids, for instance with conventional air tactics,<sup>111</sup> would undoubtedly constitute unlawful assistance to use nuclear weapons. Participation in exercises that involve the *simulated* use of nuclear weapons would also contravene Article 1(1)(e). As mentioned in the section on the prohibition on threatening to use above, nuclear strike exercises may, in certain circumstances of tension, amount to an unlawful threat to use nuclear weapons under the TPNW, if it is directed against a specific adversary and takes place in an overt manner, signalling a concrete willingness and readiness to resort to use of nuclear weapons. Where a specific strike exercise amounts to threatening to use nuclear weapons, any non-nuclear-armed states participating in it would accordingly also fall foul of the prohibition on assisting with threatening to use nuclear weapons, provided that it acted with knowledge and that its participation was a significant contribution.

Participation in other nuclear strike exercises that do not amount to threatening to use, could constitute assisting or encouraging development or possession, depending on the exact purpose of the exercise and the role of the participating state.

In the case of the so-called host states,<sup>112</sup> their conduct is not compatible with the prohibitions on assisting possession and development when they participate in the annual Steadfast Noon exercise, where they practice for the use of the B61 nuclear weapons stationed on their territories with their dual-capable aircraft.<sup>113</sup> According to NATO's Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, the purpose of these exercises is to ensure that 'NATO's nuclear deterrent remains, safe, secure, and effective'.<sup>114</sup>

### **Logistical and technical support**

Logistical and technical support to, for instance, a submarine specifically designed to carry only nuclear weapons, would likely constitute assistance with possession of nuclear weapons, provided that the support is a significant contribution. In the case of means of delivery of dual use, like a B-52 bomber-plane or an F-35

bomber-fighter, there will normally be no presumption of nuclear use. It will therefore be generally unproblematic for states parties to the TPNW that are allies and partners of nuclear-armed states to continue to provide logistical and technical support to those states' dual-use delivery platforms. If the purpose of a mission or presence with a nuclear-armed state's dual-use platform is clearly nuclear, however, the provision of logistical and technical support is likely to amount to assistance with a prohibited activity, for instance possession.

The five host states mentioned above provide logistical and security services at the bases where the US nuclear weapons are stored on their territory, and this constitutes assistance with possession and stockpiling. (Of course, these five states are also acting in conflict with Article 1(1)(g), which prohibits deployment of another state's nuclear weapons on their territory.)

### **Intelligence gathering and sharing**

If a state party to the TPNW were to engage in intelligence gathering and share it with a nuclear-armed state to knowingly identify targets for a temporally proximate use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, this would amount to assisting the prohibited use or threatening of use of nuclear weapons.

A concrete case in point is Pine Gap, an intelligence facility built and funded by the United States outside Alice Springs in Australia and operated by the US National Reconnaissance Office. More than 800 Australian and US personnel staff the facility, including units from all four branches of the US military. One of the components of the facility is a Relay Ground Station in Pine Gap's western compound whose Overhead Persistent Infra-Red (OPIR) sensors detect the heat bloom of intercontinental and submarine-launched nuclear ballistic missiles launched against the United States. It provides early warning of an incoming attack but also indicates whether a nuclear missile launch site is empty following firing, or whether it remains capable of firing.<sup>115</sup>

If Australia were to adhere to the TPNW and the Relay Ground Station nevertheless were used in a future context to knowingly identify targets for a temporally proximate use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, this would violate the prohibition on assisting use or threat of use. (This would not be the case if the data were used to identify targets for conventional strikes.) Due to the fact that such future use or threat of use of nuclear weapons still remains only a theoretical possibility, the current preparatory operations of the Relay Ground Station do not presently

<sup>111</sup> In NATO, some umbrella states have so-called SNOWCAT (Support of nuclear operations with conventional air tactics) roles.

<sup>112</sup> See the section below on the prohibition on allowing the stationing, installation or deployment of nuclear weapons.

<sup>113</sup> See for instance the NATO press release on the 2020 exercise, at: [bit.ly/3eBFXDS](https://bit.ly/3eBFXDS).

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> R. Tanter, 'An Australian pathway through Pine Gap to the nuclear ban treaty', Background Paper, Australia, Updated 8 August 2019.

constitute assistance to use or threat to use. At this time, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* considers Australia's arrangement at Pine Gap as encouragement of possession of nuclear weapons. Maintaining a capability and preparedness to identify targets for nuclear strikes also clearly runs counter to the object and purpose of the TPNW. To ensure compatibility with the TPNW, Australia would therefore have to take the necessary action to provide assurances that the Relay Ground Station's OPIR systems will not be used for nuclear planning or operations.

### Participation in nuclear planning

Participation in planning of temporally proximate use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be covered by the prohibition on assistance with use or threat of use. Participation in nuclear planning involving a general readiness for hypothetical future use of nuclear weapons (nuclear deterrence), however, is best understood as encouragement of possession.

From this perspective, participation in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)<sup>116</sup> is not compatible with Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW. In the view of the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*, however, the TPNW does not preclude the continuation of the NPG membership itself for NATO allies that join the TPNW, as the decisive criterion would be their conduct in the group. They could use their participation in the NPG to promote nuclear disarmament policies in general and the TPNW specifically.

For Japan and South Korea, there is no corresponding formal body for nuclear-weapons planning with the US. Both countries have 'Extended Deterrence Dialogues' with the US, however.<sup>117</sup> To the extent that the dialogue is on general nuclear deterrence where future use is theoretical, Japan and South Korea's participation should be considered as encouragement of possession. To the extent that the dialogue concerns specific targets, and is directed at a specific adversary and communicated as such, it could, though, amount to assistance to threaten to use nuclear weapons. The assessment is largely context dependent. Regardless, if Japan and South Korea were to sign and ratify the TPNW in the future, they would have to provide assurances that their respective Extended Deterrence Dialogues with the United States would not involve nuclear planning or operations.

### Allowing the testing of nuclear-capable missiles

When a state allows on its territory the testing of missiles that are either specifically designed to deliver nuclear warheads or which are nuclear-capable (unless the purpose of the launch is to test the conventional capability of the missile), this is inconsistent with the prohibition on assistance with development of nuclear weapons. Two states (Kazakhstan, which is a state party, and the Marshall Islands, which is undecided on the TPNW) host test sites which regularly have served as the final destination for missiles that are launched from Russia and the United States, respectively. In Kazakhstan, this applies to the Sary Shagan test site,<sup>118</sup> and in the Marshall Islands, the Kwajalein Atoll.<sup>119</sup> In both cases, the land in question is leased to the respective nuclear-armed state through pre-existing long-term agreements.

It is not the existence of the testing sites themselves that conflicts with the TPNW, but Russia's and the United States' use of them to develop nuclear-weapon missile technology. This demonstrates that the TPNW constitutes a challenge to and will affect the activities of nuclear-armed states.

Information on the nuclear-related tests in the Marshall Islands in 2020 can be found in Annex III. The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* has not found evidence that testing of nuclear-related missile testing has taken place in Kazakhstan in 2020, and the country has therefore been recorded as compliant with the prohibition on assistance and all other TPNW prohibitions in this edition. The government of Kazakhstan should, however, ensure that its territory is not used for testing of missiles designed to deliver nuclear warheads in the future.

It is recognised that it may not be possible for Kazakhstan to resolve this question in a short time frame, but it will be necessary to discuss this and similarly difficult issues in a transparent manner, such as at the meetings of states parties. Compliance and adherence will continue to build the norms established by the TPNW, and compliance issues arise in the implementation of almost every disarmament treaty. Kazakhstan, a country that once inherited more than a thousand Soviet nuclear weapons and voluntarily relinquished them, is a long-time advocate for a world free of nuclear weapons. Together with its Central Asian neighbour-states, Kazakhstan established the Central-Asian NWFZ Treaty, which already obligates its member states not to 'assist' the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons.

116 Irrespective of whether or not they have nuclear weapons, all NATO allies are members of the NPG with the exception of France, which has decided not to participate. See: [bit.ly/3elbgxa](https://bit.ly/3elbgxa).

117 See, e.g., A. Kawasaki, 'The Nuclear Ban Treaty – the Path Forward for North Korea, South Korea, Japan and the Region', September 2019, at: [bit.ly/2JLcmfT](https://bit.ly/2JLcmfT).

118 In late July 2019, Russian strategic missile forces conducted a test launch of a Topol ICBM from the Kapustin Yar practice range in Astrakhan in Russia. The missile targeted and reportedly successfully hit the target at the Sary-Shagan range in Kazakhstan. See, TASS, 'Russia tests launches Topol intercontinental missile from Kapustin Yar range', 26 July 2019, at: [bit.ly/2MZgMZ](https://bit.ly/2MZgMZ).

119 A number of US SLBM and ICBM launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California have been made to Kwajalein Atoll on the Marshall Islands in recent years. A test of an unarmed Minuteman 3 missile, for example, was launched on August 4, 2020. See, 'US Conducts Test Flight of Unarmed Minuteman 3 Missile', *Washington Post*, 4 August 2020, at: [wapo.st/2UbpWva](https://wapo.st/2UbpWva).



## b) Endorsement of nuclear-weapons doctrines, policies, and statements

All the member states of NATO (the 27 umbrella states and the 3 nuclear-armed states) act in conflict with Article 1(1)(e) through specific nuclear-related doctrines, policies, and/or statements to which they subscribe. NATO's foundational document, the North Atlantic Treaty, does not mention nuclear weapons, but every NATO member has supported possession and potential use of nuclear weapons use through their endorsement of various other alliance documents, particularly the Strategic Concept.<sup>120</sup> None of the alliance's members have so far rejected the possession or use, or even the first use, of nuclear weapons on its behalf. In the view of the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*, this amounts to encouragement of (continued) possession. It does not, however, amount to encouragement of use, as that would require, for instance, a request for use of nuclear weapons in a specific context or agreeing to rules of engagement allowing the use of nuclear weapons in a concrete multinational operation.

Beyond NATO, three states engaged in bilateral defence arrangements with the United States (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) encourage possession through explicit statements they have made or strategy documents they have endorsed. The governments of the United States and Japan expressed through a joint statement in 2013 that they remained committed to the security of Japan 'through the full range of US military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional'.<sup>121</sup> South Korea has endorsed similar statements.<sup>122</sup> In 2016, Japan and South Korea (together with France and the United Kingdom) reportedly expressed opposition to the Obama administration's proposal of adopting a nuclear no-first-use policy.<sup>123</sup> With respect to Australia, the most recent example of a government document which appears to directly encourage the United States to retain nuclear weapons was published in 2020, stating that 'Only the nuclear and conventional capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia'.<sup>124</sup>

In addition to NATO, the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is understood by certain observers as a nuclear alliance. In 2010, the CSTO's Secretary-General suggested Russia had extended a 'nuclear umbrella' over all members of the alliance.<sup>125</sup> Yet, CSTO members do not appear to have adopted official

documents stipulating a nuclear dimension to the alliance. On the contrary, three members have actively distanced themselves from nuclear deterrence. Through the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk – the treaty establishing Central Asia as an NWFZ – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have committed never to 'assist or encourage' the development, manufacture, or possession of nuclear weapons.<sup>126</sup> Kazakhstan has also signed and ratified the TPNW. Belarus, however, which is allied to Russia through the CSTO and the Union State, has previously expressed public support for nuclear deterrence and is therefore not in compliance with the TPNW's prohibition on encouragement of possession of nuclear weapons.<sup>127</sup> Armenia, the last CSTO member, has, to our knowledge, not explicitly endorsed the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf. Armenia would, though, need to actively distance itself from nuclear deterrence on its behalf in order to be considered compliant with Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, as its fellow CSTO members Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have already done.

For an overview of arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence, see Table J.

**Table J: Arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence**

	States
Plurilateral	1) France, United Kingdom, United States, and Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey (NATO).
Bilateral	1) Russia and Belarus (CSTO/Union State). 2) Russia and Armenia (CSTO). 3) United States and Australia (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)).* 4) United States and Japan (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (Anpo)). 5) United States and South Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty).
* New Zealand was de facto excluded from ANZUS in the mid-1980s due to its anti-nuclear-weapon policies.	

Some of these arrangements are formalised in writing and others are not. They have all emerged as supplements or in parallel to legally binding mutual defence treaties. None

<sup>120</sup> NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Brussels, 2010.

<sup>121</sup> 'Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities' (3 October 2013), at: [bit.ly/2MeBsVk](http://bit.ly/2MeBsVk).

<sup>122</sup> See, e.g., The White House, 'Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea' (16 June 2009), at: [on.cfr.org/2KckdS0](http://on.cfr.org/2KckdS0).

<sup>123</sup> P. Sonne, G. Lubold, and C.E. Lee, 'No First Use Nuclear Policy Proposal Assailed by U.S. Cabinet Officials, Allies', *The Wall Street Journal* (12 August 2016), at: [on.wsj.com/33UBE38](http://on.wsj.com/33UBE38).

<sup>124</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *2020 Defence Strategic Update*, Canberra, July 2020, at: [bit.ly/2PI065e](http://bit.ly/2PI065e), para. 2.22. See also on the issue of Australia, Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, 'Australia and The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', December 2018, at: [bit.ly/3lyHywZ](http://bit.ly/3lyHywZ).

<sup>125</sup> International Law and Policy Institute, 'Under my Umbrella', Report, 2016, at: [bit.ly/2mWvRHp](http://bit.ly/2mWvRHp), p. 8.

<sup>126</sup> Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (adopted 2006, in force 2009), Art. 1(1)(c).

<sup>127</sup> 'Belarus shares Russia's concern over US missile defenses in Europe', National Legal Internet Portal of the Republic of Belarus, at: [bit.ly/33tRtNj](http://bit.ly/33tRtNj).

of the existing, underlying legally binding mutual defence treaties mentions nuclear weapons specifically.<sup>128</sup> Arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence, or nuclear umbrellas, should therefore be understood as *political* constructs, not as legally binding obligations. The Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Sjøreide confirmed in Parliament in November 2018 that ‘there is no legal obligation barring Norway from signing or ratifying the TPNW, but strong political commitments amounting from the Atlantic Treaty and the strategic documents we have adopted.’<sup>129</sup>

While politically difficult, combining alliance membership and adherence to the TPNW is entirely feasible. Non-nuclear armed members of NATO, for instance, may adhere to the TPNW and remain within the Alliance as long as they explicitly distance themselves from specific statements or formulations in Alliance documents. It could be argued that a NATO member may, without having to explicitly ‘override’ previous endorsement of extended nuclear deterrence, become compliant with the TPNW through the very acts of signing and ratifying the Treaty. However, having adhered to the TPNW, such a state would certainly be obliged to refrain from endorsing future Alliance language supporting the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons. This could be done either by adjusting the current language or by the state clearly rejecting possession or use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through ‘footnotes’, an interpretive or declaratory statement, or other unequivocal means of signalling disagreement.<sup>130</sup> NATO members are not obliged to endorse every line of Alliance language. Indeed, there is a tradition of member states ‘footnoting’ or otherwise distancing themselves from specific statements in Alliance documents.

Through their continued endorsement of nuclear-weapons policies and statements, umbrella states contribute to the resolve of nuclear-armed states to modernise and expand their capabilities. Nuclear-armed states often assert a need on behalf of non-nuclear allies and partners to ‘assure’ and fulfil ‘extended deterrence commitments’ as pretexts for their nuclear deployments and modernisation programmes, including new capabilities. For example, the development of the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb, which will replace the existing B61s stored at six NATO bases in Europe, was necessary – argued the Obama administration – to ‘reassure our nonnuclear allies and partners’.<sup>131</sup> According to the 2009 Report of the Congressional

Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America must ‘continue to safeguard the interests of its allies’, including by retaining ‘numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense’.<sup>132</sup> The US Mission to NATO in August 2020 stated in a tweet that ‘#NATO needs nuclear weapons because our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate security guarantee for Europe. For 70 years nuclear weapons have kept adversaries at bay & provided reassurance for Allies.’<sup>133</sup> Some US experts have even described the ability to deter escalation of potential Russian and Chinese conflict with US allies as the ‘primary role’ of US nuclear weapons today.<sup>134</sup>

In the United Kingdom, the national government’s push for a full replacement of the Vanguard-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines in 2016 was based on the argument that NATO was a ‘nuclear alliance’ and that the United Kingdom thereby had no choice but to renew its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. For the UK prime minister, a failure to build new nuclear submarines would be a ‘reckless gamble’ that would ‘enfeeble’ the United Kingdom’s allies.<sup>135</sup>

In France, President Emmanuel Macron has recently re-launched the idea of a ‘European’ nuclear posture enacted by Paris. Specifically, the President has invited interested European states to take part in a ‘dialogue’ about the French nuclear arsenal’s contribution to European security. Similar initiatives have been made by most French governments since the 1960s, albeit with few takers and little enthusiasm among other European states. According to two scholars, the purpose of the French effort to ‘Europeanise’ its nuclear arsenal is to lend nuclear weapons ‘additional moral justification and legitimacy’ by portraying the French nuclear armoury as ‘an essential constituent of the defence posture of “civilian power Europe”’.<sup>136</sup>

### **c) Development, production, and maintenance of key components for nuclear weapons – corporate and state responsibility**

In a number of states, private companies engage in work that is linked to nuclear weapons. A company that develops, produces, or maintains key components (such as a ballistic missile) for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, or which maintains nuclear weapons, would thereby engage the international responsibility of the state in

128 International Law and Policy Institute, ‘Under my Umbrella’, Report, 2016, p. 8, at: [bit.ly/2mWvRHp](https://bit.ly/2mWvRHp).

129 Transcript from meeting in the Norwegian Parliament 14 November 2019, at: [bit.ly/2lYHbNG](https://bit.ly/2lYHbNG).

130 Such footnotes or statements could be simple and for instance phrased as follows: ‘State X does not support the possession or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on its behalf and will not assist the development, possession, acquisition, or use of such weapons or devices in any way.’

131 M. R. Crendon, ‘Statement of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global and Strategic Affairs’, in Nuclear Weapons Modernization Programs (Washington DC: United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 2013), p. 5.

132 W. Perry et al., *America’s Strategic Posture* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2009), p. 13.

133 US Mission to NATO, tweet, at: [bit.ly/2XWE0Lm](https://bit.ly/2XWE0Lm).

134 G. Perkovic, ‘Critiquing the State Department’s Nuclear Posture Clarification’, (May 2020) on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website, at: [bit.ly/33t1ASG](https://bit.ly/33t1ASG).

135 Prime Minister Theresa May, ‘UK’s Nuclear Deterrent’, *House of Commons Hansard* (18 July 2016).

136 U. Jasper and C. Portela, ‘EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons’, *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 2 (2010), p. 161.

which it is operating under the TPNW. Such a state party would be responsible for prohibited assistance under the Treaty (assistance to development, production, or possession, depending on the acts the company was performing).

Depending on the circumstances, a parent company can also be legally responsible for the acts of its subsidiary. The general position in domestic law is that a parent company is not liable where its subsidiary acts unlawfully. However, jurisprudence has established a number of exceptions to this general principle, allowing the 'veil of separate legal status ... to be pierced'.<sup>137</sup> Under international law, contravention of the provisions of a disarmament treaty or of customary disarmament law by a corporation would suffice to render the state or states responsible on whose territory that corporation committed the relevant act or acts.

In addition, any company that is engaged in a joint venture that develops or produces key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device could thereby be engaging in prohibited assistance even if it does not itself contribute materially to the nuclear-weapon development or production. This is so wherever a joint venture is akin to a partnership with unlimited liability. It may also occur when the participating companies establish the joint venture as a new body corporate, holding shares in that company. Under international law, the states on the territory of which the participating and shareholding companies are incorporated and/or have their headquarters would be responsible for the acts of the joint venture where those do not comply with an international treaty or customary law on disarmament.

Most companies involved with nuclear weapons are headquartered in the nuclear-armed states, but some have headquarters or divisions in non-nuclear-armed states. The conduct of Belarus, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands is not compatible with the prohibition on assisting development and manufacturing because they allow companies that are incorporated or have headquarters or production facilities on their territory to be involved in activities that constitute assistance for development and production of nuclear weapons. The Belarusian company Minsk Automobile Plant is the only manufacturer of the mobile launchers for the Russian Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).<sup>138</sup> The Italian company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica) is involved in the design, development, and delivery of

Transporter Erector Replacement Vehicles for the US Minuteman III ICBM arsenal.<sup>139</sup>

The multinational company Airbus Group, legally incorporated in the Netherlands and therefore falling under Dutch law and jurisdiction, is currently involved in the development and production of the French Navy's M51 nuclear-tipped SLBM (but not the warhead) through its German-headquartered subdivision Airbus Defence and Space, which owns 50% of the Ariane Group. All M51 missiles are manufactured and maintained by Ariane Group. The M51 will, over time, represent the main delivery system for France's strategic nuclear weapons. Since Airbus Group considers that the actions of its subsidiaries form part of the work of Airbus as a group entity, should either Germany or the Netherlands sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, they would not be compliant with Article 1(1)(e) if Airbus and its subsidiaries were to engage in any further assistance of the development and production of nuclear-capable weapons. The French Air Force's ASMP-A cruise missiles – designed to deliver nuclear warheads by air – were developed by the joint venture company MDBA, which was made up of Dutch/German-headquartered Airbus, UK-headquartered BAE Systems, and Italian-headquartered Leonardo.

#### **d) Nuclear cooperation arrangements**

The United Kingdom and the United States continue to engage in close cooperation on the Trident SLBM produced in the United States. This amounts to assistance with development and production. The nature of the cooperation on nuclear weapons was first set out in the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, a bilateral treaty between the two nations.<sup>140</sup> It has been renewed several times, most recently in 2014 covering the ten years through to 2024.<sup>141</sup> The United Kingdom's Trident missiles are said to be in a 'common pool' shared with the United States and maintained at Kings Bay, in the US state of Georgia.<sup>142</sup>

A cooperation between the United Kingdom and France for the maintenance of nuclear-weapon stockpiles amounts also to prohibited assistance with possession and stockpiling under the TPNW.<sup>143</sup> In June 2018, the Swedish Defence Research Agency reported that the United Kingdom and France were 'closer to each other than ever on nuclear weapons cooperation'.<sup>144</sup> The two states' cooperation on nuclear weapons' issues is supported by the 2010 Teutates

<sup>137</sup> C. Murray et al., *The Law and Practice of International Trade*, 12th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, §28-009.

<sup>138</sup> A. M. Dyer, 'The Armed Forces of Belarus', *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2017), p. 54.

<sup>139</sup> Don't Bank on the Bomb, 'Leonardo', Last updated January 2018, at: [bit.ly/2WEsaqD](http://bit.ly/2WEsaqD).

<sup>140</sup> Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

<sup>141</sup> See the UK Explanatory Memorandum of 2014, at: [bit.ly/2Z0Qqj2](http://bit.ly/2Z0Qqj2).

<sup>142</sup> B. Spence, 'The UK now relies on Trump for our nuclear weapons – we need to spend more than ever to free ourselves' *The Independent*, 23 January 2017, at: [bit.ly/301Huv2](http://bit.ly/301Huv2).

<sup>143</sup> See, e.g., P. Ricketts, 'National Security Relations with France after Brexit', Briefing Paper, RUSI, January 2018, at: [bit.ly/2HLfyot](http://bit.ly/2HLfyot).

<sup>144</sup> FOI, 'The United Kingdom and France closer to each other than ever on nuclear weapons cooperation', Press release, 19 June 2018, at: [bit.ly/2Z2b2v5](http://bit.ly/2Z2b2v5).

Treaty to develop technologies for safe and effective maintenance of both states' nuclear stockpiles.<sup>145</sup>

US-French cooperation is conducted under a 1961 Mutual Defence Agreement, which permits limited cooperation on the operation of nuclear-weapon systems. Later amendments have enabled enhanced cooperation, notably on issues of safety, security, and reliability.<sup>146</sup>

### **e) Financing of prohibited activities**

The development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons constitutes a multi-billion-dollar industry, with numerous large companies and universities profiting from, and lending their legitimacy to, the industrial effort.<sup>147</sup> The TPNW does not explicitly prohibit financing of nuclear-weapon programmes. However, the prohibition on assistance renders unlawful direct funding of any of the prohibited activities listed in the other subparagraphs of Article 1(1). If, for instance, funding in the form of an earmarked loan or a credit line is provided to a company for the development or maintenance of nuclear weapons, this is unlawful assistance with the development or possession of nuclear weapons.

The prohibition on financing encompasses not only state funding, including sovereign funds, but also private banks and individuals, as discussed above in the subsection on corporate and state responsibility. The ordinary purchase of shares in a company involved in the development, production, or maintenance of nuclear arsenals is not per se an illegal act under the TPNW, although ownership could be assessed differently depending on the amount of shares purchased and divestment from such companies is a growing trend.

Cuba issued a declaration upon joining the TPNW, stating that 'The financing of any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty is also a prohibited activity according to the provisions of Article 1(e)'.<sup>148</sup> The prohibition on assistance also appears in the CCM, where it is widely considered to prohibit financing.<sup>149</sup>

### **f) Uranium mining and export**

Under international law, mining and transfer of uranium is generally lawful, unless it is for the purpose of developing or assisting in the development of a nuclear explosive device. The peaceful use of nuclear energy is protected under Article IV of the NPT, and the Preamble to the TPNW confirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting that right. A state may therefore extract

uranium and either use the nuclear material itself or provide it to another state for peaceful purposes, as long as it is subject to Safeguards Agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Under the TPNW, the provision of uranium to any other state is prohibited where it is not subject to appropriate Safeguards Agreements or if the state party transferring the uranium knows that the material in question will, or is likely to, be used to develop a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. Otherwise, states parties to the TPNW are permitted to transfer uranium, including to nuclear-armed states and states not party to the TPNW. Several states that mine and export uranium are states parties to the TPNW, including Kazakhstan, Namibia, and South Africa. Under the NPT, the provision of uranium to any non-nuclear-weapon state is unlawful where it is not subject to appropriate Safeguards Agreements. The NPT does not directly address the legality of provision of uranium to the five nuclear-weapon states designated under that Treaty.

If a state exports uranium to a nuclear-armed state or any other state on the understanding that the uranium would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the exporting state could not be considered to be in violation of either the TPNW or the NPT if the importing state unexpectedly decided to use the uranium for weapons development instead. This would, though, be likely to affect the legality of future exports of uranium to that state.

When armed groups control areas of a state's territory or when an armed conflict is ongoing, situations could occur where it would be difficult for the authorities of a state in which uranium deposits exist to effectively control all extraction and transfers. If a non-state actor in such a situation were to transfer uranium to an actor intending to develop a nuclear explosive device, the territorial state could not be considered to be in violation of either the TPNW or the NPT, provided that it has made all reasonable efforts to prevent such extraction and transfers. All reasonable efforts would include the adoption of national legislation and implementation of other practical measures, to secure as far as possible sites in which uranium is present or where stocks of uranium are held.

<sup>145</sup> See, e.g., Nuclear Information Service, 'UK – France nuclear co-operation: The "Teutates" project. Presentation at Non-Proliferation Treaty PrepCom meeting, 23 April 2013', at: [bit.ly/2XISAeX](http://bit.ly/2XISAeX).

<sup>146</sup> See, e.g., C. Mohr, 'U.S. Secretly Helped France Develop Nuclear Weapons, an Expert Writes', *The New York Times*, 28 May 1989, at: [nyti.ms/2lcTBlc](http://nyti.ms/2lcTBlc).

