



Norwegian People's Aid



NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

Tracking progress towards a world without nuclear weapons

2021





Norwegian People's Aid

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Comments, clarifications, and corrections are welcome. Please contact Norwegian People's Aid at: banmonitor@npaid.org.

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor is available at: www.banmonitor.org. The website is updated with the most recent developments.

Cover photo: Passers-by look on as a Topol M intercontinental ballistic missile is moved through the streets of Moscow on 4 May 2021, during rehearsals for a military parade. (Photo by Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images)

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(Photo: Ari Beser/ICAN)

ABOUT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor tracks progress towards a world without nuclear weapons, highlights activities that prevent the international community from making the necessary progress towards nuclear disarmament, and analyzes the key challenges.

Established as a research programme in 2018, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor is produced and published by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), a partner organization of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Data collection and analysis for the project are assisted by a wide range of research institutes and independent experts on international humanitarian law, international human rights law, disarmament law, nuclear disarmament, nuclear arsenals, and security policy. Every year, NPA involves new external experts, to enhance the quality, relevance, and legitimacy of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor's research. Each new contributor verifies, builds on, and develops the findings and analysis of previous contributors.

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor evaluates the nuclear-weapons-related policies and practices of each of the 197 states that can become party to global treaties for which the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) is the depositary.¹ It uses the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as the primary yardstick against which progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons is measured, because this Treaty codifies the norms and actions that are needed to create and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons. The impact of the TPNW will be gradual, its effectiveness dependant on how its provisions are accepted and applied by each and every state.

As a de facto monitoring regime for the TPNW, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor records all developments related to the universalization of the Treaty. But it also tracks the status of the 197 states in relation to all other relevant multilateral treaties and regimes dealing with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT),

Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Thus, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor functions as a one-stop source of information on the status of all states in relation to all components of the existing architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor encourages universal adherence to every relevant global treaty.

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor also sets out clear legal interpretations of each of the prohibitions and positive obligations of the TPNW, and assesses the extent to which the 197 states – regardless of whether they have consented to be bound by the Treaty – act in accordance with them or not. States parties and signatories are categorized as either 'compliant' or 'not compliant' with the TPNW, whereas states not party are categorized as either 'compatible' or 'not compatible'. This is done with a view to providing guidance on implementation of the Treaty's obligations: to states that have already ratified or acceded to the Treaty; to those that are considering whether to do so; and to those that could do so in the future. In this edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, compliance and compatibility with the TPNW are assessed on the basis of active policies, practices, and actions carried out in the course of 2021, while reference is also made to certain significant earlier or more recent events.

The First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in Vienna in 2022 will be a milestone in the global community's efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. This edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor aims to assist the Treaty's first states parties to prepare for implementation and to advance further the process of institutionalizing and universalizing the Treaty.

¹ As of 31 December 2021, the Secretary-General of the UN considered that the following 197 states could become party to global treaties for which he is the depositary: all 193 UN member states, the two UN observer states (the Holy See and the State of Palestine), and two other states (the Cook Islands and Niue).

Key 2021 Findings

CONTEXT

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force and became international law on 22 January 2021.

YES

NO

The TPNW calls on states to end inconsistent stances in their policies and choose: nuclear weapons, yes or no?



4/5



32 umbrella states acted as enablers of nuclear armament. Political debate on the merits of the TPNW was ongoing in several of the umbrella states.

156 states, or four-fifths of all states, maintained nuclear-weapons-free defence postures.

The **9** nuclear-armed states (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States) continued to refuse to adhere to, or even engage constructively with, the TPNW.

STATUS

138: 59 states parties
30 signatories
49 other supporters
supporters


138 states, or 70% of all states, were supportive of the TPNW as of 31 December 2021.

17
undecided

17 states were undecided on the TPNW.

42
opposed

42 states were opposed to the TPNW.




Europe was the region with the highest concentration of states opposed to the TPNW.

The TPNW's speed of ratification and accession was for a long time the same on average as for the other treaties on weapons of mass destruction, despite obstructionism from nuclear-armed states. During the course of the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the rate of adherence to the TPNW fell behind that of all the other treaties.



The level of signatures to the TPNW remained low compared to those of all of the other treaties on weapons of mass destruction. The first few months after opening for signature is where most of the variation occurs, however. After that, all five treaties follow a similar pattern.


The TPNW is the youngest treaty in the global architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Universal adherence to every treaty outlawing weapons of mass destruction must be the objective. The Biological Weapons Convention had 14 outliers, the Chemical Weapons Convention 4 outliers, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 27 outliers, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 5 outliers.



The First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW will take place in Vienna in 2022. At this meeting, the states parties will start taking important decisions that will shape the long-term implementation, institutionalization, and universalization of the Treaty.

PROHIBITIONS

The conduct in 2021 of 153 states was either compliant (for states parties and signatories) or compatible (for states not party) with all of the prohibitions of the TPNW. The conduct of 42 states not party was not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions, and the conduct of 2 states (Iran and Saudi Arabia) was of concern.



12,705 nuclear warheads were in the combined arsenals of the nuclear-armed states at the beginning of 2022, in contravention of the TPNW norm prohibiting possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

The total number of nuclear warheads in the world continued in 2021 to decrease slightly, but only because the United States and Russia every year dismantle a small number of their retired, older warheads.



The number of nuclear warheads in global *usable* stockpiles is now increasing again. China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan increased their arsenals in 2021, the United Kingdom announced a significant potential increase, and Russia's usable stockpile is increasing.


9,440 of the world's arsenal of nuclear warheads constituted usable stockpiles, available for use by the nuclear-armed states. The remaining **3,265** warheads had previously been retired and were awaiting dismantlement.





The collective yield of the nuclear-armed states' usable stockpiles was the equivalent of approximately **138,000** Hiroshima-bombs.

Almost **2/5** of the warheads in usable stockpiles were assigned to nuclear-armed submarines. At all times, a significant number of warheads are carried through the world's oceans on submarines on active patrol, ready to be launched at short notice. The average load-out of a single Russian Borei-class submarine equates to 427 Hiroshima-bombs, and the average load-out of a single US Ohio-class submarine to 1,266 Hiroshima-bombs.



All of the nuclear-armed states engaged in conduct that was not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on developing and producing nuclear weapons. Many weapon systems currently being developed and produced are set to remain operational into the 2070s and 2080s.

Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey engaged in conduct that was not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons.



When Belarus' President Alexander Lukashenko in November 2021 said that he would be willing to host Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, this was not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in a prohibited act.

36 states, mostly in Europe, aided and abetted other states' retention of nuclear weapons, through policies and practices that were not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on assistance, encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities.



POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS


The first 56 states parties duly submitted the declaration required by Article 2 of the Treaty detailing their nuclear-weapons status. Five of the states parties submitted their respective declarations after their **30**-day deadline, however.



Guinea-Bissau and Palestine did not already have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) when they adhered to the TPNW, and therefore have to meet an **18**-month deadline to bring one into force.

70% of all non-nuclear-armed states had both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP) in force with the IAEA. 25% had a CSA in force but not yet an AP. 5% did not yet have a CSA in force, and therefore also not an AP. The TPNW is an additional forum where diplomats, civil society, and the IAEA can advocate for the universal application of CSAs and APs.

70%



The conduct of all of the nuclear-armed states was manifestly incompatible with the TPNW's obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. There was no evidence that any of the nuclear-armed states have the will to purposefully pursue nuclear disarmament.

The testing of more than 2,000 nuclear weapons between 1945 and 2017 continued to cause unnecessary suffering. In most cases, affected populations have received inadequate support. The TPNW seeks to change this situation, by obliging each state party to provide victim assistance to affected individuals of use and testing who are within its jurisdiction.





Environmental contamination from the testing of nuclear weapons is a particularly under-addressed humanitarian challenge. The TPNW seeks to change this, by obliging each state party to implement environmental remediation of any areas contaminated by use or testing in territory under their jurisdiction or control.

The TPNW obliges each state party to the TPNW to cooperate with other states parties to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty. It spreads the burden of addressing the effects of nuclear-weapons use and testing across all states parties and places this humanitarian challenge on the agenda also of donor states that are not party to the Treaty.



Implementation of the obligation under the TPNW to promote universal adherence to the Treaty was impressive in its first effective year of operation. All of the 59 states parties and 30 signatories to the Treaty took positive action to comply with this obligation. A large number of other supporters also encouraged other states to adhere to the TPNW.



A Ukrainian soldier walks in a trench on the line of separation from pro-Russian rebels near Debaltsevo, Donetsk region, Ukraine, on 3 December 2021. Tensions between Russia and NATO members escalated in 2021 with Ukraine and a number of Western states becoming increasingly concerned that a Russian troop build-up near the Ukrainian border could signal Moscow's intention to invade. Their fears were realized on 24 February 2022. (Photo: Andriy Dubchak/AP/NTB)

1 THE CONTEXT OF THE TPNW

A dominant narrative of 2021 was increased competition between major powers, centred on new weapons systems and regional hotspots and with clear risks of escalation to nuclear war. There was also increasing engagement with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which has been mobilized as a vehicle for collective resistance to the structures of power that perpetuate the existence of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear violence.

As this report was being prepared for print in March 2022, Russia had launched a devastating invasion of Ukraine only to meet fierce resistance. In order to try and deter direct NATO military involvement in the conflict, President Vladimir Putin had issued threats to use nuclear weapons and ordered Russian nuclear forces to be placed in a ‘special regime of combat duty’, raising the risk of deliberate or inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. The war in Ukraine is yet another stark reminder of the profound dangers of living in a world in which powerful states insist their security must rest on capacity for massive and indiscriminate nuclear violence. We have ended up trusting to luck rather than the supposed stabilizing effects of nuclear deterrence.

Only weeks earlier, on 3 January 2022, the five permanent – and nuclear-armed – members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) issued a restatement of the Reagan-Gorbachev declaration that a nuclear war ‘cannot be won and must never be fought’.² Yet, their reliance on nuclear deterrence means these very same states are continuously preparing to fight, and try and win, nuclear wars. The year 2021 also saw deepening confrontation not only between Russia and the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but also between China and the United States and its allies in Asia and Europe. In addition, there were rising tensions between China and another nuclear-armed state, India. The year was peppered with military preparations for armed conflict, in Ukraine and other hotspots such as Taiwan and Ladakh. The shadow of nuclear violence hangs over all of these conflicts because they create plausible pathways for escalation

in which control of a crisis could slip away from political and military leaderships.

Even before the war in Ukraine, the broader geopolitical context for the TPNW was deep uncertainty about the direction of world politics and the rules and institutions of global order, including the ‘nuclear order’ – the system of institutions and rules that determines who can do what with nuclear technologies. Decades of work to build a nuclear arms control regime have been unpicked, and quantitative and qualitative vertical proliferation by nuclear-armed states is ongoing. Moreover, the ways in which cyber warfare, advanced missile defences, and an artificial intelligence (AI) revolution could enhance the possibility of nuclear violence – in Ukraine and future confrontations – have added to a sense of nuclear *disorder*.³

These dynamics were, for a time, moderated somewhat by the change in approach by the incoming United States (US) administration in January 2021, which led to the extension of the New START treaty with Russia until February 2026, along with the resumption of a strategic dialogue with Russia. Other promising signs were a proposed dialogue with China and an effort to re-engage with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The strategic dialogue with Russia was abruptly interrupted by the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

EMBEDDING THE TPNW IN 2021

The entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021 as binding international law was an important step in the process of establishing the authority of the Treaty and its norms and rules. Work on further embedding the TPNW in global politics centred on preparing for the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties in 2022 and furthering implementation of its core prohibitions and obligations.

This involved research and outreach on specific Treaty issues, such as pathways to nuclear disarmament; verification of compliance with the Treaty; implementation of the positive obligations to address harms from nuclear-weapons use and testing; institutional design and support for the TPNW; and universalizing the Treaty.

2 ‘Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races’, published 3 January 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3gKl6jX>.

3 J. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War’, *International Security*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2018), pp. 56–99.

A large number of statements and resolutions⁴ supported the Treaty and the humanitarian initiative at the 76th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. In addition, a number of working papers were submitted in preparation for the Tenth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2022 that urged support for the TPNW and for the positioning of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear violence at the centre of NPT diplomacy.

The UN also played a positive role through its support for the Treaty in 2021. Thus, Secretary-General António Guterres declared in his report, *Our Common Agenda*, that: 'The entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in January 2021 was an extraordinary achievement and a step towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.'⁵ In September 2021, the UN Secretary-General called on 'all States to support the Treaty's goals and recognize its place in the global disarmament architecture'. He also urged states to 'reject the poisonous and flawed logic of endless nuclear competition'.⁶

States and civil society actors continued to use the Treaty's entry into force to urge states supportive of the TPNW to sign and ratify it. Campaigners mobilized local authorities and city councils to pass resolutions and legislation in support of the TPNW in nuclear-armed states and their clients. They successfully used the Treaty to motivate banks and other financial institutions to divest from companies that support the production of nuclear-weapons systems, and they have used it to gather support from a global community of parliamentarians.

At a local level, this has extended to towns and cities formally declaring themselves 'non-nuclear' through the Mayors for Peace organization and ICAN's Cities Appeal. As of the end of 2021, a total of 8,059 towns and cities across 165 countries and regions had joined Mayors for Peace and signed up to its programme for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.⁷ In addition, more than 520 cities and local and regional authorities had subscribed to ICAN's Cities Appeal in support of the TPNW. They include Barcelona, Berlin, Geneva, Hiroshima, Los Angeles, Manchester, New York, Oslo, Paris, Sydney, Toronto, and Washington D.C.⁸

COUNTER-RESISTANCE TO THE TPNW

Critics of the TPNW continued to frame it as a source rather than a symptom of polarization in global nuclear politics. When analysts and diplomats characterize the debate as polarized, what they mean is that nuclear deterrence has become more contested, as a consequence of greater diversity and inclusivity in the debate that has been enabled by the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW. After previously having failed to stop the negotiation, adoption, and entry into force of the TPNW, some nuclear-armed states and umbrella states continued in 2021 to subject the TPNW to sustained counter-resistance. P5 unity against the TPNW once again illustrated their shared commitment to nuclear deterrence as a system of security within which they can continue to threaten each other and threaten to destabilize the system as a whole. They continued to reject the TPNW on the basis that it will not create a world in which they might feel comfortable enough to relinquish their nuclear weapons.

NATO and the P5 pressured their allies and other countries not to support the TPNW or attend its First Meeting of States Parties. The North Atlantic Council's Brussels Summit reiterated its opposition to the Treaty in June 2021.⁹ NATO's Nuclear Planning Group also reportedly discussed the TPNW and NATO members' responses to it at its defence ministers meeting in Brussels in October 2021.¹⁰ The P5 delivered a joint statement at the UN General Assembly's First Committee in October 2021, calling on 'all countries that support or are considering supporting the TPNW to reflect seriously on its implications for international peace and security'.¹¹ There has, of course, been no lack of serious reflection by TPNW supporters as to the implications of the Treaty. Rather, they reject nuclear deterrence on the basis that it is an inherently unstable system which constitutes the greatest immediate threat to peace, security, and humanity.

A role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also been politicized. Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, reported after a meeting in September 2021 with Rafael Grossi, the IAEA's Director

4 In addition to the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW (A/RES/76/34 in 2021), a number of other annual resolutions were modified in the last session to include reference to the TPNW, and generally to welcome entry into force. See, e.g., 'Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world' (A/RES/76/25); 'Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons' (A/RES/76/53); 'Nuclear disarmament' (A/RES/76/46); 'Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments' (A/RES/76/49); and 'Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas' (A/RES/76/44).

5 'Our Common Agenda - Report of the Secretary-General', New York, United Nations Publications, 2021, p. 60.

6 A. Guterres, 'Remarks at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly to Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons', United Nations, 28 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/35Y76AT>.

7 See the Mayors for Peace website for the updated list of cities, at: <https://bit.ly/2lkPDXY>.

8 See the ICAN website for the updated list of cities, at: <https://bit.ly/3ptRMkT>.

9 NATO, 'Brussels Summit Communiqué, Brussels, 14 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3HhMRv3>.

10 I. Davis, 'NATO seeks to sharpen its technological advantage and adopts a Janus-inspired strategy: one face towards Russia and the other towards China - An analysis of the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting, Brussels, 21-22 October 2021', Briefing Paper No. 87, NATO Watch 2021, 1 November 2021.

11 'Cluster I - Nuclear Weapons, General Statement by France (before the vote) on behalf of People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and France on L.17 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', UN, New York, 27 October 2021.

General, that the United States is 'opposed to any IAEA role in the TPNW'.¹² The IAEA is mandated to conduct its activities 'in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies'.¹³ Thus, UN member states that are party to the TPNW — a Treaty negotiated under UN auspices — have a right to expect the IAEA to engage with the TPNW and advise on nuclear disarmament verification issues, including at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty. Opposition to such a role undermines the universalization of IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols under both the NPT and the TPNW.