<sup>147</sup> See, e.g., S. Snyder, 'Producing Mass Destruction: Private Companies and the Nuclear Weapon Industry', PAX, Utrecht, The Netherlands (May 2019).

<sup>148</sup> See Cuba's declaration, at: [bit.ly/3eB7UMm](http://bit.ly/3eB7UMm).

<sup>149</sup> At least 36 countries have taken the position that 'investment in cluster munition production is a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention' and 11 states parties have included prohibitions on investment in cluster munitions in legislation that implements the CCM. In addition, the Dubrovnik Action Plan, adopted at the convention's First Review Conference in 2015, encourages states parties to adopt legislation prohibiting investment. *Cluster Munition Monitor* 2019, p. 31, at: [bit.ly/33DmJK2](http://bit.ly/33DmJK2).

## The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities



French President Emmanuel Macron is hoisted aboard 'Le Terrible', a Triomphant-class nuclear-powered submarine with M51 nuclear missiles. Photo: Emmanuel Macron via Twitter.

Compliance by states parties and signatories:

88

Compatibility for states not party:

105

4

Four states not party - France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States - engaged in conduct in 2020 that was not compatible with the prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in a prohibited act. All of the applicable cases are described under the section above on the prohibition of assistance with prohibited activities (although with the focus on the parallel provision of assistance). They are also summarised below.

- France received assistance from Airbus Group (legally incorporated in the Netherlands) and specifically its subsidiary Airbus Defence and Space (headquartered in Germany), for the development, production, and maintenance of the French Navy's M51 nuclear-tipped SLBM (but not the warhead).
- The United States received support for the development of nuclear weapons by the Italian company Leonardo.
- The United States received assistance with possession and stockpiling from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, which provide logistical and security services at the bases where the US nuclear weapons are stored on their territory.
- The US missile-testing programme received assistance from the Marshall Islands.
- The United Kingdom appears to be seeking more or less continuous assistance from the United States to maintain its nuclear capability.
- The United Kingdom receives continuous assistance with stockpile stewardship from France and vice versa.

- Russia received assistance to develop nuclear weapons by the Belarusian company Minsk Automobile Plant.

Most of the nuclear-armed states in the past received some form of assistance to develop their nuclear weapons. More recently, North Korea's advances in ICBM technology also appear to have been fuelled by outside sources. Some have suggested that North Korea either stole information or received assistance to copy Ukrainian (ex-Soviet) missiles, but the reports have not been confirmed.<sup>150</sup>

### INTERPRETATION

- Under Article 1(1)(f) of the TPNW, states parties undertake never under any circumstances to '[s]eek or receive assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party' under the Treaty.
- In contrast to Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, which prohibits states from assisting prohibited acts by others, Article 1(1)(f) prohibits states from seeking or receiving assistance to violate the Treaty themselves.
- This precludes any state party from asking any other state or any legal or natural person to help it to develop, possess, stockpile, test, produce, use, transfer, or receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- A similar prohibition, imposed only on non-nuclear-weapon states, is contained in Article II of the NPT, though it only applies to manufacture: the undertaking is to 'not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'.

<sup>150</sup> S. Shuster, 'How North Korea Built a Nuclear Arsenal on the Ashes of the Soviet Union', *Time*, 1 February 2018, at: [bit.ly/2JLVzs7](https://bit.ly/2JLVzs7).



## The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons



NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg visited Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands on 16 October 2020, alongside Dutch Defence Minister Ank Bijleveld as well as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), US General Tod Wolters. Photo: NATO

Compliance by states parties and signatories:

88

Compatibility for states not party:

104

5

Five states not party – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey – engaged in conduct in 2020 which was not compatible with the prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons. They host approximately 150 American B61 nuclear gravity bombs between them on their metropolitan territories,<sup>151</sup> as shown in Figure 17 overleaf.

The B61 bombs are assumed to have explosive yields ranging from an equivalent of 300 tons to 170 kilotons of TNT. They are believed to be located at six bases: Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium; Büchel Air Base in Germany; Aviano and Ghedi-Torre air bases in Italy; Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands; and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The real 'deterrent' value of these foreign-deployed nuclear weapons is the subject of debate.<sup>152</sup>

### INTERPRETATION

- Article 1(1)(g) of the TPNW outlaws a particular form of assistance or encouragement of prohibited action: allowing any stationing, installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in a state party's territory or at any other place under its jurisdiction or control.
- The TPNW's prohibition against such hosting of nuclear weapons applies at all times, including during escalating tension or armed conflict. There is no corresponding prohibition in the NPT.
- The concept of jurisdiction refers primarily to a state's sovereign territory, while control extends to areas that the state party occupies or otherwise controls extraterritorially. This is irrespective of the legality of this control under international law.
- Deployment is the broadest of the three types of prohibited conduct. A violation would not require any prolonged duration, agreement, or infrastructure. Thus, although transit of nuclear weapons is not explicitly prohibited by the TPNW, if movement into the sovereign territory of a state party is not swiftly followed by exit, this might amount to assistance and encouragement to possess nuclear weapons as well as a violation of 1(1)(g).

<sup>151</sup> T. Sauer and B. van der Zwaan, 'U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe After NATO's Lisbon Summit', Harvard Kennedy School (2011), at: [bit.ly/32cXbA4](https://bit.ly/32cXbA4).

<sup>152</sup> For a review of this issue, see: T. S. Sechser, 'Sharing the Bomb' (2017), at: [bit.ly/3obsOph](https://bit.ly/3obsOph).

The respective hosting arrangements are thought to be governed by classified bilateral agreements between the United States and the host states. Representatives of the host states have traditionally been reluctant to discuss their governments' hosting policies, in part due to the classification of the respective hosting arrangements as state secrets. In 2013, two former Dutch prime ministers publicly confirmed that the Netherlands hosts nuclear weapons. Ruud Lubbers, prime minister from 1982 to 1994, stated that he 'would never have thought those silly things [nuclear bombs] would still be there in 2013'. Dries van Agt, prime minister from 1977 to 1982, said the bombs 'are there and it's crazy they still are'.<sup>153</sup> Both were threatened with prosecution,<sup>154</sup> but formal charges were never laid.

The ANPO Treaty (1960 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty)<sup>155</sup> gives the United States a right to establish military bases in Japan, which might include the right to deploy nuclear weapons without formal Japanese consent.<sup>156</sup> It is not confirmed whether the United States has ever done so.

All parties to NWFZ treaties have committed not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories. Certain states that are not members of such zones have made similar commitments not to host nuclear weapons, with some limiting their commitment only to times of peace.<sup>157</sup>

Figure 17: Locations of foreign deployed nuclear weapons, 2020



153 H. M. Kristensen, 'Nukes in Europe: Secrecy under Siege', Federation of American Scientists (13 June 2013), at: [bit.ly/2L68B37](https://bit.ly/2L68B37).

154 Nuclear Threat Initiative, 'One-time Leaders May Face Charges for Discussing Dutch-Based Nukes' 14 June 2013, at: [bit.ly/2zw6Jda](https://bit.ly/2zw6Jda).

155 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan; signed at Washington DC, 19 January 1960; entered into force, 19 May 1960.

156 L. Maizland and B. Xu, 'The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance', Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, Last updated 22 August 2019, at: [on.cfr.org/30III8f](https://on.cfr.org/30III8f).

157 Denmark, Norway, and Spain for instance do not allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime, and Iceland and Lithuania do not allow nuclear weapons to be deployed on their soil even during armed conflicts. See, International Law and Policy Institute, 'Under my Umbrella', Report, 2016, at: [bit.ly/2mWvRHp](https://bit.ly/2mWvRHp).

## 5 The Positive Obligations of the TPNW

**In addition to its comprehensive prohibitions, the TPNW obligates its states parties to take a number of positive measures to implement the Treaty. Pairing prohibitions with positive obligations ensures that the TPNW represents a broad-based response to the ‘catastrophic humanitarian consequences’ of the use and testing of nuclear weapons.**

Positive obligations are key elements of humanitarian disarmament treaties, which seek to prevent and remediate the human suffering and environmental harm inflicted by weapons.<sup>158</sup> The positive obligations in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) have significantly enhanced their humanitarian impact. While much work remains to be done, the obligations have led to a dramatic reduction in the stockpiles of banned weapons, clearance of wide swaths of land, vital support for victims, and an increase in international assistance from states parties as well as states not party.

The positive obligations of the TPNW will similarly advance its goals. Safeguarding provisions seek to prevent future harm by working toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance obligations collectively address harm that has already occurred as a result of past use and testing. Reporting, national implementation measures, and promotion of universality facilitate realisation of the Treaty’s objectives by establishing mechanisms for its implementation and oversight and encouraging more states to adhere to it.

The following pages set out clear interpretations of the positive obligations contained in the TPNW and discuss their significance and implementation measures. Assessment of compliance by states parties and signatories and of compatibility for states not party, will begin in the next edition of the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*.

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<sup>158</sup> Humanitarian Disarmament, ‘About’, at: [humanitarianism.org/about/](http://humanitarianism.org/about/); Bonnie Docherty, ‘A “Light for All Humanity”: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Progress of Humanitarian Disarmament’, *Global Change, Peace & Security* (2018), pp. 2–3, 7.



## The obligation to submit declarations and reports



*Siai Taylor, a foreign affairs officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Cook Islands, deposited the country's instrument of accession with the office of the UN Secretary-General on 4 September 2018, and simultaneously submitted the declaration required by the Treaty's Article 2. Photo: Office of Legal Affairs, UN.*

Through the obligation on all states to submit a declaration to the UN Secretary-General within 30 days of becoming party to the TPNW, their status and other resulting positive obligations under the Treaty are formally established. On the basis of their status, states parties will belong to one of the following categories:

**Non-nuclear-armed states ('Article 3 states'):** These are either states that have never possessed nuclear weapons (the overwhelming majority of potential states parties), or states that relinquished them before the TPNW was adopted on 7 July 2017 (i.e. current states parties South Africa and Kazakhstan, plus Belarus and Ukraine, should they decide to adhere to the Treaty).

**Destroy-and-join states ('Article 4(1) states'):** States that possessed nuclear weapons when the TPNW was adopted on 7 July 2017 but which relinquish them before they become a party to the TPNW. This is the 'destroy-and-join' pathway for nuclear-armed states' adherence to the TPNW. At present the nuclear-armed states are China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

### INTERPRETATION

- Article 2(1) of the TPNW imposes a duty on each state to submit a declaration to the UN Secretary-General within 30 days of becoming party to the Treaty.
- The declaration must clarify whether the state party has ever owned, possessed, or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If it has, it must further declare whether it has already eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including by destroying or irreversibly converting all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, or whether it still owns, possesses, or controls any such devices.
- Finally, the declaration must state whether foreign weapons or devices are located – stockpiled, stationed, deployed, or installed – either in its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control.
- Article 4 imposes a duty on all states parties that formerly possessed or currently possess nuclear weapons and all states that have foreign nuclear weapons on their territory or in any place under their jurisdiction or control, to submit a report to each meeting of states parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under that article, until such time as they are fulfilled.

**Join-and-destroy states ('Article 4(2) states'):**

States that still possess nuclear arms when they become party to the TPNW. This is the 'join-and-destroy' pathway for nuclear-armed states' adherence to the Treaty. At present, the nuclear-armed states are China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

**Host states ('Article 4(4) states'):**

States that, when they become party to the TPNW, have nuclear weapons on their territory or in any place under their jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed, or controlled by another state. At present, the relevant states are Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. They would be both Article 3 and Article 4(4) states should they decide to adhere to the Treaty.

Information on the respective obligations that the TPNW lays down on the states in these categories follows in the next sections.

After the submission of its declaration under Article 2, each state party's further reporting requirements will depend on its status under the Treaty. All Article 4 states will be required to submit a report to each meeting of states parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of their obligations under that article, until such time as they are fulfilled.

Work is ongoing with a Model Declaration, to assist the first states parties to the TPNW in preparing it. Since the TPNW enters into force on 22 January 2021, 21 February 2021 is the date upon which the 30-day deadline for submission of a declaration expires for the first 50 states parties. One state had however already provided the requisite declaration. When acceding to the TPNW in September 2018, the Cook Islands declared:

- (a) that it does not own, possess, or control nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, nor does it have a nuclear-weapon programme or nuclear-weapons-related facilities in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control;
- (b) notwithstanding Article 1(1)(a), that it does not own, possess, or control any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (c) notwithstanding Article 1(1)(g), that there are no nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed, or controlled by another state.

The Cook Islands has thereby complied with all of its obligations under Article 2 of the TPNW.

In addition to the declarations required by Article 2 and reporting required by Article 4, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* would encourage voluntary reporting under the TPNW on legislative and other measures taken to implement the Treaty (Article 5) and on other issues such as cooperation and assistance, victim assistance, and environmental remediation.

## The obligation to have Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with the IAEA



IAEA trainer Ms. Perpetua Rodriguez briefs IAEA Safeguards trainees at the Reactor Hall of the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant in Slovakia. Photo: Dean Calma/IAEA.

Just as IAEA safeguards are implemented pursuant to the NPT and NWFZ treaties, they will be central in verification of the TPNW. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works with its member states and multiple partners worldwide to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use in nuclear weapons. Safeguards are a set of technical measures that are applied by the IAEA on nuclear material and activities. The objective of the IAEA

safeguards is to deter the spread of nuclear weapons by the early detection of the misuse of nuclear material or technology.<sup>159</sup> Application of the safeguards provides credible assurances that states are honouring their legal obligations to only use nuclear material for peaceful purposes.<sup>160</sup> Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation.<sup>161</sup> The methods and procedures applied are described in a

### INTERPRETATION

- Under the TPNW (Articles 3(1) and (2) and 4(1) and (3), respectively) it is mandatory for all states parties to, at a minimum, either conclude and enter into force or maintain in force a specific IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). The Treaty specifies that the CSA must be the IAEA document INFCIRC 153 (Corrected), which is the most recent version.
- An IAEA Additional Protocol (AP), or an instrument of equivalent or higher standard, is mandatory for all states parties that possessed nuclear weapons when the TPNW was adopted on 7 July 2017 but relinquish them before joining the Treaty (Art 4(1)); for all current nuclear-armed states that join the TPNW (Art 4(2) and (3)); and for all non-nuclear-armed states parties that had an AP in force upon the entry into force of the TPNW (Art 3(1)).
- The text of the TPNW does not explicitly refer to the AP. Article 4 of the Treaty, however, requires that all the above-mentioned former and current nuclear-armed states that join the Treaty conclude and bring into force a safeguards agreement with the IAEA 'sufficient to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities'. In practice, this means at least an instrument of the level of the AP, as well as a CSA.
- Where the TPNW as mentioned above requires the conclusion of a new Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of the Treaty for that state party, and enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force for that state party. The state party can then not withdraw from the agreement, but can enter into additional relevant instruments with higher standards.

<sup>159</sup> IAEA, 'Basics of IAEA Safeguards', 2018, at: [bit.ly/2WJPdvC](https://bit.ly/2WJPdvC).

<sup>160</sup> IAEA, 'Safeguards explained', at: [bit.ly/36h383S](https://bit.ly/36h383S).

<sup>161</sup> IAEA, 'IAEA Safeguards Overview', 2019, at: [bit.ly/2q2kJGL](https://bit.ly/2q2kJGL).

recent extended Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) article.<sup>162</sup> States accept these measures through the conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, which are legally binding treaties between the IAEA and each respective state.

IAEA safeguards were established nearly 60 years ago, prior to the adoption of the NPT. The scope and methods used have continued to evolve since the NPT entered into force in 1970, and the 'model' for the safeguards system – the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) (INFCIRC/153) – was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1972. Note that the IAEA tailors the safeguards measures to each state, reflecting the state's capabilities. In addition to CSAs with non-nuclear-weapon states, the IAEA today maintains 'voluntary offer' Safeguards Agreements in force with each of the five 'nuclear-weapon states' under the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)<sup>163</sup> and 'item-specific agreements' with three states not party to the NPT (India, Israel, and Pakistan).<sup>164</sup>

A model IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) was approved by the Board in 1997,<sup>165</sup> in response to threats arising from clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes. An AP concluded between a state and the IAEA provides the Agency with additional access to information, locations, and personnel over and above that provided in a CSA, providing much greater assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

The IAEA applies safeguards, 'at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the

field of atomic energy'.<sup>166</sup> All of the five regional NWFZ Treaties obligate their states parties to conclude CSAs with the IAEA. The Central Asian NWFZ Treaty goes one step further than any other existing treaty and also requires that its states parties adopt an AP with the IAEA. Under the NPT, a CSA is mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon states parties, but not for the nuclear-weapon states. Under the TPNW, on the other hand, a CSA is mandatory for all states parties.

Under the TPNW, an AP is mandatory for all states parties that already had an AP in force upon the entry into force of the TPNW, and an AP (or an instrument of equivalent or higher standard) is also mandatory for all Article 4(1) and 4(2) states – i.e. the nuclear-armed states that eliminate their nuclear-weapons programme before joining the TPNW and the states that still possess nuclear weapons when they join. This means that under the TPNW, an AP will be mandatory for almost three quarters of the potential states parties. For the remaining non-nuclear-armed states parties to the TPNW, an AP will be voluntary. Under the NPT, however, it is not mandatory for any states parties to have an AP, it is a voluntary decision. Thus, the safeguards requirements in the TPNW are stronger than those in the NPT. See Figure 18 overleaf for details.

As set out in Chapter 6, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* calls on the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW to urge all states parties that have not yet done so to adopt and bring into force an AP with the IAEA, adopting a non-binding recommendation similar to that agreed on in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan.

162 J. Carlson, V. Kuchinov, and T. Shea (May 2020), *The IAEA's Safeguards System as the Non-Proliferation Treaty's Verification Mechanism*, NTI Paper, at: [bit.ly/2GKpqBh](https://bit.ly/2GKpqBh).

163 See, e.g., The Text of the Agreement of 18 November 1977 Between the United States of America and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, at: [bit.ly/2WZBggD](https://bit.ly/2WZBggD).

164 Such agreements are based on the safeguards procedures established in IAEA doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 and its earlier versions; generic text available at: [bit.ly/341maIG](https://bit.ly/341maIG).

165 Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, IAEA doc. INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). Text available at: [bit.ly/2X13Zlg](https://bit.ly/2X13Zlg).

166 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, at: [bit.ly/36ijBVo](https://bit.ly/36ijBVo).



Figure 18: Provisions for verification of non-proliferation of nuclear material in the NPT and the TPNW

VERIFICATION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL		
	NPT	TPNW
<b>IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement mandatory?</b>	<p>✓ Mandatory for non-nuclear-weapon states parties. (Art. III(1))</p> <p>✗ Not required and thus voluntary for the five “nuclear-weapon states”.</p>	<p>✓ Mandatory for all states parties. (Art. 3(1) and (2) and 4(3))</p>
<b>IAEA additional protocol (or instrument of equal or higher standard) mandatory?</b>	<p>✗ Voluntary for all states parties.</p>	<p>✓ Mandatory for all join-and-destroy states. (Art. 4(2) and (3))</p> <p>✓ Mandatory for all destroy-and-join states. (Art. 4(1))</p> <p>✓ Mandatory for all states parties that had an IAEA additional protocol in force upon the entry into force of the TPNW. (Art. 3(1))</p> <p>✗ Voluntary for the remaining states parties.</p>
<b>Non-binding recommendation to adopt IAEA additional protocol?</b>	<p>✓ The 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan “encourages” all states parties which have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an IAEA additional protocol (Action 28).</p>	<p>✗ A first or subsequent meeting of states parties to the TPNW should consider adopting a non-binding recommendation similar to that adopted in the NPT urging all states parties to conclude and bring into force an IAEA additional protocol.</p>

## Status of IAEA Safeguards Agreements

The TPNW constitutes an additional forum where diplomats, civil society, and the IAEA can advocate for the last remaining states to bring CSAs and APs into force. The state profiles in Chapter 7 of this report details which states have concluded and brought into force CSAs and APs, and which have yet to do so. An overview of the outliers among states parties to the NPT also follows in Tables K and L below.

As of September 2020, ten non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT did not have a CSA in force with the IAEA.<sup>167</sup> This is so, despite the fact that they already have

a pre-existing legal obligation under that Treaty. Fifty-five of the 190 states parties to the NPT<sup>168</sup> had not yet brought an AP into force, although the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan encourages them to do so.

Of the 55 outliers on the AP, more than half are already TPNW states parties or signatories, while the clear majority of the rest of the outliers are clear candidates for joining the TPNW. Advocacy for bringing into force an AP, as well as a CSA, should be included in civil society's efforts to universalise the TPNW.

<sup>167</sup> IAEA, ‘Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols’, Status as of 18 September 2020, at: [bit.ly/3dFm8L0](https://bit.ly/3dFm8L0).

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

**Table K: Non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT without a CSA in force**

State	TPNW Status	Status of CSA
Cabo Verde*	Signatory	Signed 2005
Equatorial Guinea*	Other supporter	Approved 1986
Eritrea	Other supporter	Approved 2020
Guinea*	Other supporter	Signed 2011
Guinea-Bissau*	Signatory	Signed 2013
Micronesia	Opposed	Signed 2015
Palestine	State Party (March 2018)	Signed 2019
Sao Tome and Principe	Signatory	Approved 2019
Somalia	Undecided	None approved
Timor-Leste	Signatory	Signed 2009

\* Also obligated under the Pelindaba Treaty to conclude a safeguards agreement.


**Table L: States parties to the NPT without an AP in force**

State	TPNW Status	Status of AP
Algeria	Signatory	Signed 2018
Argentina	Undecided	None approved
Bahamas	Other supporter	None approved
Barbados	Other supporter	None approved
Belarus	Undecided	Signed 2005
Belize	State Party	None approved
Bhutan	Other supporter	None approved
Bolivia	State Party	Signed 2019
Brazil	Signatory	None approved
Brunei	Signatory	None approved
Cabo Verde	Signatory	Signed 2005
Dominica	State Party	None approved
Egypt	Other supporter	None approved
Equatorial Guinea	Other supporter	None approved
Eritrea	Other supporter	Approved 2020
Grenada	Signatory	None approved
Guinea	Other supporter	Signed 2011
Guinea-Bissau	Signatory	Signed 2013
Guyana	State Party	None approved
Iran	Other supporter	Signed 2003 (Provisionally applied since 2016)
Kiribati	State Party	Signed 2004
Lao PDR	State Party	Signed 2014
Lebanon	Other supporter	None approved
Malaysia	State Party	Signed 2005
Maldives	State Party	None approved
Micronesia	Opposed	None approved
Myanmar	Signatory	Signed 2013
Nauru	State Party	None approved
Nepal	Signatory	None approved
Oman	Other supporter	None approved
Palestine	State Party	None approved
Papua New Guinea	Other supporter	None approved



State	TPNW Status	Status of AP
Qatar	Other supporter	None approved
Saint Lucia	State Party	None approved
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	State Party	None approved
Samoa	State Party	None approved
San Marino	State party	None approved
Sao Tome and Principe	Signatory	Approved 2019
Saudi Arabia	Other supporter	None approved
Sierra Leone	Other supporter	None approved
Solomon Islands	Other supporter	None approved
Somalia	Undecided	None approved
Sri Lanka	Other supporter	Approved 2018
Sudan	Signatory	None approved
Suriname	Other supporter	None approved
Syria	Undecided	None approved
Timor-Leste	Signatory	Signed 2009
Tonga	Undecided	None approved
Trinidad and Tobago	State party	None approved
Tunisia	Other supporter	Signed 2005
Tuvalu	State Party	None approved
Venezuela	State party	None approved
Yemen	Other supporter	None approved
Zambia	Signatory	Signed 2009
Zimbabwe	Signatory	None approved

## The obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons



A worker prepares to dismantle a SS-19 missile at a special decommissioning station in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine on July 26, 1996. The station was built with financial aid from the United States. Photo: Efrem Lukatsky/AP/NTB.

None of the world's current nuclear-armed states chose to participate in the negotiation of the TPNW or its adoption, and to date, none has adhered to the Treaty. The Treaty provides two pathways to their future adherence: one for so-called destroy-and-join states ('Article 4(1) states'), and a second for so-called join-and-destroy-states ('Article 4(2) states').

The TPNW helps create the conditions for nuclear disarmament, and synergistic political processes can

spring from it. Some of today's nuclear-armed states might be influenced to disarm on a unilateral basis, while others might be willing to engage in bilateral or multilateral negotiations that could lead to the elimination of their respective arsenals. Disarmament is possible. Historically, only ten states have manufactured some form of nuclear explosive device. One of them, South Africa, subsequently disarmed. South Africa produced nuclear weapons in the late 1970s but decided in 1989 to give up its nuclear-weapons and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-

### INTERPRETATION

- Article 4(1) of the TPNW obligates states parties that after the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but eliminated their nuclear-weapon programmes (including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities) before becoming party to the TPNW, to cooperate with the competent international authority designated by the states parties, for the purpose of verifying that its nuclear-weapon programme has been irreversibly eliminated.
- Article 4(2) of the TPNW obligates states parties that continue to own, possess, or control nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices upon becoming party to the Treaty, to immediately remove the weapons or devices from operational status and to destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the First Meeting of States Parties. The process of destruction must be detailed in a legally binding, time-bound plan that provides for the verified and irreversible elimination of that state party's nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. Such a state must submit a draft of the plan to the other states parties or to a competent international authority they designate within 60 days of becoming a party. The plan must then be negotiated with such an authority and submitted to the next meeting of states parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval.
- To prevent re-armament, both the so-called destroy-and-join states and the join-and-destroy states are also obliged to conclude a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities. For the interpretation and information on this, please refer to the above section on the obligation to have Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with the IAEA.

weapon state in 1991. In 1994, the IAEA confirmed that South Africa had converted its nuclear programme to exclusively peaceful applications. Three states – Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine – acquired the nuclear weapons they had hosted on their territories when the Soviet Union collapsed, but voluntarily handed them over to Russia for destruction with the support of the United States and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in the 1990s.

According to the Federation of American Scientists, the number of nuclear weapons in the world peaked in 1986 at around 70,300 warheads (see Figure 19). That number was subsequently hugely reduced, and in September 2020 the global estimate was of 13,410 nuclear warheads remaining.


The overwhelming portion of this reduction in nuclear-weapon stockpiles took place in the 1990s, and nearly all of the reduction occurred in the massive US and Russian arsenals (but there were reductions in France and the United Kingdom as well, and, as noted above, South Africa destroyed its entire (small) arsenal of nuclear explosive devices). The reductions made by the United States and

Russia thus far have mostly been results of arms control agreements and stockpile management, and did not form part of a coherent plan to ‘ultimately eliminate’ such weapons. The pace of nuclear reductions has also slowed considerably since the 1990s, as illustrated by Figure 19. China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan appear to be increasing their weapon stockpiles.<sup>169</sup> And despite their repeated claims that they are pursuing nuclear disarmament, there have been no negotiations about total nuclear disarmament between the United States and Russia since the Reagan–Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in 1986, or even on reductions to 1,000 nuclear weapons each.

### Setting a deadline for destruction

In accordance with Article 4, the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW is explicitly obligated to set a deadline for the destruction of a state party’s nuclear explosive devices. The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* recommends that it considers setting a deadline of ten years, renewable upon request to the other states parties where necessary. In ten years, it may be feasible to achieve elimination of even the largest nuclear-weapon stockpiles (those of the United States and Russia).<sup>170</sup> (See on this issue Chapter 6.)