NAVIGATING THE TPNW

Despite continued opposition to the Treaty from nuclear-armed states and their clients, there has been some toning down of criticism since the TPNW's entry into force in January 2021. For example, in September 2021, Ambassador Jenkins also stated that the United States was no longer telling countries not to sign the Treaty, and that 'we're not nearly as assertive as we were in the past about it'.¹⁴ In October 2021, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was also reported to have stated that Moscow will not pressure other states to stay away from the TPNW's First Meeting of States Parties.¹⁵ Finally, in contrast to other actors' claims about the dangers supposedly posed by the TPNW, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken merely noted in December 2021 that 'we don't for a minute question the motivations of TPNW supporters, but we simply don't believe that the treaty will aid in actually meeting the objectives that we share'.¹⁶

During the course of the year, political initiatives by coalitions of states were further developed to navigate the politics of the TPNW, the NPT, and the nuclear-armed states. In preparation for the NPT Review Conference, initiatives like the Stockholm Initiative have focused on commitments to previously agreed but unfulfilled disarmament steps and risk reduction measures by the P5.¹⁷ However, it was the lack of progress on these issues (such as de-alerting, further reductions, no-first use,

support for NWFZs, and negative security assurances) that prompted work on alternative ways forward after the 2005 NPT Review Conference by reframing the debate around humanitarian consequences, which then generated the TPNW. In some respects, the risk reduction agenda that gathered momentum in 2021 is therefore coming full circle to where the world was in the 2005–10 NPT review cycle. The danger is that approaches such as these are reduced to asking the P5 to say certain things (such as the joint statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought) rather than actually take concrete actions towards disarmament. This limits engagement with nuclear-armed states to those issues with which they are comfortable and ends up leaving nuclear disarmament diplomacy exactly where it is.

The nuclear-armed states and their clients all have a longstanding, declared commitment to the objective of nuclear disarmament and the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.¹⁸ However, not only do they reject the idea that the TPNW represents an effective and necessary step towards that goal, but also the idea that nuclear weapons *can* be eliminated. The argument is that nuclear weapons cannot be 'uninvented' and that since revolutionary change in global politics looks unlikely, the weapons are here to stay, whether we like it or not. Moreover, the weapons are framed as the solution to the security dilemmas the weapons themselves produce. Nuclear deterrence is depicted as necessary and rational while alternative views are derided as unrealistic or dangerous.

The TPNW was a product of profound concern about this de facto permanence of nuclear weapons in world politics. The Treaty reflects a different view, insisting that nuclear weapons can be eliminated from world politics without a wholesale transformation of the current system of states, following the processes by which chemical and biological weapons have been stigmatized, prohibited, and largely eliminated. In doing so, the Treaty explicitly challenges the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.

If a nuclear-armed state genuinely wanted to pursue balanced, mutual nuclear disarmament then it could and should engage constructively with the TPNW and declare

12 Tweet by US Under-Secretary for Arms Control, @UnderSecT, 21 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/34E7rla>.

13 Art. III(B)(1), 1956 IAEA Statutes.

14 Tweet by Seth Shelden, @SethShelden, 30 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3LhAzWs>.

15 Tweet by Oliver Meier, @meier_oliver, 1 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3GB5HN4>.

16 A. Blinken, 'Press Availability at the NATO Ministerial', US State Department, Washington, D.C., 1 December 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3oxfDRM>.

17 'A Nuclear Risk Reduction Package, Working paper by the Stockholm Initiative, supported by Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland to the 10th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', New York, United Nations, 11 May 2021.

18 The five nuclear-weapon states designated under the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have agreed to an 'unequivocal undertaking' to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, consonant with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. See '2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document', Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28, Part I, p. 14, para. 6, and '2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document', Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/50. Of the four other nuclear-armed states (all States not party to the NPT), India and Pakistan have longstanding and frequently referenced policies in favour of global nuclear disarmament, formulated in similar terms to those of the NPT nuclear-weapon states. See, e.g., <https://bit.ly/3kNGBzG> and <https://bit.ly/36OHzU>. North Korea intermittently expresses support for a nuclear-weapon-free world and joins statements and policy documents of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that call for nuclear disarmament. See, e.g., <https://bit.ly/3fgKR9P>. Israel too is on record as supporting nuclear disarmament, although it does so in abstract terms since it does not officially acknowledge its own possession of nuclear weapons. See, e.g., <https://bit.ly/333LKOa>.

that it would be willing to adhere to the Treaty and disarm if its nuclear-armed competitors also do so. At present, however, their focus remains on maintaining nuclear weapons in order to exert nuclear deterrent threats and thereby produce 'national security'.

COMPLICIT UMBRELLA STATES

The addition of the TPNW to the nuclear order has laid bare the significant role that states with arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with nuclear-armed states (so-called 'umbrella states') play in perpetuating the idea that nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are legitimate and necessary. Basing their security on one or more allies' continued retention of nuclear weapons, umbrella states act as enablers of nuclear armament and obstacles to nuclear disarmament. They bear a considerable degree of responsibility for the nuclear risks that the entire international community is forced to endure.

While 156 states – four-fifths of the world's total of 197 – presently maintain defence postures based exclusively on non-nuclear means, a substantial minority of 41 states continued in 2021 to centre their defence posture on the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons. As shown in Figure 1 opposite, nine of these states are themselves nuclear-armed (China, France, India, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), while the remaining 32 are umbrella states.¹⁹

The TPNW asks nuclear-armed states and umbrella states to end their inconsistent stances and choose: nuclear weapons, yes or no. While they are all still opting for the continuance of nuclear weapons, the TPNW has prompted political debate in several umbrella states. This culminated in 2021 in decisions in NATO member states Norway and Germany to attend the TPNW's First Meeting of States Parties as observers, despite strong pressure from within the alliance not to do so. The new governments elected in Norway and Germany in 2021 found themselves as targets of a familiar narrative of danger, immaturity, and naivety for engaging with the TPNW. The Treaty was crudely caricatured in terms of zero-sum geopolitics in which participation in the TPNW is a loss for NATO and a win for Russia and China.²⁰

Supporting the Norwegian government's decision, two former Norwegian prime ministers, Kjell Magne Bondevik and Thorbjørn Jagland, said in November 2021 that doublethink where nuclear weapons are deemed 'unwanted' and 'indispensable' at the same time is causing the stalemate in nuclear disarmament. They argued: 'We can and should start the work to reduce the value ascribed to nuclear weapons and instead stigmatize them, also while allied states still possess them,' advising NATO to open 'discussion on whether nuclear deterrence creates more risk than security, if the alliance is really doing all in its power to enable negotiations on disarmament, and how the TPNW can be integrated in NATO's disarmament strategy.'²¹

It can be expected that several non-nuclear-armed members of NATO will grow increasingly uncomfortable with the fact that the real reason for their nuclear-armed allies' resistance to the TPNW is that it is making the dissonance between a continuing commitment to nuclear deterrence on the one hand, and a commitment to nuclear disarmament on the other, untenable.

In sum, the TPNW gained in relevance for the global politics of nuclear weapons in 2021, despite ongoing resistance to the Treaty and the possibilities for nuclear disarmament that it represents. More broadly, the TPNW stands as a multilateral response to a systemic existential danger. It confronts powerful structures that support a dangerous and unsustainable status quo, paralleling the movement to mitigate the global ecological crises of climate heating, collapsing biodiversity, and widespread chemical pollution forcefully highlighted at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow in November 2021.²² Both of these global initiatives ultimately seek a fundamental reconception of how powerful and adversarial states relate to each other on questions of military and ecological violence and the necessity (still) of shifting how we think about security from the state to the human community and the planet we all inhabit.


19 Two (Armenia and Belarus) are allies of Russia, while the other 30 are allies of the United States. Of the latter group, three states (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) have made bilateral nuclear defence arrangements with the United States and 27 states are members of NATO: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey.

20 See, e.g., S. Jenssen, 'Veien mot en verden uten atomvåpen', *Verdens Gang*, 27 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3rx5p5H>; and J. Stoltenberg, 'Speech. NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg at the German Atlantic Association "NATO Talk" Conference 2021', 19 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3nYyWDg>.

21 K. M. Bondevik and T. Jagland, 'Selvmotsigende om atomvåpen', *Verdens Gang*, 4 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3syBFVg>.

22 The same city that passed a resolution in support of the TPNW in May 2021. D. Sandelands, 'Glasgow City Council calls on UK Government to scrap nuclear weapons', *The Glasgow Times*, 15 May 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3HzTKbU>.

Figure 1: The world's states disaggregated by national defence posture



The TPNW

- The TPNW is the only legally binding global treaty that outlaws nuclear weapons.
- It was adopted on 7 July 2017 at a diplomatic conference established by the United Nations General Assembly.
- A total of 122 states, more than three-fifths of the world's total, voted in favour of the Treaty's adoption. Only one state participating in the conference, the Netherlands, voted against adoption, while a second, Singapore, abstained.
- The Treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017.
- The TPNW received its 50th ratification/accession on 24 October 2020, triggering entry into force on 22 January 2021.
- Article 8 of the TPNW provides for regular meetings of states parties. The First Meeting of States Parties will be held in Vienna in 2022. At this meeting, the states parties will start taking important decisions that will shape the long-term implementation, institutionalization, and universalization of the Treaty.



Voting on the annual TPNW resolution in the plenary of the UN General Assembly on 6 December 2021.

2 THE STATUS OF THE TPNW

The TPNW entered into force under international law on 22 January 2021, almost 75 years to the day after the UN General Assembly first set the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.²³ In the course of 2021, seven more states – Cambodia, Chile, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Peru, the Philippines, and the Seychelles – ratified the Treaty, and an eighth – Mongolia – acceded. No new signatures were secured.

By 31 December 2021, the TPNW had a total of 59 states parties while a further 30 states were signatories that had not yet ratified. Thus, 45% (89 states) of the global total of 197 states had accepted binding obligations in international law under the TPNW.²⁴ A further 49 states

are identified by the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor as 'other supporters' on the basis of their most recent voting record on the Treaty in the UN. This means that a total of 138 states (exactly 70% of all states) were effectively supportive of the TPNW.

The criteria for the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor's categorization of states by their position on the TPNW are explained in Table A opposite. The distribution of support is illustrated in Figure 2 opposite, while Table B on page 25 lists all states by support category and region. For details about individual states, see the state profiles in this report.

²³ UN General Assembly Resolution 1(I): 'Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy', UN doc. A/RES/1(I), 24 January 1946.

²⁴ The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international law provide that a signatory state or, before it formally becomes a state party, a ratifying or acceding state, must not engage in conduct that frustrates the object and purpose of a treaty.

Figure 2: Global distribution of support for the TPNW




Table A: Criteria for TPNW support categories

CATEGORY	CRITERION
States parties	States that have signed and ratified or have acceded to the TPNW.
Signatories	States that have signed the TPNW but not yet ratified it.
Other supporters	States that are not in category 1 or 2 but whose most recent vote in the UN on the TPNW (the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017 or on the subsequent annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW) was 'yes'.
Undecided	All states that are not in category 1 or 2 and whose most recent vote in the UN on the TPNW (the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017 or on the subsequent annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW) was an abstention, or which never participated in such a vote.
Opposed	All states that are not in category 1 or 2 and whose most recent vote in the UN on the TPNW (the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017 or on the subsequent annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW) was 'no'.

STATES PARTIES AND SIGNATORIES

Of the 59 states parties to the Treaty, three — the Cook Islands, Mongolia, and Niue — acceded while the remainder signed and ratified. In several of the 30 signatory states, the executive branch of government has submitted the TPNW to the legislature for review and approval for ratification. As of 31 December 2021, these included Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guatemala, and Tanzania. In addition, the legislatures of two signatory states — Congo and Côte d'Ivoire — have already approved ratification of the TPNW, with the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification expected imminently.

Of the combined total of 89 states parties and signatories, 77 were among the 122 states that negotiated and adopted the TPNW at the diplomatic conference in the UN in June–July 2017. Of the adopting states, therefore, 63% had by the end of 2021 proceeded to become either a state party or at least a signatory. In addition, 12 states that did not take part in the Treaty adoption in 2017 had also become a state party or a signatory.²⁵

OTHER SUPPORTERS

Several of the 49 states in the 'other supporters' category have already started the domestic process to sign or accede to the TPNW. These include the Bahamas, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Kenya, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. It is also expected that many of the states in this category will participate as observers at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022.

Most of the states in this category were also among the 122 states that adopted the TPNW in July 2017. While they have not yet signed or adhered to the Treaty, they have continued to vote in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW. The resolution calls upon all states that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, or accede to the Treaty 'at the earliest possible date'.²⁶

Seven other supporters (Bahamas, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Mauritania, Senegal, and Turkmenistan) also joined a large group of TPNW states parties and signatories as co-sponsors of the 2021 General Assembly resolution.²⁷

The 'other supporters' category now also includes a total of eleven states — Andorra, Barbados, Cameroon, Eswatini, Guinea, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — which either did not participate in the negotiation of the TPNW or did not vote when it was adopted in 2017, but which have subsequently expressed their support for the Treaty by voting in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution.

Somalia and South Sudan were new additions to the list of 'other supporters' in 2021, after having voted (and voted yes) for the first time on the annual resolution in the UN General Assembly.

UNDECIDED STATES

A total of 17 states (or some 9% of the global total) were undecided on the TPNW in 2021. This is a mixed group of states, spread across all five continents. Some of the undecided states appear to be choosing to stay neutral on the TPNW for the time being, while others, for various reasons, including internal challenges, are not currently considering whether or not to join the Treaty. Other states in this category are in protracted processes to arrive at a final national position on the TPNW. This includes the Marshall Islands²⁸ and Switzerland,²⁹ both of which have announced their intention to participate as observers at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022. Finland and Sweden are also among the undecided states that have confirmed their participation as observers.

Djibouti and Saudi Arabia,³⁰ which in previous years were on the list of other supporters, changed their vote in 2021 from yes to abstention on the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, and have consequently been moved to the undecided category.

Of the 17 states in this group, 15 already have nuclear-weapon-free security policies. The remaining two undecided states—Armenia and Belarus³¹—are the only states with arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with Russia. Both states abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021.

25 Central African Republic, Comoros, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Libya, Maldives, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, Tuvalu, and Zambia.

26 2018, A/RES/73/48; 2019, A/RES/74/41; 2020, A/RES/75/40; and 2021, A/RES/76/34. The annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW was first introduced in 2018. The voting records are an important indicator when analysing the trend in support for the TPNW and can also constitute *opinio juris* towards a customary law prohibition of nuclear weapons.

27 The text of the draft resolution submitted (A/C.1/76/L.17) and final list of co-sponsors can be found in the Report of the First Committee, at: <https://undocs.org/en/A/76/444>.

28 In September 2021, Marshall Islands announced that it is 'still studying' the TPNW and plans to participate in the meetings of states parties as an observer, in particular, 'to see what concrete victim assistance provisions actually come forward by states parties and if they are at scale'. See ICAN's country profile for Marshall Islands, at: <https://bit.ly/3gvjM43>.

29 See ICAN's country profile for Switzerland, at: <https://bit.ly/3uvy3pP>.

30 Saudi Arabia's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation has been open to question in recent years, as this year's Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor observes.

31 Although Belarus meets the criteria set by the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor for inclusion in the undecided category, the statements of its president in 2021 clearly demonstrate support for nuclear weapons.

OPPOSED STATES

As in previous years, the same 42 states (equating to 21% of the global total) were opposed to the TPNW in 2021: the 9 nuclear-armed states; all of the 30 states³² with arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with the United States; and 3 states with nuclear-weapon-free security policies (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Micronesia, and Monaco).

Political debate about adherence to the TPNW was, however, ongoing in 2021 in several of the opposed states. Polling showed high levels of public support for the TPNW in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain.³³ There are now also signs that some of these states may wish to engage with the intention and substance of the Treaty in a more constructive way. Most notably, new governments were formed in Norway and Germany in 2021 after coalition parties agreed on governing platforms that committed these states to attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW as observers, despite strong pressure from the United States and from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg not to do so.³⁴


Also in Japan, there was vibrant discussion on the Treaty in 2021, with the new prime minister, Fumio Kishida, a parliamentarian elected in Hiroshima, stating a number

of times that 'the TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons'.³⁵ The question of observing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW was highly debated before and during the general election which took place in October 2021 and subsequent Diet sessions, including by members of the coalition government.³⁶ In Australia, the opposition Labor Party in 2021 reaffirmed the formal commitment it made in 2018 to 'sign and ratify the Ban Treaty' when in government, after taking into account the need to ensure complementarity with the NPT and an effective verification and enforcement architecture.³⁷ A general election in Australia was expected to be held no later than May 2022.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPORT

Breaking down all states' positions on the TPNW by region, Figure 3 below and Table B on page 25 show that, as of 31 December 2021, support for the TPNW was high in all regions of the world apart from Europe. In Africa, all states but one – Djibouti – now formally support the Treaty, either as states parties or signatories, or by voting in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW. As already mentioned, Somalia and South Sudan supported the annual resolution for the first time in 2021 and have been added to the list of other supporters, while Djibouti abstained for the first time after having voted yes

Figure 3: TPNW support by region



32 Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey.

33 See 'NATO Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons', ICAN, January 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3pZDSJr>; 'Svært få nordmenn tror at atomvåpen skaper sikkerhet' ('Very few Norwegians believe that nuclear weapons create security'), Norwegian People's Aid, October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3JQgiqy>; and 'A strong majority want Canada to join the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, despite pressure it may face from the United States', Nanos, April 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3uxSr9S>.

34 R. Ganster, 'Germany's New Government Settles the Nuclear Debate – for Now', The German Marshall Fund, 29 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3qQbUPz>.

35 Opening address at 'Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament', 9 December 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3J7AVNB>.

36 'Lawmakers Call on Japan to Attend Nuke Ban Treaty Meeting as Observer', *Jiji Press News*, 5 August 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3J478oW>.

37 ICAN news article, at: <https://bit.ly/3skwTdT>.

in previous years and is therefore now categorized as undecided. No state is opposed to the TPNW in Africa.

Africa is followed by the Americas, where all but three states are now either states parties, signatories, or other supporters, with only Argentina remaining undecided and the United States and Canada opposed. The Americas is also the region with the highest share of states parties, with 23 states parties (or over 65%) among the regional total of 35 states by the end of 2021. In Oceania, too, the share of states parties is high, with 10 states parties (or more than 62%) among the 16 states in the region.