Figure 19: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945–2020.



Source: H. Kristensen and M. Korda, ‘Status of World Nuclear Forces’, Federation of American Scientists, (September 2020), at: [bit.ly/33nQ7Uk](https://bit.ly/33nQ7Uk).

169 SIPRI, ‘Nuclear weapon modernization continues but the outlook for arms control is bleak: New SIPRI Yearbook out now’, News release, Stockholm, 15 June 2020, at: [bit.ly/2UsM1Wc](https://bit.ly/2UsM1Wc).

170 M. Kütt and Z. Mian (2019) ‘Setting the Deadline for Nuclear Weapon Destruction under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, at: [bit.ly/2oh0fNd](https://bit.ly/2oh0fNd).

### Verifying elimination under the TPNW

Whether future elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon programmes will be implemented under one or more disarmament treaties complementing and implementing both the NPT and the TPNW, or whether it will take place within the TPNW, verification will play an important role. As yet, no internationally agreed measures exist for verification of destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons, under any treaty. As illustrated in Figure 20 overleaf, the TPNW is the first and only legally binding multilateral instrument that requires verification of nuclear disarmament and elimination. All states that join the TPNW while still in possession of nuclear weapons must negotiate a legally binding, time-bound plan that provides for the verified and irreversible elimination of that state party's nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. And all states that have disarmed before joining the TPNW must demonstrate to a competent international authority to be designated by the states parties to the Treaty that the weapons and programmes have been eliminated.

The TPNW's entry into force means that it is important now to lay the ground work so that, as soon as possible, it can accommodate one or more nuclear-armed states that may come to conclude that their national security would not be jeopardised by decreasing and finally eliminating their arsenal, and that taking such steps within the framework of the TPNW would provide assurance to the world of its actions. Building a system for the verification of the disarmament obligations in the TPNW is an important challenge which will be on the agenda of the meetings of states parties to the TPNW in the years ahead.

Annex V presents the verification missions that it can be assumed will be needed in order to satisfy the TPNW's requirements for verification.

### Designating the international authority or authorities

Article 4(6) of the TPNW establishes that the states parties shall designate a 'competent international authority or authorities' to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes of destroy-and-join states and join-and-destroy states. The need for a dedicated organisation tasked with the international control of disarmament has been discussed for decades.<sup>171</sup> The TPNW provides a framework within which such a regime for nuclear disarmament can emerge, despite the fact that current member states have limited financial and technical resources and despite (or perhaps even because of) initial opposition from nuclear-weapon states.


The TPNW explicitly assigns some verification responsibilities to the IAEA. Several experts have suggested that the states parties to the TPNW should establish one or more new authorities in addition to the IAEA, which would cooperate with the IAEA and other relevant organisations through a division of tasks.<sup>172</sup> One group of experts at Princeton University and Harvard University has recommended a phased approach, with the early establishment of a two-part organisational structure, comprising an implementation support unit and a dedicated scientific and technical advisory body. This would enable substantive work to identify implementation and verification challenges and finding solutions by the time one or more nuclear-weapon states join the Treaty, and the structure could then be scaled-up.<sup>173</sup>

171 See A. Myrdal, 'The international Control of Disarmament', *Scientific American* 231 (4): 21-33.

172 See T. Shea (2019), *Verifying Nuclear Disarmament*, Routledge Press, New York and London; and T. Patton, S. Philippe, and Z. Mian, 'Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* Vol. 2, no. 2 (2019).

173 Patton, Philippe, and Mian, 'Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons'.

Figure 20: Provisions for verification of elimination of nuclear-weapons stockpiles and programmes in the NPT and the TPNW





## The obligation to remove foreign nuclear weapons



An inert training version of a B61 nuclear gravity bomb in an underground Weapons Storage and Security System vault at Volkel Air Base, Netherlands. Photo: USAF.

Only the United States is known to station nuclear weapons in other countries today (in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey respectively), but Russia and the United Kingdom have also done so in the past. A total of 19 states are believed to have previously hosted such deployments, in some cases without their knowledge.<sup>174</sup> Most nuclear hosting arrangements were put in place in the 1950s and 1960s, and all but the above-mentioned five cases in Europe are believed to have since been discontinued.

There have been several attempts by European policy-makers to have the remaining weapons removed from European soil. For example, in 2005, the Belgian Senate unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the removal of nuclear weapons from Belgian territory.<sup>175</sup> In 2009, the German coalition government committed through its governing platform to have the remaining nuclear weapons in Germany withdrawn. The then Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, promoted the initiative enthusiastically for some time, but the United States responded negatively, and the initiative was quietly shelved the next year.<sup>176</sup> At the NATO summit in 2018, the allies collectively declared that NATO's deterrence posture 'relies on the United States'

nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned.<sup>177</sup>

Renewed debate about Germany's role in NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements erupted in 2020, when Rolf Mützenic, chairman of the Social Democratic Party's parliamentary group, called for US nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from the country.<sup>178</sup> The NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, quickly responded that Germany's support for nuclear sharing was 'vital to protect peace and freedom'.<sup>179</sup>

### INTERPRETATION

- Under Article 4(4), any state party with foreign nuclear weapons in its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control is obligated to ensure their prompt removal as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the First Meeting of States Parties.
- Upon their removal, the territorial state party is required to submit a declaration of full compliance to the UN Secretary-General. To date, no state with foreign nuclear weapons on any territory under its jurisdiction or control has adhered to the TPNW.

174 Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark (Greenland), France, East Germany and West Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom. The figure does not include territories that during the relevant period were under the direct jurisdiction or administration of a nuclear-armed state (Guam, Okinawa, and the Marshall Islands). Sources: H. M. Kristensen, 'Where the Bombs Are', FAS (9 November 2006); M. Furmann and T. S. Sechser, 'Appendices for "Signalling Alliance Commitments"' (6 April 2014); R. S. Norris, W. M. Arkin, and W. Burr, 'Where they Were', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 6 (1999); E. N. Rózsa and A. Péczelli, 'Nuclear Attitudes in Central Europe', EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, no. 42 (2015).

175 Nuclear Threat Initiative, 'Belgian Senate Calls for Removal of U.S. Nukes' (22 April 2005), at: [bit.ly/2NH12BI](https://bit.ly/2NH12BI).

176 M. Skjønberg, 'Nato og amerikanske kjernevåpen i Europa', *Internasjonal Politikk* Vol. 75, no. 2 (2017), pp. 187–88.

177 NATO, 'Brussels Summit Declaration' (11 July 2018), at: [bit.ly/30HzwYc](https://bit.ly/30HzwYc).

178 DW, 'Germany: SPD call to withdraw US nuclear arms stokes debate' (2 May 2020), at: [bit.ly/2PGWpqM](https://bit.ly/2PGWpqM).

179 NATO, 'Germany's support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom', NATO (11 May 2020), at: [bit.ly/30GU05K](https://bit.ly/30GU05K).



## The obligation to adopt national implementation measures



Seán Ó Fearghail, the speaker of the lower house of the Parliament of Ireland, in the moment when the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Bill was passed on 20 November 2019. Photo: Screenshot from video archive of the Parliament of Ireland.

Appropriate national legislation should be adopted by all states parties to the TPNW that do not yet have such laws in place. The ICRC has developed and published a model law for common-law states which serves as a valuable basis for states parties to draft and enact suitable legislation.<sup>180</sup>

To the knowledge of the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*, only one state has adopted legislation specifically to implement the TPNW thus far. Ireland, which has signed and ratified the Treaty, adopted its Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act in 2019. The Act, which was signed into law by the Irish President in December 2019, is formally entitled an ‘Act to give effect to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons done at New York on 7 July 2017 and for those purposes to provide for offences relating to acts prohibited by that Treaty; and to provide for related matters’. The list of offences in Section 2 of the Act reflects Article 1(1) of the TPNW. The Irish Act defines a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device quite narrowly as ‘any weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing

nuclear energy that is designed for a hostile purpose or for use in armed conflict, and includes such a weapon or device in unassembled or partly assembled forms but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from, and not an indivisible part of, such a weapon or device’.<sup>181 182</sup> Of course, a nuclear explosive device designed for ‘peaceful purposes’ would also be unlawful.

### INTERPRETATION

- Article 5 of the TPNW obligates every state party to take ‘the necessary measures’ to implement its obligations under the Treaty. This paragraph applies to all of the Treaty’s obligations, whether prohibitions or positive obligations.
- Paragraph 2 of Article 5 stipulates that the duty to implement the Treaty nationally includes the taking of ‘all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress’ any prohibited activity. It concerns any such activity whether it is undertaken by natural or legal persons under its jurisdiction or control or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

180 ICRC, ‘Model law for the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons’, 17 April 2019, at: [bit.ly/3faEDXV](https://bit.ly/3faEDXV).

181 Section 1, Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act 2019 (Act 40 of 2019), at: [bit.ly/39vSI4b](https://bit.ly/39vSI4b).

182 Section 6(1) of the Irish Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act 2019 stipulates that where an offence under the Act is committed by a company (‘body corporate’) and where an officer of the company consented to or was guilty of wilful neglect, both the human and legal person is guilty of an offence.

Other states do, though, have legislation that addresses some or all of the obligations under the Treaty. The most comprehensive examples of such legislation are those adopted in TPNW state party New Zealand (which is also a party to a regional NWFZ) and Mongolia (which has unilaterally renounced nuclear weapons). The 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, possession, or taking control over any nuclear explosive device as well as the transport on land or inland waters or internal waters and deployment of any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.<sup>183</sup> Mongolia, which has not yet signed the TPNW, adopted a Law on its

nuclear-weapon-free status in 2000.<sup>184</sup> Article 4 of the Law prohibits any natural or legal person or any foreign state from involvement in the development, manufacture, acquisition, possession or control over nuclear weapons, their stationing or transportation or their testing or use anywhere on Mongolian territory. On 17 September 2012, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council declared that they recognise the unique status of Mongolia and would not do anything that would violate that status and issued (on 5 October 2000) a similar statement concerning security assurances for Mongolia.

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183 Sections 4–6, 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act.

184 Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status, adopted on 3 February 2000.

## The obligation to assist victims



*The Soviet Union detonated more than 450 nuclear bombs at the Semipalatinsk test site in north-east Kazakhstan, resulting in thousands of victims who suffer from radioactive diseases. The photo is from the local school in the village of Dolan in Kazakhstan, where a majority of the inhabitants are ill with radioactive after-effects. Photo: John van Hasselt/Corbis via Getty Images.*

The use and testing of nuclear weapons have caused large-scale deaths, horrific injuries, long-term illnesses, socio-economic exclusion, displacement, and environmental damage. Exacerbating the situation, fallout from detonations often reaches a wide geographic area, illnesses can manifest themselves years later, and the harm inflicted by radiation, often altering DNA, crosses generations. To address the ongoing suffering inflicted by use and testing, the TPNW includes an obligation to assist affected individuals.

The 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki together killed an estimated total of 213,000 people instantaneously or within five months due to the combined effects of blast wind, radiant heat and ionizing radiation. More than 210,000 remaining victims survived the first five months and became hibakusha. Many of them had horrific burns, experienced higher rates of cancer and other illnesses, and endured psychological trauma and socio-economic marginalisation. While their numbers are dwindling, the hibakusha still feel the effects of the bombings 75 years ago.<sup>185</sup>

Nuclear testing, while far less well publicised, has harmed communities in many other parts of the world. At least 2,050 nuclear test explosions were carried out on the territories of 15 states and in a number of seas and oceans in 1945–2017.<sup>186</sup> The list of countries affected by atmospheric and underground nuclear-weapon tests includes: Algeria, Australia, China, North Korea, French Polynesia, India, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Pakistan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States, and Uzbekistan. These tests caused immediate and long-term health problems including thyroid cancer and birth defects. They displaced whole communities that had traditionally resided on the test sites, and many of those still cannot return. Lingering environmental contamination has interfered with food security and sustainable development.

Radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear-weapons testing led to measurable radioactivity on every continent and an estimated 430,000 additional cancer deaths worldwide attributable to these exposures by the year 2000, with 90% confidence limits of 320,000 to 650,000.

<sup>185</sup> M. Tomonaga, 'The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Summary of the Human Consequences, 1945-2018, and Lessons for *Homo Sapiens* to End the Nuclear Weapon Age', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Volume 2, 2019, Issue 2, at: [bit.ly/36wXILN](https://bit.ly/36wXILN).

<sup>186</sup> Arms Control Association, 'The Nuclear Testing Tally', Last updated July 2020, at: [bit.ly/34oa8vh](https://bit.ly/34oa8vh).

Total excess cancer deaths over time were estimated to eventually reach 2.4 million. It is likely, however, that these estimates substantially underestimate the true long-term toll of nuclear test explosions.<sup>187</sup>

Other nuclear-weapon activities, such as the mining, milling, storage, and transportation of uranium for nuclear-weapons production, expose those involved in the supply chain, as well as the general public, to ionising radiation. There have also been accidents involving the development, production, transportation, storage, and deployment of nuclear-weapons and/or their constituent elements, which may expose those handling them, or the general public, to radiation, or may pose other risks (such as the blast and incendiary effect of a chemical explosion). While the victim assistance obligations in the TPNW only address the effects of nuclear-weapons use and testing, they can create infrastructure and set standards that will help all affected individuals.

As noted in the TPNW's preamble, certain groups have been disproportionately affected by nuclear weapons. Nuclear-armed states often conducted tests in the territories of indigenous peoples, resulting in widespread and often ongoing displacement of whole communities. For those told it was safe to return, radiation has frequently made it too dangerous to hunt, fish, or farm. The testing thus threatened cultural traditions as well as their health.

The effects of 67 US nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands, which contaminated some atolls and made others uninhabitable, exemplify lingering impacts on indigenous peoples.

Women and girls also face a greater risk from nuclear-weapons use and testing. For every two men who develop cancer through exposure to ionising radiation, three women will get the disease. Furthermore, while children as a whole experience more harm from radiation than adults, exposed infant and young girls run the highest risk of cancer across their lifetime, and teenage girls suffer almost double rates of cancer compared to boys in the same juvenile group and the same level of exposure. There are sex-specific health impacts pertaining to the biological effects of radiation, and gender-specific impacts due to different cultural and social roles or stereotypes based on gender. Women are biologically more vulnerable to harmful health effects of ionising radiation than men. Pregnant women exposed to high doses of ionising radiation also have the risk of damage to their children. Spontaneous abortion and stillbirth will occur if pregnant women are exposed to a certain level of radiation. Women exposed to ionising radiation are also more likely than men to face certain forms of social rejection and stigma. For instance, women, rather than men, are often blamed for sterility or abnormality in offspring, making it more challenging for 'contaminated' women and girls to find partners.<sup>188</sup>

## INTERPRETATION

- Article 6(1) of the TPNW concerns the duty of each state party to provide 'adequate' assistance to any victim of nuclear-weapons use or testing under its jurisdiction. Assistance includes, but is not limited to, medical care, rehabilitation, and psychological support, as well as support for social and economic inclusion.
- Assistance under Article 6(1) must be provided in accordance with international human rights law and, where applicable, international humanitarian law. In all cases, assistance must be age-appropriate and gender-sensitive. It must be provided to all on the basis of need 'without discrimination'.\*
- While addressing the human impacts of nuclear weapons can be daunting, the TPNW facilitates the process by creating a framework of shared responsibility for victim assistance (as well as environmental remediation, discussed in the next section). Affected states parties bear the primary responsibility as this protects their sovereignty and follows the precedent of international human rights law and humanitarian disarmament law. But other states parties are required to provide international cooperation and assistance to help affected states parties meet their victim assistance (and environmental remediation) obligations.\*\*
- To make victim assistance more manageable, Article 6(1) can also be understood to allow affected states parties to realise some of their obligations, particularly those related to economic, social, and cultural rights, progressively. International human rights law requires a state to take steps to achieve those rights 'to the maximum of its available resources', while recognising that full realization may be a gradual process.\*\*\*

\* This caveat ensures that States Parties do not adversely distinguish among recipients based on adverse distinction on the basis of sex, race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, political opinion, or other status identified in international human rights law. For prohibited grounds for discrimination, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976, art. 2(1); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), adopted May 3, 2008, entered into force May 3, 2008, art. 5(2); UN Human Rights Council, 'Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity', Resolution 17/19, A/HRC/Res/17/19, preamble.

\*\* See the section on the obligation to cooperate and assist.

\*\*\* International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force January 3, 1976, art. 2(1).

187 T. A. Ruff, 'The humanitarian impact and implications of nuclear test explosions in the Pacific region', *International Review of the Red Cross*, 97, no. 899 (2015), pp. 775–813, at: [bit.ly/35v8704](http://bit.ly/35v8704).

188 For more information, see for instance: [bit.ly/3lvcMEp](http://bit.ly/3lvcMEp).

## A global needs assessment

While the types of harm described above have been well documented, more research is required. It is complicated to define exactly which states are affected by harm from nuclear weapons and thus need to provide victim assistance. The effects, particularly of stratospheric fallout from atmospheric testing, are global. It can be equally complicated to define who is a victim within those states, as seen by divergent approaches in existing programmes. These challenges are exacerbated because the issue is highly sensitive, and states do not willingly share information. Nevertheless, it is shocking that a comprehensive overview of the human and environmental harm from several decades of nuclear-weapons testing and other activities is not available today. In-depth research on the global extent of the harm from nuclear weapons and the associated needs for victim assistance and environmental remediation should be a humanitarian priority. This will also establish a baseline for the implementation of the positive obligations of the TPNW concerning victim assistance and environmental remediation.

## Implementing victim assistance

A recent report by the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic and the Conflict and Environment Observatory identifies fourteen principles for assisting victims that can inform implementation of the TPNW's victim assistance obligation.<sup>189</sup> The report bases its principles on humanitarian disarmament law, international human rights law, and international environmental law. In particular, it adapts standards for assisting victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war to the context of toxic remnants of war, which are exemplified by nuclear weapons. The principles in the report provide guidance for defining terms, determining the types of harm and assistance, dividing responsibility, and ensuring effective and fair implementation.

To start the victim assistance process, affected states parties should look to accepted victim assistance standards for guidance.<sup>190</sup> They should develop a national plan and budget, appoint a government focal point, and adopt relevant laws and policies.<sup>191</sup> They should also collect and disseminate information about the ongoing threats posed by contamination and the needs of victims. These practical steps promote efficiency, coordination, and accountability.

The provision of victim assistance should be guided by the principle of inclusivity. States parties should involve affected individuals and their representatives during the design, implementation, evaluation, and monitoring of victim assistance. Those individuals can describe the harm they have experienced, articulate their current needs, and offer expert insights on how best to address those needs. Inclusivity is a widely accepted principle of victim assistance in humanitarian disarmament and has been codified in the CCM, which requires affected states parties to 'closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and their representative organisations'.<sup>192</sup>

Other key principles victim assistance should follow are transparency and accessibility. The former facilitates monitoring, evaluation, and accountability and ensures affected individuals have the information they need. The latter ensures that affected individuals do not face physical or informational obstacles to receiving assistance.<sup>193</sup>

Some countries have already adopted programmes to address the harm caused by the use and testing of nuclear weapons. For example, Japan has legislation that provides aid to the *hibakusha*. The US Radiation Exposure Compensation Act awards compensation to some of the individuals affected by nuclear testing and uranium mining in the western United States. The United States has also set up health care programmes for residents of the most affected atolls in the Marshall Islands. Other countries have provided assistance to military veterans who participated in tests. While lessons may be learned from these examples, none of these programmes constitutes a comprehensive and adequate response to the harm experienced by affected individuals.<sup>194</sup>

189 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic and Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), *Confronting Conflict Pollution: Principles for Assisting Victims of Toxic Remnants of War* (September 2020), at: [bit.ly/32v12FT](https://bit.ly/32v12FT).

190 See, e.g., Nairobi Action Plan, para. 5, in First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, 'Final Report', Doc. APLC/CONF/2004/5, November 29-December 3, 2004; Convention on Cluster Munitions, art. 5(2).

191 B. Docherty, 'From Obligation to Action: Advancing Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* (November 2020), at: [bit.ly/3moXJ0k](https://bit.ly/3moXJ0k).

192 See, e.g., Maputo Action Plan, para. 22, in Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, 'Final Document', Doc. APLC/CONF/2014/4, June 23-27, 2014; Convention on Cluster Munitions, Art. 5(2)(f).

193 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic and Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), 'Principles for Assisting Victims of Toxic Remnants of War' (2020), at: [bit.ly/3fXYrz4](https://bit.ly/3fXYrz4), principles 11 and 14 and commentary.

194 For an analysis of some existing programmes, see ICAN, 'Around the World, Victim Assistance Comes Up Short', at: [bit.ly/2lmfxtK](https://bit.ly/2lmfxtK).



## The obligation to remediate affected territory



*This photo taken May 27, 2019 at the Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands shows the Runit Dome, a crater created by nuclear testing and covered by concrete to contain contaminated soil. The US Department of Energy has disclosed high levels of radiation in giant clams in a lagoon near the Runit Dome, raising concerns that the contamination is spreading from the dome into the ocean and the food chain. Photo: Carolyn Cole/Polaris/NTB.*

Use and testing of nuclear weapons have caused not only multigenerational harm to people but also persistent environmental damage. Environmental contamination from testing is a particularly under-communicated and under-addressed humanitarian challenge. Like victim assistance, environmental remediation of areas affected by nuclear-weapons use and testing is crucial to protecting affected populations from unnecessary suffering and to securing their rights. It also benefits the environment by helping to restore damaged ecosystems and promoting biodiversity. Yet, efforts to implement such remediation measures have been and continue to be insufficient. In many cases, affected populations do not even have access to knowledge about the level of threat, how to protect themselves, which areas not to access, which food types to avoid, etc.

The experience of the Marshall Islands illuminates the grave humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear testing. In 1946–58, the United States conducted 67 tests in the Marshall Islands. Speaking about these

tests at the UN General Assembly's High Level Meeting in 2020 to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the President of the Marshall Islands, David Kabua, said: 'The exposure of our people and land has created impacts that have lasted – and will last – for generations. These impacts to our human rights, land, culture, health and lives – the mistreatment and marginalization – are burdens that no other nation or country should ever have to bear.'<sup>195</sup> The tests have particularly affected four atolls: Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utirik. Residents have experienced long-term health effects from exposure to fallout. The entire Bikini Atoll and parts of the Enewetak Atoll are still uninhabitable, and contamination has made it unsafe to hunt, fish, or grow food in other areas. As a result, large numbers of Marshallese remain displaced. In an effort to contain radiation in the late 1970s, the United States dumped contaminated soil from Enewetak into an unlined pit and covered it with the concrete Runit Dome. Rising tides due to climate change now threaten the integrity of the structure.<sup>196</sup>

<sup>195</sup> Statement at: [bit.ly/32Y2eaF](https://bit.ly/32Y2eaF).

<sup>196</sup> S. Rust, 'How the U.S. Betrayed the Marshall Islands, Kindling the Next Nuclear Disaster', *Los Angeles Times*, 10 November 2019, at: [lat.ms/3pdm9f6](https://lat.ms/3pdm9f6).



## INTERPRETATION

- Article 6(2) of the TPNW obligates states parties to remediate any areas in territory under their jurisdiction or control that have been contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- This article builds on the obligations in earlier disarmament treaties to clear landmines and explosive remnants of war, but adapts them to nuclear contamination.
- Given that nuclear fallout causes significant levels of contamination that spread across time and space, the TPNW recognises that environmental remediation is a long-term commitment. While the earlier treaties imposed specific deadlines for clearing landmines and cluster munition remnants, it is difficult, and often impossible, to return areas affected by nuclear weapons to their pre-detonation condition. Therefore, Article 6(2) specifies that affected states parties must take 'necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of [contaminated] areas'. Although they may never achieve complete remediation, they must work in good faith towards that goal.
- In addition, certain interim activities, such as risk education, marking of contaminated areas, and national planning, can be accomplished in the near term.

Joining the TPNW would offer many benefits to the Marshall Islands and any other affected states. The Treaty would entitle the Marshall Islands to new resources to implement victim assistance and environmental remediation measures in the form of international assistance from other states parties, and Article 6(3) ensures that the responsibilities of the United States also remain unchanged.

Kazakhstan, which has already ratified the TPNW, is also contaminated as a result of testing conducted by the Soviet Union during the Cold War; more than 450 nuclear tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Site between 1949 and 1989. A media report in 2011 stated that soil, water, and air are still highly irradiated in the fallout area with one in every twenty children around the city of Semey (renamed from Semipalatinsk in 2007) being born with serious deformities.<sup>197</sup>

Considerable atmospheric and underground testing (totalling 17 nuclear explosive devices) was also carried out in TPNW signatory state Algeria by colonial power France in 1960–66.<sup>198</sup> Of the 13 underground nuclear tests that took place near In Ecker (Tan Afella mountain), 4 tests (Beryl, Amethyst, Ruby, Jade) were not completely contained or confined, resulting in the release of radioactive gases, aerosols and lava into the environment.<sup>199</sup>

## A global needs assessment

The international community must urgently strengthen operational efforts to address nuclear contamination. The TPNW obligation to remediate affected areas will function as a catalyst for this. As already discussed in the section on the obligation to assist victims, a key step will be to implement a long overdue global survey of the environmental contamination caused by nuclear weapons and the associated needs for both environmental remediation and victim assistance. A global survey project should also investigate the current state of environmental remediation and victim assistance programmes in affected areas and develop recommendations for states on feasible, cost-effective measures to address the harm from nuclear-weapons activities.

While implementing such a global survey is a considerable challenge that requires radiation expertise and technology, it may be possible to employ survey methodology developed over the past decade in humanitarian mine action operations. Initial and substantial over-appreciation of the size of the areas contaminated by landmines often resulted in misuse of the operational and financial resources that the international community made available to affected countries. It is important not to repeat the same mistakes when researching the scope of contamination resulting from nuclear-weapon activities. To this end, it is vital to actively engage affected communities, who have a wealth of first-hand knowledge of the situation on the ground and insight into how to address it. Doing so will not only inform assessments but also help empower those who have borne the brunt of the consequences of nuclear-weapons testing, including indigenous peoples.

A global needs assessment could achieve transformational impact. Such a survey is vital to placing this humanitarian challenge on the agenda of donors, establishing baselines, and prioritizing the most affected areas and populations first. It would create conditions for the humanitarian sector and their donors to finally start addressing in a systematic and comprehensive way the harm resulting from nuclear-weapons activities, particularly nuclear-weapons testing. It would thus save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect human dignity in a situation that for too long has not received the necessary attention. A global needs assessment would also raise awareness around the ongoing threats from nuclear-weapon activities, beyond the potential for new use. It will deepen and widen understanding of the fact that the catastrophic

197 'Slow Death In Kazakhstan's Land Of Nuclear Tests', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 August 2011, at: [bit.ly/2wQrhiW](http://bit.ly/2wQrhiW). See also A. Genova, 'This Is What Nuclear Weapons Leave in Their Wake', National Geographic, 3 October 2017, at: [on.natgeo.com/3av8R60](http://on.natgeo.com/3av8R60). See also: UNDP (2009): Kazakhstan Still Recovering 60 Years after Soviet Bombing, at: [bit.ly/3pJnSJe](http://bit.ly/3pJnSJe).

198 E. Bryant, 'Algeria: 60 years on, French nuclear tests leave bitter fallout', *Deutsche Welle*, 13 February 2020, at: [bit.ly/2yf7qtZ](http://bit.ly/2yf7qtZ). See also J. Magdaleno, 'Algerians suffering from French atomic legacy, 55 years after nuke tests', *Aljazeera*, 1 March 2015, at: [bit.ly/2UW3KFs](http://bit.ly/2UW3KFs).

199 J.-M. Collin and P. Bouveret, 'Radioactivity Under the Sand: The Waste From French Nuclear Tests in Algeria. Analysis with regard to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', Heinrich Boll Stiftung, July 2020.

consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed and that they transcend national borders and pose grave implications for human survival and the environment.

### Implementing environmental remediation

The Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic has prepared a useful paper on environmental remediation.<sup>200</sup> The paper suggests that the following principles derived from other disarmament treaties should inform implementation of the environmental remediation provisions under the TPNW:

- **Assessment and prioritisation:** The process of dealing with the contamination caused by a nuclear detonation should begin with an assessment of risks and prioritisation of steps to be taken.
- **Rehabilitation options:** Actual rehabilitation efforts can take a number of forms. In the case of nuclear contamination, some methods aim to reduce the amount of radioactive material in an area by separating contaminated particles from non-contaminated particles and removing the former. Other methods seek to contain radioactive material by trapping it in the soil where the isotopes can decay over time or by creating a barrier to prevent human contact.
- **Reduction of human exposure:** Remediation should encompass not only treatment of the environment, but also measures to reduce human exposure to radiation, even when it spreads. For example, evacuating contaminated areas and marking them with fencing and warning signs can help keep people away from the most dangerous zones.
- **Monitoring:** Monitoring radioactivity levels in local food and providing clean alternatives can prevent radiation exposure through ingestion.
- **Information sharing:** Dissemination of information regarding the location of contaminated areas and the dangers of exposure can ensure that people in the vicinity are aware of the risks and ways to protect themselves. Such information also helps affected people to engage more effectively in decision making about remediation plans and thus exercise their right to participation.
- **Development of a national plan and reporting measures:** Establishment of a national plan and regular reporting on progress made can help ensure remediation measures are implemented.<sup>201</sup>

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200 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, 'Environmental Remediation under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', Boston, April 2018, at: [bit.ly/2ykewgQ](https://bit.ly/2ykewgQ).

201 Ibid., p. 3.

## The obligation to cooperate with and assist other states parties



Article 7 of the TPNW provides a mechanism for states to work in close partnership on the implementation of the Treaty. The photo was taken after the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017, of diplomats from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ireland, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa. Photo: Ambassador Juan Sandoval Mandiolea, Mexico's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.

The TPNW's Article 6 obligations to assist victims and remediate the environment must be read in conjunction with the Treaty's obligation under Article 7 to provide international cooperation and assistance. Article 7 spreads the burden of addressing the effects of nuclear-weapons use and testing across states parties. In so doing, it can help build the capacity of affected states, promote implementation, and further the humanitarian goals of the Treaty.

The Treaty requires all states parties 'in a position to do so' to provide assistance to affected states parties. That assistance can come in a variety of forms. For example, donor states parties can provide technical support in the form of medical, scientific, or environmental expertise; material support, such as health care or remediation equipment; or financial support to fund affected states' victim assistance and environmental remediation

programmes. Given the range of types of assistance, all states should be in a position to provide some sort of support.<sup>202</sup>

### INTERPRETATION

- Article 7(1) of the TPNW obligates each state party to cooperate with other states parties to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty. In addition, under paragraph 3 of Article 7 each state party 'in a position to do so' is required to provide technical, material, and financial assistance to states parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing.
- Article 7(6) of the TPNW provides that any state party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices 'shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance' to affected states parties for victim assistance and environmental remediation. This responsibility is without prejudice to any other duty or obligation the state may have under international law.

<sup>202</sup> Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic and Conflict and Environment Observatory, *Confronting Conflict Pollution: Principles for Assisting Victims of Toxic Remnants of War* (September 2020), p. 29. For a presentation of this argument in the context of the CCM, see B. Docherty and R. Moyes, 'Article 6: International Cooperation and Assistance', in G. Nystuen and S. Casey-Maslen (eds.), *The Convention on Cluster Munitions: A Commentary* (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 418.

The Treaty also mandates that all states parties that have used or tested nuclear weapons provide 'adequate assistance' to help affected states meet their victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations.

This provision was especially important to small and affected countries during the drafting of the Treaty; they argued user and testing states should be legally as well as morally responsible for their actions. Although nuclear-armed states have not joined the Treaty, their adherence is not necessary to trigger the responsibility of other states parties.

While most of Article 7 is directed at supporting victim assistance and environmental remediation, it obliges all states parties to cooperate 'to facilitate implementation of the Treaty' and entitles all states parties 'the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible'. Assistance can also be provided for the development of national implementation legislation or destruction of stockpiles.

International and non-governmental organisations also have a role to play. As referenced in Article 7(5) of the TPNW, assistance may be provided through the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, civil society groups, or other organisations.

To help donor states determine how best to distribute support, states requesting international assistance should present their needs, national plans, and existing resources and provide regular updates on their progress in implementation. Donor states should, in turn, commit to multi-year assistance packages and work closely with recipients to ensure support is used effectively and efficiently.

### **Effectiveness of cooperation and assistance obligations**

Significant evidence exists in other disarmament treaties of the effectiveness of an obligation to cooperate and assist. Comparable provisions in the APMBC and the CCM, for example, have generated extensive international assistance. In 2014–18, donor states provided \$2.6 billion to mine action. The funds have supported clearance of landmines and cluster munition remnants (which is akin to environmental clean-up) as well as victim assistance and capacity building.<sup>203</sup> The norms set by these treaties have even led to significant contributions from states not party, notably the United States.

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203 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 'Global Support for Mine Action', June 2020, at: [bit.ly/3lt6tRN](https://bit.ly/3lt6tRN).



## The obligation to promote universality of the Treaty



Photo: Ari Beser/ICAN.

A large number of states promoted the universalisation of the TPNW in their statements during the UN General Assembly also in 2020, in particular in connection with a high-level meeting on 2 October to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (an annual observance that takes place each year on 26 September). The vast majority of states participating in the commemorative event welcomed the adoption of the TPNW. Among others, the President of the General Assembly, African Group, Arab Group, Colombia, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nepal, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and South Africa highlighted the importance of the TPNW, with some explaining how it complements other international law on nuclear weapons. Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Ghana, Ireland, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malta, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Viet Nam highlighted that they have signed and ratified this Treaty, while the African Group, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), Ecuador, Ghana, Maldives, Namibia, Nicaragua, Palau, the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), Thailand, and Trinidad and Tobago urged all states to join it.<sup>204</sup>

Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa and Thailand, in collaboration

with ICAN, organised a webinar on 23 October 2020 to discuss the entry into force of the TPNW.<sup>205</sup>

Social media is also used by many states to promote the TPNW. One example was a video released by New Zealand's Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern in connection with the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where she urged all other states to join New Zealand in ratifying the TPNW, 'as a necessary step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and in pursuit of global negotiations involving all nuclear weapon possessors to achieve nuclear zero'.<sup>206</sup>

A 'universalisation contact group' was established by ICAN in August 2020 as an informal mechanism to facilitate TPNW states parties' implementation of their obligation under Article 12 by exchanging information and suggestions related to universalisation.

### INTERPRETATION

- Article 12 of the TPNW obligates each state party to encourage states not party to sign or ratify the Treaty, 'with the goal of universal adherence'.
- The manner and frequency of the actions to be taken are not set out in the provision and are therefore left to the discretion of the state party. That said, any state party that sought to discourage adherence to the TPNW by a state not party would be in violation of this provision.

<sup>204</sup> Reaching Critical Will summary from the event, at: [bit.ly/32pk0mX](https://bit.ly/32pk0mX).

<sup>205</sup> Facebook live, at: [bit.ly/38WAgGX](https://bit.ly/38WAgGX).

<sup>206</sup> Video, at: [bit.ly/2TN5II3](https://bit.ly/2TN5II3).

## 6 Recommendations to the First Meeting of States Parties

**The First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW will be hosted by Austria. At this meeting, the states parties will start taking important decisions that will shape the long-term implementation, institutionalisation, and universalisation of the Treaty. The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* has eight recommendations for the First Meeting of States Parties.**

1. The First Meeting of States Parties should elaborate and adopt a Declaration of the States Parties and a Plan of Action to promote the full implementation and universalisation of the TPNW and to further stigmatise nuclear weapons. The Declaration should demand that negotiations begin between nuclear-armed states, whether bilaterally or multilaterally (or both), on ending the new nuclear arms race and on comprehensive nuclear disarmament. The obligations for victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance should also be addressed in both the Declaration and the Action Plan in order to underline the importance of the provisions to address past use and testing and to provide guidelines for implementation. The role of civil society and international organisations as partners should be stressed throughout.
2. In accordance with Article 4, the First Meeting of States Parties is explicitly obligated to set the deadlines for the destruction of a state party's nuclear explosive devices and for the removal of a foreign state's nuclear weapons from any area under the jurisdiction or control of a state party. It should consider setting a deadline of ten years for the destruction of all nuclear weapons, renewable upon request to the other states parties where necessary. In ten years it may be feasible to achieve elimination of even the largest nuclear-weapon stockpiles (those of the United States and Russia).<sup>207</sup> A far shorter deadline for removal of foreign nuclear weapons (hosting arrangements) – for example, no more than three years – would seem appropriate.
3. The First Meeting of States Parties could also begin consideration of the mandate and capacities of the competent international authority or authorities for verification of nuclear disarmament referred to in Article 4, and establish a working group on verification of disarmament obligations under the Treaty. The working group should engage with states not party to the Treaty with relevant expertise in the field.
4. The First Meeting of States Parties should strongly encourage each state party and signatory to the TPNW that has not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
5. The First Meeting of States Parties should strongly encourage each state party and each signatory to the TPNW that has not yet done so to adhere to the CTBT.
6. The First Meeting of States Parties should establish standing committees to address issues related to victim assistance and environmental remediation, including needs assessments, programmatic responses, and international cooperation and assistance.
7. The First Meeting of States Parties may need to address issues of compliance, such as with respect to assisting or encouraging prohibited activities, and should consider establishing a standing committee for such matters.
8. The First Meeting of States Parties should call upon each state party to submit voluntary, regular reports on progress in implementing the Treaty.

- Article 8 of the TPNW provides for regular meetings of states parties, the first of which is to be held within one year of the Treaty's entry into force.
- Subsequent meetings will be convened every two years unless the states parties agree otherwise, with a review conference to be held after five years and then every six years thereafter. Extraordinary meetings of states parties will be convened if one third of the states parties support a written request by any state party.
- The scope of work of the meetings is broad, with each meeting of states parties effectively mandated to consider any matters 'pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of' the TPNW, including its status and implementation.

<sup>207</sup> M. Kütt and Z. Mian (2019) 'Setting the Deadline for Nuclear Weapon Destruction under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, at: [bit.ly/2oh0fNd](https://bit.ly/2oh0fNd).



## 7 State Profiles

**The following state profiles contain summary data on the status of each of the 197 states that can become party to global treaties for which the Secretary-General of the UN is the depositary, in relation to the TPNW as well as other treaties and regimes dealing with weapons of mass destruction.**

The state profiles also contain an overview of each state party and signatory's compliance and each state not party's compatibility with the prohibitions of the TPNW. The 197 states are categorised according to their position

on the TPNW, with separate sections for the states parties, signatories, other supporters, opposed states, and undecided states. Within each of the five categories, the state profiles are presented in alphabetical order.



# Antigua and Barbuda

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Antigua and Barbuda is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Antigua and Barbuda highlighted that it was proud to ratify the TPNW in 2019 and urged all states to do the same. At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Antigua and Barbuda also noted that 'nuclear weapons are not deterrents, but cultivate a false sense of security, with consequences that will fall on all of us. It is disingenuous to promote multilateralism and international peace and security while stockpiling tools of mass destruction.' See: [bit.ly/32XyuKQ](https://bit.ly/32XyuKQ), [bit.ly/3fiXxgA](https://bit.ly/3fiXxgA).

## Recommendations

- Antigua and Barbuda should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Antigua and Barbuda should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2018) and ratified (25 Nov 2019)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	50%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Austria

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

Austria was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Austria is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

## Latest developments

Austria has announced that it will host the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, and that its 'ambition and aim is clear: to lay the foundations for a world free of nuclear weapons.' At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Austria said: 'By now, it is very clear that the so-called advantages of nuclear weapons do not exist. Nuclear deterrence does not increase security! Let's finally lay this myth to rest. As long as they exist, these weapons will remain a constant threat for peace and security for all nations.' See: [bit.ly/2UJfMCb](https://bit.ly/2UJfMCb), [bit.ly/2UX3QNV](https://bit.ly/2UX3QNV).

## Recommendations

- Austria should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Austria should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.



### TPNW status

**Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (8 May 2018)**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>21%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Bangladesh

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Bangladesh is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Bangladesh stated that it ratified the TPNW to attain the overarching objective of a nuclear-weapons-free world, and called upon other states to do the same. See: [bit.ly/3pOhW1R](https://bit.ly/3pOhW1R).

## Recommendations

- Bangladesh should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Bangladesh should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.



ASIA > SOUTHERN ASIA

### TPNW status

**Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (26 Sept 2019)**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Belize

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Belize is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of CARICOM, Belize aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which highlighted the TPNW and called 'for the denuclearization of all areas of the world.' See: [bit.ly/2UN9K3n](https://bit.ly/2UN9K3n).

## Recommendations

- Belize should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Belize should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Belize should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AMERICAS > CENTRAL AMERICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (6 Feb 2020) and ratified (19 May 2020)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>No data</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Benin

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Benin is a state party to the TPNW from 11 March 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Benin was the first state to ratify the TPNW after the Treaty reached the required 50 ratifications or accessions to enter into force. It was also the first francophone African state to ratify the Treaty. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Benin aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/3oqz0JC](https://bit.ly/3oqz0JC), [bit.ly/33PzL75](https://bit.ly/33PzL75), [bit.ly/337TILD](https://bit.ly/337TILD), [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Benin should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.

<p>AFRICA &gt; WESTERN AFRICA</p>	
TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2018) and ratified (11 Dec 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Bolivia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Bolivia is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Speaking in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Bolivia said 'nuclear weapons are most inhumane weapons ever designed', noting that their impacts last for decades. It also called on all other states to ratify the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/3nlpud](https://bit.ly/3nlpud).

## Recommendations

- Bolivia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Bolivia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Bolivia should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.



AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (16 Apr 2018) and ratified (6 Aug 2019)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2019)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Botswana

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Botswana is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Botswana was the 40th state to ratify the TPNW, coinciding with the 11th anniversary of the establishment of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. In a statement on the occasion, Botswana called on 'all other peace-loving nations to collectively join hands and contribute to this noble endeavor for the prohibition of all nuclear weapons.' Speaking in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Botswana said 'we are concerned by the slow pace with which nuclear weapon states are implementing the nuclear disarmament agenda. We encourage nuclear weapon states to recommit to nuclear disarmament and work towards total elimination of these weapons.' See: [bit.ly/2VKo39C](https://bit.ly/2VKo39C), [bit.ly/2HnNo5C](https://bit.ly/2HnNo5C).

## Recommendations

- Botswana should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Botswana should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AFRICA > SOUTHERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2019) and ratified (15 Jul 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>25%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Cook Islands

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Cook Islands is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

When the Cook Islands deposited the country's instrument of accession to the TPNW with the office of the UN Secretary General on 4 September 2018, it simultaneously submitted the declaration required by the Treaty's Article 2. It was the first state to comply with the obligation to submit a declaration.

## Recommendations

- The Cook Islands should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cook Islands should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Cook Islands should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

	
OCEANIA > POLYNESIA	
TPNW status	
Acceded (4 Sept 2018)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	N/A
Participated in treaty negotiations	N/A
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	N/A
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Costa Rica

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Costa Rica was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, and Costa Rica's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez, chaired the negotiations in 2017 that resulted in the adoption of the TPNW. Costa Rica is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Costa Rica pointed out that 'any initiative to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be joined by a parallel initiative to eliminate all nuclear arms, in a verifiable, irreversible and transparent manner. Costa Rica is also concerned by the apparent lack of urgency and seriousness with which solemn commitments continue to be approached, particularly with respect to nuclear disarmament.' Costa Rica invited all those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the TPNW, which it called a 'historic instrument, which complements and strengthens the NPT.' See: [bit.ly/3IRYQp7](https://bit.ly/3IRYQp7).

## Recommendations

- Costa Rica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Costa Rica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AMERICAS > CENTRAL AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (5 Jul 2018)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>75%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Cuba



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Cuba is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Speaking in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Cuba reiterated its call on all states to sign and ratify the TPNW, which it said it was proud to already have ratified. Cuba also said: '[T]he COVID-19 pandemic is a challenge posed to all, generating a crisis of several and devastating effects not only for health but also on economy, trade and our societies in general, while nuclear stockpiles are being modernized and enlarged, under the pretext of concepts or military doctrines of defense and security, which continue to threaten humanity.' See: [bit.ly/36TESUx](https://bit.ly/36TESUx).

## Recommendations

- Cuba should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cuba should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Cuba should sign and ratify the CTBT.

AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (30 Jan 2018)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>43%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Dominica

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Dominica is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of CARICOM, Dominica aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which highlighted the TPNW and called 'for the denuclearization of all areas of the world.' See: [bit.ly/2UN9K3n](https://bit.ly/2UN9K3n).

## Recommendations

- Dominica should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Dominica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Dominica should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Dominica should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2019) and ratified (18 Oct 2019)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Ecuador

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Ecuador is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Ecuador stated that in efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, the real path forward is through universalising the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2IXH8IF](https://bit.ly/2IXH8IF).

## Recommendations

- Ecuador should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Ecuador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

	
AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (25 Sept 2019)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# El Salvador

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**El Salvador is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Speaking in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, El Salvador reminded all member states of the NPT that 'the implementation of Article VI of the NPT is a legal obligation, which calls on us to fulfil the commitment to nuclear disarmament, an aspect of the NPT that is still unsatisfactory. In that regard, and with the aim of prohibiting, through a legally binding instrument, the only weapons of mass destruction that had not been prohibited by international law, El Salvador participated in the negotiation and adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and has ratified [it]. We [...] encourage those who have not yet done so to accelerate their internal processes'. See: [bit.ly/2UJUXqp](https://bit.ly/2UJUXqp).

## Recommendations

- El Salvador should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- El Salvador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

<p>AMERICAS &gt; CENTRAL AMERICA</p>	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (30 Jan 2019)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Fiji

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Fiji is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

When Fiji ratified the TPNW on 7 July 2020, its ambassador to the United Nations, Satyendra Prasad, said the Treaty has particular resonance in the Pacific as a region that has suffered from decades of nuclear testing by colonial powers. On behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), Fiji delivered a statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which said: 'The world does not need nuclear weapons. The challenges of nuclear disarmament can only be resolved by a strengthened multilateral system that sets the conditions for transparency, confidence-building and co-operation. The NPT, the CTBT and the TPNW are crucial if we are to further the objective of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Today, we PSIDSs say no to nuclear weapons, and we reiterate our commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. We encourage member states to ratify the CTBT and the TPNW. It is morally right, and we owe it to ourselves and our future generations.' See: [bit.ly/36ObLDw](https://bit.ly/36ObLDw), [bit.ly/36QVwUU](https://bit.ly/36QVwUU).

## Recommendations

- Fiji should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Fiji should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

OCEANIA > MELANESIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (7 Jul 2020)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Rarotonga)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Gambia



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**The Gambia is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Speaking at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Gambia called upon 'the international community to intensify its efforts towards convincing Nuclear-Weapons states not to abandon their commitments, especially as they concern non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.' See: [bit.ly/2UV01GG](https://bit.ly/2UV01GG).

## Recommendations

- The Gambia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Gambia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Gambia should ratify the CTBT.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (26 Sept 2018)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>25%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No (Signed)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Guyana

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Guyana is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Guyana said: 'Guyana remains concerned at the continued existence of nuclear weapons despite the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences that would be occasioned by their use and which we have already seen. We are equally concerned at the promulgation of the idea that nuclear weapons are important for security and are disappointed that resources continue to be invested in nuclear weapon modernization programmes. As a developing country, Guyana deems it unconscionable that resources would be utilized on weapons of mass destruction while millions of the world's people are mired in poverty. Guyana is firm in its conviction that nuclear weapons have no place in our world and that their continued existence is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and to the spirit of the Charter. We express our strong support for the [TPNW] and recognize the important contribution that the Treaty makes in closing an important legal gap and in strengthening the global norm for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. [...] We urge all Member States to ratify the Treaty with urgency in a tangible show of commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.' See: [bit.ly/3fs0zyZ](https://bit.ly/3fs0zyZ).

## Recommendations

- Guyana should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Guyana should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Guyana should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (20 Sept 2017)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Holy See

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**The Holy See is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

The Holy See has on multiple occasions expressed grave concern over the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons. In November 2017, Pope Francis maintained that 'the possession of nuclear weapons should be firmly condemned.' He also said that the existence of nuclear weapons 'creates a false sense of security that holds international relations hostage and stifles peaceful coexistence'. On 26 September 2019, Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin, said in the UN that the Holy See 'acknowledges with satisfaction the increasing number of states who have ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and encourages those states who have already signed it to ratify it as soon as possible. We believe that the treaty is an important step towards a nuclear-weapons-free world and complements the NPT.' See: [bit.ly/2kLINA7](https://bit.ly/2kLINA7), [bit.ly/2obi545](https://bit.ly/2obi545).

## Recommendations

- The Holy See should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Holy See should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

EUROPE > SOUTHERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (20 Sept 2017)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>N/A</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>22%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>N/A</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Honduras

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Honduras is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

On 24 October, the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, Honduras became the 50th state to deposit its instrument of ratification of the TPNW with the UN Secretary-General, ensuring the Treaty's entry into force. After having signed the instrument of ratification, Honduras' Foreign Minister, Lisandro Rosales Banegas, said: 'Today is an historic day.' The National Congress of Honduras had unanimously approved the ratification on 24 September 2020. See: [bit.ly/3geAvYo](https://bit.ly/3geAvYo), [bit.ly/2VFjkWJ](https://bit.ly/2VFjkWJ).

## Recommendations

- Honduras should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Honduras should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AMERICAS > CENTRAL AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (24 Oct 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>75%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Ireland

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Ireland was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Ireland is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In an op-ed on the occasion of Ireland's ratification of the TPNW on 6 August 2020, Ireland's Foreign Minister Simon Coveney wrote that 'Ireland will continue to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons and to ensure the most powerful and most indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction ever invented have no place in the security doctrine of any state. The very existence of nuclear weapons threatens us all. There can be no right hands for the wrong weapons. The only guarantee of protection from nuclear weapons use is their complete elimination.' When the TPNW reached its 50th ratification on 24 October 2020, Coveney said: 'At a time of rising international tensions, and as we see renewed concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation, a renewed arms race and the destabilising effects of technological developments, the support for the Treaty is a clear indication of the will of the majority of countries to add fresh momentum to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.' In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Ireland said: 'The COVID 19 pandemic is an urgent reminder of the importance of international cooperation to avoid global catastrophes, including the unthinkable and unacceptable humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapons explosion, whether deliberately, by accident or miscalculation. The global pandemic has also shown us that the arsenals of nuclear weapons afford us no security or safety and that we are completely ill-equipped to respond to such a catastrophic event. The only guaranteed protection from this risk is the elimination of nuclear weapons.' The statement also said that 'Ireland takes the view that the TPNW is fully compatible with the NPT, and provides a legal pathway for states to fulfil their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. [...] We encourage states who have not yet joined the Treaty to do so.' See: [bit.ly/3quaHMK](https://bit.ly/3quaHMK), [bit.ly/3mOpIMG](https://bit.ly/3mOpIMG), [bit.ly/2J75xp9](https://bit.ly/2J75xp9).

## Recommendations

- Ireland should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (6 Aug 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Jamaica

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Jamaica is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In a statement on the occasion of its ratification of the TPNW on 23 October 2020, Jamaica said: 'Ratification of the TPNW fulfills Jamaica's international obligation under Article 6 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We view the TPNW as an indispensable part of the global disarmament framework. This Treaty's entry into force will move us closer to our objective of a total ban on the possession of certain types of weapons, an achievement which would advance our efforts to secure international peace and security.' It also reiterated its call on 'all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to consider doing so.' See: [bit.ly/2L6SR21](https://bit.ly/2L6SR21).

## Recommendations

- Jamaica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Jamaica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

	
AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
TPNW status	
Signed (8 Dec 2017) and ratified (23 Oct 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Kazakhstan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union but renounced them and has since advocated for nuclear disarmament. Kazakhstan is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021.**

## Latest developments

Kazakhstan, which has suffered the consequences of Soviet nuclear testing, said in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly that it believes that further advancing the TPNW 'is the right path forward for the international community. We should build on our past and accelerate momentum for the speedy entry into force of the Treaty and other disarmament instruments, including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.' See: [bit.ly/33eWolb](https://bit.ly/33eWolb).

## Recommendations

- Kazakhstan should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Kazakhstan should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures, including by requesting that Russia refrain from all testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Sary Shagan.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (2 Mar 2018) and ratified (29 Aug 2019)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Semipalatinsk)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>1,000–10,000 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Kiribati

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Kiribati is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), Kiribati aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which said: 'The world does not need nuclear weapons. The challenges of nuclear disarmament can only be resolved by a strengthened multilateral system that sets the conditions for transparency, confidence-building and co-operation. The NPT, the CTBT and the TPNW are crucial if we are to further the objective of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Today, we PSIDSs say no to nuclear weapons, and we reiterate our commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. We encourage member states to ratify the CTBT and the TPNW. It is morally right, and we owe it to ourselves and our future generations.' See: [bit.ly/36QVwUU](https://bit.ly/36QVwUU).

## Recommendations

- Kiribati should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Kiribati should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Kiribati should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Kiribati should also adhere to the BWC.

OCEANIA > MICRONESIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (26 Sept 2019)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>No data</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Rarotonga)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2004)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>No</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Lao People's Democratic Republic



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Lao PDR is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Lao PDR highlighted its ratification in 2019 of the TPNW and said it 'welcomes those states which have already submitted their instrument of ratification and accession of TPNW. In this regard, we call upon other states that have not yet done so, to join the Treaty in order to facilitate an early entry into force of the Treaty, so that it can further contribute to the realization of making our world free from nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3l6MRD2](https://bit.ly/3l6MRD2).

## Recommendations

- Lao PDR should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Lao PDR should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Lao PDR should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.



ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA

### TPNW status

**Signed (21 Sept 2017) and ratified (26 Sept 2019)**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Bangkok)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2014)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Lesotho

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Lesotho is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Lesotho said: 'Nuclear weapons create a false sense of security. Their possession breeds mistrust and heightens tensions between states. For as long as they exist, the risk of their use remains. The enormous loss of life and catastrophic destruction to the environment that could be caused by detonation of nuclear weapons is known to all.' It also welcomed the steadily increasing number of signatories to the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/3pVkdbt](https://bit.ly/3pVkdbt).