In Asia, where five of the world's nine nuclear-armed states are located, support for the TPNW is also relatively high. A total of 32 of 45 states in the region (more than 71%) are states parties, signatories, or other supporters. Seven states (or 15%) in Asia were opposed to the TPNW: nuclear-armed states China, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan, alongside Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea).

Europe continues to be the region with the highest concentration of opposed states. A total of 31 of the 47 states (66%) in Europe were opposed to the TPNW in 2021. The region has only five states parties: Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Malta, and San Marino; and one signatory that has not yet ratified: Liechtenstein.

SPEED OF RATIFICATION/ACCESSION AND SPEED OF SIGNATURE

According to ICAN, which works directly with states on their plans for signature and ratification or accession to the TPNW, several states informed them that the COVID-19 pandemic continued to cause delays in 2021.³⁸ As mentioned above, eight states joined the TPNW in 2021: one state acceded while seven signatory states ratified. No new signatures were obtained. Figure 4 opposite shows the speed of ratification and accession relative to other treaties on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) while Figure 5 shows the relative speed of signatures.

It took 3 years and 4 months (40 months) from the date of opening for signature of the TPNW (20 September 2017) to its entry into force on 22 January 2021, 90 days after it had reached the required 50 ratifications/accessions.³⁹

The TPNW's speed of ratification and accession was for a long time the same on average as for the other WMD treaties, despite obstructionism from nuclear-armed states.⁴⁰ During the course of 2021, however, the TPNW's rate of adherence fell behind that of all the other treaties.

As noted above, the TPNW had attracted 59 ratifications and accessions by the end of 2021, just over 4 years and 3 months (51 months) after opening for signature. Over the same period of time following opening for signature, the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) both had 69 ratifications and accessions, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 67, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 72.

In terms of signatures to the TPNW, the number remained at 86 after 51 months. As Figure 5 opposite shows, the level of signatures to the TPNW is low compared to those of all of the other WMD treaties. The first few months after opening for signature is where most of the variation occurs, however. After that, all five treaties follow a similar pattern.⁴¹

Note also that the NPT's signature curve is the second lowest of the treaties. The patterns of signature and ratifications/accession for the NPT serve as a timely reminder that it took several years also for that Treaty to accrue authority and become regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

38 Email from ICAN's Treaty Coordinator Tim Wright, 7 January 2022: Consideration of the TPNW by cabinets of ministers and by legislatures has, in some cases, been put on hold while the impacts of the pandemic are addressed. As had been the case in 2020, the UN was also unable to facilitate a ceremony for further signatures and ratifications of the TPNW during the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in 2021 due to ongoing pandemic-related restrictions at UN Headquarters. Such ceremonies had helped to secure new ratifications in 2018 and 2019.

39 The BWC entered into force 36 months following opening for signature (after having reached the required 22 ratifications/accessions); the CWC 52 months after opening for signature (180 days after having reached the required 65 ratifications/accessions); and the NPT 20 months after opening for signature (after having reached the required 43 ratifications/accessions). The CTBT has not yet entered into force.

40 In 2017, US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis wrote to his Swedish counterpart to dissuade Sweden from signing the Treaty. C Woody, 'Mattis reportedly threatened Sweden with retaliation over signing a nuclear-weapons ban', *Business Insider*, 5 September 2017, at: <http://bit.ly/2ltqcU2>. In October 2020, the United States called on states that had ratified the TPNW to withdraw from the Treaty. M. Lederer, 'US urges countries to withdraw from UN nuke ban treaty', *Associated Press*, 22 October 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/3lswFgm>.

41 The CWC does not allow signature after its entry into force. The BWC and the NPT allow signature also after entry into force, but there have been no new signatures to those treaties since they entered into force, only accessions. The TPNW too allows signature at any time. The CTBT has not entered into force but thereafter signature will no longer be possible.

Figure 4: Speeds of ratification and accession – WMD treaties compared





Figure 5: Speeds of signature – WMD treaties compared



GAPS IN ADHERENCE ACROSS ALL WMD TREATIES

The TPNW is but one component in the treaty architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Universal adherence to all of the main multilateral treaties in this architecture – the BWC, CWC, CTBT, NPT, and TPNW – must be the objective, meaning that all 197 states reviewed in this report should be states parties to each and every one of them. Figure 6 below therefore highlights the gaps in adherence as of 31 December 2021, across all the treaties. Where a state is an outlier (i.e. state not party) to any of these five treaties, this is noted in its respective state profile in this report, along with a recommendation for urgent adherence.


As of end 2021, there were still 138 states⁴² not yet party to the TPNW, the youngest treaty in this architecture, although, as mentioned above, 30 of them were signatories. The BWC had 14 outliers (four of which were signatories).⁴³ The CWC had only four outliers (one of

which is a signatory),⁴⁴ the CTBT (which has not yet entered into force) 27 outliers (15 of which are signatories),⁴⁵ and the NPT five outliers.^{46, 47}

Two states (Israel and South Sudan) are outliers on all of the five treaties; two states (Egypt and North Korea) are outliers on four; and four states (India, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria) are outliers on three.

In 2021, the CTBT gained two new states parties: Comoros and Cuba. Comoros ratified the CTBT on the same day it ratified the TPNW, highlighting the complementary nature of the treaties.⁴⁸ Cuba signed and ratified the CTBT on 4 February 2021, after having become a state party to the TPNW in 2018.⁴⁹ The latest development in adherence for the BWC was in 2019, when it was ratified by the United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania). For the CWC, the latest development was Palestine's accession in 2018. Palestine was also the most recent country to adhere to the NPT, in 2015.

Figure 6: WMD Treaty architecture – gaps in adherence (as of end 2021)



42 See the states listed in the categories 'signatories', 'other supporters', 'undecided', and 'opposed' in Table B.

43 The outliers were: Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt (signatory), Eritrea, Haiti (signatory), Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, Namibia, Somalia (signatory), South Sudan, Syria (signatory), and Tuvalu.

44 The outliers were: Egypt, Israel (signatory), North Korea, and South Sudan.

45 The outliers were: Bhutan, China (signatory), Dominica, Egypt (signatory), Equatorial Guinea (signatory), Gambia (signatory), India, Iran (signatory), Israel (signatory), Mauritius, Nepal (signatory), North Korea, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea (signatory), Sao Tome and Principe (signatory), Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands (signatory), Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka (signatory), Syria, Timor-Leste (signatory), Tonga, Tuvalu (signatory, but it ratified in January 2022), United States (signatory), and Yemen (signatory).

46 The outliers were: Israel, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Sudan.

47 The Cook Islands and Niue have not adhered to the NPT in their own right, but New Zealand's ratification of the NPT included territorial application to both states, which remain bound by its provisions.

48 ICAN news article, at: <https://bit.ly/3B47KrW>.

49 CTBTO news article, at: <https://bit.ly/3HBe78G>.

Table B: All states by region and their position on the TPNW

CATEGORY	ASIA	EUROPE	AFRICA	AMERICAS	OCEANIA
States Parties (59 states)	Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Palestine, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam.	Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Malta, San Marino.	Benin, Botswana, Comoros, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa.	Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.	Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.
Signatories (30 states)	Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Timor-Leste.	Liechtenstein.	Algeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Ghana, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe.	Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala.	
Other supporters (49 states)	Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.	Andorra, Cyprus, Moldova.	Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda.	Bahamas, Barbados, Haiti, Suriname.	Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands.
Undecided (17 states)	Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Tajikistan.	Belarus, Finland, Georgia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine.	Djibouti.	Argentina.	Marshall Islands, Tonga.
Opposed (42 states)	China, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea.	Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom.		Canada, United States.	Australia, Micronesia.

3 THE PROHIBITIONS OF THE TPNW

All 59 states parties and 30 signatories to the TPNW were compliant with all of the prohibitions of the TPNW throughout 2021. Of the states not yet party to the Treaty, the conduct of 64 states was fully compatible with the prohibitions, which means they can adhere to the TPNW without making any changes to their existing policies and practices. A minority, consisting of 42 states not party (21%), continued to engage in conduct that was not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions. In addition, Iran and Saudi Arabia were again recorded as states of concern.

The heart of the TPNW is its Article 1, which contains the Treaty's prohibitions. They apply at all places and in all circumstances, including during armed conflict. In the following sections, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor sets out interpretations of each of the prohibitions and evaluates the extent to which all states — regardless of whether they have consented to be bound by the Treaty — act in accordance with them or not. States parties and signatories are categorized as either 'compliant' or 'not compliant', whereas states not party are categorized as either 'compatible' or 'not compatible'. Where a state has been assessed to be 'of concern', this means that worrying developments in the state warrant close attention. The conclusion of the assessments for each respective state can be found in the state profiles in this report.

ARTICLE 1(1) – PROHIBITIONS

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

- Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

As illustrated in Figure 7, the conduct of a total of 153 states (equating to almost 78% of the global total) was either compliant or compatible, respectively, with all of the prohibitions of the TPNW. They are listed in Table C.

The 42 states with conduct that was not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions in the TPNW are first and

Figure 7: Compliance and compatibility with the TPNW prohibitions, across all states




Table C: States with policies and practices that were compliant or compatible with all of the prohibitions of the TPNW

STATE CATEGORY	STATES
Compliant states parties (59)	Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cambodia, Chile, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam.
Compliant signatories (30)	Algeria, Angola, Brazil, Brunei, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Indonesia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
States not party with policies and practices that were compatible (64)	Afghanistan, Andorra, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
Total (153)	

foremost the 9 nuclear-armed states and the 32 umbrella states, but also one state — the Marshall Islands — that has a nuclear-weapon-free security policy. Every state may lawfully sign and ratify the TPNW, but these 42 states, listed in Table D overleaf, would have to make varying degrees of changes to their existing policies and practices in order to meet the demands of the Treaty.

As Figure 8 below shows, Europe is the region with the most states whose conduct conflicts with the TPNW. A total of 30 of the 47 states in Europe (63%) currently maintain policies and practices that are not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. In Africa, all of the 54 states recognized by the United Nations have been found to be fully compliant

or compatible. In the other regions, compliance and compatibility with the TPNW is also generally high. In the Americas, only 2 of the 35 states across the region (Canada and the United States) engage in conduct which is not compatible with the Treaty. In Asia, where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of the 45 states maintain policies and practices that are not compatible: Armenia, China, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Korea. In addition, the two states listed as being 'of concern' — Iran and Saudi Arabia — are both located in Asia. In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands are the two states with policies and practices that are not fully compatible with the TPNW among the 16 states in the region.

Figure 8: Compliance and compatibility by region




Figure 9 below disaggregates compliance and compatibility for each of the Article 1 prohibitions. Most importantly, the conduct of the nine nuclear-armed states was not compatible with either the prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or acquiring nuclear weapons, or the prohibition on possessing or stockpiling them. The prohibition in Article 1(1)(e) on assisting, encouraging, or inducing prohibited acts, however, stands out as the one where the greatest number of states have policies and practices that are not compatible. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor found that a total of 36 states assisted, encouraged, or induced acts in 2021 that are prohibited by the TPNW. For more information on compliance and compatibility by prohibition, see Table D opposite and the following sections on the respective prohibitions.

THE TPNW AND 'NUCLEAR DETERRENCE'

The TPNW does not explicitly prohibit or even mention 'nuclear deterrence'. The reason for this is that deterrence is not a specific act or behaviour, but a psychological state that may or may not exist inside an adversary's head. However, the TPNW prohibits a range of specific actions that are typically enacted with the aim of fostering deterrence, including possessing nuclear weapons, hosting nuclear weapons, threatening to use nuclear weapons, or assisting or encouraging other states to engage in such behaviour. Crucially, these behaviours are prohibited irrespective of whether they succeed in fostering 'deterrence' in the minds of potential adversaries.

Figure 9: Compliance and compatibility by prohibition





Table D: States not party with policies or practices that are not compatible with, or of concern in relation to, one or more of the TPNW's prohibitions

TPNW Article	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(a)	Art 1(1)(b)	Art 1(1)(c)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(d)	Art 1(1)(e)	Art 1(1)(f)	Art 1(1)(g)
Prohibition	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist, encourage, or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation or deployment
Asia										
Armenia								Not compatible		
China	Not compatible		Not compatible							
India	Not compatible		Not compatible							
Iran	Of concern									
Israel	Not compatible		Not compatible							
Japan								Not compatible		
North Korea	Not compatible		Not compatible							
Pakistan	Not compatible		Not compatible							
Saudi Arabia	Of concern									
South Korea								Not compatible		
Europe										
Albania								Not compatible		
Belarus								Not compatible	Not compatible	
Belgium								Not compatible		Not compatible
Bulgaria								Not compatible		
Croatia								Not compatible		
Czechia								Not compatible		
Denmark								Not compatible		
Estonia								Not compatible		
France	Not compatible		Not compatible					Not compatible	Not compatible	
Germany								Not compatible		Not compatible
Greece								Not compatible		
Hungary								Not compatible		
Iceland								Not compatible		
Italy								Not compatible		Not compatible
Latvia								Not compatible		
Lithuania								Not compatible		
Luxembourg								Not compatible		
Montenegro								Not compatible		
Netherlands								Not compatible		Not compatible
North Macedonia								Not compatible		
Norway								Not compatible		
Poland								Not compatible		
Portugal								Not compatible		
Romania								Not compatible		
Russia	Not compatible		Not compatible						Not compatible	
Slovakia								Not compatible		
Slovenia								Not compatible		
Spain								Not compatible		
Turkey								Not compatible		Not compatible
United Kingdom	Not compatible		Not compatible		Not compatible			Not compatible	Not compatible	
Americas										
Canada								Not compatible		
United States	Not compatible		Not compatible	Not compatible				Not compatible	Not compatible	
Oceania										
Australia								Not compatible		
Marshall Islands								Not compatible		

The prohibition on **DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, MANUFACTURING, AND OTHER ACQUISITION**



This 25 July 2021 satellite image shows what analysts from the Federation of American Scientists believe is construction of a missile silo near Hami in China.
(Photo: Planet Labs PBC/AP/NTB)



Nine states not party to the TPNW – the nuclear-armed states China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States – engaged in conduct in 2021 that was not compatible with the Treaty's prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. Two further states not party – Iran and Saudi Arabia – were recorded as states of concern.

Most nuclear-armed states brand their ongoing development and production efforts as 'modernization', but all continue to be actively engaged in development and production of new nuclear delivery vehicles and/or warheads, upgrading and perpetuating their nuclear capabilities. An overview of each nuclear-armed state's new nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021 can be found in their respective state profiles in this report.

Many weapon systems currently being developed and produced are set to remain operational into the 2070s and 2080s, implying that the states in question are committing themselves to nuclear armament for at least half a century into the future – longer than the NPT has been in existence. This qualitative and quantitative vertical proliferation is now framed as a new and unexpected nuclear arms race, rather than a systemic feature of living in a nuclear-armed world in which states compete to sustain their own nuclear capabilities and deterrence doctrines whilst challenging and attempting to negate those of their adversaries. Many nuclear-armed states are also reinvigorating or even expanding the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines.

It is particularly worrisome that several nuclear-armed states are now increasingly posturing themselves for nuclear warfighting. It is also important to note that the arms race is directly fuelled by the tremendous influence that weapons contractors, lobbyists, and financial institutions have on governmental nuclear policy decisions.⁵⁰

ARTICLE 1(1)(A) - INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 'Develop, [...] produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire [...] nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'

- The prohibited 'development' of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device encompasses any of the actions and activities intended to prepare for its production. This covers relevant research, computer modelling of weapons, and the testing of key components, as well as sub-critical testing (i.e. experiments simulating aspects of nuclear explosions using conventional explosives and without achieving uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions).
- The concepts of 'production' and 'manufacture' overlap significantly, covering the processes that are intended to lead to a completed, useable weapon or device. In general parlance, 'production' is a broader term than 'manufacture': manufacture describes the use of machinery to transform inputs into outputs. Taken together, these concepts encompass not only any factory processes, but also any improvisation or adaptation of a nuclear explosive device.
- The prohibition on 'otherwise acquiring' a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is a catch-all provision that encompasses any means of obtaining nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices other than through production. This could be through import, lease, or borrowing from another source or, in theory, by recovering a lost nuclear weapon or capturing or stealing one. This prohibition overlaps with the one in Article 1(1)(c) not to receive the control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (discussed below).

- The prohibition on development, production, manufacturing, and acquisition also cover key components. It is widely accepted that the missile, rocket, or other munition, including both the container and any means of propulsion, are key components in a nuclear weapon. Delivery platforms such as bombers and submarines are not key components of nuclear weapons as such, and are not captured by the prohibitions in Article 1, though they may be integral to a nuclear-weapon system.
- Key components are of course also the fissile material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) and the means of triggering the nuclear chain reaction. Production or procurement of fissile material constitutes prohibited development when this is done with the intent to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. To research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is permitted both under the NPT and the TPNW.
- Development and production of dual-use components, such as navigation or guidance systems, which could be used in both nuclear and conventional weapons, would only be prohibited under the TPNW when they were intended to be used in nuclear weapons.
- Under Article II of the NPT, a similar obligation is imposed not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but this applies only to the non-nuclear-weapon states designated under the Treaty and does not prohibit nuclear-weapon states from continuing to develop, produce, and manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

50 M. Korda, 'Influence of the Defense Industry on US National Security Strategy', *Russia Matters*, 12 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3rBhHKm>; P. Luzin, 'Russia's Defense Industry and Its Influence on Policy: Stuck in a Redistributive Feedback Loop', *Russia Matters*, 3 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3gzNPAL>.

STATES OF CONCERN

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor continues to list Iran and Saudi Arabia as states of concern in relation to the prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. They do not possess nuclear weapons, but both have latent nuclear breakout capabilities. Therefore, in the event that either state intended to become party to the TPNW, possible compliance issues would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties or review conference.