## Recommendations

- Lesotho should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Lesotho should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AFRICA > SOUTHERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2019) and ratified (6 Jun 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>75%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Malaysia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Malaysia is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

On the occasion of Malaysia's ratification of the TPNW on 30 September 2020, the country's Foreign Minister, Dato' Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, stated: 'The coming entry into force of the TPNW complements international law, and reinforces that nuclear weapons are unacceptable, should not be used, should not be threatened to be used, and need to be discarded and destroyed as soon as possible. The TPNW further changes the nuclear disarmament discourse – from that dominated by the nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed States, to that which is more democratic, equitable, and where all countries have a voice.' At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, he said: 'Security for all can only be guaranteed by the total elimination of nuclear weapons. International law and multilateral approaches to disarmament need to be strengthened.' See: [bit.ly/39Mj7sX](https://bit.ly/39Mj7sX), [bit.ly/2UZoeNC](https://bit.ly/2UZoeNC).

## Recommendations

- Malaysia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Malaysia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Malaysia should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (30 Sept 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>40%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>Yes (Bangkok)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2005)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Maldives

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**The Maldives is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Maldives said: 'When it comes to our common goal of nuclear disarmament, we cannot be complacent, nor lag behind. We must remember that every effort towards nuclear disarmament is a step towards strengthening international peace and security. It would foster greater economic development and enable more prosperity.' The Maldives also highlighted that it in 2019 ratified the TPNW and noted that it believes this instrument is 'critical' and urged 'those states that have not ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to do so as soon as possible'. See: [bit.ly/3nS9exO](https://bit.ly/3nS9exO).

## Recommendations

- The Maldives should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Maldives should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- The Maldives should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.



### TPNW status

**Signed (26 Sept 2019) and ratified (26 Sept 2019)**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>No data</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote*</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

\* After the vote on the TPNW on 7 July 2017, the delegation of the Maldives informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour (A/72/206, note 2).

# Malta

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Malta is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

When Malta ratified the TPNW on 21 September 2020, the Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs issued a press release that said: 'Amongst other things, the treaty has the ambition to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons which is also a guiding principle of Malta's foreign policy. The ratification of this treaty stands in testimony to Malta's unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and global disarmament that remain crucial to securing a safer future for all and for future generations.' At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Malta highlighted its recent signature and ratification of the TPNW and said: 'Malta has taken this political decision to clearly signal that it is in favour of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and that it shares the view of many other countries, which like it, believe that the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against their use.' See: [bit.ly/33L8l2s](https://bit.ly/33L8l2s), [bit.ly/3nNSPub](https://bit.ly/3nNSPub).

## Recommendations

- Malta should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Malta should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

EUROPE > SOUTHERN EUROPE	
TPNW status	
Signed (25 Aug 2020) and ratified (21 Sept 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Mexico

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Mexico was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Mexico is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Mexico said: 'The 75 years of the United Nations also remind us of the 75 years of the nuclear era. [...] Let's not forget that the first resolution of the UN General Assembly was on nuclear disarmament. Therefore, around these commemorations it is impossible to avoid the fact that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the unfinished business of the UN'. [...] For decades, Mexico has reiterated that the only guarantee against the use and threat of nuclear weapons is to prohibit and eliminate them. Therefore, we are pleased that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is about to enter into force.' See: [bit.ly/3fxq5mn](https://bit.ly/3fxq5mn).

## Recommendations

- Mexico should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Mexico should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AMERICAS > CENTRAL AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (16 Jan 2018)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>38%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Namibia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Namibia is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In an online meeting following Namibia's ratification of the TPNW, the permanent representative of Namibia to the United Nations, Ambassador Neville Gertze, stressed that all nations must do their utmost to ensure that no one else ever suffers as the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered in 1945. He added: 'I really hope that, on this occasion of Namibia's joining, we can encourage more [UN] member states to come on board, that we can in this way make our contribution towards a world that is much safer, and that we can do away with these illegal weapons.' In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Namibia highlighted that it has ratified the TPNW and called it a 'landmark Treaty'. It also said: 'This is a show of our commitment to the non-proliferation, disarmament and the irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. We applaud those Member States that have ratified the TPNW in the course of this year and urge other Member States to ratify the TPNW'. Finally, Namibia said that it, once again, renewed its call 'for the Nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and in a verifiable manner.' See: [bit.ly/2JXy1S4](https://bit.ly/2JXy1S4), [bit.ly/2IUuy6Z](https://bit.ly/2IUuy6Z).

## Recommendations

- Namibia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Namibia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Namibia should also adhere to the BWC.

AFRICA > SOUTHERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (8 Dec 2017) and ratified (20 Mar 2020)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>20%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>No</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Nauru



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Nauru is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In a statement on the occasion of its ratification of the TPNW on 23 October 2020, Nauru said: 'In line with our national position which is to never acquire nuclear weapons, the Republic of Nauru supports and recognizes the important role the treaty plays in achieving its goal towards total elimination of nuclear weapons. The continued existence of nuclear weapons and the prospect of use or threat of use of such weapons continue to pose danger to humanity; therefore we reiterate our call to other countries to complete all steps for treaty ratification as soon possible.' See: [bit.ly/2LdXTtR](https://bit.ly/2LdXTtR).

## Recommendations

- Nauru should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nauru should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Nauru should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

TPNW status	
Signed (22 Nov 2019) and ratified (23 Oct 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>Yes (Rarotonga)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# New Zealand

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**New Zealand was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. New Zealand is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

New Zealand's Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, issued a video message on social media in connection with the 75th commemoration of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, urging all states to join the TPNW. In the General Debate of the 2020 UN General Assembly, New Zealand said: 'We know that no state or organisation can prepare for the unimaginable suffering in the wake of a nuclear holocaust. If we cannot prepare, we must prevent. That is why New Zealand has signed up to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We urge all others to join this landmark Treaty, and we welcome its imminent entry-into-force. The Treaty's global prohibition on nuclear weapons is a necessary step on the way towards their total elimination.' See: [bit.ly/3qx8BK](https://bit.ly/3qx8BK), [bit.ly/3m46Oel](https://bit.ly/3m46Oel).

## Recommendations

- New Zealand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- New Zealand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

OCEANIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (31 Jul 2018)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>83%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Rarotonga)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Nicaragua

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Nicaragua is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Nicaragua stated: 'There is no Plan B to save Mother Earth from a nuclear catastrophe, the only guarantee to prevent use or threat of weapons of mass destruction and its non-proliferation is the total and absolute elimination of nuclear weapons. We look forward to the prompt entry into force and universalization of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons adopted in 2017, which prohibits for the first time in history, the possession, use and the threat of the use of nuclear weapons and even of nuclear tests. Nicaragua has ratified this Treaty, which complements the NPT, in accordance with its Article VI.' See: [bit.ly/399HH6P](https://bit.ly/399HH6P).

## Recommendations

- Nicaragua should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nicaragua should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AMERICAS > CENTRAL AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (22 Sept 2017) and ratified (19 Jul 2018)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	33%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Nigeria

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Nigeria was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Nigeria is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

## Latest developments

In the General Debate of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Nigeria's President, Muhammadu Buhari, said: '[W]e recall the adoption of the landmark Treaty on The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which opened for signature on 20 September 2017. Nigeria participated actively in the processes leading to its adoption and was an early signatory and ratifier. [...] [W]e urge other member states who have not done so to quickly ratify the Treaty for the actualization of its important objective.' See: [bit.ly/39c5SBv](https://bit.ly/39c5SBv).

## Recommendations

- Nigeria should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nigeria should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AFRICA > WESTERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (6 Aug 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Niue

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Niue is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

When Niue acceded to the TPNW in August 2020, the Premier of Niue, Dalton Tagelagi, issued a national statement that said: 'Niue is honoured to accede to the Treaty on the 2017 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and draw us closer to witnessing this very significant Treaty enter into force. [...] [N]o state is immune to the threats and consequences of nuclear weapons. [...] We recall the vision and values of our Pacific Leaders for a region of 'peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy and productive lives. As a global citizen we renew our pledge to ensuring the achievement of this vision and endeavour to uphold Niue's commitment to the international community in the enforcement and implementation of this treaty including the enactment of national legislation in Niue. [...] We are hopeful that more States join us in this united commitment to enter this Treaty into force in the near future and eliminatenuclearweaponsaltogether.' See: [bit.ly/3m29EB9](https://bit.ly/3m29EB9).

## Recommendations

- Niue should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Niue should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Niue should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

<b>TPNW status</b> <b>Acceded (6 Aug 2020)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	N/A
Participated in treaty negotiations	N/A
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	N/A
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Palau

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Palau is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Palau's President, Tommy E. Remengesau Jr, remarked that the TPNW is '[a] sign of what is possible when we are committed to dialogue, solidarity and peaceful cooperation. This work of fostering new norms for peace and security is one of the strengths of the United Nations. That nuclear possession is as immoral as nuclear use. Palau was one of the first countries to ratify this treaty, and our Constitution enshrines a commitment against the possession of nuclear weapons. [...] We urge all other member states to join us.' See: [bit.ly/2J41x8D](https://bit.ly/2J41x8D).

## Recommendations

- Palau should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Palau should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (3 May 2018)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>No data</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Panama

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Panama is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Panama noted that it 'is proud to be one of the first countries to have signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, so it considers that its entry into force, will bring us closer to guaranteeing international peace and security towards the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is a matter of the utmost concern, if its total elimination is not guaranteed.' See: [bit.ly/2J43wtB](https://bit.ly/2J43wtB).

## Recommendations

- Panama should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Panama should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AMERICAS > CENTRAL AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (11 Apr 2019)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>60%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Paraguay

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Paraguay is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Paraguay highlighted its active participation in the negotiation of the TPNW and that it had deposited its instrument of ratification earlier in the year. Paraguay also said that it considers that the standard set by the TPNW provides a basis 'for future negotiations that could eventually allow the full elimination of these weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner.' See: [bit.ly/3nR5mgj](https://bit.ly/3nR5mgj).

## Recommendations

- Paraguay should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Paraguay should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (23 Jan 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No (Signatory)</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Saint Kitts and Nevis

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY




**Saint Kitts and Nevis is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Saint Kitts and Nevis ratified the TPNW on 9 August 2020, 75 years after the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Nagasaki, to honour the victims and survivors of the attack. On the occasion, Mark Brantley, the Foreign Minister of Saint Kitts and Nevis, said: 'The bombing of Nagasaki was the apogee of human cruelty and inhumanity. As a small nation committed to global peace, Saint Kitts and Nevis can see no useful purpose for nuclear armaments in today's world. May all nations work towards peace and mutual respect for all mankind.' See: [bit.ly/2UYmIB8](https://bit.ly/2UYmIB8).

## Recommendations

- Saint Kitts and Nevis should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Saint Kitts and Nevis should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

	
TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2019) and ratified (9 Aug 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>No data</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Saint Lucia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Saint Lucia is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of CARICOM, Saint Lucia aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which highlighted the TPNW and called 'for the denuclearization of all areas of the world.' See: [bit.ly/2UN9K3n](https://bit.ly/2UN9K3n).

## Recommendations

- Saint Lucia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Saint Lucia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Saint Lucia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Signed (27 Sept 2018) and ratified (23 Jan 2019)	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>75%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Saint Vincent and the Grenadines



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the 2019 UN General Assembly, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines critiqued the “muscular masculinity” of the nuclear umbrella and the idea that nuclear weapons are important for security. It commended the development of the TPNW and urged all states to sign and ratify it. See: [bit.ly/35XY6cj](https://bit.ly/35XY6cj).

## Recommendations

- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
TPNW status	
Signed (8 Dec 2017) and ratified (31 Jul 2019)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>No data</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Samoa

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Samoa is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In 2019, Samoa's Prime Minister, Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, said in the UN that his country had signed and rapidly ratified the TPNW to underscore its commitment to the NPT goals. He also said that the Treaty's 'success over time will depend on the commitment of each and every UN member state. Each new signature and ratification of the treaty ban will strengthen global norms against these weapons of terror and move us closer to a nuclear-weapon-free world. And the only guarantee humankind has against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons is through the non-possession and total elimination of all nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/2obi545](https://bit.ly/2obi545).

## Recommendations

- Samoa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Samoa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Samoa should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

OCEANIA > POLYNESIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (26 Sept 2018)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>60%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Rarotonga)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# San Marino

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**San Marino is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, San Marino remarked: 'This year we commemorate the 75th anniversary of the first use of nuclear weapons in warfare in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The touching testimonies of the survivors are a constant reminder that we need to urgently commit to a world free of nuclear weapons. The Republic of San Marino has therefore decided to sign and ratify the TPNW, an instrument that can give a critical contribution to peace and security. We encourage other Countries to sign and ratify this treaty. San Marino stands for a world free of weapons of mass destruction, free of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. We are convinced that peace and security can be reached through cooperation, dialogue, transparency and trust, investing more in education, development and cooperation rather than in armaments and wars.' See: [bit.ly/33bL9tP](https://bit.ly/33bL9tP).

## Recommendations

- San Marino should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- San Marino should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- San Marino should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

EUROPE > SOUTHERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (26 Sept 2018)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# South Africa

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



South Africa produced nuclear weapons in the late 1970s but decided in 1989 to give them up and has since advocated for nuclear disarmament. It was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. South Africa is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, South Africa said that 'The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is an historic milestone for nuclear disarmament in that it shares with the NPT the core goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons. As we stated before, the two Treaties are fully compatible and indeed complimentary. We are encouraged that the TPNW is fast approaching the 50 ratifications needed to enter-into-force and encourage States that have not done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty. See: [bit.ly/3m1sIPW](https://bit.ly/3m1sIPW).

## Recommendations

- South Africa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- South Africa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

	
AFRICA > SOUTHERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (25 Feb 2019)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	30%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	100–1,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# State of Palestine

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Palestine is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Palestine remarked: 'The exceptional status enjoyed by nuclear weapons compared to other weapons of mass destruction can no longer be justified, nor can the Non-Proliferation Treaty or its indefinite extension be interpreted as allowing indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is one of the three pillars of the NPT and we reject the interpretation of this treaty as giving legitimacy in any way to the possession of nuclear weapons. The State of Palestine is thus proud to have participated in the elaboration of the historic Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and to have been among the first to ratify it, having thus joined all conventions prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. We look forward to the early entry into force of this treaty.' See: [bit.ly/3frQi5Z](https://bit.ly/3frQi5Z).

## Recommendations

- Palestine should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Palestine should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Palestine should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA and conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP). Palestine should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

ASIA > WESTERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (22 Mar 2018)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	N/A
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	60%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	N/A
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No (Signed 2019)
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Thailand

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

Thailand was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Thailand is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Thailand stated: 'The TPNW is a clear demonstration that multilateralism reinforces momentum of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation agenda. As we approach this historical milestone, we are to be reminded that our efforts do not end at the Treaty's entry into force. Much work still lies ahead of us to translate the text of the Treaty into implementation reality.' See: [bit.ly/3l9e7Rn](https://bit.ly/3l9e7Rn).

## Recommendations

- Thailand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Thailand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.



ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA

### TPNW status

**Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (20 Sept 2017)**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>46%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Bangkok)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Trinidad and Tobago

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Trinidad and Tobago is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Trinidad and Tobago delivered a joint statement on behalf of CARICOM, which highlighted the TPNW and called 'for the denuclearization of all areas of the world.' See: [bit.ly/2UN9K3n](https://bit.ly/2UN9K3n).

## Recommendations

- Trinidad and Tobago should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Trinidad and Tobago should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Trinidad and Tobago should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.



AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (26 Sept 2019) and ratified (26 Sept 2019)</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>75%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Tuvalu

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Tuvalu is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Tuvalu said that it 'stands in solidarity with the victims of nuclear weapon use and testing, including in the Pacific' and that it joined the TPNW 'because it does not want history to repeat itself.' See: [bit.ly/3m2l1sK](https://bit.ly/3m2l1sK).

## Recommendations

- Tuvalu should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Tuvalu should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Tuvalu should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Tuvalu should also adhere to the BWC.

OCEANIA > POLYNESIA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (13 Sept 2020)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Uruguay

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Uruguay is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Uruguay remarked that it was among the first countries to have ratified the TPNW. It further said about the TPNW that '[i]t is a fundamental instrument for the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons as it explicitly prohibits these weapons', and that '[w]e consider that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons completes the legal vacuum that existed and does not oppose or hinder the application of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty'. See: [bit.ly/3ftc49e](https://bit.ly/3ftc49e).

## Recommendations

- Uruguay should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Uruguay should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.



AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA

### TPNW status

**Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (25 Jul 2018)**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Vanuatu

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Vanuatu is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Vanuatu aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which said: 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Vanuatu should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Vanuatu should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

OCEANIA > MELANESIA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (26 Sept 2018)	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Rarotonga)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Venezuela

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Venezuela is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Venezuela made the following statement about the TPNW: 'Venezuela has been one of the main promoters of the TPNW, as it is the first legal instrument that expressly and comprehensively prohibits these weapons and addresses the humanitarian impact associated with their testing and use. This Treaty is a forceful expression of the majority will of the Member States of this Organization that require significant progress towards nuclear disarmament, which in turn is in line with the conclusions reached by the International Court of Justice on the existing obligation to advance and conclude the negotiations leading to the nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective international controls. In this regard, we salute the States that have signed and ratified this historic Treaty, while urging those who have not done so to consider soon joining this important instrument, which is an essential complement to other fundamental agreements on the matter, such as the NPT, the CTBT and Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaties.' See: [bit.ly/378W88F](https://bit.ly/378W88F).

## Recommendations

- Venezuela should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Venezuela should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Venezuela should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.



### TPNW status

**Signed (20 Sept 2017) and ratified (27 Mar 2018)**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>25%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Viet Nam

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Viet Nam is a state party to the TPNW from 22 January 2021 and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Viet Nam delivered a statement on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which said: 'The TPNW is a historic agreement. It contributes towards global nuclear disarmament and complements other existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. There is an increasing number of instruments of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty [...] We believe that once entered into force, the TPNW will contribute further to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/39dfKuY](https://bit.ly/39dfKuY).

## Recommendations

- Viet Nam should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Viet Nam should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.



<p>ASIA &gt; SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA</p>	
TPNW status	
<b>Signed (22 Sept 2017) and ratified (17 May 2018)</b>	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Bangkok)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>





# Algeria

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Algeria has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Algeria's Foreign Minister, Sabri Boukadam, said that 'delegitimising nuclear weapons is a necessary step to forestall the world from their danger.' He reiterated that Algeria intends to ratify the TPNW in the very near future. See: [bit.ly/3INxyjy](https://bit.ly/3INxyjy).

## Recommendations

- Algeria should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Algeria should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AFRICA > NORTHERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No (Signatory)</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2018)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Angola

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Angola has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, Angola aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Angola should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > MIDDLE AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (27 Sept 2018), not ratified</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Brazil

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Brazil was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Brazil was the first state to sign the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Speaking in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Brazil said that it is proud to have been active in the negotiations on the TPNW and that it was the first state to sign. It also said that its ratification process is underway. See: [bit.ly/3fkC4E0](https://bit.ly/3fkC4E0).

## Recommendations

- Brazil should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Brazil should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>30%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Brunei



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Brunei has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Brunei aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which said: 'The TPNW is a historic agreement. It contributes towards global nuclear disarmament and complements other existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. There is an increasing number of instruments of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty [...] We believe that once entered into force, the TPNW will contribute further to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/39dfKuY](https://bit.ly/39dfKuY).

## Recommendations

- Brunei should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Brunei should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2018), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	50%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Cabo Verde

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Cabo Verde has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Cabo Verde has indicated that its ratification process for the TPNW is well advanced. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Cabo Verde aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- Cabo Verde should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Cabo Verde should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AFRICA > WESTERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>No (Signed 2005)</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2005)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Cambodia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY




**Cambodia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Cambodia's National Assembly and Senate approved ratification of the TPNW in November 2020. At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Cambodia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ouch Borit said that Cambodia 'is now actively engaged in ratifying and implementing' the TPNW. He also said: 'The existence of nuclear weapons stands in direct contradiction to the objectives of the United Nations Charter, which calls on the global community to safeguard international peace and security while promoting development. Yet the existence of nuclear weapons threatens humanity and the planet as a whole. Cambodia reaffirms its commitment to global nuclear disarmament and calls on all States to come together, and through multilateral negotiation and compromise, to ensure total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3qAbTxY](https://bit.ly/3qAbTxY), [bit.ly/2lLaCn1](https://bit.ly/2lLaCn1).

## Recommendations

- Cambodia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

	
ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Signed (9 Jan 2019), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>25%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Bangkok)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Central African Republic

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**The Central African Republic has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, the Central African Republic aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- The Central African Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.



AFRICA > MIDDLE AFRICA

### TPNW status

**Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>No data</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No (Signed, Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Chile



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Chile has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

A 'priority bill' on the ratification of the TPNW has been submitted to Chile's Congress and will be considered for the 2021 legislative agenda. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Chile stated: 'Our country's commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation is clear. Proof of this is Chile's signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the last category of weapons of mass destruction not prohibited explicitly through a legally binding instrument, which paves a promising path towards the common goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world, strengthening and complementing the current legal architecture on the matter.' See: [bit.ly/3pH8sFo](https://bit.ly/3pH8sFo).

## Recommendations

- Chile should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	14%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Colombia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Colombia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Colombia said that it 'observes with concern that there are approximately 14 thousand nuclear warheads in the world, with the capacity to erase any trace of life on the planet, even if only a small amount of them were used.' It also highlighted that it signed the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/35SsCVf](https://bit.ly/35SsCVf).

## Recommendations

- Colombia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.



AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA

### TPNW status

**Signed (3 Aug 2018), not ratified**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Comoros



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Comoros has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In a workshop with ICAN in September 2020, parliamentarians and other stakeholders discussed Comoros' ratification of the TPNW. At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Comoros highlighted that it was one of the first countries to sign the TPNW, 'which marks an important step towards the common goal of a world without nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/33OzyRU](https://bit.ly/33OzyRU), [bit.ly/3lXnHYM](https://bit.ly/3lXnHYM).

## Recommendations

- Comoros should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Comoros should also ratify the CTBT and adhere to the BWC.

<p>AFRICA &gt; EASTERN AFRICA</p>	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Congo

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Congo has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Congo stated that 'every day that goes by, we ask ourselves these fundamental questions about the survival of humanity, given the modernisation of nuclear weapons. The production of these weapons is an aberration.' It urged all states to uphold their disarmament commitments. See: [bit.ly/2HpYIDM](https://bit.ly/2HpYIDM).

## Recommendations

- Congo should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.



AFRICA > MIDDLE AFRICA

### TPNW status

**Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Côte d'Ivoire

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Côte d'Ivoire has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Côte d'Ivoire highlighted that it was one of the very first states to sign the TPNW, and said that it 'is working to consolidate this commitment by completing the procedure for ratification'. See: [bit.ly/3l3YbPX](https://bit.ly/3l3YbPX).

## Recommendations

- Côte d'Ivoire should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > WESTERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Democratic Republic of the Congo



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY


**The Democratic Republic of the Congo has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Democratic Republic of the Congo said it 'has reaffirmed its unwavering commitment in favor of international peace and security by signing [the TPNW], which strengthens the NPT.' It also encouraged 'all peace-loving countries' to accede to the Treaty. It added that '[t]he management of Covid-19 has shown that we share a single planet and that we are all vulnerable. No one is safe if the world is not. And collective security requires the renunciation of proliferation and the commitment to disarmament.' See: [bit.ly/2UMdAtF](https://bit.ly/2UMdAtF).

## Recommendations

- The Democratic Republic of the Congo should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.



AFRICA > MIDDLE AFRICA

### TPNW status

**Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>29%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No (Signed, Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Dominican Republic

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**The Dominican Republic has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the NPT Preparatory Committee in 2019, the Dominican Republic said the TPNW is important and provides a framework for elimination of nuclear weapons. It encouraged all states to join the Treaty, and said that its own 'ratification is now before Congress'. The country's constitutional tribunal approved the ratification in October 2020, but it must still be approved by the Senate. See: [bit.ly/332nvQw](https://bit.ly/332nvQw), [bit.ly/37DDSnX](https://bit.ly/37DDSnX).

## Recommendations

- The Dominican Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
TPNW status	
Signed (7 Jun 2018), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Ghana

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Ghana has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Speaking in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Ghana said: 'The detonation of a single nuclear weapon will create unbearable humanitarian and environmental consequences and open the floodgate of hell on earth. The only guarantee to avoid the far-reaching havoc of these weapons is to completely eliminate them. Fortunately, a prudent legal pathway towards eliminating nuclear weapons has been established by the adoption of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017.' Ghana also stated that it was among the first countries to sign this 'landmark Treaty' and that its 'ratification process is still underway.' See: [bit.ly/2IXCJip](https://bit.ly/2IXCJip).

## Recommendations

- Ghana should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > WESTERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>18%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Grenada



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Grenada has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Grenada's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Labour, Peter David, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. As a member of CARICOM, Grenada aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which highlighted the TPNW and called 'for the denuclearization of all areas of the world.' See: [bit.ly/2UN9K3n](https://bit.ly/2UN9K3n).

## Recommendations

- Grenada should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Grenada should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (26 Sept 2019), not ratified</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>100%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Tlatelolco)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Guatemala

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Guatemala has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Approval of Guatemala's ratification of the TPNW is on the current congressional agenda. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Guatemala said that the Treaty 'constitutes a milestone and a firm step towards nuclear disarmament'. The statement also said: 'Guatemala signed this instrument and we are currently in the internal final phase of ratification. My country reiterates its position, according to which, the said Treaty complements the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and strengthens its 3 fundamental pillars.' See: [bit.ly/3mOyrcg](https://bit.ly/3mOyrcg), [bit.ly/35XUoj0](https://bit.ly/35XUoj0).

## Recommendations

- Guatemala should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AMERICAS > CENTRAL AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	60%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Guinea-Bissau

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Guinea-Bissau has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, Guinea-Bissau aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Guinea-Bissau should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Guinea-Bissau should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2018), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No (Signed 2013)
IAEA AP in force	No (Signed 2013)
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Indonesia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Indonesia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Indonesia noted that it is currently in the process of ratifying the TPNW. On behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Indonesia also delivered a statement in First Committee that said: 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3fCAKMV](https://bit.ly/3fCAKMV), [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Indonesia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Bangkok)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Libya

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Libya has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Libya stated that it regrets that nuclear-armed states are not complying with their agreements, leading to a new nuclear arms race, and welcomed the adoption of the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2UPFtBc](https://bit.ly/2UPFtBc).

## Recommendations

- Libya should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Liechtenstein

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Liechtenstein has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In response to questions asked in Parliament, Liechtenstein's government has said that, before ratifying the TPNW, it must address issues related to its customs union with Switzerland. At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Liechtenstein said: 'The Non-Proliferation Treaty charted a course to eliminate nuclear weapons making it illegal to acquiring them. Its lack of implementation is read by some as an incentive to do the opposite. Liechtenstein strongly supports the collective effort to outlaw nuclear weapons and is committed to ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty provides the adequate legal framework for nuclear disarmament. Eliminating nuclear weapons is not a policy choice. It is a legal and moral necessity and a dictate of public conscience.' See: [bit.ly/2JF6W6B](https://bit.ly/2JF6W6B) (2 Sep 2020), [bit.ly/373RMzh](https://bit.ly/373RMzh).

## Recommendations

- Liechtenstein should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>40%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Madagascar



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Madagascar has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, Madagascar aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that it does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Madagascar should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	33%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Malawi

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Malawi has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, Malawi said that it supports all nuclear disarmament initiatives, including the NPT, the TPNW, CTBT, and the Pelindaba Treaty. Malawi also urged states to stop paying lip service to disarmament, and encouraged them to 'use multilateral diplomacy to implement these agreements so we can achieve our disarmament agenda.' See: [bit.ly/3716EOX](https://bit.ly/3716EOX).