Following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran restarted uranium enrichment beyond levels previously permitted by the agreement; as of November 2021, it was estimated that Iran had a stockpile of 113.8 kg of uranium enriched up to 20%, and 17.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60%.⁵¹ This is particularly worrisome, because very little additional work is required to enrich uranium from 20 per cent to weapons-grade status. These developments have therefore effectively reduced Iran's potential nuclear breakout time from approximately a year under the JCPOA to just a couple of months, although there is currently little public indication that Tehran intends to take that highly consequential step at this time. It is concerning, however, that since February 2021 Iran has continuously refused to allow the IAEA access to a facility where advanced centrifuge components are being produced; this could complicate a potential return to compliance with the JCPOA.⁵²

At the time of writing, the United States and the remaining parties to the JCPOA were in the midst of negotiations over a potential US return to the deal (or perhaps the conclusion of a new interim deal); however, it remained to be seen whether either option would be possible in 2022.

If Iran obtained a true nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia would almost certainly follow through on its promise to acquire one as well. Although Saudi Arabia's capabilities are much further behind Iran's, the country possesses a sizable stockpile of mineable uranium ore; has announced an intention to build several nuclear reactors across the country; and possesses several types of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear warheads.⁵³ While these factors do not necessarily indicate the country's interest in developing nuclear weapons at this

WHAT IS A NUCLEAR WEAPON?

- As is the case with the NPT, the TPNW does not define 'nuclear weapons' or 'other nuclear explosive devices'. There is, though, a settled understanding among states of these terms.
- A nuclear explosive device is an explosive device whose effects are derived primarily from nuclear chain reactions.
- A nuclear weapon is a nuclear explosive device that has been weaponized, meaning that it is contained in and delivered by, for example, a missile, rocket, or bomb.
- Thus, all nuclear weapons are a form of nuclear explosive device but not all nuclear explosive devices are nuclear weapons.

time, Saudi Arabia's Small Quantities Protocol exempts the country from IAEA monitoring and inspections obligations, which increases ambiguity around the country's nuclear intentions and capabilities.

MISSILE TESTS

Test launches of missiles that are either specifically designed to deliver nuclear warheads or which are 'nuclear-capable' are often used to validate particular delivery systems or subcomponents and therefore constitute prohibited development of nuclear weapons under Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW (unless the purpose of the launch is to test the conventional capability of the missile). Information from public reports,⁵⁴ which may not be exhaustive, shows that seven of the nine nuclear-armed states (China, France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States) tested nuclear missiles in 2021.

FISSILE MATERIAL

Fissile material — plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)⁵⁵ — is essential for all nuclear weapons. Both military and civilian stocks of HEU and plutonium must be secured and reduced (and further production limited) in order to achieve nuclear disarmament, halt proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ensure that terrorists do not acquire them.⁵⁶ Production or procurement of fissile material constitutes prohibited development under the TPNW when done with the intent to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

51 'Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), Report by the Director General', IAEA doc. GOV/2021/51, 17 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3hExe6d>, para. 46.

52 K. Davenport and J. Masterson, 'Iran's Failure to Cooperate with the IAEA is Raising Tensions', Arms Control Association, 19 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3uBTd11>.

53 E. Graham-Harrison, S. Kirchgaessner, and J. Borger, 'Revealed: Saudi Arabia may have enough uranium ore to produce nuclear fuel', *The Guardian*, 17 September 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3B9L2Pg>.

54 See, in particular, the news section of the Missile Threat website produced by CSIS, at: <https://bit.ly/3ghd6ou>.

55 Natural uranium consists mostly of the isotope U238 and very little U235. To enrich uranium is to increase the percentage of U235 it contains. Enrichment can be accomplished through a variety of methods, but centrifuges are today the standard technology. From 20% U235 the uranium is considered highly enriched (HEU). Standard nuclear power fuel has 3–5% U235. In nuclear weapons it is common to use HEU with at least 90% U235, but the enrichment level may also vary over a wide range.

56 International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), 'About IPFM', 31 August 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/35ebStG>.

According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), the global stockpile of HEU was estimated to be about 1,330 metric tonnes at the beginning of 2020, while the global stockpile of separated plutonium was about 540 tonnes, of which about 316 tonnes was civilian plutonium.⁵⁷ Russia and the United States possess enormous quantities of both HEU and plutonium that could be used to produce tens of thousands of new nuclear weapons.

Enriched uranium is also used in civilian reactor fuel. As of May 2021, 13 non-nuclear-armed states (Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, and Syria) had at least 1kg of HEU in civilian stockpiles, and some of them between 1 and 10 tonnes.⁵⁸ One of these – Japan – also has a very large stockpile of 45.5 tonnes of separated plutonium, some in storage in the United Kingdom and in France, and some on its territory, theoretically sufficient for the production of thousands

of nuclear weapons.⁵⁹ However, there is currently no indication that any of these countries intends to develop a military nuclear-weapons programme.

Facilities that can produce fissile material (reprocessing plants and/or enrichment facilities) exist in 15 states (the nine nuclear-armed states plus Argentina,⁶⁰ Brazil, Germany, Iran, Japan,⁶¹ and the Netherlands). Of these, production of fissile material intended for nuclear weapons appears to continue in India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.⁶² China, Russia, and the United States do not currently appear to be producing new fissile material for weapons, but continue to operate at least one reprocessing plant or enrichment facility without non-proliferation safeguards attached. The remaining two nuclear-armed states, France and the United Kingdom now only possess fissile material production complexes under safeguards, as do Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Iran, Japan, and the Netherlands.⁶³

THE TPNW AND MINING AND TRANSFER OF URANIUM

Under international law, mining and transfer of uranium is generally lawful, unless it is being done for the purpose of developing or assisting in the development of a nuclear explosive device. The peaceful use of nuclear energy is protected under Article IV of the NPT (and customary international law), and the Preamble to the TPNW confirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting that right. A state may therefore extract uranium and either use the nuclear material itself or provide it to another state for peaceful purposes, as long as it is subject to Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA.

Under the TPNW, the provision of uranium to any other state is prohibited where it is not subject to appropriate Safeguards Agreements or if the state party transferring the uranium knows that the material in question will, or is likely to, be used to develop a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. Otherwise, states parties to the TPNW are permitted to transfer uranium, including to nuclear-armed states and states not party to the TPNW. Several states that mine and export uranium are party to the TPNW, including Kazakhstan, Namibia, and South Africa.

Under the NPT, the provision of uranium to any non-nuclear-weapon state is unlawful where it is not subject to appropriate Safeguards Agreements. The NPT does not

directly address the legality of provision of uranium to the five nuclear-weapon states designated under that Treaty.

If a state exports uranium to a nuclear-armed state or any other state subject to IAEA safeguards and on the understanding that the uranium would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the exporting state could not be considered to be in violation of either the TPNW or the NPT if the importing state unexpectedly decided to use the uranium for weapons development instead. This would, though, affect the legality of any future exports of uranium to that state.

When armed groups control areas of a state's territory, or when an armed conflict is ongoing, situations could occur where it would be difficult for the authorities of a state in which uranium deposits exist to effectively control all extraction and transfers. If a non-state actor in such a situation were to transfer uranium to an actor intending to develop a nuclear explosive device, the territorial state could not be considered to be in violation either of the TPNW or the NPT, provided that it has made all reasonable efforts to prevent such extraction and transfers. All reasonable efforts would include the adoption of national legislation and implementation of other practical measures to secure as far as possible sites in which uranium is present or where stocks of uranium are held.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ IPFM, 'Materials: Highly enriched uranium', September 2021, at: <http://bit.ly/374aF6O>. All HEU has been removed from 34 states plus Taiwan.

⁵⁹ IPFM, 'Materials: Plutonium', September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3lCxEq9>.

⁶⁰ The operating status of Argentina's facility for enrichment of uranium is uncertain.

⁶¹ The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is resuming operation. Many are concerned that the Japanese production of separated plutonium serves no essential purpose, is enormously expensive, and will complicate nuclear disarmament. See, e.g., T. Keiichi, Questions emerge over need for Japanese nuclear reprocessing plant, *NHK-World-Japan*, 1 June 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/2NoHHno>.

⁶² IPFM, 'Fissile material stocks', 4 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3lAi2TX>.

⁶³ IPFM, 'Enrichment facilities', 4 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3lCz6J7>; and 'Reprocessing Plants', 4 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3oFyzhu>.

The prohibition on **POSSESSION AND STOCKPILING**



India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi speaking about India's ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant. India was one of the nuclear-armed states that increased their nuclear-weapons stockpile in 2021. (Photo: @narendramodi on Twitter)



9

NOT COMPATIBLE

China, France, India, Israel,
North Korea, Pakistan,
Russia, United Kingdom,
United States

The nine nuclear-armed states – states not party China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States – engaged in conduct in 2021 that was not compatible with the TPNW’s prohibition on possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Combined, they retained approximately 12,705 nuclear warheads in early 2022.

An estimated 9,440 of these warheads constituted *usable* stockpiles, meaning that they are available for use by the nuclear-armed states on missiles, aircraft, ships and submarines. Of these, 3,732 warheads were deployed with operational forces and the remaining 5,708 were in storage. An additional total of 3,265 warheads had previously been retired and were awaiting dismantlement in Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.⁶⁴ See Figure 11 overleaf for the overview. The respective numbers for each nuclear-armed state can also be found in their state profiles in this report.

While the total number of nuclear warheads in the world in 2021 continued to decrease slightly because the United States and Russia every year dismantle a small number of their retired, older nuclear warheads,⁶⁵ the number of


ARTICLE 1(1)(A) – INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: ‘[...] possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’

- The prohibition on possession of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device under Article 1(1)(a) makes it illegal to have a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.
- Possession does not require ownership.
- One nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is sufficient to constitute a stockpile.
- The prohibition on possession covers activities such as maintenance and deployment of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Indirectly, it also acts to render deterrence practices unlawful.

warheads in global usable stockpiles has actually been increasing somewhat since its lowest point in 2017, when it was at 9,227 warheads. This is illustrated in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Global inventory of nuclear warheads compared with global usable stockpiles of nuclear warheads.



⁶⁴ Additional information about global nuclear arsenals can be found on the ‘Status of World Nuclear Forces’ page on the Federation of American Scientists’ website, at: <http://bit.ly/2B71Qcf>.


⁶⁵ For more information on this, see the section in the present report on the obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Figure 11: The world's nuclear arsenals (as of January 2022)

RUSSIA




Total 5,977



CHINA




Total 350



FRANCE




Total 290



UNITED KINGDOM



Total 225



- **Deployed:** Nuclear warheads that are deployed on delivery vehicles or at bomber bases.
- **In storage:** Nuclear warheads that are not deployed but in storage.
- **Retired:** Retired, but still intact, nuclear warheads awaiting dismantlement. Refers to sizable backlogs of legacy warheads, as opposed to the regular flow of warheads in and out of a country's stockpile.


Usable stockpile: The deployed and stored nuclear warheads together constitute a state's usable stockpile, available for use by its armed forces.
Total inventory: The usable stockpile and retired warheads together constitute a state's total inventory of nuclear warheads.

Source: H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, *Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories, 2022*, Federation of American Scientists, February 2022, at: <http://bit.ly/2B71Qcf>.

UNITED STATES



Total 5,428



1,744

1,964

1,720

PAKISTAN



Total 165



INDIA



Total 160



ISRAEL



Total 90



NORTH KOREA



Total 20



China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan all increased their total arsenals in 2021, and although Russia’s usable stockpile appeared stable in 2021, the trend over the past few years has been an increase. The United States’ usable stockpile increased slightly in 2019 but declined again in 2020 and 2021, while France’s and Israel’s stockpiles have remained constant.

In its 2021 Integrated Review, the UK government also announced a significant increase in the upper limit of the United Kingdom’s nuclear inventory, up to 260 warheads.⁶⁶ This sudden decision effectively reverses several decades of gradual disarmament-minded policies, and joins the United Kingdom together with China and Russia as the three members of the P5 to increase the sizes of their nuclear stockpiles, in conflict with their obligations under the NPT.⁶⁷ As a result of these developments, the post-Cold War trend of countries reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines appears to have now come to a halt. Worryingly, in some cases it is actually being reversed.

This situation is being driven by a variety of intersecting factors, including the embrace of ‘great power competition’ and the accompanying arms race; a renewed emphasis on nuclear warfighting in nuclear strategy; a general lack of interest in arms control; the powerful influence of the nuclear-weapons industry on national security policy; and a general lack of vision for how to advance global disarmament goals.

STOCKPILE YIELDS

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor estimates that the 9,440 nuclear warheads in the usable stockpiles of the nine nuclear-armed states have a collective yield of approximately 2,059 megatons (MT).

This is almost 138,000 times the approximate yield of the 15-kiloton (Kt) bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. The estimated total yield of each nuclear-armed state’s usable stockpile of warheads is shown in Table E below, with the corresponding number of Hiroshima-bomb equivalents.



Combined, the United States and Russia are responsible for approximately 90% of the global nuclear stockpile yield. Both countries operate nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) that can fire several missiles that also carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), meaning that the total firepower onboard a single SSBN can be extraordinary in magnitude.

It is estimated that the average current load-out of a single Russian Borei-class SSBN equates to approximately 6.4 MT, or 427 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents, and that the average current load-out of a single US Ohio-class SSBN equates to approximately 19 MT, or 1,266 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents. Therefore, even with an average current load-out, a single Russian SSBN is believed to carry as much destructive power as the entire, combined nuclear arsenals of India and Israel, while the destructive power carried on board a single US SSBN is believed to be twice that of the entire, combined nuclear arsenal of India, Pakistan, and Israel. In a nuclear crisis, the megatonnage could be increased further, by loading each missile with more warheads.

FACILITIES, DELIVERY VEHICLES, AND DEPLOYMENTS

Nuclear weapons are currently believed to be stored at more than 100 distinct locations in 14 states: the nine nuclear-armed states plus five European host nations for

Table E: Estimated total yield in MT of global useable stockpiles of nuclear warheads (as of January 2022)⁶⁸

		RUSSIA	UNITED STATES	CHINA	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM	PAKISTAN	INDIA	ISRAEL	NORTH KOREA	TOTAL
Total stockpile yield (MT)		995.8	857.6	148	29	18	3.1	3.9	2.5	1.3	2,059.2
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents		66,388	57,840	9,887	1,933	1,200	207	260	167	87	137,969

66 HM Government, ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’, CP 403, March 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3vWpSkw>.
67 Article VI of the NPT obligates the Parties to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.’
68 The yield estimates are derived through the best open-source estimates of each type of warhead, multiplied by their estimated numbers in the usable stockpile. The number of “Hiroshima-bomb equivalents” is calculated by dividing the estimated stockpile yield by 15 kilotons, a widely-assumed yield for the Hiroshima bomb.


US nuclear weapons (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey). Nuclear weapons are also frequently transported between locations for deployment, retirement, maintenance, or modification.

The estimated 9,440 nuclear warheads in global usable stockpiles are assigned to a wide variety of delivery vehicles. Figure 12 below shows that nuclear-armed submarines are the largest carrier of nuclear weapons, accounting for 3,644, or almost two fifths of the warheads. At all times, a significant number of warheads are carried through the world’s oceans on SSBNs on active patrol, ready to be launched on short notice. As of January 2022, the United States operates 14 SSBNs that can carry nuclear weapons, Russia operates 10, China operates 6, the United Kingdom operates 4, France operates 4, and India operates 1, with two more being fitted. North Korea has one ballistic missile submarine (SSB) which is not considered operational. Russia also has attack submarines that can launch nuclear weapons, and Israel is thought to have nuclear-capable attack submarines.

Russia and India are the only nuclear-armed states that deploy surface vessels that can launch nuclear weapons. Russian surface vessels also carry naval aircraft for delivery of nuclear weapons. France too has a surface vessel with naval aircraft with a nuclear role.

Significant numbers of nuclear warheads are also actively deployed during peacetime on mobile and siloed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as at bomber bases. Several hundred warheads are also assigned to tactical delivery systems or air, coastal, and missile defence systems, although these are mostly kept in central storage. Some states, such as China, India, Pakistan, and Israel, keep the majority – or even the entirety – of their nuclear stockpiles in storage during peacetime, while others, such as France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, deploy nuclear weapons on alert in peacetime.

Figure 12: Global usable stockpiles of nuclear warheads, by type of delivery vehicle.⁶⁹



69 This overview does not include 32 warheads in India and 11 warheads in Pakistan that are not yet assigned to delivery vehicles but thought to have been produced to eventually arm delivery vehicles that are not yet operational.

The prohibition on **TESTING**



A screen grab from North Korea's state television channel shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspecting what was said to be a thermonuclear bomb near Pyongyang, North Korea, on 3 September 2017. North Korea's last nuclear test explosion was carried out hours after this and other images were released. (Photo: Stephen Shaver/UPI/Shutterstock/NTB)



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COMPLIANT



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COMPATIBLE

No state engaged in conduct in 2021 that contravened the TPNW's prohibition on testing. North Korea is the only state that is known to have engaged in explosive nuclear testing since 1998, with its last test detonation occurring in September 2017.

Pyongyang announced a moratorium on nuclear testing in April 2018 (and destroyed the Punggye-ri test site in May 2018) but declared an end to this moratorium on 31 December 2019. The change of position was confirmed in January 2020.⁷⁰ In January 2022, there were unconfirmed reports that North Korea was contemplating a new nuclear test detonation.⁷¹ If such a test were conducted, it would violate UN Security Council resolutions as well as, arguably, customary international law, in addition to being incompatible with Article 1 of the TPNW.