## Recommendations

- Malawi should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Mozambique

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Mozambique has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In cooperation with ICAN, a workshop was held in November 2020 with parliamentarians and other stakeholders to discuss Mozambique's ratification of the TPNW. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Mozambique aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Mozambique should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (18 Aug 2020), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Myanmar

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Myanmar has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Myanmar highlighted that it has become a signatory member of the 'historic treaty on nuclear disarmament—the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', and said that '[w]hile Myanmar is considering progressively for ratification, we strongly encourage other member states to join the Treaty to demonstrate political will towards nuclear disarmament.' See: [bit.ly/2UQybwW](https://bit.ly/2UQybwW).

## Recommendations

- Myanmar should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Myanmar should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2018), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Bangkok)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2013)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Nepal

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Nepal has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Nepal said that as a signatory of the TPNW, it 'is committed to ratifying the Treaty at the earliest possible', and noted that the 'TPNW complements and strengthens the Non-Proliferation Treaty'. See: [bit.ly/33aWVVi](https://bit.ly/33aWVVi).

## Recommendations

- Nepal should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Nepal should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Nepal should also ratify the CTBT.

ASIA > SOUTHERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	25%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Niger

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Niger has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, Niger aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The African Group statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Niger should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > WESTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Signed (9 Dec 2020), not ratified	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>No data</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Peru



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Peru has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the 2020 UN General Assembly, Peru's President, Martín Vizcarra Cornejo, said: 'Equally firm is our commitment to the general and complete disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. We are part of the Chemical Weapons Convention and a member of the main international regimes on conventional arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. We are in the process of ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and we are convinced that the prohibition of nuclear weapons and tests remains a moral imperative for the planet and humankind.' See: [bit.ly/372L10F](https://bit.ly/372L10F).

## Recommendations

- Peru should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Philippines

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**The Philippines has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In the General Debate of the 2020 UN General Assembly, the President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Roa Duterte, said: 'Given the size and military might of the contenders, we can only imagine and be aghast at the terrible toll on human life and property that shall be inflicted if the "word war" deteriorates into a real war of nuclear weapons and missiles. [...] But no aspiration nor ambition can justify the use of weapons that destroy indiscriminately and completely. There is no excuse for deaths that a nuclear war could cause nor the reckless use of chemical and biological weapons that can cause mass destruction. These weapons of death put us all at mortal risk, especially if they fall in the hands of terrorists without a shred of humanity in their souls. We call on all Member States to fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Chemical and the Biological Weapons Conventions. I have asked the Philippine Senate to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Importantly, we were among those to sign it first.' See: [bit.ly/3716FTh](https://bit.ly/3716FTh).

## Recommendations

- The Philippines should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>53%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>Yes (Bangkok)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Sao Tome and Principe

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Sao Tome and Principe has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, Sao Tome and Principe aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Sao Tome and Principe should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Sao Tome and Principe should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Sao Tome and Principe should also ratify the CTBT.

AFRICA > MIDDLE AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No (Approved 2019)
IAEA AP in force	No (Approved 2019)
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Seychelles

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**The Seychelles has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

The Seychelles' cabinet approved ratification of the TPNW on 1 July 2020, but approval from the National Assembly is still needed. As a member of the African Group in the UN, the Seychelles aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/39NG0vW](https://bit.ly/39NG0vW), [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- The Seychelles should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (26 Sept 2018), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Sudan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Sudan has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Sudan said the TPNW had a 'complementary role' to the NPT, and that Sudan has signed the Treaty and is 'undertaking an internal process to ratify it.' Sudan also called on all other states to sign and ratify the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/3m3pjA4](https://bit.ly/3m3pjA4).

## Recommendations

- Sudan should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Sudan should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AFRICA > NORTHERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Signed (22 Jul 2020), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Timor-Leste

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY




**Timor-Leste has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Minister, Adaljiza Magno, said that 'in keeping with its wish to promote peaceful, just, and inclusive societies, it supported the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and signed it,' and that it is 'currently in the process to conclude the internal procedures for the ratification of the Treaty'. See: [bit.ly/39aZnis](https://bit.ly/39aZnis), [bit.ly/34ddEb6](https://bit.ly/34ddEb6).

## Recommendations

- Timor-Leste should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Timor-Leste should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Timor Leste should also ratify the CTBT.



ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA

### TPNW status

**Signed (26 Sept 2018), not ratified**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>100%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No (Signed)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>No (Signed 2009)</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2009)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Togo

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Togo has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, Togo said its ratification procedure for the TPNW was 'nearly complete'. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Togo also aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC), [bit.ly/2UTH2hg](https://bit.ly/2UTH2hg).

## Recommendations

- Togo should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

<p>AFRICA &gt; WESTERN AFRICA</p>	
TPNW status	
Signed (20 Sept 2017), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# United Republic of Tanzania

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Tanzania has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Tanzania reaffirmed that it 'is fully committed to support and complement all UN efforts in compliance with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, towards total elimination of nuclear weapons.' In 2019, Tanzania said in First Committee that its ratification process was underway. See: [bit.ly/371Uyp0](https://bit.ly/371Uyp0), [bit.ly/3kVK8w5](https://bit.ly/3kVK8w5).

## Recommendations

- Tanzania should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Signed (26 Sept 2019), not ratified	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>25%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Zambia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Zambia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Zambia highlighted that it was pleased to be a signatory to the TPNW and said: '[W]e make an appeal to those who have not signed yet, to do so and finally ratify for the treaty to come into force after reaching the required ratification threshold. With the prohibition of nuclear weapons on the horizon, allow me to quote President Ronald Reagan's words, "Our moral imperative is to work with all our powers for that day when the children of the world grow up without fear of nuclear war."' See: [bit.ly/2J70vJh](https://bit.ly/2J70vJh).

## Recommendations

- Zambia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Zambia should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Signed (26 Sept 2019), not ratified</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2009)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Zimbabwe

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Zimbabwe has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.**

## Latest developments

Zimbabwe was the first state to sign the TPNW after the 50th ratification. Speaking in First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, Zimbabwe expressed concern about the modernization of nuclear arsenals and about disarmament receding instead of proceeding, as a result of the inflexibility of nuclear-armed states. Zimbabwe also said: 'Disarmament is not a choice but an existential imperative.' See: [bit.ly/2LamCz1](https://bit.ly/2LamCz1)

## Recommendations

- Zimbabwe should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Zimbabwe should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.



TPNW status	
Signed (4 Dec 2020), not ratified	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>20%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compliant</b>
Test	<b>Compliant</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compliant</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compliant</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compliant</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compliant</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compliant</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compliant</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compliant</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compliant</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Afghanistan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Afghanistan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Afghanistan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Afghanistan voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2019 and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Afghanistan said: 'The situation of nuclear disarmament remains at an impasse and a source of great concern in the context of international peace and security. A new focus and commitment is needed on the part of international community to reverse the trend and pave the ground for the decrease and total elimination of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.' As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Afghanistan also aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee in 2020, which said: 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/2INXAVj](https://bit.ly/2INXAVj), [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Afghanistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Andorra

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Andorra did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has not yet adhered to the Treaty, but has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Andorra maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Andorra has indicated that it intends to adhere to the TPNW in the near future.

## Recommendations

- Andorra should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

<p>EUROPE &gt; SOUTHERN EUROPE</p>	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>100%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Azerbaijan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Azerbaijan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Azerbaijan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Azerbaijan has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Azerbaijan stated that '[n]uclear disarmament is a critical element of global efforts to make the world safer, to strengthen peace and security, as well as to promote confidence. Azerbaijan supports efforts aimed at achieving this goal, which ultimately should lead to the world free of nuclear weapons and nuclear danger. ' As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Azerbaijan also aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee, which said: 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/35Ptqdw](https://bit.ly/35Ptqdw), [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Azerbaijan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Bahamas



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

The Bahamas voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. The Bahamas maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

The Bahamas has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, the Bahamas stated that '[a]s a committed party to the Treaty of Tlateloco, which established Latin America and the Caribbean as the first Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, we understand that it is important not only to lead by example, but to also build on achievements made. The Bahamas, therefore, has been encouraged by the signatures and ratifications, several of which represent Caribbean States, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and hopes to be in a position to join on to the Treaty, following the completion of internal review.' See: [bit.ly/3IP4qbO](https://bit.ly/3IP4qbO).

## Recommendations

- The Bahamas should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- The Bahamas should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	75%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Bahrain



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Bahrain voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Bahrain maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Bahrain has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee in the 2020 UN General Assembly, Bahrain called on all states to renounce nuclear weapons. As a member of the Arab Group, Bahrain also endorsed a statement on behalf of the group at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which highlighted the TPNW as an 'unprecedented development' and said that it 'places nuclear weapons in their logical position as weapons whose possession, use, or even threat of use conflict with the most basic principles of international humanitarian law, in addition to being a direct threat to international peace and security.' See: [bit.ly/3fkUWmi](https://bit.ly/3fkUWmi), and [bit.ly/2UQCmst](https://bit.ly/2UQCmst).

## Recommendations

- Bahrain should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>100%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Barbados



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

Barbados did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has not yet adhered to the Treaty, but has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Barbados maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Barbados has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of CARICOM, Barbados aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which highlighted the TPNW and called 'for the denuclearization of all areas of the world.' See: [bit.ly/2UN9K3n](https://bit.ly/2UN9K3n).

## Recommendations

- Barbados should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Barbados should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	75%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Bhutan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Bhutan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Bhutan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Bhutan has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Bhutan aligned itself with a statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which said that 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Bhutan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Bhutan should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Bhutan should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

ASIA > SOUTHERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	33%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Burkina Faso

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Burkina Faso voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Burkina Faso maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Burkina Faso has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Burkina Faso welcomed the adoption of the TPNW, noted that it complements the NPT and the legal regime prohibiting weapons of mass destruction, and also welcomed the growing number of signatures and ratifications for the Treaty's entry into force. See: [bit.ly/391sbtr](https://bit.ly/391sbtr).

## Recommendations

- Burkina Faso should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > WESTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	40%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Burundi



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Burundi voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Burundi maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Burundi has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Burundi aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- Burundi should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Cameroon

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Cameroon participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. It's last vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW was yes (in 2018). Cameroon maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Cameroon delivered a statement on behalf of the African Group in the UN, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and said that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- Cameroon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	33%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Chad

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Chad voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Chad maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Chad voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018 and 2020, and did not cast a vote in 2019. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Chad aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Chad should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Chad should also adhere to the BWC.

<p>AFRICA &gt; MIDDLE AFRICA</p>	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Cyprus

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Cyprus voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Cyprus maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Cyprus has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- Cyprus should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

EUROPE > WESTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Djibouti

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Djibouti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Djibouti maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Djibouti has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Djibouti aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- Djibouti should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Djibouti should also adhere to the BWC.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	25%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Egypt

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Egypt voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to it. Egypt maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Egypt has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Egypt said that '[t]he continued reliance on nuclear deterrence by a handful of states can no longer be morally or politically acceptable norms.' On behalf of the Arab Group in the UN, Egypt also delivered a statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which highlighted the TPNW as an 'unprecedented development' and said that it 'places nuclear weapons in their logical position as weapons whose possession, use, or even threat of use conflict with the most basic principles of international humanitarian law, in addition to being a direct threat to international peace and security.' See: [bit.ly/35QpFEm](https://bit.ly/35QpFEm), [bit.ly/2UQCmst](https://bit.ly/2UQCmst).

## Recommendations

- Egypt should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Egypt should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Egypt should also ratify the CTBT and the BWC, and adhere to the CWC.

AFRICA > NORTHERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	No
Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Equatorial Guinea

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Equatorial Guinea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Equatorial Guinea maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Equatorial Guinea has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- Equatorial Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Equatorial Guinea should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA and conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP). Equatorial Guinea should also ratify the CTBT.

AFRICA > MIDDLE AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No (Approved 1986)
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Eritrea

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY




**Eritrea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Eritrea maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Eritrea has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020, and has indicated that it intends to adhere to the TPNW. It took steps in 2020 towards bringing into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Eritrea stated: 'The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is illegal and immoral. Legally binding negative assurances, the establishment of nuclear-free zones; the universalisation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the recently adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, are critical steps to complete denuclearization. Eritrea supports the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.' See: [bit.ly/370buvQ](https://bit.ly/370buvQ), [bit.ly/36LwnvW](https://bit.ly/36LwnvW).

## Recommendations

- Eritrea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Eritrea should bring into force its newly approved CSA and AP with the IAEA. Eritrea should also adhere to the BWC.

	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No (Signed, Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>No (Approved 2020)</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Approved 2020)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>No</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Eswatini

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Eswatini did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has not yet adhered to the Treaty, but has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Eswatini maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Eswatini said in First Committee of the 2018 UN General Assembly that it welcomes the adoption of the TPNW as an 'essential building block' to the elimination of nuclear weapons. It said it was 'involved in internal processes to become a party to the treaty soon'. See: [bit.ly/3kW3bpL](https://bit.ly/3kW3bpL).

## Recommendations

- Eswatini should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > SOUTHERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Ethiopia



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Ethiopia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Ethiopia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Ethiopia has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Ethiopia said: 'The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a major achievement, which strengthens the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and ultimately paves the way for reaching a legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. We have fully supported the treaty and we look forward to ratifying'. See: [bit.ly/39PXSq6](https://bit.ly/39PXSq6), [bit.ly/3lSKq8a](https://bit.ly/3lSKq8a).

## Recommendations

- Ethiopia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	50%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Gabon

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Gabon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Gabon maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Gabon has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Gabon aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- Gabon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > MIDDLE AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Guinea

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Guinea did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has not yet adhered to the Treaty, but has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Guinea maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, Guinea aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC)

## Recommendations

- Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Guinea should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AFRICA > WESTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No (Signed 2011)
IAEA AP in force	No (Signed 2011)
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Haiti

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Haiti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Haiti maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Haiti did not cast a vote on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, or 2020. As a member of CARICOM, Haiti aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which highlighted the TPNW and called 'for the denuclearization of all areas of the world.' See: [bit.ly/2UN9K3n](https://bit.ly/2UN9K3n).

## Recommendations

- Haiti should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Haiti should also ratify the BWC.

AMERICAS > CARIBBEAN	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	25%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Did not vote
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Iran

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. If Iran were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the prohibition on development, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties. *The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* has therefore listed Iran as a state of concern.

## Latest developments

Iran has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In response to targeted assassinations of Iranian officials, apparent acts of sabotage against Iran's nuclear installations, and the United States' violation of the JCPOA, Iran has taken steps to expand its nuclear programme, reneging on obligations stipulated in the Iran deal. It is to be hoped that the two sides, following the US presidential elections, will change track and return to diplomacy. See: [bbc.in/2DEWp8z](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55888888), [bit.ly/2ZdDj0z](https://bit.ly/2ZdDj0z).

## Recommendations

- Iran should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Iran should return to compliance with the JCPOA, and permanently bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Iran should also ratify the CTBT.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Of concern</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWfZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No (Signed, Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No (Signed 2003, provisionally applied)</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>1–10 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Iraq

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Iraq voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Iraq maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Iraq has indicated that the issue of adhering to the TPNW is still under consideration by the government. The government of Iraq has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Iraq warned of the risks of nuclear weapons for people and the planet, called for universality of all relevant treaties, and said it supported the adoption of the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/397FJUz](https://bit.ly/397FJUz).

## Recommendations

- Iraq should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Jordan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Jordan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Jordan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Jordan has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the Arab Group in the UN, Jordan aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which highlighted the TPNW as an 'unprecedented development' and said that it 'places nuclear weapons in their logical position as weapons whose possession, use, or even threat of use conflict with the most basic principles of international humanitarian law, in addition to being a direct threat to international peace and security.' See: [bit.ly/2UQCmst](https://bit.ly/2UQCmst).

## Recommendations

- Jordan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

ASIA > WESTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
See: <a href="https://bit.ly/2UQCmst">bit.ly/2UQCmst</a> for nuclear production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Kenya

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Kenya voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Kenya maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Kenya has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Angola aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- Kenya should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	20%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Kuwait

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Kuwait voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Kuwait maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Kuwait has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the Arab Group in the UN, Kuwait aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which highlighted the TPNW as an 'unprecedented development' and said that it 'places nuclear weapons in their logical position as weapons whose possession, use, or even threat of use conflict with the most basic principles of international humanitarian law, in addition to being a direct threat to international peace and security.' See: [bit.ly/2UQCmst](https://bit.ly/2UQCmst).

## Recommendations

- Kuwait should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

ASIA > WESTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Lebanon

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Lebanon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Lebanon maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Lebanon has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. It has indicated that the TPNW is still being studied by the relevant government ministries. At the 2019 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Lebanon stated: 'We must transfer from a narrow security approach to a comprehensive humanitarian approach. [...] Activating the international instruments that exist must not distract us from looking for a new and complementary instrument. The adoption of the TPNW in 2017 [...] is an important step'. See: [bit.ly/2obwUU6](https://bit.ly/2obwUU6).

## Recommendations

- Lebanon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Lebanon should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>40%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Liberia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Liberia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Liberia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Liberia has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Speaking at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Liberia said: 'The time has come for us to stigmatize and denounce nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and policy rhetoric of the Nuclear Weapon states. We also reiterate our concerns regarding arguments which set preconditions for the implementation of existing nuclear disarmament obligations.' See: [bit.ly/394T144](https://bit.ly/394T144).

## Recommendations

- Liberia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > WESTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>33%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No (Signed, Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Mali

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Mali did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has not yet adhered to the Treaty, but voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2020. Mali maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, Mali aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- Mali should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

<p>AFRICA &gt; WESTERN AFRICA</p>	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Mauritania

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Mauritania voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Mauritania maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Mauritania has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Mauritania noted that it was one of 122 states that voted in favour of adopting the TPNW, 'a treaty that makes a sizeable contribution to working towards our common goal and is undeniably an historical step.' See: [bit.ly/3fq5od](https://bit.ly/3fq5od).

## Recommendations

- Mauritania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Mauritius

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Mauritius voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Mauritius maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Mauritius has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Mauritius highlighted the TPNW as an 'important instrument' that 'sustains the commitment of the international community to uphold the disarmament agenda.' It also said: 'We cannot afford the tragedy of a nuclear confrontation. Let us get our act together. Let us do all to prevent the occurrence of another nuclear incident. Let us build a better world for generations to come.' See: [bit.ly/3IWtUEb](https://bit.ly/3IWtUEb).

## Recommendations

- Mauritius should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Mauritius should sign and ratify the CTBT.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>20%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>Yes (Pelindaba)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Mongolia



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

Mongolia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Mongolia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Mongolia has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Mongolia said that it 'is continuing [its] internal process towards joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.' See: [bit.ly/35WTPWG](https://bit.ly/35WTPWG).

## Recommendations

- Mongolia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	50%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (unilateral)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Morocco

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Morocco voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Morocco maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Morocco has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Speaking at the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee, Morocco called the adoption of the TPNW a 'great achievement'. See: [bit.ly/2KxysmG](https://bit.ly/2KxysmG).

## Recommendations

- Morocco should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > NORTHERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Oman



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Oman voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Oman maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Oman has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Oman said that 'the Arab Group rejects the idea that possession of nuclear weapons is necessary for stability or that the international environment is not conducive to nuclear disarmament. See: [bit.ly/3lXy6nb](https://bit.ly/3lXy6nb).

## Recommendations

- Oman should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Oman should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Papua New Guinea

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Papua New Guinea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Papua New Guinea maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Papua New Guinea has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), Papua New Guinea aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which said: 'The world does not need nuclear weapons. The challenges of nuclear disarmament can only be resolved by a strengthened multilateral system that sets the conditions for transparency, confidence-building and co-operation. The NPT, the CTBT and the TPNW are crucial if we are to further the objective of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Today, we PSIDSs say no to nuclear weapons, and we reiterate our commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. We encourage member states to ratify the CTBT and the TPNW. It is morally right, and we owe it to ourselves and our future generations.' See: [bit.ly/36QVwUU](https://bit.ly/36QVwUU).

## Recommendations

- Papua New Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Papua New Guinea should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Papua New Guinea should also ratify the CTBT.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>0%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Rarotonga)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No (Signed)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Qatar

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Qatar voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Qatar maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Qatar has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the Arab Group in the UN, Qatar aligned itself with this group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which highlighted the TPNW as an 'unprecedented development' and said that it 'places nuclear weapons in their logical position as weapons whose possession, use, or even threat of use conflict with the most basic principles of international humanitarian law, in addition to being a direct threat to international peace and security.' See: [bit.ly/2UQCmst](https://bit.ly/2UQCmst).

## Recommendations

- Qatar should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Qatar should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

ASIA > WESTERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Republic of Moldova

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Moldova voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Moldova maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Moldova has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- Moldova should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>40%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Rwanda



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

Rwanda did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not yet adhered to the Treaty, but voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018 and 2020. Rwanda maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, Rwanda aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The African Group statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- Rwanda should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Saudi Arabia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Saudi Arabia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Saudi Arabia has explicitly threatened to swiftly acquire nuclear weapons should Iran do so. Thus, if Saudi Arabia were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties. The *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* has therefore listed Saudi Arabia as a state of concern.

## Latest developments

Saudi Arabia has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- Saudi Arabia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Saudi Arabia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Saudi Arabia should also sign and ratify the CTBT.



TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	25%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Of concern
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Senegal



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Senegal voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Senegal maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Senegal has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Senegal reiterated its commitment to preservation of the NPT but also to the entry into force of the TPNW and CTBT and added that for these to be effective, nuclear-armed states must act. See: [bit.ly/3m0CG3S](https://bit.ly/3m0CG3S).

## Recommendations

- Senegal should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Sierra Leone

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Sierra Leone voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Sierra Leone maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Sierra Leone has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Sierra Leone aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The African Group statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Sierra Leone should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Sierra Leone should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

	
AFRICA > WESTERN AFRICA	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Solomon Islands

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Solomon Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Solomon Islands maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Solomon Islands has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), Solomon Islands aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which said: 'The world does not need nuclear weapons. The challenges of nuclear disarmament can only be resolved by a strengthened multilateral system that sets the conditions for transparency, confidence-building and co-operation. The NPT, the CTBT and the TPNW are crucial if we are to further the objective of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Today, we PSIDSs say no to nuclear weapons, and we reiterate our commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. We encourage member states to ratify the CTBT and the TPNW. It is morally right, and we owe it to ourselves and our future generations.' See: [bit.ly/36QVwUU](https://bit.ly/36QVwUU).

## Recommendations

- Solomon Islands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Solomon Islands should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Solomon Islands should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	50%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Sri Lanka

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Sri Lanka voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Sri Lanka maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Sri Lanka has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Sri Lanka aligned itself with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which said: 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Sri Lanka should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Sri Lanka should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Sri Lanka should ratify the CTBT.

	
ASIA > SOUTHERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No (Approved 2018)
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Suriname

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Suriname voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Suriname maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Suriname has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of CARICOM, Suriname aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which highlighted the TPNW and called 'for the denuclearization of all areas of the world.' See: [bit.ly/2UN9K3n](https://bit.ly/2UN9K3n).

## Recommendations

- Suriname should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Suriname should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.



TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Tunisia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Tunisia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Tunisia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Tunisia has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Speaking in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Tunisia highlighted that it 'has supported from its earliest stages the process leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and considers it to complement and strengthen the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We hope for the early entry into force of this Treaty which contributes to the objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/2J0IHZr](https://bit.ly/2J0IHZr).

## Recommendations

- Tunisia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Tunisia should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

AFRICA > NORTHERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No (Signed 2005)
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Turkmenistan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY




Turkmenistan did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty, but has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Turkmenistan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Turkmenistan aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which said: 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Turkmenistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Uganda

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Uganda voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Uganda maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Uganda has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the African Group in the UN, Uganda aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The African Group statement also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction.' See: [bit.ly/2UG2lmC](https://bit.ly/2UG2lmC).

## Recommendations

- Uganda should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

AFRICA > EASTERN AFRICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	29%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# United Arab Emirates



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. The UAE maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

The UAE has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, the UAE said that it 'supports all international efforts aimed to support progress in achieving the common goal of establishing a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We also express our concern regarding the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, and the continuous instances of noncompliance with the regime of nuclear non-proliferation.' See: [bit.ly/33d8cEG](https://bit.ly/33d8cEG).

## Recommendations

- The UAE should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

ASIA > WESTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	14%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Uzbekistan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Uzbekistan did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has not yet adhered to the Treaty, but voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2019 and 2020. Uzbekistan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Uzbekistan aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which said: 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Uzbekistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.



### TPNW status

**Not signed, not ratified, not acceded**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Abstained</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>No data</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted yes</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Semipalatinsk)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Yemen

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Yemen voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Yemen maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Yemen has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Yemen aligned itself with this group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which said: 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Yemen should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Yemen should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Yemen should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted yes
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No







# Argentina

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY




Turkmenistan did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty, but has consistently voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Argentina maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Argentina explained that it abstained on the TPNW resolution because it has not yet signed it, and that it 'is continuing its analysis and evaluation of the text of the Treaty.' See: [bit.ly/2KfHuo3](https://bit.ly/2KfHuo3).

## Recommendations

- Argentina should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Argentina should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

	
AMERICAS > SOUTH AMERICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	40%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Armenia

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL WITH RUSSIA)



Armenia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. The government has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Armenia is deemed to be part of an arrangement of extended nuclear deterrence and is therefore not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. It may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

## Latest developments

Armenia has indicated that the issue of adhering to the TPNW is not currently on the political agenda.

## Recommendations

- Armenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Armenia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

ASIA > WESTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Belarus

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL WITH RUSSIA)



Belarus did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not yet adhered to the Treaty. It has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As an umbrella state, Belarus is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. It may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

## Latest developments

Speaking in First Committee at the 2020 UN General Assembly, Belarus argued that problems related to nuclear weapons and failure to implement the NPT are becoming more acute. It also regretted that there are no NWFZs in Europe. See: [bit.ly/3fkgEqc](https://bit.ly/3fkgEqc).

## Recommendations

- Belarus should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Belarus should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- Belarus should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.



TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No (Signed 2005)
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	100–1,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Finland



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Finland did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty, but has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Finland maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

The Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Finnish Parliament gave a statement on the TPNW in June 2018. According to the Committee, the TPNW 'supports and complements' the NPT and CTBT. The TPNW 'could lead to changed expectations, priorities and views also in states outside of the treaty.' The Committee argued that Finland should 'continue to analyse the contents of the treaty and compare it to other central initiatives in the area.' The Committee did not offer a recommendation with respect to adherence or not, but concluded that Finland should cooperate with Sweden and monitor the Swedish stance on the TPNW. In a speech on August 25, 2020 Finland's Prime Minister Sanna Marin stated: 'We participate in the dialogue concerning the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons. Finland is committed to nuclear disarmament and promotes it through the Non-proliferation Treaty.' Three of the five political parties in Finland's coalition government have indicated their support for the TPNW: the Finnish Social Democratic Party, the Green League and the Left Alliance. The former Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomija has called on the government to join the TPNW. Since 1987 Finland has had national legislation in place (in its Nuclear Energy Act) which forbids the importation, manufacturing, possession and detonation of nuclear explosive devices in Finland. See: [bit.ly/2mkxaz9](https://bit.ly/2mkxaz9), [bit.ly/3meEw16](https://bit.ly/3meEw16), [bit.ly/3i3oZiB](https://bit.ly/3i3oZiB).

## Recommendations

- Finland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.



TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Georgia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Georgia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty, but has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Georgia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Speaking in the General Debate of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Georgia's Prime Minister, Giorgi Gakharia, did not touch upon the TPNW, but reflected on the need for global cooperation on common challenges, when he said: 'It has been voiced repeatedly here that all UN member states are equal, and the pandemic has made this clear; it showed us that in the face of common adversity, we must unite and use the unique capabilities of each state. Unfortunately, COVID-19 is not the only international challenge. There are many others, such as armed conflicts, poverty, climate change, natural and technogenic disasters, terrorism and international crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and many others.' See: [bit.ly/39d0ail](https://bit.ly/39d0ail).

## Recommendations

- Georgia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

EUROPE > WESTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Kyrgyzstan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Kyrgyzstan participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. The government has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Kyrgyzstan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

On behalf of the states parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan delivered a statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, where they stressed that 'for the states of Central Asia, the establishment of a zone was a practical necessity, driven by the need to ensure that the people of our region will never again suffer the consequences of a nuclear arms race.' See: [bit.ly/3l3fOQb](https://bit.ly/3l3fOQb).

## Recommendations

- Kyrgyzstan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

ASIA > CENTRAL ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Marshall Islands

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



The Marshall Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty and has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Latest developments

The Marshall Islands' President, David Kabua, said in the High-Level Debate of the UN General Assembly in 2020 that his country 'is not currently prepared to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and we will continue to study it', citing concerns about the Treaty's provisions on victim assistance and environmental remediation. See: [bit.ly/32Y2eaF](https://bit.ly/32Y2eaF).

## Recommendations

- The Marshall Islands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- The Marshall Islands should request that the United States cease testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Kwajalein Atoll.

OCEANIA > MICRONESIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	50%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Serbia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Serbia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Serbia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Nothing to report.

## Recommendations

- Serbia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.



### TPNW status

**Not signed, not ratified, not acceded**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Abstained</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Singapore

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Singapore participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but was the only state to abstain on the vote when the Treaty was adopted and has not adhered to it. The government has also consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Singapore maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Singapore stated that it aligned itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The ASEAN statement said: 'The TPNW is a historic agreement. It contributes towards global nuclear disarmament and complements other existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. There is an increasing number of instruments of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty [...] We believe that once entered into force, the TPNW will contribute further to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.' The NAM statement noted that 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/39dfKuY](https://bit.ly/39dfKuY), [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Singapore should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

ASIA > SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>17%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Abstained</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Abstained</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>Yes (Bangkok)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Somalia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY




Somalia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. The government has not cast a vote on any of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, or 2020. Somalia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, Somalia aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The African Group also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- Somalia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Somalia should conclude and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Somalia should also sign and ratify the CTBT, and ratify the BWC.



TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Did not vote
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# South Sudan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



South Sudan participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. The government has also not cast a vote on any of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, or 2020. South Sudan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

As a member of the African Group in the UN, South Sudan aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stated that the Treaty does not undermine the NPT but complements and strengthens it. The African Group also called on all states, especially nuclear-armed and umbrella states, to sign and ratify the TPNW, and to consider the catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, and economic impacts of nuclear weapons and to dismantle and renounce these weapons of mass destruction. See: [bit.ly/2UG2ImC](https://bit.ly/2UG2ImC).

## Recommendations

- South Sudan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- South Sudan should conclude and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. South Sudan should also adhere to the NPT, the CTBT, the BWC, and the CWC.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Did not vote
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	No (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	No
Party to the BWC	No
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Sweden



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty and has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Sweden maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

In July 2019 the Swedish government announced that it would 'refrain from signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the present time.' The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has confirmed that it will seek to become an observer state once the TPNW enters into force, to actively follow its further development. The government has also indicated that Sweden might reassess its position following the NPT review conference, now postponed to 2021. There has been extensive debate in the Swedish Parliament and in the media about the merits of the TPNW. Sweden has launched the Stockholm Initiative, which is aimed at unlocking disarmament diplomacy through constructive engagement and a 'stepping stones' approach. See: [bit.ly/2kr6r3l](https://bit.ly/2kr6r3l).

## Recommendations

- Sweden should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	45%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Switzerland



STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY

**Switzerland voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty and has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Switzerland maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

In June 2018, the Swiss Government published an interdepartmental working group (IDAG) report on the implications of accession to the TPNW. 'At the current stage', the report concluded, 'the reasons against an accession of Switzerland outweigh the potential opportunities accompanying a signature and ratification of this treaty.' Both houses of the Swiss Parliament subsequently instructed the government to sign and ratify without delay. The Swiss Government plans to update the IDAG report and review its decision after the NPT Review Conference, now postponed to 2021, and contends that this fulfils the mandate given by Parliament. Parliament and NGOs disagree. In a letter to ICAN dated 20 July 2020, the President of the Swiss Confederation, Ms. Simonetta Sommaruga, wrote: 'As you will know, the Federal Council has discussed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) a number of times on the basis of an in-depth analysis by an interdepartmental working group. While the Federal Council decided not to join the Treaty at this stage, it took note of the position of the Swiss Parliament and agreed to re-evaluate the Swiss position on the TPNW earlier than originally planned. The outcomes of the next NPT Review Conference are one of several developments which will influence the Swiss re-evaluation.' Bern and Geneva have signed ICAN's Cities Appeal. See: [bit.ly/2nGhQr](https://bit.ly/2nGhQr), [bit.ly/2kTeiql](https://bit.ly/2kTeiql), [bit.ly/2ktmTQF](https://bit.ly/2ktmTQF).

## Recommendations

- Switzerland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

EUROPE > WESTERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Abstained</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>14%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted yes</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Abstained</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/Stored abroad</b>

# Syrian Arab Republic

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Syria participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. The government has not cast a vote on any of the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, or 2020. Syria maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Syria aligned itself with the group's statement in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, which said: 'NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' See: [bit.ly/3kSkWGC](https://bit.ly/3kSkWGC).

## Recommendations

- Syria should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Syria should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Syria should also sign and ratify the CTBT and ratify the BWC.



### TPNW status

**Not signed, not ratified, not acceded**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>11%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Did not vote</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>No (Signatory)</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>1 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Tajikistan

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Tajikistan participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. The government has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Tajikistan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Tajikistan aligned itself with a statement delivered in First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly on behalf of the states parties to the NWFZ Treaty in Central Asia, which stressed that 'for the states of Central Asia, the establishment of a zone was a practical necessity, driven by the need to ensure that the people of our region will never again suffer the consequences of a nuclear arms race.' See: [bit.ly/3l3fOQb](https://bit.ly/3l3fOQb).

## Recommendations

- Tajikistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

ASIA > CENTRAL ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	No data
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Tonga

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Tonga voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty and abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2020. Tonga maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

As a member of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), Tonga aligned itself with the group's statement at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which said: 'The world does not need nuclear weapons. The challenges of nuclear disarmament can only be resolved by a strengthened multilateral system that sets the conditions for transparency, confidence-building and co-operation. The NPT, the CTBT and the TPNW are crucial if we are to further the objective of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Today, we PSIDSs say no to nuclear weapons, and we reiterate our commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. We encourage member states to ratify the CTBT and the TPNW. It is morally right, and we owe it to ourselves and our future generations.' See: [bit.ly/36QVwUU](https://bit.ly/36QVwUU).

## Recommendations

- Tonga should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Tonga should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. Tonga should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	Yes
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	33%
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Abstained
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Ukraine

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Ukraine boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty, but it has consistently abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Ukraine maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Ukraine did not touch upon the TPNW in its statements during the 2020 UN General Assembly, but in the General Debate, Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelensky, made the following remark regarding the need for global cooperation: 'Consider also this. Coronavirus spares no one. It does not care whether the country has nuclear weapons or what is the level of its GDP, [...] The COVID-19 showed that global world is not just the world without borders. It is also about global responsibility, when counteracting joint threats should involve not 7, not 20, but at least 193 countries.' He also said: 'We don't have a planet B. We live here and just once.' See: [bit.ly/2KCfyfC](https://bit.ly/2KCfyfC).

## Recommendations

- Ukraine should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

EUROPE > EASTERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Abstained</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>





# Albania

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Albania boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Albania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Albania voted against the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Albania stated that it has not joined the TPNW because it believes that 'in the current security architecture of the world a step-by-step approach to global nuclear disarmament is what we need to build trust and confidence.' The former Albanian president Rexhep Meidani and former prime ministers Ylli Bufi and Fatos Nano were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2IUbxRK](https://bit.ly/2IUbxRK), [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Albania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Albania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > SOUTHERN EUROPE	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Australia

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL WITH USA)



**Australia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Australia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

The Australian government has opposed the idea of a ban on nuclear weapons since the beginning. It has argued that a key problem with the TPNW is that it 'seeks to delegitimise extended deterrence' and 'would be inconsistent with our US alliance obligations'. The opposition Australian Labor Party in December 2018 formally committed to 'sign and ratify the Ban Treaty' when in government, after taking into account the need to ensure complementarity with the NPT and an effective verification and enforcement architecture. The Labor leader, Anthony Albanese, and shadow foreign minister, Penny Wong, reaffirmed this commitment in October 2020 upon the 50th ratification of the TPNW. Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney are among more than 30 cities in Australia that have committed to ICAN's Cities Appeal. See: [bit.ly/2mX63ek](https://bit.ly/2mX63ek), [bit.ly/2UR0gEj](https://bit.ly/2UR0gEj), [bit.ly/2mmfEdT](https://bit.ly/2mmfEdT), [bit.ly/36Y1CCR](https://bit.ly/36Y1CCR).

## Recommendations

- Australia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Australia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	1–10 kg
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Belgium

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Belgium boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state and a host of foreign nuclear weapons, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Belgium may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Belgium voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In January 2020, a resolution urging the Belgian government to remove the US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory and join the TPNW was narrowly rejected by parliament (74 votes against and 66 votes in favour). In September 2020, the country's new coalition government agreed on a government declaration which states that 'Belgium will play a proactive role in the 2021 NPT Review Conference and, together with European NATO allies, will explore how to strengthen the multilateral non-proliferation framework and how the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons can give new impetus to multilateral nuclear disarmament.' Four former prime ministers and foreign ministers of Belgium (Willy Claes, Erik Derycke, Yves Leterme and Guy Verhofstadt) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. A total of 39 cities and municipalities in Belgium have joined ICAN's Cities' Appeal. In September 2019, 152 Belgian mayors signed an open letter urging Belgium to join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2kKIHc0](https://bit.ly/2kKIHc0), [bit.ly/31DJsEL](https://bit.ly/31DJsEL), [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp), [bit.ly/31JwyF5](https://bit.ly/31JwyF5).

## Recommendations

- Belgium should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Belgium should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > WESTERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Not compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>100–1,000 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Bosnia and Herzegovina

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Bosnia and Herzegovina did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. Bosnia and Herzegovina maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Bosnia and Herzegovina voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations


- Bosnia and Herzegovina should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.



TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Bulgaria

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Bulgaria boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Bulgaria may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Bulgaria voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2018 UN General Assembly, Bulgaria, on behalf of a number of countries, argued that the TPNW will not contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons. See: [bit.ly/2HrFFUa](https://bit.ly/2HrFFUa).

## Recommendations

- Bulgaria should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Bulgaria should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.



TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Canada

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Canada boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Canada may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Canada voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In a written statement on 26 October 2020, Global Affairs Canada said: 'We acknowledge the widespread frustration with the pace of global efforts toward nuclear disarmament, which clearly motivated the negotiation of the TPNW.' A month earlier, two former Canadian prime ministers (Jean Chrétien, the now late John Turner), three former foreign ministers (Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham, John Manley) and two former defence ministers (Jean-Jacques Blais, John McCallum) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. Toronto and Vancouver are among ten Canadian cities that have committed to ICAN's Cities Appeal. See: [bit.ly/3pMI667](https://bit.ly/3pMI667), [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Canada should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Canada should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

AMERICAS > NORTHERN AMERICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>1,000–10,000 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# China

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (320 nuclear warheads)



**China boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. China may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

China voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, China said it objected to all references to the TPNW in various resolutions, and that nuclear disarmament cannot be divorced from the security environment. See: [bit.ly/2HjZ21c](https://bit.ly/2HjZ21c).

## Recommendations

- China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- China should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- China should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. China should conclude and bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. China should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFFZ	No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Voluntary offer agreement
IAEA AP in force	Partial
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	14,300 kg
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	2,900 kg/40 kg

# Croatia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Croatia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. It may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Croatia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The former Croatian foreign ministers Zdravko Mršić and Vesna Pusić were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Croatia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Croatia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.



EUROPE > SOUTHERN EUROPE

### TPNW status

**Not signed, not ratified, not acceded**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Czechia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Czechia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Czechia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Czechia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Jan Kavan, a former Czech foreign minister and former president of the UN General Assembly, was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Czechia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Czechia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Democratic People's Republic of Korea



NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (35 nuclear warheads)

**North Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As a nuclear-armed state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. North Korea may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

North Korea is the only state to have tested a nuclear weapon in the 21st century. North Korea abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018 and 2019, and voted against in 2020. In 2017, North Korea stated in First Committee of the UN General Assembly that it 'consistently supports the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the efforts for denuclearization of the entire world. However as long as the U.S. who constantly threatens and blackmails the [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] with nuclear weapons rejects the NBT [Nuclear Ban treaty] the DPRK is not in position to accede to the treaty'. See: [bit.ly/3nKMb7T](https://bit.ly/3nKMb7T).

## Recommendations

- North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- North Korea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- North Korea should return to the NPT regime. North Korea should implement its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA, and conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP). It should also adhere to the CTBT and the CWC.



ASIA > EASTERN ASIA

### TPNW status

**Not signed, not ratified, not acceded**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Did not vote</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Not compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Not compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>No (1985-2003)</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes (Not implemented)</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>No</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>100 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>40 kg/No</b>

# Denmark

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Denmark boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Denmark may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Denmark voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. A ban on nuclear weapons would conflict with NATO commitments, said Denmark's Foreign Minister in 2017. Three former Danish foreign ministers (Mogens Lykketoft, Holger K. Nielsen and Kjeld Olesen) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2krOgux](https://bit.ly/2krOgux), [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Denmark should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Denmark should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Estonia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Estonia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Estonia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Estonia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- Estonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Estonia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > NORTHERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# France

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (290 nuclear warheads)



**France boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. France may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

France voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In an Explanation of Vote on the TPNW resolution in 2019, France, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, said that they are 'firmly opposed' to the TPNW. They asserted that '[n]uclear deterrence is essential to international security' and argued that the TPNW 'denies this reality.' In July 2018, an information mission set up by the parliamentary foreign affairs commission concluded that France should 'mitigate its criticism' of the TPNW 'and the countries that have contributed to its adoption, to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of States and their desire for more balanced global governance.' Paris and a dozen other French cities have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal. See: [bit.ly/2UNUuDt](https://bit.ly/2UNUuDt), [bit.ly/2krrvX](https://bit.ly/2krrvX).

## Recommendations

- France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- France should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- France should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. It should conclude and bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

EUROPE > WESTERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Not compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Not compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Not compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Voluntary offer agreement</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Partial</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>30,000 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>6,000 kg/67,700 kg</b>

# Germany

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Germany boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state and a host of foreign nuclear weapons, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Germany may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Germany voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The German government has consistently opposed the idea of a treaty banning nuclear weapons. The opposition Green Party released its party platform for the 2021 election on 22 November 2020, confirming that it is a foreign policy priority for the Green Party to get Germany to join the TPNW. Opposition party Linke also favours German adherence, and support for the TPNW keeps growing in the German Parliament. 168 federal parliamentarians have signed the ICAN Parliamentary Appeal. A cross-party working group on the TPNW (Parlamentskreis Atomwaffenverbot) was established in the Parliament in September 2019. The former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer and former defence minister Rudolf Scharping were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. Four federal states and almost 100 cities have signed ICAN's Cities Appeal, including all 16 capitals of federal states. See: [bit.ly/390tzQS](https://bit.ly/390tzQS), [bit.ly/2krGFfn](https://bit.ly/2krGFfn), [bit.ly/2ojf2GU](https://bit.ly/2ojf2GU), [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Germany should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Germany should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > WESTERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Not compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>100–1,000 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Greece

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Greece boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Greece may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Greece voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The former Greek foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Greece should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Greece should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.



TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Hungary

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)




**Hungary boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Hungary may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Hungary voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. According to the Hungarian government, the TPNW may 'intentionally or unintentionally [...] lead to the erosion of the NPT regime.' The former Hungarian defence minister Szekeres Imre was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2kWHFz2](https://bit.ly/2kWHFz2), [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Hungary should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Hungary should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Iceland



UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)

**Iceland boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Iceland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Iceland voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In Iceland's Parliament, 40% of the members have signed ICAN's Parliamentary Pledge. The former Icelandic prime minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir and former foreign ministers Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir and Össur Skarphéðinsson were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Iceland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Iceland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > NORTHERN EUROPE	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# India

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (150 nuclear warheads)



**India boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. India may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

India voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, India said that it did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and therefore will not join the Treaty or be bound by its obligations. It further said that the TPNW does not constitute or contribute to customary international law. See: [bit.ly/3kX0fsZ](https://bit.ly/3kX0fsZ).

## Recommendations

- India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- India should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- India should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. India should conclude and bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. It should also sign and ratify the CTBT.



### TPNW status

**Not signed, not ratified, not acceded**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Abstained</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Not compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Not compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>No</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Item-specific agreement</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Partial</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>4,400 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>600 kg/6,900 kg</b>



# Israel



NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (90 nuclear warheads)

**Israel boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Israel may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Israel voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, Israel said it did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and 'has deep reservations about this initiative.' See: [bit.ly/35RurBw](https://bit.ly/35RurBw).

## Recommendations

- Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Israel should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- Israel should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Israel should conclude and bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. It should also ratify the CTBT and the CWC.

ASIA > WESTERN ASIA	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Item-specific agreement
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	No (Signatory)
Party to the BWC	No
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	300 kg
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	900 kg/No

# Italy

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Italy boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state and host of foreign nuclear weapons, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Italy may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Italy voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The former Italian prime minister Enrico Letta and former foreign minister Franco Frattini were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. In September 2017, the Italian parliament adopted a resolution committing the government to 'pursue a nuclear weapon free world' and 'in a way compatible with its NATO obligations and with the positioning of allied states, to explore the possibility of becoming a party to the legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons'. According to the government, the NPT 'provides the only realistic legal framework to attain a world without nuclear weapons, in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.' See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp), [bit.ly/2IY88FY](https://bit.ly/2IY88FY), [bit.ly/2kkJldB](https://bit.ly/2kkJldB).

## Recommendations

- Italy should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Italy should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.



### TPNW status

**Not signed, not ratified, not acceded**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Not compatible</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>100–1,000 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/Stored abroad</b>

# Japan

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL WITH USA)



**Japan boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Japan may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Japan voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In October 2020, Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato said that the treaty is 'different from our approach' and the government's position not to sign it 'remains unchanged.' The former Japanese prime minister Hatoyama Yukio, former foreign minister Tanaka Makiko, and former defence minister Tanaka Naoki were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. 1,733 municipalities (out of the national total of 1,741, or 99.5%) are members of Mayors for Peace. The mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have expressed their support for ICAN's Cities Appeal on behalf of the Japanese member cities of Mayors for Peace and have requested the Japanese government to join the TPNW and until then participate in the meetings of states parties as an observer. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp), [bit.ly/37kmiXc](https://bit.ly/37kmiXc), [bit.ly/2Kar14P](https://bit.ly/2Kar14P).

## Recommendations

- Japan should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Japan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

ASIA > EASTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>1,000–10,000 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/45,700 kg</b>

# Latvia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Latvia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Latvia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Latvia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Three former Latvian defence ministers (Tālav Jundzis, Linda Mūrniece and Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Latvia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Latvia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

<p>EUROPE &gt; NORTHERN EUROPE</p>	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Lithuania

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Lithuania boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Lithuania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Lithuania voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In 2018, the Lithuanian delegation declared in First Committee of the UN General Assembly that, 'Given the current geopolitical context, we do not agree that delegitimization of nuclear weapons is a realistic addition to the harmonization of the disarmament and security ends.' See: [bit.ly/2m4sUne](https://bit.ly/2m4sUne).

## Recommendations

- Lithuania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Lithuania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Luxembourg

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Luxembourg boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Luxembourg may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Luxembourg voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- Luxembourg should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Luxembourg should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>



# Micronesia

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



**Micronesia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. Micronesia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.**

## Latest developments

Micronesia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- Micronesia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Micronesia should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA and conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP). Micronesia should also adhere to the BWC.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>No (Signed 2015)</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>No</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Monaco

STATE WITH NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY POLICY



Monaco participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. Monaco maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

## Latest developments

Monaco voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- Monaco should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

EUROPE > WESTERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>67%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Montenegro

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Montenegro boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Montenegro may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Montenegro voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- Montenegro should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Montenegro should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > SOUTHERN EUROPE	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Netherlands

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



The Netherlands was the only umbrella state to participate in the negotiations of the TPNW in 2017 and the only state that voted against the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017. As an umbrella state and host of foreign nuclear weapons, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. The Netherlands may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

## Latest developments

The Netherlands voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In November 2018, the Dutch House of Representatives adopted a series of motions calling on the government to intensify its advocacy for nuclear disarmament, including to champion the TPNW within NATO and investigate the compatibility of the TPNW with existing Dutch legislation. In January 2019, the Dutch foreign and defence ministers informed the Dutch House of Representatives that there are no legal obstacles within Dutch law preventing the Netherlands from joining the TPNW. An opinion poll conducted in April 2019 shows that a large majority of Dutch citizens want the Netherlands to sign the TPNW. In January 2020, the Dutch minister of foreign affairs repeated that the government does not support the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2P730d7](https://bit.ly/2P730d7), [bit.ly/2QVL4nB](https://bit.ly/2QVL4nB), [bit.ly/3i3Z5eH](https://bit.ly/3i3Z5eH).

## Recommendations

- The Netherlands should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of nuclear weapons.
- The Netherlands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > WESTERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Abstained</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>30%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Voted no</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Not compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>100–1,000 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/Stored abroad</b>

# North Macedonia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



North Macedonia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. After joining NATO in 2020 without reserving itself from the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, North Macedonia became part of an extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangement and is therefore not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. North Macedonia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

## Latest developments

North Macedonia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020.

## Recommendations

- North Macedonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- North Macedonia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.



EUROPE > SOUTHERN EUROPE

### TPNW status

**Not signed, not ratified, not acceded**

### TPNW voting and participation

Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted yes</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>Yes</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>50%</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>Did not vote</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>

### TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>

### Related treaties and regimes

Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>No</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>

### Fissile material

Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Norway

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



Norway started the initiative on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which resulted in a majority of states negotiating and adopting the TPNW. But Norway boycotted the negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Norway may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

## Latest developments

Norway voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Ine Eriksen Smith, confirmed in Parliament in November 2018 that 'there is no legal obligation barring Norway from signing or ratifying the TPNW, but strong political commitments amounting from the Atlantic Treaty and the strategic documents we have adopted.' Two former Norwegian prime ministers (Kjell Magne Bondevik, Thorbjørn Jagland), two former foreign ministers (Bjørn Tore Godal, Knut Vollebæk), and two former defence ministers (Eldbjørg Løwer, Anne-Grete Strøm Erichsen) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. Norway's capital Oslo and 39 other Norwegian cities have endorsed ICAN's Cities Appeal. See: [bit.ly/2IYHBnG](https://bit.ly/2IYHBnG), [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Norway should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Norway should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > NORTHERN EUROPE	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	1–10 kg
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Pakistan

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (160 nuclear warheads)



**Pakistan boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Pakistan may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Pakistan voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Pakistan explained that it voted against the TPNW resolution because 'progress on nuclear disarmament and arms control can't be divorced from security challenges'. See: [bit.ly/3ITFuQw](https://bit.ly/3ITFuQw).

## Recommendations

- Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Pakistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- Pakistan should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Pakistan should conclude and bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. It should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

ASIA > SOUTHERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Abstained</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Not compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Not compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>No</b>
Party to a NWFFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Item-specific agreement</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>No</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>3,700 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>370 kg/No</b>

# Poland

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Poland boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Poland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Poland voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former prime minister Hanna Suchocka, and former foreign ministers Andrzej Olechowski and Dariusz Rosati were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Poland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Poland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > EASTERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Portugal

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Portugal boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Portugal may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Portugal voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The former Portuguese defence minister Nuno Severiano Teixeira was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp)

## Recommendations

- Portugal should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Portugal should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > SOUTHERN EUROPE	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# Republic of Korea

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL WITH USA)



**South Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. South Korea may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

South Korea voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In the words of the South Korean delegation to the 2018 NPT Preparatory Committee, the TPNW, 'crafted without the participation of nuclear-weapon states cannot but bear intrinsic limitation.' Ban Ki-moon, a former foreign minister of South Korea and a former UN secretary-general, was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2mqPAYq](https://bit.ly/2mqPAYq), [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- South Korea should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- South Korea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

	
ASIA > EASTERN ASIA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Romania

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Romania boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Romania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Romania voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. According to the Romanian delegation to the 2018 NPT Preparatory Committee, '[a] viable road to nuclear disarmament in the current security environment should concentrate first and foremost on improving the geopolitical conditions.' See: [bit.ly/2mnh6N6](https://bit.ly/2mnh6N6).

## Recommendations

- Romania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Romania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > EASTERN EUROPE	
TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No



# Russian Federation

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (6,372 nuclear warheads)



**Russia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Russia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Russia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly Russia delivered a statement attacking the TPNW for potentially 'destroying' the non-proliferation regime, asserting that it is not based on the principles of the NPT and 'cannot' achieve nuclear disarmament. See: [bit.ly/3nNYbbp](https://bit.ly/3nNYbbp).

## Recommendations

- Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. Russia should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Russia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- Russia should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Russia should bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. It should also extend New START.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Not compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Voluntary offer agreement
IAEA AP in force	Partial
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	679,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	128,000 kg/61,300 kg



# Slovakia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Slovakia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Slovakia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Slovakia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In 2018, Slovakia's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs declared that 'we do not believe that the mere existence of a legally binding international instrument banning nuclear weapons will attain the goal of zero. No shortcuts can lead us toward this direction. That is the reason, why Slovakia is not in the position to support the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.' The former Slovakian foreign minister Juraj Schenk was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2mjLzvs](https://bit.ly/2mjLzvs), [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Slovakia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Slovakia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > EASTERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Slovenia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Slovenia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Slovenia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Slovenia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The former Slovenian president Danilo Türk and former defence ministers Ljubica Jelusič and Alojz Krapež were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Slovenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Slovenia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

EUROPE > SOUTHERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>No (Observer)</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/No</b>

# Spain

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Spain boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Spain may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Spain voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House of the Spanish Parliament adopted a resolution on 21 December 2020 which welcomed the TPNW 'as an effort to move towards peace, security and disarmament'. The Spanish government agreed in September 2018 to sign the TPNW. The agreement was made during negotiations on the 2019 budget, when the left-wing party Podemos obtained a commitment from the government to sign the Treaty in exchange for Podemos' support for the 2019 budget. During a meeting in 2020 with ICAN, Spanish government officials said that the government is not ready to sign the TPNW but willing to participate in the First Meeting of States Parties as an observer. Three former Spanish foreign ministers (Ana Palacio, Javier Solana and Carlos Westendorp) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. Twelve Spanish cities including Barcelona have signed ICAN's Cities Appeal. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp), [bit.ly/2koi0gA](https://bit.ly/2koi0gA).