Since the first nuclear test explosion on 16 July 1945, at least eight states have conducted a total of at least 2,050 nuclear test explosions at dozens of test sites around the world.⁷² India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear devices in 1998. The United Kingdom undertook its last explosive test in 1991. France completed its last nuclear explosive test in 1996 and completely dismantled its nuclear testing site in the Pacific. The United States conducted its last explosive tests in 1992, but in November 2017 the US government decided to shorten its testing readiness timeline from between 24 and 36 months to between 6 to 10 months 'for a simple test'.⁷³ Information disclosed by The Washington Post in May 2020 reported discussions by senior US national security officials about the option of a demonstration nuclear blast as a political signal to Russia and China.⁷⁴

China's last explosive nuclear test was in July 1996, only a few months prior to the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the UN General Assembly.⁷⁵ The Soviet Union/Russia undertook its last known explosive test in 1990. In late May 2019, a senior US official accused China and Russia of potentially having conducted low-yield explosive testing of nuclear weapons but did not adduce any evidence in support of this assertion.

ARTICLE 1(1)(A) - INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: '[...] test [...] nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'

- The prohibition on testing in Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW bans the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. It is therefore limited to explosive testing.
- All non-explosive forms of testing are outlawed by the prohibition on development in the TPNW.
- All explosive testing also contravenes the CTBT (a treaty not yet in force) and, arguably, customary international law.
- The preamble of the TPNW recognizes 'the vital importance' of the CTBT and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

Other authorities within the US Government, however, contested the official's allegations, as did China and Russia. Furthermore Lassina Zerbo, head of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), said that the 'international monitoring system has been operating as normal and has not detected any unusual event'.⁷⁶

In September 1979, a flash over the Indian Ocean detected by a US satellite (Vela) was suspected of being a South African nuclear test, conducted in collaboration with Israel. This was never confirmed officially by either of these states.⁷⁷

70 K. Davenport and J. Masterson, 'North Korea Reiterates End to Test Moratorium', Arms Control Association, 30 January 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3EWmha6>.

71 R. Lloyd Parry, 'North Korea: Kim Jong-un ponders return to nuclear warhead and long-range ballistic missiles tests', *The Times*, 20 January 2022.

72 Arms Control Association, 'The Nuclear Testing Tally', Last updated July 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/34oa8vh>.

73 Department of Energy, 'Fiscal Year 2018, Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan' (November 2017), pp. 3–26.

74 'Trump administration discussed conducting first U.S. nuclear test in decades', *The Washington Post*, 22 May 2020.

75 Government of China, Statement on the Moratorium of Nuclear Tests, *Xinhua*, 29 July 1996, via: www.cnr.cn; see Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 'China Nuclear Overview', Fact Sheet, 29 April 2015, at: <https://bit.ly/33iBvZ8>.


76 J. Borger, 'Nuclear watchdog says any US test would be 'grave challenge to peace'', *The Guardian*, 28 May 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/3k5eKf5>.

77 See, e.g., C. M. Wright and L.-E. De Geer, 'The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: The Detected Double-Flash', *Science & Global Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2017), 95–124; and A. Cohen and W. Burr, 'What the U.S. Government Really Thought of Israel's Apparent 1979 Nuclear Test', *Politico*, 8 December 2016, at: <https://politi.co/3gnmzL9>.

The prohibition on **TRANSFER**



A Trident II, or D-5 missile, is launched from an Ohio-class submarine in this undated file photo. The United States has effectively exported a nuclear-weapon system to the United Kingdom. (Photo: HO/REUTERS/NTB)



One state not party – the United States – engaged in conduct in 2021 which was not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on transfer of nuclear weapons, by virtue of its export of key components to the United Kingdom's nuclear arsenal.

The United States has effectively transferred nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom, because the United Kingdom's nuclear-weapon system in very large measure is imported from the United States: the UK leases its Trident II (D5) SLBMs from the United States' stockpile; the design for the UK's Holbrook nuclear warhead for its Trident missiles is based on the US W76 design; key components for the warhead are imported from US nuclear-weapons laboratories; key components of the UK's SSBNs are imported from the United States (the Trident SLBM fire control system and missile compartments); and the submarines' reactors were developed from a US design.^{78, 79}

The nature of the cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom was first set out in the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, a bilateral treaty between the two nations.⁸⁰ It has been renewed several times, most recently in 2014, covering the ten years through to 2024.⁸¹ Whether this arrangement is compliant with the corresponding prohibition on transfer by nuclear-weapon states under the NPT is also highly questionable.⁸²

UK officials have reportedly lobbied the US Congress to expedite the development of a new warhead, the W93, on which a replacement for the Holbrooke warhead would be based.⁸³ If the United States shares its warhead design with the UK, it will almost certainly be violating Article I of the NPT. This is so, because it will be indirectly transferring nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE 1(1)(B) - INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 'Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly.'

- 'Transfer' means to transmit either possession or ownership.
- Because transfer is prohibited 'to any recipient whatsoever' and irrespective of whether this occurs 'directly or indirectly', it is also illegal to transmit possession or ownership to any other state or to any natural or 'legal' person (e.g. a company or organization) of key components of any nuclear explosive device in separate instalments or via intermediaries or third parties where there is knowledge they will be used to produce a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.
- Unlawful transfer does not necessarily involve payment or other form of 'consideration'.
- Under Article 1 of the NPT, the five nuclear-weapon states parties have committed never to transfer nuclear weapons 'to any recipient whatsoever'. The NPT does not include a corresponding prohibition on non-nuclear-weapon states to either transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or to assist in a transfer. These important lacunae are addressed by Article 1(1)(b) and (e) of the TPNW.

78 D. Plesch and J. Ainslie, 'Trident: Strategic Dependence & Sovereignty', Working Paper, School of Oriental and African Studies, London 2016, p. 10, at: <https://bit.ly/3sP6DZy>; S. Jones, 'A wonk's guide to the Trident nuclear deterrent', *The Financial Times*, 18 July 2018: at: <http://on.ft.com/30ShqDo>.

79 N. Ritchie, *A Nuclear Weapons-Free World? Britain, Trident and the Challenges Ahead*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, Chap. 6: 'A very special nuclear relationship'.


80 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

81 See the UK Explanatory Memorandum of 2014, at: <http://bit.ly/2Z0Qqj2>.


82 See, e.g., R. Singh and C. Chinkin, 'Mutual Defence Agreement [MDA] and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] Joint Advice', 26 July 2004. Nuclear sharing was one of the key issues in the NPT negotiations. Several of the 18 participating States disagreed strongly about the degree to which allies should be allowed to share hardware and decision-making powers. In the end, a tacit agreement was made between key states that foreign deployment would be acceptable as long as the weapons were kept under the control of the owner/possessor state. However, any transfer of weapons to the control of the host state was deemed unacceptable. There may have been an informal agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union about nuclear sharing, but this would only be an authoritative interpretation of the NPT under international law if this constituted an agreement between all the negotiating states. See Art. 31(2)(a), 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

83 See J. Borger, 'UK lobbies US to support controversial new nuclear warheads', *The Guardian*, 1 August 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/3hRtqga>.

The prohibition on **RECEIVING TRANSFER OR CONTROL**



A UK Weapons Engineer Officer's hand on a tactical trigger for the launching of Trident ballistic missiles. (Photo: Simmo Simpson, © Crown copyright)



As discussed in the section above, one state not party — the United Kingdom — leases Trident missiles and imports other key nuclear components from the United States, which is not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on receiving the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

In 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace, urged the US Congress to support initial spending on developing a new nuclear warhead, the W93, which is intended for deployment on US SSBNs by 2040.⁸⁴ A replacement for the United Kingdom's Holbrooke warhead would be based on the W93. Nonetheless, in March 2021, the same Secretary of State declared in the UK House of Commons that: 'For clarity, the United Kingdom does not buy warheads from other countries. Under the nuclear proliferation treaty, warheads have to be developed within that very country itself.'⁸⁵

Another potential future compatibility issue under this prohibition concerns the US B61 nuclear bombs stored in Europe. Arrangements are reportedly in place for control over the bombs to be given by the United States to the host states Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, for loading and use in their dual-capable NATO-designated aircraft. If this were to occur, the receiving state would contravene Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW (and potentially also the NPT). This specific task division arrangement has therefore been much discussed, not least when the German Bundeswehr in 2008 handed out directives, in the form of a pocket card ('Taschenkarte'), stipulating that German soldiers were prohibited from using nuclear weapons under international law.⁸⁶ The directives have since been changed and the sentence in question omitted.

Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands all have a nuclear role in NATO and retain the dual-capable aircraft and pilots trained in the use of the weapons at bases on their territory. The weapons are subject to 'dual key' authorisation by the United States government and the government of the respective host state in order to be used. In the case of the B61 bombs stationed at Incirlik in Turkey, however, any use of the weapons would reportedly be carried out by aircraft stationed at other bases, and it is not clear whether Turkey's fighters maintain the capacity to drop nuclear bombs. There are ostensibly no nuclear-capable aircraft at Incirlik.⁸⁷

ARTICLE 1(1)(C) - INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 'Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly.'

- To 'receive' a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to take possession or control over it. This broad notion does not require that ownership also pass to the recipient.
- The prohibition on indirect receipt covers accepting the key components of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device as well as an assembled version. This extends to transfers made through intermediaries.
- Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW follows a similarly worded provision in Article II of the NPT, but the corresponding prohibition in that Treaty applies only to those States that are designated as non-nuclear-weapon states.

Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey have recently undergone, or are still undergoing, processes to procure the F35-A fighter aircraft in order to fulfil the technical requirements of their nuclear-sharing arrangements. In the Netherlands, a majority of the members of parliament supported a motion stating that the F-35s should have no nuclear role.⁸⁸ The Dutch government decided to ignore the parliamentary vote, opting to procure nuclear-capable F-35s. The final technical adjustments necessary to enable the F-35 to employ nuclear weapons ('Block 4') are expected to be implemented across the relevant host states between 2020 and 2024. Germany decided in March 2022 to replace its ageing Tornado fleet, which includes nuclear-capable aircraft, with F-35 fighters.⁸⁹ The decision was taken following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

See the section below on the prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons for further information on the US nuclear weapons stored in Europe.

84 J. Borger, 'UK lobbies US to support controversial new nuclear warheads', *The Guardian*, 1 August 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3hRtqga>.

85 Hansard, 'Integrated Review: Defence Command Paper', Vol. 691, 22 March 2021, col. 636 et seq., at: <https://bit.ly/3GCX70p>.

86 See: O. Nassauer, 'Pilots practice delivering nuclear bombs. Tornado pilots between orders and international law', [Piloten üben Atom-bomben-Abwurf. Tornado-Piloten zwischen Befehl und Völkerrecht], Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, 10 July 2008, at: <https://bit.ly/3rMOQSi>. The pocket card ('Taschenkarte') is the summary of the central service regulation 15/2 of the Bundeswehr, which was adapted in 2013 to no longer include this prohibition (and resulting personal responsibility under international law).

87 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, 'Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 73, No. 5 (2017), at: <https://bit.ly/2NEA1yL>.

88 DutchNews.nl, 'Ministers ignore vote, JSF jet fighter could carry nuclear weapons', 14 January 2014, at: <https://bit.ly/2Zp6NuS>.

89 G. Bottaro, 'Germany to buy nuclear-capable F-35 fighter jets in defence spending spree', *Daily Telegraph*, 14 March 2022.


The prohibition on **USE**



The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Mark Milley (on the right of the picture), was so worried in early January 2021 that Donald Trump was out of control, that he took secret action to order aides not to act immediately on any move by Trump to use US nuclear forces. This is according to the book 'Peril' by Bob Woodward and Robert Costa. (Photo: Alex Brandon/AP/NTB)



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COMPLIANT



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COMPATIBLE

Today's nine nuclear-armed states possess the unique capability to start or engage in a nuclear war, which could — under some extreme scenarios — end all human life on Earth. Nuclear weapons have not been used since August 1945 when the United States dropped a nuclear weapon first on Hiroshima and then, three days later, on Nagasaki.

Other nuclear explosive devices have not been used since some 150 such devices were detonated for so-called 'peaceful' use (for civil engineering purposes) between the second half of the 1950s and the end of the 1980s by the Soviet Union and the United States.⁹⁰

No state has therefore contravened the TPNW's prohibition on use of nuclear weapons since the Treaty was adopted in 2017. The world has, however, on several occasions been brought to the brink of nuclear war or nuclear accidents.⁹¹ Luck has had an alarmingly significant role in the history of nuclear weapons.⁹² The UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned in September 2021 that 'Humanity remains one misunderstanding, one misstep, one miscalculation, one pushed button away from annihilation.'⁹³

The trend towards 'smaller' and 'smarter' nuclear weapons is also believed to increase risk. A number of experts have argued that 'low-yield' capabilities such as the US W76-2 Trident warhead deployed in early 2020 are 'more usable as weapons of war, and therefore some president, in a crisis, might feel more tempted to use them.'⁹⁴

With the exception of Pakistan, where nuclear use could reportedly be decided by a ten-member employment committee, each nuclear-armed state reserves 'sole' or final authority over the decision to use nuclear weapons for the head of state or government. Nuclear deterrence theory also assumes a rational decision-making procedure, but, of course, this can never be guaranteed. The dramatic, final days in office of President Donald Trump in January 2021 served as a reminder of this.

After the January 6 attack on the US Capitol, Trump's top military adviser, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Mark Milley, is said to have taken secret action to limit Trump from potentially ordering a dangerous military strike or launching nuclear weapons. This was reported in a book by Bob Woodward and Robert Costa. They

ARTICLE 1(1)(D) - INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 'Use [...] nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'

- Preventing use is a central aim of the TPNW.
- To use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to launch, release, deliver or detonate it with hostile intent or for so-called 'peaceful' use, such as in civil engineering. Intent can be discerned from the circumstances and does not have to be publicly declared.
- Possession or deployment of nuclear weapons for the purpose of 'deterrence' does not amount to their use under the TPNW but is caught by the prohibition on possession in Article 1(1)(a).
- The NPT does not address the use of nuclear weapons in so far as it allows 'peaceful' detonation of nuclear explosive devices by nuclear-weapon states. The CTBT prohibits such 'peaceful' nuclear explosions.

wrote that General Milley 'was certain that Trump had gone into a serious mental decline in the aftermath of the election', and was worried that he could 'go rogue'.⁹⁵ Milley called a secret meeting in his Pentagon office on January 8 to review the process for military action, including the launching of nuclear weapons. Speaking to senior military officials in charge of the National Military Command Center, the Pentagon's war room, Milley instructed them not to take orders from anyone unless he was involved. Woodward and Costa also write that 'some might contend that Milley had overstepped his authority and taken extraordinary power for himself', but he believed his actions were 'a good faith precaution to ensure there was no historic rupture in the international order, no accidental war with China or others, and no use of nuclear weapons'.⁹⁶

Most nuclear weapons today have an explosive yield that is many times higher than that of the nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, whose explosive force was the equivalent of approximately 15 kilotons (Kt) of

90 World Nuclear Association, 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosions', updated December 2018, at: <https://bit.ly/2wGTC7z>.

91 P. Lewis et al., 'Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy', Chatham House (2014), at: <https://bit.ly/3oUm2X6>.

92 B. Pelopidas, 'The unbearable lightness of luck', *European Journal of International Security*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2017), and see also B. Pelopidas and A. Wellerstein, 'The reason we haven't had nuclear disasters isn't careful planning. It's luck.', *The Washington Post*, 10 August 2020, at: <https://wapo.st/36oMDmv>.

93 A. Guterres, 'Remarks at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly to Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons', United Nations, 28 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/35Y76AT>.

94 F. Kaplan, 'The Senseless Danger of the Military's New "Low-Yield" Nuclear Warhead', *Slate*, 18 February 2020.

95 B. Woodward and R. Costa, *Peril*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2021, p. xxv.

96 *Ibid.*, p. xxviii. See also J. Gangel, J. Hern, and E. Stuart: 'Woodward/Costa book: Worried Trump could "go rouge", Milley took secret action to protect nuclear weapons', *CNN Politics*, 14 September 2021, at: <https://cnn.it/34j4Wvh>.


TNT and killed 140,000 people instantaneously or within five months.⁹⁷ For context, Figure 13 below provides an overview of the immediate estimated fatalities and injuries which one typical nuclear weapon, with a yield of 100 kilotons, would cause if it were dropped today on the capitals of the nuclear-armed states.⁹⁸

A study in *Science Advances* published in early October 2019 examines a scenario of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. If India were to use 100 nuclear weapons against urban targets and Pakistan were to use 150, the two countries alone could suffer 50 to 125 million fatalities (depending on the yield of the weapons). In addition to significant radioactive fallout, smoke from burning cities would spread globally within a matter of weeks, triggering severe short-term climate perturbations, with temperatures declining to values not seen on Earth since the middle of the last Ice Age. Food production worldwide would decline and mass starvation ensue. Every nation on Earth could be severely affected.⁹⁹

POLICIES ON USE

Five of the nine nuclear-armed states — France, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States — maintain written nuclear doctrines that allow for the ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons. Two of the nine (India and China) have long maintained so-called no-first-use policies, declaring that they will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation to prior use by an adversary. Yet both are in the process of expanding their arsenals, which many analysts have interpreted as an indication they might also be in the process of changing their nuclear postures, including by envisioning pre-emptive use under certain circumstances.¹⁰⁰ US officials have suggested that, as of 2021, China has deployed at least one satellite into orbit to facilitate a shift to a nuclear ‘launch-on-warning’ posture.¹⁰¹ Under such a posture, China might choose to launch pre-emptive nuclear strikes when confronted with the likelihood of a first strike by an adversary.

Figure 13: Immediate fatalities and injuries from one 100 Kt nuclear weapon



97 M. Tomonga, ‘The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Summary of the Human Consequences, 1945-2018, and Lessons for Homo Sapients to End the Nuclear Weapons Age’, *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2019), at: <https://bit.ly/36wXILN>.