## Recommendations

- Spain should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Spain should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>No</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>No</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>No/Stored abroad</b>

# Turkey

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



**Turkey boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. As an umbrella state and host of foreign nuclear weapons, it is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Turkey may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

Turkey voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. The former Turkish defence minister Hikmet Sami Türk was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW. See: [bit.ly/2TwCaOp](https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp).

## Recommendations

- Turkey should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Turkey should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.



TPNW status	
Not signed, not ratified, not acceded	
TPNW voting and participation	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations	No
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Last vote on UNGA resolution	Voted no
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Not compatible
Related treaties and regimes	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes
Fissile material	
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	No/No

# United Kingdom

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (195 nuclear warheads)



**The United Kingdom boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. The United Kingdom may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

The United Kingdom voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In 2017, the government said that the United Kingdom 'does not intend to sign, ratify or become party to' the TPNW. It further stated that '[t]he unpredictable international security environment we face today demands the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.' More than 30 bishops of the Church of England published a letter in the Observer on 15 November 2020, calling on the UK government to sign the TPNW. Despite the UK government's position, the devolved government in Scotland has reiterated repeatedly its opposition to nuclear weapons. The First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, the majority of Scottish parliamentarians both in the Scottish Parliament and among those who represent Scotland in the UK Parliament at Westminster have signed ICAN's Parliamentary Pledge and spoken out in support of the TPNW. The cities of Edinburgh and Manchester have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal. See: [bit.ly/2mp3twV](https://bit.ly/2mp3twV), [bit.ly/37DegYk](https://bit.ly/37DegYk), [bit.ly/2ms2psg](https://bit.ly/2ms2psg).

## Recommendations

- The United Kingdom should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- The United Kingdom should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- The United Kingdom should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. It should conclude and bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.

EUROPE > NORTHERN EUROPE	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Not compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Not compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Not compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Not compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>Yes (Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Voluntary offer agreement</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Partial</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>22,600 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>3,200 kg/115,800 kg</b>



# United States of America

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (5,800 nuclear warheads)



**The United States boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. The United States may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.**

## Latest developments

The United States voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In October 2020, the United States called on states that had ratified the TPNW to withdraw from the Treaty. The government's opposition to the TPNW is unlikely to change with the transition from the Trump administration to the Biden administration in January 2021, though it is expected that the US will rejoin and renew previous arms control agreements and consider limits on nuclear-weapons use and the development of new weapons. Support, primarily through the Back from the Brink campaign, for the ICAN Cities Appeal continues to build in the US, numbering 36 cities and towns and three state governments in December 2020. Opinion varies considerably from region to region in the US, but 49% of Americans now support nuclear weapons abolition. New York City continues to consider divesting from nuclear weapons makers, which, if successful, would be the largest city in the world to do so. See: [bit.ly/3lswFgm](https://bit.ly/3lswFgm), [bit.ly/3qqUTKO](https://bit.ly/3qqUTKO).

## Recommendations

- The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- The United States should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- The United States should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. The United States should conclude and bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. It should extend New START, rejoin Open Skies Treaty, and return to compliance with the JCPOA. The United States should also ratify the CTBT.

AMERICAS > NORTHERN AMERICA	
<b>TPNW status</b>	
<b>Not signed, not ratified, not acceded</b>	
<b>TPNW voting and participation</b>	
Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)	<b>Voted no</b>
Participated in treaty negotiations	<b>No</b>
Share of women in treaty neg. delegation	<b>N/A</b>
Vote on adoption of treaty text	<b>N/A</b>
Last vote on UNGA resolution	<b>Voted no</b>
<b>TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2020</b>	
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	<b>Not compatible</b>
Test	<b>Compatible</b>
Possess or stockpile	<b>Not compatible</b>
(b) Transfer	<b>Not compatible</b>
(c) Receive transfer or control	<b>Compatible</b>
(d) Use	<b>Compatible</b>
Threaten to use	<b>Compatible</b>
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	<b>Not compatible</b>
(f) Seek or receive assistance	<b>Not compatible</b>
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	<b>Compatible</b>
<b>Related treaties and regimes</b>	
Party to the NPT	<b>Yes</b>
Party to a NWFZ	<b>No (1 of 5 NSA protocols)</b>
Ratified the CTBT	<b>No (Signed, Annex 2 state)</b>
Party to the PTBT	<b>Yes</b>
Member of the CD	<b>Yes</b>
IAEA CSA in force	<b>Voluntary offer agreement</b>
IAEA AP in force	<b>Partial</b>
Party to the CWC	<b>Yes</b>
Party to the BWC	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Fissile material</b>	
Fissile material production facilities	<b>Yes</b>
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<b>565,000 kg</b>
Plutonium stocks (military/civilian)	<b>79,700 kg/8,000 kg</b>





## Annexes

### Annex I: Comparison of the prohibitions in the TPNW and the NPT

Activity	TPNW	NPT	
	All States Parties	'Nuclear-weapon states'	'Non-nuclear-weapon states'
Research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes	● Permitted	● Permitted	● Permitted
Develop nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Not addressed
Manufacture nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Prohibited
Test nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	
Possess and stockpile nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Prohibited(implicitly)
Transfer nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Prohibited	● Not addressed
Receiving the transfer of nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	● Prohibited
Use nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	● Prohibited(implicitly)
Threaten to use nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	● Prohibited(implicitly)
Assist, encourage, or induce 'nuclear-weapon states' to engage in activities prohibited under the respective Treaty.	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Permitted (implicitly)
Assist, encourage, or induce 'non-nuclear-weapon states' to carry out acts prohibited under the respective Treaty.	● Prohibited	● Prohibited for 'nuclear-weapon states' to assist, encourage, or induce 'non-nuclear-weapon states' to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over these devices.	● Transfer of nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon states is prohibited unless safeguarded. Otherwise not addressed.
Seek or receive assistance from another state in the manufacture of nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Prohibited
Seek or receive assistance from another state in the development, possession, stockpiling, or use of nuclear weapons	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	
Allow stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory or at any place under its control	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	

## Annex II: Nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2020

The information on new nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition is primarily sourced from the Nuclear Notebooks, compiled by experts at the Federation of American Scientist and published by the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, at: [thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook](http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook). The full extent of developments is not known.

### Russia

- A new nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile labelled Burevestnik.
- Sarmat, a new intercontinental ballistic missile. The new weapon is scheduled to enter service in 2021.
- Poseidon, an autonomous, nuclear-powered, and nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle capable of producing a 'radioactive tsunami', is currently under development by Rubin Design Bureau. The weapon is scheduled to be delivered in 2027.
- A nuclear-capable hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, Avangard, which can be installed on intercontinental ballistic missiles.
- An air-launched ballistic missile, Kinzhal, deliverable by MiG-31 fighter aircraft. The Kinzhal appears to be a modified version of the Iskander-M missile.
- New, improved nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Borei-class are set to replace SSBNs in the Delta-classes.
- A fighter modernisation programme involves the development of a stealthier version of the Tu-160, the Tu-160M2, and the equipping of the Tu-95 and Tu-160 to carry a larger number of air-launched cruise missiles (now 14 missiles per aircraft).
- New nuclear-capable fighters, the Su-57, have reportedly just entered serial production.
- A new generation of bombers, known as the PAK-DA, is under development by Tupolev.
- A new class of nuclear attack-submarines capable of delivering nuclear-armed torpedoes or cruise missiles, known as Project 885M or Yasen-M, is under construction and development.
- Several missile defence and tactical nuclear-weapon systems are reportedly being updated and introduced.

### United States

- A new air-launched cruise missile, labelled the 'Long Range Stand Off Weapon', is currently being developed by Raytheon.
- Development of a new intercontinental ballistic missile, commonly referred to as the 'Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent' programme, is currently at an advanced stage. Northrop Grumman is the only bidder for the contract – Boeing withdrew from the process in 2019, suggesting that the US Air Force was 'playing favourites'.
- A new fighter-bomber, Lockheed Martin's F-35, has recently been completed. The software for nuclear use was set to be introduced from 2020.
- A new nuclear gravity bomb, the B61-12, is under development. The bomb features a guidance tail kit that ostensibly will allow for greater precision in targeting. The US government insists that it is not a new weapon – merely a refinement of existing hardware. Several other warheads are undergoing less comprehensive 'life-extension' programmes.
- Development of a new nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missile is currently at the planning stage.
- Development of three new ground-launched intermediate-range missiles (two ballistic missiles and one cruise missile) is underway. It is currently unclear whether these will have the capability to carry nuclear warheads.
- A new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, dubbed the Columbia-class, is currently in the engineering and manufacturing development phase and is scheduled to enter service in 2031. According to current plans, General Dynamics will build a minimum of 12 new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
- The United States is in the midst of a full overhaul of all three legs of its nuclear triad (air, sea, land), an effort that will, over the next 30 years, commit expenditure on nuclear weapons of up to an unprecedented US\$2 trillion (accounting for inflation).<sup>208</sup>

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208 K. Reif with A. Sanders-Zakre, 'U.S. Nuclear Excess', Arms Control Association (April 2019), at: [bit.ly/2zt2yyL](http://bit.ly/2zt2yyL).

## China

- New intercontinental ballistic missiles, the DF-41 and the DF-31AG, are reportedly nearing completion. The missile may be China's first with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capability.
- A new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, type 096, is reportedly under development and will begin construction in the mid-2020s.
- A new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the JL-3. The new missile will likely have a range of up to 10,000 km.
- A new strategic bomber, known as the H-20, is expected to become operational by the late 2020s.

## India

- A near-intercontinental ballistic missile, Agni-V, is nearing completion.
- India ordered 36 Rafale fighters from the French aviation company Dassault in 2017. The Rafale serves in a nuclear role in the French Air Force, and it is likely that India will use the Rafale in a similar role, albeit initially with gravity bombs and not air-launched cruise missiles.
- India is currently constructing two new Arihant-class submarines, as well as developing a new class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, the S-5.
- A new, intermediate-range SLBM, the K4. The K4 has been tested on a number of occasions and is nearing completion.
- A new near-intercontinental-range SLBM matching the design of the Agni-V.
- A new ground-launched cruise missile capable of carrying nuclear or conventional warheads, the Nirbhay.

## Pakistan

- A medium-range ballistic missile known as Ababeel, with MIRV capability.
- A short-range, ground-based cruise missile, Babur-2, is being tested.
- A short-range, submarine-launched cruise missile, Babur-3, is being tested. The missile, which will be deployable on the diesel-electric Agosta-class submarines, will reportedly be able to carry both nuclear and conventional warheads.

## France

- A third-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, currently known as the SNLE-3G project, is being designed by Naval Group.
- New versions of the M51 nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missile are under development. The fourth version, M51.4, is set to become operational in 2025.
- A new air-launched cruise missile, currently known as the ASN4G, is currently being developed by the Ariane Group (a joint venture of Airbus and Safran) and scheduled to enter service around 2035. The new missile will reportedly have longer range than the current ASMP-A cruise missile.

## The United Kingdom

- A new generation of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, the Dreadnought-class, is being constructed by BAE Systems. The first submarine is provisionally expected to enter service in the early 2030s.
- The United Kingdom is looking to replace its 'Holbrook' nuclear warheads, which are based on the US W76 warhead. (UK officials have reportedly lobbied the US Congress to support the development of a new warhead, the W93, on which a new UK Trident would presumably be based.<sup>209</sup>)

## Israel

- Israel is currently integrating 50 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighters, which may be nuclear-capable.

## North Korea

- Intercontinental ballistic missiles (Bukkeukseong-3, Hwasong-15, Hwasong-14, Hwasong-13), likely with longer reach and greater warhead capacity than current systems.
- An intermediate-range ballistic missile (Hwasong-12), likely with greater warhead capacity than current systems.
- A medium-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (Bukkeukseong-1).

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209 See J. Berger, 'UK lobbies US to support controversial new nuclear warheads', *The Guardian*, 1 August 2020, at: [bit.ly/3hRtqga](https://bit.ly/3hRtqga).

## Annex III: Tests with missiles specifically designed for nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable missiles

The main source is the news section of the Missile Threat website produced by the Missile Defense Project at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), at: [bit.ly/3ghd6ou](http://bit.ly/3ghd6ou).

State	Date in 2020	Missile	Details
China	26 August	DF-26 IRBM/DF-21 MRBM	Launched from Qinghai/Zhejiang.
France <sup>210</sup>	12 June	M51	Unknown.
	9 Dec	ASMP-A	Launched from 120 air base in Cazaux.
India	19 January	K4	Unknown.
	24 January	K4	The Bay of Bengal, off the coast of the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, near Vizag.
	23 September	Prithvi-II	From near Chandipur to the Bay of Bengal.
	3 October	K-15 Sagarika/Shaurya SLBM	Abdul Kalam Island test range in Odisha into Bay of Bengal.
	12 October	Nirbhay cruise missile	Launched from facility in Odisha.
Israel	No tests publicly reported.		
North Korea	2 March	Apparent ballistic missiles	Flight from Sondok area in South Hamgyong province.
	21 March	KN-24 SRBM	Flight from Sonchon into the East Sea.
	29 March	KN-25 SRBM	Flight from Wonsan into Sea of Japan.
Pakistan	23 January	Ghaznavi (Hatf 3)	Unknown.
	18 February	Ra'ad-II ALCM	Fired from a Mirage aircraft.
Russia <sup>211</sup>	Early January	Tsirkon hypersonic missile	Sea launched in the Barents Sea.
	7 October	Tsirkon hypersonic missile	Sea launched in the Barents Sea.
	9 December	R-29RM ballistic missile	Sea launched in the Barents Sea.
	9 December	ALCMs (At least some of them of the Kh-101 type.)	Launched from strategic bombers at the Pemboy test range.
	9 December	Yars ICBM	Launched from mobile launcher deployed at Plesetsk test site toward the Kura range in Kamchatka.
	12 December	4 Bulava missiles	Launched from Sea of Okhotsk toward the Chizha test range.
United Kingdom	No tests. <sup>212</sup>		
United States	5 February	Minuteman III ICBM	Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
	12 February	Trident II (D5LE) SLBM	Off coast of San Diego, California.
	16 February	Trident II (D5LE) SLBM	Off coast of San Diego, California.
	10 March/30 April	Precision Strike Missile	White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.
	4 August	Minuteman III ICBM	Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
	2 September	Minuteman III ICBM	From Vandenberg Air Force Base, California to Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands.
	29 October	Minuteman III ICBM	From Vandenberg Air Force Base, California to Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands.

<sup>210</sup> The French tests were reported at: [bit.ly/2KceJZH](http://bit.ly/2KceJZH) and [bit.ly/3acRSbn](http://bit.ly/3acRSbn).

<sup>211</sup> The main source for the Russian tests is the website Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, at: [russianforces.org/](http://russianforces.org/).

<sup>212</sup> The United Kingdom does not conduct missile tests as regularly as other nuclear-armed states, as its Trident missiles are on lease from the United States and receive upkeep and maintenance work in a common pool with the equivalent US missiles at Kings Bay in Georgia, United States.

## Annex IV: Nuclear-weapon inventories in 2020

The information on nuclear-weapon inventories is primarily sourced from the Nuclear Notebooks, compiled by experts at the Federation of American Scientists and published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at: [thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook](http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook). The full extent of inventories is not known.

### United States

- **Intercontinental ballistic missiles** (Minuteman III), capable of delivering two types of warheads (W78 and W87).
- **Submarine-launched ballistic missiles** (Trident II), capable of delivering three types of warheads (W88, W76-1, and W76-2), deployable across 14 Ohio-class **ballistic missile submarines** (the W76-2 warhead is a new 'low-yield' warhead deployed in 2019).
- **Bomber aircraft** (B-52 and B-2), capable of delivering nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles and two types of nuclear bombs (B61 and B83).
- **Fighter aircraft** (F-15 and F-16), capable of delivering nuclear bombs (B61).

### Russia

- **8 types of intercontinental ballistic missiles**, capable of delivering warheads of varying yields.
- **3 types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles**, capable of delivering 3, 4, or 6 MIRV warheads respectively, deployable across six Delta IV **nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines** (SSBNs), one Delta III SSBN, and three Borei SSBNs.
- **Bomber aircraft** (Tu-95 MS, Tu-95 MSM, and Tu-160), capable of delivering nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (AS-15A, AS-23B, AS-15B) and nuclear bombs (AS-23B).
- **Fighter aircraft** (Tu-22M3, Su-23M, Su-34, MiG-31K), capable of delivering nuclear bombs.
- **ABM/Air/Coastal defence systems**, including surface-to-air-missile S-300/S-400. Many systems can be used with both nuclear and conventional warheads.
- **Short/medium-range ground-based missiles** (Tochka, Iskander-M, 9M728, and 9M729). The deployment of the 9M729 missile prompted the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019.
- **Naval systems**, including sea-launched cruise missiles, anti-submarine weapons, and torpedoes capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

### China

- **Intercontinental ballistic missiles**, capable of delivering one or up to eight nuclear warheads.
- **Medium/intermediate-range ballistic missiles**, capable of delivering one nuclear warhead.
- **Submarine-launched ballistic missiles** (JL-2), deployable across four Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Each sub carries up to 12 missiles.
- **Bombers** (H-6K) capable of delivering either one nuclear bomb or one air-launched ballistic missile.
- **Fighters** capable of delivering one nuclear bomb.
- **Cruise missiles (?)** Chinese (air-launched) cruise missiles may be nuclear capable.

### India

- **Medium/intermediate-range ballistic missiles** Agni-II, Agni-III, and Agni-IV, each capable of delivering one 40kt nuclear warhead.
- **Short-range ballistic missiles** (Prithvi-II and Agni-I), capable of delivering one 12kt nuclear warhead and 50kt nuclear warhead, respectively.
- **Fighters** (Varja/Mirage 200H and Shamsher/Jaguar IS) capable of delivering one nuclear bomb each.
- **Short-range, ship-based ballistic missiles** (Danush) capable of delivering one 12kt nuclear bomb. Deployable on two specially configured Sukanya-class patrol vessels.
- **Short-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles** (K15/Sagarika) capable of delivering one 12kt nuclear bomb. Deployable on two nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in the Arihant-class.

### Pakistan

- **Short-range, ground-based ballistic missiles** (Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-1, Shaheen-1A, and NASR), each capable of delivering one 5–12kt nuclear warhead.
- **Medium/intermediate-range ballistic missiles** (Shaheen-2, Ghauri, and Shaheen-3). The latter may still be under development.
- **Short-range, ground-based cruise missiles** (Babur), capable of delivering one 5–12kt nuclear warhead each.
- **Short-range, air-launched cruise missiles** (Ra'ad and Ra'ad-2).
- **Fighters** (F-16 and Mirage III/V) capable of delivering one nuclear bomb each.



### France

- **Submarine-launched ballistic missiles** (M51.1 and M51.2), each armed with 100kt nuclear warheads (of the TN75 and TNO types, respectively), deployable across four Triomphant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
- **Fighters** (Rafale MF3 and Rafale BF3, the former carrier-based and the latter ground-based), armed with one air-launched cruise missile (ASMP-A) each.

### The United Kingdom

- **Submarine-launched ballistic missiles** (Trident II) carrying Holbrook warheads with yields varying up to 100kt, deployable across four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

### Israel

- **Medium/intermediate-range ballistic missiles** (Jericho II and Jericho III), likely capable of delivering nuclear warheads.
- **Fighters** (F-16 and F-15), likely capable of delivering nuclear bombs
- **Submarine-launched cruise missiles** (likely) deployable across Dolphin-class diesel-electric submarines.

### North Korea

- **Intercontinental ballistic missiles** (Hwasong-13, Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, Hwasong-16).
- **Submarine-launched ballistic missiles** (Bukgeukseong-1).
- **Medium/intermediate-range ballistic missiles** (Hwasong-10, Hwasong-7, Hwasong-9).

## Annex V: Assumed verification missions required by the TPNW

	TPNW Fissile Material Verification Missions					IAEA Safeguards Missions
State category and TPNW obligation	Join-and-destroy states (Articles 4(2) and (3))			Destroy-and-join states (Article 4(1))		Non-nuclear-armed states (Articles 3(1) and (2))
Mission type and objective	Verify elimination of the nuclear weapons	Verify elimination of the nuclear-weapons complex	Prevent re-armament	Verify elimination of a former nuclear-weapons complex	Prevent re-armament	Verify non-proliferation undertakings under the NPT and the TPNW
Verification steps	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Verify all declared nuclear weapons and nuclear warheads;</li> <li>2. Verify the absence of any undeclared nuclear weapons;</li> <li>3. Verify the removal of each deployed warhead from its delivery system and establish a chain of custody;</li> <li>4. Verify each warhead by visual examination, use of allowed radiometric devices, and application of containment and surveillance measures;</li> <li>5. Verify transport and interim storage of each warhead pending dismantlement;</li> <li>6. Verify warhead dismantlement and removal of fissile material primary and secondary components;</li> <li>7. Verify transport and interim storage of fissile material warhead components pending processing to remove classified properties;</li> <li>8. Verify release of unclassified fissile material from nuclear weapons use to disposition.</li> <li>9. Verify disposition of unclassified fissile material.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Verify location and function of each nuclear weapon facility;</li> <li>2. Verify facilities already eliminated;</li> <li>3. Verify destruction of any remaining facilities; or,</li> <li>4. Approve and verify the irreversible conversion of any designated facilities;</li> <li>5. Verify destruction or repurposing of all equipment essential for the operation of each facility, or verify the use of the equipment for bona fide peaceful use, and place the equipment on a list for periodic reverification;</li> <li>6. Verify the disposition of all unclassified fissile material released from nuclear weapons use;</li> <li>7. Estimate and verify historical production, imports/ exports, and disposition of all unclassified fissile material.</li> </ol>	<p>This mission is essentially the same as IAEA safeguards missions to verify the non-proliferation undertakings by non-nuclear weapon states. (See last column.)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Verify facilities already eliminated;</li> <li>2. Approve and verify the irreversible conversion of any designated facilities;</li> <li>3. Verify repurposing or use of equipment for bona fide peaceful use, and place the equipment on a list for periodic reverification;</li> <li>4. Verify the absence of any undeclared nuclear weapons;</li> <li>5. Estimate and verify historical production, imports/ exports, and disposition of all unclassified nuclear material.</li> </ol>	<p>This mission is essentially the same as IAEA safeguards missions to verify the non-proliferation undertakings by non-nuclear-weapon states. (See last column.)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Detect diversion of declared nuclear materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives, or for unknown purposes.</li> <li>2. Detect undeclared activities in declared peaceful use nuclear facilities.</li> <li>3. Detect undeclared nuclear activities or nuclear materials anywhere in a state or under its control.</li> </ol>

## Annex VI: Text of the Treaty

### Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

*The States Parties to this Treaty,*

*Determined* to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Deeply concerned* about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the consequent need to completely eliminate such weapons, which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances,

*Mindful* of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including from any nuclear-weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons,

*Cognizant* that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation,

*Acknowledging* the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is a global public good of the highest order, serving both national and collective security interests,

*Mindful* of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons,

*Recognizing* the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples,

*Reaffirming* the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law,

*Basing* themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, the rule of

distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment,

*Considering* that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law,

*Reaffirming* that any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience,

*Recalling* that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

*Recalling* also the first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Concerned* by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste of economic and human resources on programmes for the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons,

*Recognizing* that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and determined to act towards that end,

*Determined* to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*Reaffirming* that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

*Reaffirming* also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security,

*Recognizing* the vital importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime,

*Reaffirming* the conviction that the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament,

*Emphasizing* that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

*Recognizing* that the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is an essential factor for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security, and committed to supporting and strengthening the effective participation of women in nuclear disarmament,

*Recognizing* also the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations, and committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this Treaty,

*Stressing* the role of public conscience in the furthering of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, other international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians, academics and the hibakusha,

*Have agreed as follows:*

## **Article 1**

### **Prohibitions**

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
  - (a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise

acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

- (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- (c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- (d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

## **Article 2**

### **Declarations**

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration in which it shall:
  - (a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party;
  - (b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns, possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
  - (c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations received to the States Parties.

### **Article 3**

#### **Safeguards**

1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.
2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

### **Article 4**

#### **Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons**

1. Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme. The competent international authority shall report to the States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.
2. Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party's nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure.
3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.
4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.
5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and

each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled.

6. The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.

## **Article 5**

### **National implementation**

1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty.
2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

## **Article 6**

### **Victim assistance and environmental remediation**

1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age-and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.
2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.
3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under international law or bilateral agreements.

## **Article 7**

### **International cooperation and assistance**

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis.
6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

## **Article 8**

### **Meeting of States Parties**

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear disarmament, including:
  - (a) The implementation and status of this Treaty;
  - (b) Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including additional protocols to this Treaty;
  - (c) Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Treaty.



2. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, shall apply.
3. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least one third of the States Parties.
4. After a period of five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the Treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene further review conferences at intervals of six years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties.
5. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant entities of the United Nations system, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of States Parties and the review conferences as observers.

## **Article 9**

### **Costs**

1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the circulation of declarations under Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

3. The cost related to the implementation of verification measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including the elimination or conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.

## **Article 10**

### **Amendments**

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first.
2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.
3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment 90 days following the deposit of such instruments of ratification or acceptance by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party 90 days following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment.

## **Article 11**

### **Settlement of disputes**

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and

recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

## **Article 12**

### **Universality**

Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.

## **Article 13**

### **Signature**

This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.

## **Article 14**

### **Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession**

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for accession.

## **Article 15**

### **Entry into force**

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

## **Article 16**

### **Reservations**

The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

## **Article 17**

### **Duration and withdrawal**

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.

## **Article 18**

### **Relationship with other agreements**

The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.

## **Article 19**

### **Depositary**

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.

## **Article 20**

### **Authentic texts**

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic.

DONE at New York, this seventh day of July, two thousand and seventeen.

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)
ALCM	Air-launched cruise missile
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (Treaty).
AP	Additional Protocol
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
ASCM	Anti-ship cruise missile
ASMP	Air-Sol Moyenne Portée (also ASMP-A); French cruise missile
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CSA	Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty)
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
HEU	Highly enriched uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty)
INFCIRC	Information Circular
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Kt	Kilotons
Lao PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
MIRV	Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle
MRBM	Medium-range ballistic missile
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAM	Non-aligned Movement
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWFZ	Nuclear-weapon-free zone
Pu	Plutonium
PTBT	Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
SNOWCAT	Support of nuclear operations with conventional air tactics
SLBM	Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM	Submarine-launched cruise missile
SRBM	Short-range ballistic missile
SSBN	Submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear powered
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TNT	Trinitrotoluene
TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
US	United States
WMD	Weapon of mass destruction





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