98 Statistics on the number of fatalities and injured are from NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein, using population density information and nuclear effects information, at: <https://bit.ly/34XSpGR>. Fatalities and injuries are based on the immediate impact of the detonation and do not account for long-term radiation deaths and injuries or the lasting environmental impact a large-scale nuclear detonation could cause. All of the detonations calculated were airbursts, not surface detonations.

99 O. B. Toon et al., ‘Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and global catastrophe’, *Science Advances*, Vol. 5, No. 10 (2 October 2019), at: <https://bit.ly/2VnRL3T>.

100 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, ‘Chinese nuclear forces, 2019’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (2019), at: <https://bit.ly/2ZuCOYx>; and H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, ‘Indian nuclear forces, 2018’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 74, No. 6 (2018), at: <https://bit.ly/32fNiS7>.

101 US Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 3 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3LkKzP0>, pp. 93–94.

Kim Jong-un stated in 2016 and 2018 that North Korea will not use nuclear weapons unless 'its sovereignty is encroached upon by any hostile force with nuclear weapons'.¹⁰² However, other statements from his government, including threats of a 'pre-emptive nuclear strike of justice'¹⁰³ against Japan and South Korea, have undercut the credibility of these comments.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's apparent claim in October 2018 that Russia would not use nuclear weapons first is not reflected in Russia's official nuclear-weapons doctrine, which explicitly stipulates that Russia would consider using nuclear arms in response to the use of 'weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy'.¹⁰⁴

The ninth nuclear-armed state, Israel, has not formally admitted to possessing nuclear weapons, and has thus not made clear its policy on their use.

France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States all maintain nuclear weapons on alert, ready to be launched on short notice. For information on this, see the section on the prohibition on possession and stockpiling.

COUNTER-FORCE AND COUNTER-VALUE

- Theorists and military planners often distinguish between strategies aimed at destroying the adversary's missile bases and other nuclear assets ('counter-force') and strategies aimed at killing civilians and destroying the adversary's population centres ('counter-value').
- Counter-force strategies are commonly presumed to require larger nuclear arsenals and more sophisticated command and control structures than do counter-value strategies.
- Russia and the United States are believed to have maintained plans for both counter-value and counter-force strikes since the 1960s. The remaining seven nuclear-armed states have maintained smaller nuclear arsenals primarily structured to facilitate counter-value strikes or tactical use on the battlefield. However, there are now signs that certain nuclear-armed states, China and India in particular, are expanding their arsenals in such a way as to enable counter-force strikes.

¹⁰² R. Smart, 'North Korea will not use nuclear weapons first, says Kim Jong-un', *The Guardian*, 8 May 2016, at: <https://bit.ly/2mvie1C>.

¹⁰³ 'North Korea threatens pre-emptive nuclear strikes on South Korea and US', *The Straits Times*, 7 March 2016, at: <https://bit.ly/2KZxv6H>.

¹⁰⁴ The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), at: <https://bit.ly/2Z8lakM>; and Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (2020), at: <https://bit.ly/3sWQlh8>.

The prohibition on **THREATENING TO USE**




A 96th Bomb Squadron pilot operates a US B-52 on a flight in November 2021 during the annual nuclear command and control exercise Global Thunder.
(Photo: Senior Airman Jonathan E. Ramos, 2nd Bomb Wing Public Affairs, US Air Force)



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COMPLIANT



108

COMPATIBLE

In 2021, there was, in the view of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, no clear instance of threatening to use nuclear weapons, as prohibited under Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW. The closest to an instance of threatening to use was a US simulation of nuclear strikes against Russia.

The United States' annual nuclear command and control exercise, 'Global Thunder', took place in November 2021.^{105, 106} Russia claimed that, during this nuclear strike rehearsal, ten US strategic bombers approached towards Russia from both the west and the east, and that they had come within 20 kilometres of the Russian border. US authorities did not deny the substance of Russia's claim, but said the manoeuvres had been announced publicly at the time and were carried out in 'compliance with all national and international requirements and protocols'.¹⁰⁷

Given the backdrop of tensions over Ukraine at the time, this particular drill was a provocative act and might constitute threatening to use nuclear weapons.

An even more provocative act was the Russian Grom-2022 Strategic Deterrence Force exercise in February 2022,¹⁰⁸ which took place prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This exercise will be discussed in greater detail in the 2022 edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, as will the implicit threats to use nuclear weapons made by President Vladimir Putin. During the early days of the Ukraine conflict, a number of such threats were made by Russia. In late February 2022, President Vladimir Putin warned the West of 'consequences never seen before'. Following an order from the Russian President, the state of alertness of Russia's nuclear forces was then heightened.¹⁰⁹ In response, Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, said: 'Vladimir

ARTICLE 1(1)(D) – INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: [...] 'threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'

- Article 1(1)(d) prohibits threatening to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, regardless of whether such use would itself be a violation of international law or whether the device would be used in legitimate self-defence against foreign aggression. It is therefore broader in scope than the prohibition on threat of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
- To violate the TPNW, a threat of use must be credible in the circumstances. This means that the threat must emanate from a person or an authority in a position to either effect or direct the use of a nuclear explosive device. Typically, therefore, such a threat would be made by a senior, pertinent government official or the ruling party in a nuclear-armed state.
- The narrow wording in Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW with the active verb 'threaten to use' also requires that any signalled intention by a state to use nuclear weapons be specific as to the target of possible use.
- Prohibited threats may, however, be implicit as well as explicit. A stated threat does not, therefore, have to refer

to use of nuclear weapons, although it would be more likely to violate the norm in the TPNW should it do so.

- In certain circumstances of tension, a show of force by means of missile testing, an explosive test of a nuclear weapon, a military exercise involving possible use of nuclear weapons, or a nuclear strike exercise, could amount to unlawfully threatening to use nuclear weapons under the TPNW (along with other violations of the Treaty).
- Policies of nuclear 'deterrence' rest on willingness to use nuclear weapons. Accordingly, reflecting the severity of the danger, some experts take the view that a practice of nuclear 'deterrence' in and of itself constitutes an unlawful threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is the view of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor that the broader concept of nuclear deterrence, where the threat to use nuclear weapons is general and not specific in nature, is not sufficient in itself to constitute threatening to use under the TPNW. Deterrence practices are, however, illegal under the prohibition on possession and stockpiling.
- The NPT does not prohibit the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

¹⁰⁵ US Strategic Command, 'U.S. Strategic Command commences annual nuclear readiness exercise—Global Thunder 22', 1 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3tlmcKm>.

¹⁰⁶ J. Johnson, 'U.S. Strategic Command to begin exercise Global Thunder 22', Air Force Global Strike Command, 2 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/30COI3r>.

¹⁰⁷ A. Osborn and P. Stewart, 'Moscow says U.S. rehearsed nuclear strike against Russia this month', *Reuters*, 23 November 2021, at: <https://reut.rs/3d4w55z>.

¹⁰⁸ AFP, 'Russia Test Fires Missiles as U.S. Warns Moscow "Poised" to Invade Ukraine', *The Moscow Times*, 19 February 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/33ywU5A>; and T. Balmforth and M. Kiselyova, 'Putin leads sweeping nuclear exercises as tensions soar', *Reuters*, 19 February 2022, at: <https://reut.rs/3v3EqRu>.

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g. 'Russia attacks Ukraine as Putin warns countries who interfere will face "consequences you have never seen"', *PBS*, 24 February 2022, at: <https://to.pbs.org/3tOKJWN>.

Putin must also understand that the Atlantic Alliance is a nuclear alliance.¹¹⁰ This statement also amounted to threatening to use nuclear weapons.

In previous years, Russian simulations of nuclear use against specific adversaries received significant attention in international media. These include simulations of nuclear strikes against Poland in 2009¹¹¹ and against Sweden in 2013.¹¹²

Earlier in November 2021, Russia had also sent two nuclear-capable strategic bombers on a training mission over Belarus for two days in a row in a strong show of support for its ally amid a dispute over migration at the Polish border. The Russian military told the *Associated Press* news network that the bomber patrol 'was not aimed against any third countries'.¹¹³ While it is possible under international law for military exercises to constitute a threat of use of force,¹¹⁴ the circumstances of these flights do not meet the threshold for threatening to use nuclear weapons under the TPNW.

Also in relation to Belarus, in the same month, President Alexander Lukashenko stated in a TV interview that 'you understand that the war in Belarus will involve NATO and

Russia. The war will be nuclear....'¹¹⁵ While deliberately provocative, this was not tantamount to threatening to use nuclear weapons as Belarussian officials do not possess nuclear weapons or have control over use of any of Russia's nuclear arsenal.

Test launches of missiles are often used to validate particular delivery systems or subcomponents; however, in some cases such test launches may also be used for sabre-rattling or nuclear signalling. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor did not find that any of the known missile tests in 2021 amounted to threatening to use nuclear weapons under the TPNW. The closest was a test by India in October 2021, which was the first user trial of its Agni-V nuclear-capable ICBM with a range of 5,000 kilometres from an island off its east coast amid rising border tensions with China.^{116, 117}

The Arms Control Association stated that the test was an 'apparent effort to signal advances in its nuclear deterrent to China'.¹¹⁸ In 1998, UN Security Council Resolution 1172 had called upon India (and Pakistan) to 'cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons'.¹¹⁹

110 French Embassy in London, 'President Putin has united the allies as never before - Minister', 25 February 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3pUsQ7R>.

111 M. Day, 'Russia "simulates" nuclear attack on Poland', *Daily Telegraph*, 1 November 2009, at: <https://bit.ly/3quR4Gh>.

112 A. Rosen, 'NATO report: A 2013 Russian aerial exercise was actually a "simulated nuclear attack" on Sweden', *Business Insider*, 3 February 2016, at: <https://bit.ly/3fp51PZ>.

113 V. Isachenkov, 'Russia sends nuclear-capable bombers on patrol over Belarus', *Associated Press*, 12 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3DNrb9b>.

114 International Court of Justice, *Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States)*, Judgment (Merits), 27 June 1986, para. 227.

115 Delfi, 'Lukashenko threatened nuclear war – DELFI', *News.TVS.24*, 22 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3rFABjM>.

116 'India tests nuclear-capable missile amid tensions with China', *Aljazeera*, 28 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3IHtAF3>.

117 S Gupta, 'Strategic Forces Command conducts Agni V trial, hits target 5,000 km away', *Hindustan Times*, 28 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3tv03sU>.


118 K. Davenport, 'India Tests Missile Capable of Reaching China', *Arms Control Today*, December 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3DNAipl>.

119 UN Security Council Resolution 1172, adopted by unanimous vote in favour on 6 June 1998, operative para. 7.

The prohibition on **ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGEMENT, OR INDUCEMENT**



Polish Air Force F-16 landing at Aviano airbase in Italy on 18 October 2021, where it participated in an exercise simulating the use of nuclear weapons.
(Photo: Courtesy of Claudio Tramontin)



Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

The prohibition on assistance, encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities is the provision of the TPNW that is contravened by the greatest number of states. Based on available information, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor has concluded that all states parties and signatories were compliant, while 36 states not party engaged in conduct in 2021 that was not compatible with this prohibition.

States parties to the TPNW are allowed to participate in security alliances and military cooperation arrangements with nuclear-armed states – and may continue to carry out all planning, operations, exercises, and other military activities with them – so long as this does not involve nuclear weapons.¹²⁰ Participation in nuclear-weapon-related military activities, however, would need to be discontinued.

Of the 36 states not party (see the full list on page 53) which in 2021 acted in conflict with Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, three are nuclear-armed while the remainder are non-nuclear-armed. This includes as many as 27 European non-nuclear-armed states. Outside Europe, the only non-nuclear-armed states found to have assisted, encouraged, or induced an activity prohibited by the

TPNW were Armenia, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Marshall Islands, and South Korea.

The 36 states not party that aid and abet other states' retention of nuclear weapons do so in multiple ways, as discussed under headings A) to I) below. Given the secrecy surrounding military activities, the information is likely incomplete.

A) PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR STRIKE EXERCISES AND JOINT MANOEUVRES

Assisting nuclear bombing raids or strikes, for instance with conventional air tactics,¹²¹ would undoubtedly constitute unlawful assistance to use nuclear weapons. Participation in exercises that involve the simulated use of nuclear weapons also contravenes Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW. Specifically, participation in nuclear strike exercises would, in most conceivable scenarios, amount to encouragement of possession and development. After all, practising nuclear-weapon use implies an endorsement of the potential use of the weapons in the future and, by extension, an encouragement of the possession of nuclear weapons in the present. Nuclear-weapon-use exercises are frequently conducted precisely with a view to building collective resolve

ARTICLE 1(1)(E) – INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 'Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.'

- Under this Article, a state party is precluded from assisting any other state, alliance, or international organisation, company, non-state group, or individual to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, stockpile, transfer, deploy, receive, threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- Several other longstanding disarmament treaties contain a similarly worded prohibition, and there is an established understanding of the concepts of assistance, encouragement, and inducement in international law.
- The term 'in any way' does not materially alter the scope of the provision. Conduct by act or omission would be covered by this prohibition irrespective of the words 'in any way'.
- The effects of violating this prohibition are identical, regardless of which alternative has been violated.

If an act is clearly assistance, it is superfluous to determine whether the act also constitutes encouragement, and vice versa.

- Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the TPNW does not contain a broad prohibition on 'military preparations to use' nuclear weapons. (Nor do the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).) However, the object and purpose of the TPNW, as well as its negotiating history, leave nothing to suggest that this omission of a provision on military preparations was meant to exclude such activities from the scope of the Treaty. For the nuclear-armed states themselves, military preparations are rendered illegal under the TPNW through the prohibition on possession and stockpiling. When non-nuclear-armed states participate in such activities together with nuclear-armed states, this is rendered unlawful by the prohibition on assisting, encouraging or inducing a prohibited activity.

¹²⁰ While the TPNW does not contain an express permission to engage in cooperation with states not party to the Treaty along the lines of the CCM, there is nothing in the TPNW to suggest that such cooperation would be unlawful per se. The APMBC does not contain any such express formulation either, yet has been interpreted by its states parties as not proscribing participation in alliances with states not party. See Norwegian Academy of International Law, 'The TPNW and its Implications for Norway', Oslo, 2019.

¹²¹ In NATO, some umbrella states have so-called SNOWCAT roles (Support of nuclear operations with conventional air tactics).

and commitment to continued possession as well as for potential use of nuclear arms in certain circumstances.

Czechia, Poland, and the five nuclear host states in NATO (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) all encouraged possession of nuclear weapons when, in October 2021, they participated in NATO's annual nuclear strike exercise, 'Steadfast Noon', at Ghedi and Aviano air bases in Italy. The drill allows NATO members to practise use of the B61 nuclear bombs stationed in Europe.¹²² According to NATO, aircraft and personnel from 14 unnamed NATO states took part. However, plane spotters only identified aircraft from the seven mentioned above, in addition to the United States. The host states practised loading and dropping of inert nuclear bombs with their dual-capable aircraft, and Czechia and Poland likely practised air-cover manoeuvres using conventional fighter aircraft.^{123, 124}

In November 2021, Australian and British personnel participated in the United States' annual nuclear command and control exercise, 'Global Thunder', which

simulated nuclear strikes against Russia in order to validate the various elements of the US nuclear triad.^{125, 126} The US Government stated that 'Allied personnel integrate into senior leadership teams and work across a broad spectrum of areas, offering public affairs and policy support, as well as deterrence and information operations insight'.¹²⁷ This amounts to encouragement of possession of nuclear weapons, as prohibited under Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW.

More broadly, participation by non-nuclear-armed states in nuclear strike exercises, when conducted in especially sensitive circumstances of tension or conflict, may also amount to prohibited assistance with threatening to use nuclear weapons (Article 1(1)(d)), provided that it acted with knowledge and that its participation was a significant contribution. (See the section above on the prohibition on threatening to use.)

Several non-nuclear-armed states routinely commit conventional fighter planes or other military capabilities to joint manoeuvres with US or Russian strategic

ASSISTANCE

- In order for conduct to constitute assistance, there must be a causal link between the conduct and a prohibited activity. In addition, the conduct must contribute significantly to this activity, although it does not need to be essential to its occurrence. Insignificant contributions would not constitute prohibited assistance. Inherent in the requirement that the contribution is significant is that the prohibited activity which is assisted must be ongoing or temporally proximate. This means that it need not have happened or be ongoing, but cannot just be a theoretical possibility.
- The state must have acted with the knowledge that the conduct would, in the ordinary course of events, assist a prohibited activity. This effectively excludes temporally remote or incidental contributions.
- The forms of assistance that are unlawful can be, among others, financial (such as through economic assistance for nuclear-weapon production); technological (for example, by the export of equipment/components for such production); operational (for instance, by conventional military support for nuclear bombing); technical (through the provision of expert information); or human (such as by seconding nuclear scientists to assist in another state's nuclear-weapon programme).

ENCOURAGEMENT

- Encouraging in the context of the TPNW means persuading or seeking to persuade any other state or any legal or natural person to carry out a prohibited activity or continue an ongoing violation of any of the Article 1 prohibitions.
- The prohibited activity being encouraged does not need to materialize as it is the act of encouragement that is prohibited and not the result.
- Encouragement could take the form of verbal, written, material, or institutional support, whether from a government as such (for instance, through the adoption of a particular policy or document) or from pertinent senior government or military officials. Where such support has been given, the encouragement is understood to be ongoing until the point at which it is clearly withdrawn.

INDUCEMENT

- Inducing a prohibited activity means offering someone something in exchange for the performance of that activity. Thus, inducing will always involve encouragement.

122 H. M. Kristensen, 'NATO Nuclear Weapons Exercise over Southern Europe', Federation of American Scientists, at: <https://bit.ly/308Cbii>.

123 D. Cenciotti, 'NATO's Annual Nuclear Strike Exercise Underway in Southern Europe', *The Aviationist*, 21 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3n129ND>.

124 See the NATO press release on the 2020 exercise, at: <https://bit.ly/3eBFXDS>.

125 US Strategic Command, 'U.S. Strategic Command commences annual nuclear readiness exercise—Global Thunder 22', 1 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3tImcKm>.

126 J. Johnson, 'U.S. Strategic Command to begin exercise Global Thunder 22', Air Force Global Strike Command, 2 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/30COl3r>.

127 STRATCOM, 'U.S. Strategic Command Kicks Off Exercise Global Thunder', 19 October 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3wPoGQX>.



A B-52 Stratofortress taxis on the flight line on 23 April 2021, at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. The United States deployed the B-52s to Al Udeid to protect US and coalition forces as they conducted drawdown operations from Afghanistan. (Photo: Staff Sgt. Kylee Gardner, US Air Force)

bombers. The dual capability of strategic bombers renders unequivocal legal assessment of such participation difficult. Provided that the manoeuvres in question are not specifically 'nuclear', i.e. that the deployed strategic bombers are not practising for the use of nuclear weapons but are instead involved in conventional-weapon roles, participation by non-nuclear-armed states is not controversial under the TPNW. That said, the deployment of strategic bombers often has a clear nuclear signalling effect. In most cases, however, information about the true nature of such manoeuvres (and the roles of the various non-nuclear-armed states involved) is not available.

The year 2021 saw a number of joint manoeuvres that, in the absence of further information, cannot be said straightforwardly to contravene the prohibition in Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, but which nevertheless cast nuclear shadows over the participation of non-nuclear-armed states. On 17 May 2021, for example, F-16 fighters from Bodø Air Base in Norway conducted manoeuvres with an American B-52 strategic bomber just south of the Arctic circle. The Norwegian warplanes were reportedly engaged as 'joint terminal attack controllers', meaning they were practising close air support and other offensive air operations from a forward position.¹²⁸

Probably the closest example in 2021 to a joint manoeuvre (beyond the nuclear strike exercises discussed above) where participation might be incompatible with Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW was when Russian nuclear bombers, flanked by Belarusian fighter jets, flew patrols over Belarus in November. The patrols were carried out amid a dispute between Belarus and the European Union concerning migration at the Polish–Belarusian border. The Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, said:

'Let them scream and squeak. Yes, those are nuclear-capable bombers, but we have no other choice.'¹²⁹

B) LOGISTICAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

The provision of logistical and technical support to, for instance, a submarine specifically designed to carry nuclear weapons, would likely constitute assistance with possession of the weapons, provided that the support is a significant contribution. Port visits by SSBNs are rare, however, as such submarines typically seek to remain undetected and untraceable while on patrol. In June 2021, a US SSBN visited the UK Naval Base in Gibraltar in what was termed an 'exceedingly rare' stopover.¹³⁰

In the case of logistical and technical support for dual-use delivery vehicles, such as a B-52 bombers or F-35 fighter-bombers, there will normally be no presumption of nuclear involvement. It will therefore be generally unproblematic for states parties to the TPNW that are allies and partners of nuclear-armed states to continue to host or provide logistical and technical support to those states' dual-use delivery vehicles. In 2021, for instance, multiple US B-52s were hosted at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. B-52s were also hosted at the Morón Air Base in Spain. There is no evidence that the aircraft in question were specifically engaged or deployed in nuclear roles. If the purpose of a mission or presence with a nuclear-armed state's dual-use delivery vehicle is clearly nuclear, however, the provision of logistical and technical support is likely to contravene the prohibition on assistance to and encouragement of prohibited activities.

The five nuclear host states provide logistical and security services at the bases where US nuclear weapons are deployed to their territory. This constitutes assistance

¹²⁸ W. Olson, 'B-52 bombers traverse Arctic in 27-hour Europe-to-Pacific mission', *Stars and Stripes*, 22 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3FgHpYt>.

¹²⁹ V. Isachenkov, 'Russia sends nuclear-capable bombers on patrol over Belarus', *Associated Press*, 11 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/31TqIti>.

¹³⁰ J. Trevithick, 'U.S. Navy Ballistic Missile Submarine's Gibraltar Visit Is First In Over Two Decades', *The Drive*, 29 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3cCXc7M>.

with possession and stockpiling. (Of course, these five states are also acting in conflict with Article 1(1)(g), which explicitly prohibits the hosting of another state's nuclear weapons.)

C) INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SHARING

If a state party to the TPNW were to engage in intelligence gathering and share it with a nuclear-armed state to knowingly identify targets for a temporally proximate use or threat to use nuclear weapons, this would amount to assisting use or threatening to use nuclear weapons.

A concrete case in point is Pine Gap, an intelligence facility built and funded by the United States outside Alice Springs in Australia and operated by the US National Reconnaissance Office. More than 800 Australian and US personnel staff the facility, including members of units from all four branches of the US military. One of the components of the facility is a Relay Ground Station in Pine Gap's western compound, whose Overhead Persistent Infra-Red (OPIR) sensors will detect the heat bloom of any ICBMs or SLBMs launched against the United States. It provides early warning of an incoming attack but also indicates whether a nuclear missile launch site/launcher is empty (following firing) or not.¹³¹

If Australia were to adhere to the TPNW and the Relay Ground Station were nevertheless used to identify imminent targets for US nuclear weapons, this would violate the prohibition on assisting use or the threatening of use. (This would not be the case if the data were used to identify targets for conventional strikes or to alert a vulnerable target population.) Since such future use or threat to use nuclear weapons remains a theoretical possibility, the operations of the Relay Ground Station do not presently constitute assistance or encouragement to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE TPNW

- In some cases, it may not be possible to conclude that a specific practice or capability in a given state presently amounts to assistance or encouragement of a prohibited act under the TPNW, while it is clear that it may well do so in the future.
- For umbrella states considering which changes they would need to implement in order to ensure compatibility with the TPNW, the central issue is whether maintaining a particular practice or capability would run counter to the object and purpose of the TPNW – which is to ensure that nuclear weapons are never again used under any circumstances. (See TPNW, preambular paragraph 2.)
- Article 5 of the TPNW also obligates each state party to take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to prevent and suppress prohibited activities undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. There is a general obligation under international law to implement treaties adhered to in good faith.

In so far as it applies to nuclear weapons, however, the current arrangement with the Australian government at Pine Gap is part of the United States' nuclear-strategic infrastructure and can thus be considered a manifestation of Australia's encouragement of continued US possession of such weapons. Maintaining a capability and preparedness to identify targets for nuclear strikes also runs counter to the object and purpose of the TPNW. To ensure compatibility with the TPNW, Australia would therefore have to take the necessary action to provide assurances that the Relay Ground Station's OPIR systems will not be used for nuclear targeting.



The Joint Defense Facility Pine Gap in Australia. (Photo: Kristian Laemle Ruff)

¹³¹ R. Tanter, 'Hope Becomes Law', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2021).



Japan's former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Defence Minister General Nakatani visiting the USS Ronald Reagan in 2015. If Japan decides to adhere to the TPNW, it will have to provide assurance that its 'extended deterrence dialogue' with the United States would not involve participation in nuclear strike planning. (Photo: Kyodo/Reuters/NTB)

D) PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR PLANNING

Participation in nuclear strike planning entails an endorsement of the potential use of nuclear weapons in the future and, by extension, an encouragement of the possession and development of nuclear weapons in the present. Participation in planning of temporally proximate use or threats to use nuclear weapons would amount to assistance with use or the threatening of use. As discussed above, Australia was involved in nuclear planning and preparations in 2021 through its participation in the US nuclear command and control exercise Global Thunder, in contravention of Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW.

From this perspective, participation in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)¹³² – the alliance's senior body on nuclear strategy – is not compatible with Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW. In the view of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, however, the TPNW does not necessarily preclude continued membership and participation in the NPG. The decisive criterion would be what happened inside the group. A state party to the TPNW could, for example, use its participation in the NPG only to promote nuclear disarmament.

Japan and South Korea on their part are engaged in 'extended deterrence dialogues' with the United States.¹³³ To the extent that such dialogue is on general nuclear deterrence where future use is theoretical, their participation should be considered as encouragement of possession. To the extent that the dialogue concerns specific targets and is directed and communicated towards a specific adversary, it could also amount to assistance to threatening to use nuclear weapons.

Any assessment is largely context-dependent. Thus, if Japan and South Korea were to adhere to the TPNW in the future, they would have to provide assurances that their respective 'extended deterrence dialogues' with the United States would not involve nuclear strike planning or target selection.

E) ALLOWING THE TESTING OF MISSILES DESIGNED TO CARRY NUCLEAR WARHEADS

Permitting the testing of missiles designed to carry nuclear warheads on one's territory is not consistent with the TPNW's prohibition on assistance with development of nuclear weapons. Two states (Kazakhstan, which is a state party, and the Marshall Islands, which is undecided on the TPNW) host test sites that have regularly served as the destination point for long-range missile tests carried out by Russia and the United States, respectively. In Kazakhstan, the site in question is the Sary-Shagan test site, a missile range established by the Soviet government in 1956. In the Marshall Islands, the site in question is the Ronald Reagan range at Kwajalein Atoll, a military station established after the Second World War. In both cases, the land on which the site is located is leased to the respective nuclear-armed state through long-term agreements. It is not the testing sites in and of themselves that conflict with the TPNW, but Russia's and the United States' use of them to maintain and develop nuclear-weapon missile technology.

The Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll was the destination point for at least two US ICBM tests in 2021.¹³⁴ Should the Marshall Islands decide to adhere to the TPNW, such testing would need to stop if it involved nuclear-capable missiles.

¹³² Irrespective of whether or not they have nuclear weapons, all NATO allies are members of the NPG with the exception of France, which has decided not to participate in it. See: <https://bit.ly/3elbgxa>.

¹³³ See, e.g., A. Kawasaki, 'The Nuclear Ban Treaty – the Path Forward for North Korea, South Korea, Japan and the Region', Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, September 2019, at: <http://bit.ly/2JLcmfT>.

¹³⁴ See CSIS Missile Defense Project, at: <https://bit.ly/3tqliKY> and <https://bit.ly/3qpwK94>.

Marshallese adherence to the TPNW could thus lead to friction with the United States, perhaps helping to explain the Marshall Islands' hesitancy about joining the Treaty. With its long history as a testing ground for US nuclear weapons, the Marshall Islands has been a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament and the campaign to end nuclear testing.

With respect to Kazakhstan, there is no evidence that Russia used the Sary-Shagan site to test missiles designed to carry nuclear warheads in 2021. Sary-Shagan appears not to have been used as the destination point for ICBM tests for some time now, possibly in reaction to Kazakhstan's ratification of the TPNW. In fact, Russian officials have recently noted the problem of not having testing grounds on Russian soil, and Russia has reportedly begun constructing a new missile test site on Russian territory.¹³⁵ As a state committed to the goals of the TPNW, Kazakhstan should communicate its priorities to Russia and request that it continues to abstain from using the Sary-Shagan site for testing any missiles that can carry nuclear warheads.

It will be necessary to discuss these and other difficult compliance questions in a transparent manner, including at the TPNW's meetings of states parties. Compliance and adherence will continue to build the norms established by the TPNW, and compliance issues arise in the implementation of almost every disarmament treaty. Kazakhstan, a nation that once inherited more than a thousand Soviet nuclear weapons and voluntarily relinquished them, is a long-time advocate of a world free of nuclear weapons. Together with its Central Asian neighbour-states, Kazakhstan established the Central-

Asian NWFZ Treaty, which similarly obligates its member states not to 'assist' the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons.

It has been suggested that the obligation in TPNW Article 4(2) to ensure 'the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities' obligates Kazakhstan to close the Sary-Shagan site.¹³⁶ However, Article 4(2) applies to any state that 'owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices' and can therefore not be applied to Kazakhstan. To the extent that Sary-Shagan is 'clearly connected to Russia's nuclear weapon complex', any responsibility to eliminate or irreversibly convert the Sary-Shagan test site under Article 4(2) would fall on Russia.

F) ENDORSEMENT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS DOCTRINES, POLICIES, AND STATEMENTS

All of NATO's member states (the 27 umbrella states and the 3 nuclear-armed states) contravene Article 1(1)(e) through specific nuclear-related doctrines, policies, and/or statements to which they subscribe. NATO's foundational document, the North Atlantic Treaty, does not mention nuclear weapons, but every NATO member has supported possession and potential use of nuclear weapons through their endorsement of various other alliance documents, particularly the Strategic Concept.¹³⁷ None of the alliance's members has so far rejected the possession or use, or even the first use, of nuclear weapons on its behalf. In the view of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, their endorsement of the Strategic Concept amounts to encouragement of possession of nuclear weapons.¹³⁸ It does not, however, amount to encouragement of use,



An unarmed Minuteman III ICBM launches from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California on 11 August 2021, destined for the Kwajalein Atoll on the Marshall Islands. (Photo: Airman First Class Tiarra Sibley, US Air Force)

¹³⁵ H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, 'Russian nuclear weapons, 2021', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 77, No. 2 (2021).

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ NATO, 'Active Engagement, Modern Defence', Brussels, 2010.

¹³⁸ At the Brussels Summit in June 2021, NATO Leaders agreed to develop the next Strategic Concept in time for the Madrid Summit in June 2022. NATO, 'NATO 2022 Strategic Concept', accessed 21 February 2022 at: <https://bit.ly/3s3Q3pq>.



NATO's Strategic Concept contains language that supports possession and potential use of nuclear weapons. (Photo: NATO)

as that would require, for instance, a request for use of nuclear weapons in a specific context, or agreeing to rules of engagement allowing the use of nuclear weapons in a concrete multinational operation.

Three non-NATO US allies (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) also encourage possession of nuclear weapons through explicit statements they have made or strategy documents they have endorsed. For example, the governments of the United States and Japan expressed through a joint statement in 2013 that they remained committed to the security of Japan 'through the full range of US military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional'.¹³⁹ South Korea has endorsed similar statements with respect to its own position.¹⁴⁰ In 2016, Japan and South Korea (together with France and the United Kingdom) reportedly expressed opposition to the Obama administration's plans of adopting a nuclear no-first-use policy.¹⁴¹ With respect to Australia, the most recent example of a government document which appears to directly encourage the United States to retain nuclear weapons was published in 2020, stating that 'only the nuclear and conventional capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia'.¹⁴²

In addition to NATO, the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is understood by some observers as a 'nuclear alliance'. In 2010, the CSTO's Secretary-General suggested Russia had extended a 'nuclear umbrella' over all members of the alliance.¹⁴³ Yet, CSTO members do not appear to have adopted official documents stipulating a nuclear dimension to the alliance. On the contrary, three members have actively distanced themselves from nuclear deterrence. Through the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk — the treaty establishing Central Asia as an NWFZ — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have committed never to 'assist or encourage' the development, manufacture, or possession of nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁴ Kazakhstan is also a state party to the TPNW.

Belarus, however, which is allied to Russia through the CSTO and the Union State, has on multiple occasions expressed support for nuclear deterrence, and is therefore not in compliance with the TPNW's prohibition on encouragement of possession of nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁵ Armenia, the last CSTO member, has, to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor's knowledge, not explicitly endorsed the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf. Armenia would, though, need to actively distance itself from nuclear deterrence in order to be considered compliant with Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, as fellow CSTO members Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and

139 'Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities', 3 October 2013, at: <https://bit.ly/3H58nTp>.

140 See, e.g., The White House, 'Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea', 16 June 2009, at: <https://bit.ly/3I7NEQ6>.

141 P. Sonne, G. Lubold, and C. E. Lee, "No First Use" Nuclear Policy Proposal Assailed by U.S. Cabinet Officials, Allies', *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 August 2016, at: <http://on.wsj.com/33UBE38>.

142 Australian Department of Defence, '2020 Defence Strategic Update', Canberra, July 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/2PI065e>, para. 2.22. See also on the issue of Australia, Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, 'Australia and The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', December 2018, at: <http://bit.ly/3lyHywZ>.

143 International Law and Policy Institute, 'Under my Umbrella', Report, 2016, p. 8.

144 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (adopted 2006, in force 2009), Art. 1(1)(c).

145 'Belarus shares Russia's concern over US missile defenses in Europe', National Legal Internet Portal of the Republic of Belarus, at: <http://bit.ly/33tRtNj>. See also Isachenkov, 'Russia sends nuclear-capable bombers'.

Tajikistan have already done through their adherence to the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, and in Kazakhstan's case also to the TPNW.

For an overview of arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence ('nuclear umbrellas'), see Table E below.

Some nuclear umbrella arrangements are formalized in writing and others are not. They have all emerged as supplements or in parallel to general military alliances. None of the existing, underlying legally binding mutual defence treaties mentions nuclear weapons specifically.¹⁴⁶ Nuclear umbrellas should therefore be understood as political, not legal arrangements. The then Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide declared in the Norwegian Parliament in November 2018 that 'there is no legal obligation barring Norway from signing or ratifying the TPNW'. The obstacle, she argued, was 'political commitments'.¹⁴⁷

Through their continued endorsement of nuclear deterrence, umbrella states contribute to the resolve of nuclear-armed states to continuously modernize and maintain their capabilities. Nuclear-armed states often assert a need on behalf of non-nuclear allies and partners to 'assure' and fulfil 'extended deterrence commitments' as pretexts for their nuclear deployments and modernization programmes, including the building of new capabilities. For example, the development of the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb, which will replace the existing B61s stored at six NATO bases in Europe, was necessary, argued the Obama administration, to 'reassure our nonnuclear allies and partners'.¹⁴⁸ According to the 2009 Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America must 'continue to safeguard the interests of its allies', including by retaining 'numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it [the United States] might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense'.¹⁴⁹ The US Mission to NATO stated in a tweet in August 2020 that 'NATO needs nuclear weapons

ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP AND THE TPNW

- Non-nuclear-armed states may adhere to the TPNW and remain within an alliance with one or more nuclear-armed states as long as they explicitly distance themselves from specific statements or formulations in alliance documents that amount to encouragement of use or possession of nuclear arms.
- It could be argued that for example a NATO member may, without having to explicitly 'override' previous endorsement of extended nuclear deterrence, become compliant with the TPNW through the acts of signing and ratifying the Treaty. However, having adhered to the TPNW, such a state would be obliged to refrain from endorsing future NATO language supporting the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons. This could be done either by adjusting the current language or by the state clearly rejecting possession or use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through 'footnotes', an interpretive or declaratory statement, or other unequal means of signalling disagreement with any endorsement of the potential use or possession of nuclear weapons. Such footnotes or statements could be simple and for instance phrased as follows: 'State X does not support the possession or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on its behalf and will not assist the development, possession, acquisition, or use of such weapons or devices in any way.'
- NATO members are not obliged to endorse every line of alliance language. Indeed, there is a tradition of member states 'footnoting' or otherwise distancing themselves from specific statements in alliance documents.

Table E: Arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence

STATES	
Plurilateral	France, United Kingdom, United States, and Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey (NATO).
Bilateral	Russia and Belarus (CSTO/Union State). Russia and Armenia (CSTO). United States and Australia (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS)).* United States and Japan (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (Anpo)). United States and South Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty).
* New Zealand was de facto excluded from ANZUS in the mid-1980s due to its anti-nuclear-weapon policies.	

146 International Law and Policy Institute, 'Under my Umbrella', Report, 2016, p. 8.

147 Transcript from meeting in the Norwegian Parliament on 14 November 2019, at: <http://bit.ly/2IYHBnG>.

148 M. R. Creedon, 'Statement of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global and Strategic Affairs', in *Nuclear Weapons Modernization Programs* (Washington DC: United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 2013), p. 5.

149 W. Perry et al., *America's Strategic Posture* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2009), p. 13.

because our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate security guarantee for Europe. For 70 years nuclear weapons have kept adversaries at bay & provided reassurance for Allies.¹⁵⁰ Experts even describe the ability to deter escalation of potential Russian and Chinese conflict with US allies as the 'primary role' of US nuclear weapons today.¹⁵¹

In the United Kingdom, the government's push for a full replacement of the Vanguard-class SSBNs in 2016 was based on the argument that NATO was a 'nuclear alliance' and that the United Kingdom thereby had no choice but to renew its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. For the then UK Prime Minister, a failure to build new nuclear submarines would be a 'reckless gamble' that would 'enfeeble' the United Kingdom's allies.¹⁵²

In France, President Emmanuel Macron has recently re-launched the idea of a 'European' nuclear posture enacted by Paris. Specifically, the President has invited interested European states to take part in a 'dialogue' about the French nuclear arsenal's supposed contribution to European security. Similar initiatives have been made by most French governments since the 1960s, albeit with few takers and little enthusiasm among other European states. According to two scholars, the purpose of the French effort to 'Europeanize' its nuclear arsenal is to lend nuclear weapons 'additional moral justification and legitimacy' by portraying the French nuclear armoury as 'an essential constituent of the defence posture of "civilian power Europe"'.¹⁵³

G) DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND MAINTENANCE OF KEY COMPONENTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Numerous private companies are engaged in work linked to nuclear weapons. Most defence contractors involved in the nuclear enterprise are headquartered in the nuclear-armed states. However, some have headquarters or divisions in non-nuclear-armed states. As a result, as discussed below, the conduct of non-nuclear-armed Belarus, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands is not compatible with the prohibition on assisting development and manufacturing nuclear weapons because they allow companies that are incorporated or have headquarters or production facilities on their territory to be involved in the development of nuclear weapon systems.

- The Belarusian company Minsk Automobile Plant is the only manufacturer of the mobile launchers for the Russian Topol-M ICBM.¹⁵⁴
- The German-headquartered company Airbus Defence and Space is currently involved in the development and production of French nuclear weapons. This development takes place within the framework of the joint venture company MBDA, which produces France's air-launched cruise missiles, and the joint venture company ArianeGroup, which is the lead contractor for both France's M51 nuclear-tipped SLBMs and the next generation of nuclear-tipped air-launched

CORPORATE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY

- A company that develops, produces, or maintains key components (such as a ballistic missile) for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, or which maintains nuclear weapons, would thereby engage the international responsibility of the state in which it is operating. Such a state party would be responsible for prohibited assistance under the TPNW (assistance to development, production, or possession, depending on the acts the company was performing).
- Depending on the circumstances, a parent company can also be legally responsible for the acts of its subsidiaries. The general position in domestic law is that a parent company is not liable where its subsidiary acts unlawfully. However, jurisprudence has established a number of exceptions to this general principle, allowing the 'veil of separate legal status [...] to be pierced'.* Under international law, contravention of the provisions of a disarmament

treaty or of customary disarmament law by a corporation would suffice to render the state or states responsible on whose territory that corporation committed the relevant act or acts.

- In addition, any company that is engaged in a joint venture that develops or produces key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device could thereby be engaging in prohibited assistance even if it does not itself contribute materially to the nuclear-weapon development or production. This is so wherever a company establishes a new body corporate, and is holding shares in that company. Under international law, the states on the territory of which the participating and shareholding companies are incorporated and/or have their headquarters would be responsible for the acts of the joint venture where those do not comply with an international treaty or customary law on disarmament.

* C. Murray et al., *The Law and Practice of International Trade*, 12th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, §28-009.


150 Tweet by US Mission to NATO, at: <http://bit.ly/2XWE0Lm>.

151 G. Perkovic: 'Critiquing the State Department's Nuclear Posture Clarification', May 2020, posted on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website, at: <http://bit.ly/33t1ASG>.

152 Prime Minister Theresa May, 'UK's Nuclear Deterrent', House of Commons Hansard, 18 July 2016.

153 U. Jasper and C. Portela, 'EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2010), p. 161.

154 A. M. Dyner, 'The Armed Forces of Belarus', *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2017), p. 54.



A man is seen among the display items on the MBDA missile systems product area at the DSEI (Defence and Security Equipment International) exhibition on 15 September 2021 in London. (Photo: Leon Neal/Getty Images)

cruise missiles.¹⁵⁵ Airbus Defence and Space is a subdivision of Airbus, which is headquartered in the Netherlands. Since Airbus considers that the actions of its subsidiaries form part of the work of Airbus as a group entity, both Germany and the Netherlands may be understood to presently be engaged in activities prohibited under Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW.

- The Italian company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica) is also involved in the development and production of France's current nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missiles through the joint venture MBDA (with Airbus and BAE Systems).¹⁵⁶

H) NUCLEAR COOPERATION ARRANGEMENTS

The United Kingdom and France are engaged in close cooperation on maintenance of nuclear stockpiles, which amounts to prohibited (mutual) assistance with possession and stockpiling under the TPNW.¹⁵⁷ The two states' cooperation on stockpiling is supported by the 2010 Teutates Treaty to develop technologies for safe and effective maintenance of both states' nuclear stockpiles.¹⁵⁸

US–French cooperation is conducted under a 1961 Mutual Defense Agreement, which permits limited cooperation on the operation of nuclear-weapon systems. Later amendments have enabled enhanced cooperation, notably on issues of safety, security, and reliability.¹⁵⁹

As discussed above under the prohibitions on transfer and on receiving transfer or control of nuclear weapons or

other nuclear explosive devices, the United Kingdom and the United States continue to engage in close cooperation on Trident II SLBMs. The nature of the cooperation also amounts to US assistance with the United Kingdom's development of nuclear weapons.

I) FINANCING OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

According to the 2021 Pax/ICAN Don't Bank on the Bomb report 'Perilous Profiteering', the total amount of loans offered to companies involved in the production and maintenance of nuclear weapons increased in 2021 compared to the previous year. At the same time, the number of investors decreased.¹⁶⁰ In 2021, the year the TPNW entered into force, as many as 127 financial institutions divested from companies involved in the nuclear-weapons business. This was a significant increase on previous years, suggesting the TPNW had a significant impact on the financial sector.¹⁶¹

For example, in November 2021, Norway's biggest pension fund, KLP, announced its decision to divest from a range of companies involved in the production of maintenance of nuclear weapons, including Larsen & Toubro, Leidos, Leonardo, Raytheon, Rolls Royce, and Thales. The companies in question were considered to be undermining the goal of creating a world without nuclear weapons in line with the TPNW.¹⁶² In the words of the fund's head of responsible investments, KLP wanted 'to support the aim of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which came into force in January, and therefore had to

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Don't Bank on the Bomb, 'Producing Mass Destruction: private companies and the nuclear weapons industry', at: <https://bit.ly/3DHuPea>.

¹⁵⁷ See, e.g., P. Ricketts, 'National Security Relations with France after Brexit', Briefing Paper, RUSI, January 2018, at: <https://bit.ly/3gUNn7e>.

¹⁵⁸ See, e.g., Nuclear Information Service, 'UK – France nuclear co-operation: The "Teutates" project. Presentation at Non-Proliferation Treaty PrepCom meeting, 23 April 2013', at: <https://bit.ly/3oSxxxw>.

¹⁵⁹ See, e.g., C. Mohr, 'U.S. Secretly Helped France Develop Nuclear Weapons, an Expert Writes', *The New York Times*, 28 May 1989, at: <http://nyti.ms/2lcTBlc>.

¹⁶⁰ S. Snyder, 'Perilous Profiteering', Pax/ICAN, 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3s534zl>.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² KLP, 'Beslutning om å utelukke selskaper som produserer kontroversielle våpen', November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3wCsNzq>.



Gathering at the steps of City Hall in New York, a group advocating for the Comptroller of New York to divest the city's pensions and finances from nuclear weapons producers. (Photo: Erik McGregor/LightRocket/Getty Images)

apply stricter standards to firms that contributed to the continuing existence of such arms.¹⁶³

Also in 2021, as 'a result of a changing international norm, with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entering into force in January 2021', the Responsible

Investment Association Australasia (RIAA) announced it will not certify financial products that involve investment in companies that produce nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁴ RIAA promotes responsible investing in Australia and New Zealand.

THE TPNW AND FINANCING

- The TPNW does not explicitly prohibit the financing of nuclear-weapon programmes. However, the prohibition on assistance renders unlawful direct funding of any of the prohibited activities listed in other subparagraphs of Article 1(1). If, for instance, funding in the form of an earmarked loan or credit line is provided to a company for the development or maintenance of nuclear weapons, this is unlawful assistance with the development, production, and possession of nuclear weapons.
- The prohibition on financing encompasses not only state funding, such as sovereign wealth funds, but also private banks and individuals, as discussed above in the subsection on corporate and state responsibility. The

ordinary purchase of shares in a company involved in the development, production, or maintenance of nuclear arsenals is not per se an illegal act under the TPNW, although ownership could be assessed differently depending on the amount of shares purchased while divestment from such companies is a growing trend.

- Cuba issued a declaration upon joining the TPNW, stating that 'The financing of any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty is also a prohibited activity according to the provisions of Article 1(e).' (See: <https://bit.ly/3eB7UMm>.) The prohibition on assistance also appears in the CCM, where it is widely considered to prohibit financing.


¹⁶³ R. Fixen, 'KLP cracks down on nuclear weapons, sells off €131m shares, bonds', *IPE*, 4 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3D5PkHn>.

¹⁶⁴ Good Returns, 'Nuclear weapons and nicotine alternatives a no-go zone for responsible investors', 19 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3DLcgft>.

The prohibition on **SEEKING OR RECEIVING ASSISTANCE**



Belarus's president, Alexander Lukashenko, in an interview on 30 November 2021 by Russia's Rossiya Segodnya news agency (also known as Sputnik), where he said that Belarus is willing to host Russian nuclear weapons. (Photo: Nikolay Petrov/AP/NTB)



Five states not party — Belarus, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States — engaged in conduct in 2021 that was not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in a prohibited act.

Belarus sought assistance from Russia for the stationing of Russian nuclear weapons on its territory (which would not be compatible with the prohibition in Article 1(1)(g) of the TPNW on allowing the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons), when in November 2021 President Alexander Lukashenko said: 'Then I will propose to Putin to return nuclear weapons to Belarus.' He added: 'We, on the territory of Belarus, are ready for this.'¹⁶⁵

The other applicable cases in 2021 are described under the section above on the prohibition of assistance with prohibited activities (although with the focus on the parallel provision of assistance). They are also summarized below:

- France received assistance for the development, production, and maintenance of its Navy's M51 nuclear-tipped SLBMs from the Netherlands (where Airbus Group is legally incorporated) and Germany (where the subsidiary Airbus Defence and Space is headquartered). It also received support for the development of a new generation of air-delivered nuclear weapons from Italy (Leonardo). MBDA, in which Leonardo has a 25% stake, is involved in developing the new ASN4G replacement for the ASMP-A cruise missile.¹⁶⁶ BAE Systems, which is headquartered in the United Kingdom, has also contributed to the work as a member of the joint venture through its provision of key components.¹⁶⁷
- The United States continued to receive assistance with possession and stockpiling from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, which provide logistical and security services at the bases where the US nuclear weapons are stored on their territory.
- The United States received assistance to develop Transporter Erector Replacement Vehicles for its Minuteman II ICBMs by Italian company Leonardo.
- The US missile-testing programme, and by extension, its development of nuclear weapons received assistance from the Marshall Islands.¹⁶⁸

ARTICLE 1(1)(F) – INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 'Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.'

- In contrast to Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, which prohibits states from assisting prohibited acts by others, Article 1(1)(f) prohibits states from seeking or receiving assistance to violate the Treaty themselves. It does not matter whether or not the assistance is actually received.
 - This precludes any state party from asking any other state or any legal or natural person to help it to develop, possess, stockpile, test, produce, use, transfer, or receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
 - A similar prohibition, imposed only on non-nuclear-weapon states, is contained in Article II of the NPT, though it applies only to manufacture: the undertaking is to 'not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'.
- The United Kingdom appears to be seeking more or less continuous assistance from the United States to maintain its nuclear capability. This includes assistance with the maintenance of the Trident II missile (the United Kingdom's only nuclear-capable means of delivery) from the US company Lockheed Martin.¹⁶⁹ A new contract with Lockheed Martin was signed to continue assistance through to 2028.¹⁷⁰
 - The United Kingdom receives continuous assistance with stockpile stewardship from France and vice versa.
 - Russia received assistance to develop and produce mobile launchers for its ICBMs by the Belarusian company Minsk Automobile Plant.
- In the past, most of the nuclear-armed states received some form of assistance to develop their nuclear weapons.

¹⁶⁵ Statement available at: <https://bit.ly/3tCbJKz>.

¹⁶⁶ Don't Bank on the Bomb, 'Leonardo', at: <https://bit.ly/3Evg7x>.

¹⁶⁷ Don't Bank on the Bomb, 'BAE Systems', at: <https://bit.ly/3oPdFMX>.

¹⁶⁸ See, e.g., J. Cutshaw, 'Army's Reagan Test Site supports missile test', *US Army*, 26 August 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3y26fZJ>.


¹⁶⁹ US Department of Defense, 'Contracts For April 1, 2019', at: <https://bit.ly/3GiWt8x>.

¹⁷⁰ 'Lockheed Martin receives contract for Trident missile system', *Shephard News*, 18 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3DwnqUm>.

The prohibition on **ALLOWING STATIONING, INSTALLATION, OR DEPLOYMENT**



Members of the Royal Netherlands Air Force 1st Fighter Wing participate in a strike 'load and recap' exercise to showcase their procedures and response times for dealing with intruders at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands. (Photo: Airman 1st Class Jovante Johnson, 52nd Fighter Wing Public Affairs, US Air Force)



Five states not party to the TPNW — Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey — engaged in conduct in 2021 that was not compatible with the Treaty's prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Between them, they continue to host a total of approximately 100 US B61-3 or B61-4 nuclear gravity bombs on their territories.

The compatibility of these NATO nuclear sharing arrangements with NPT obligations has been called into question,¹⁷¹ as well as defended.¹⁷² By the time the NPT was concluded in 1968, hosting arrangements were in place and part of discussions surrounding the establishment of the Treaty. Apart from the legality of these arrangements, the real 'deterrent' value of these foreign-deployed nuclear weapons is disputed.¹⁷³

The B61 bombs hosted under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements in Europe are assumed to have explosive yields ranging from an equivalent of 300 tons to 50 Kt (B61-4), to 170 Kt (B61-3) of TNT. As shown in Figure 14 opposite, they are believed to be located at six airbases: Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium; Büchel Air Base in Germany; Aviano and Ghedi-Torre air bases in Italy; Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands; and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey.¹⁷⁴ The bombs are stored in underground vaults at these national airbases and remain under US command and control. In a scenario of use, European aircraft and pilots would have to deliver the US nuclear bombs to their target. See the section on the prohibition on receiving transfer or control of nuclear weapons for more information on this.

Currently, NATO, meaning the United States (in coordination with the host states), is in the process of modernizing the nuclear weapons it has deployed in Europe. B61-12 bombs, with a maximum yield of 50 Kt, will replace the existing bombs between 2022 and 2024. The bases where the nuclear weapons are stored will also be modernized, with upgraded command and control as well as security arrangements.¹⁷⁵

The respective hosting arrangements are thought to be governed by classified bilateral agreements between the United States and the host states. Representatives of NATO, but also of the host states, have traditionally been reluctant to discuss their governments' hosting policies, in part due to the classification of the respective hosting

ARTICLE 1(1)(G) – INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: 'Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.'

- This provision outlaws a particular form of assistance or encouragement of prohibited action: allowing any stationing, installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in a state party's territory or at any other place under its jurisdiction or control.
- The TPNW's prohibition against such hosting of nuclear weapons applies at all times, including during escalating tension or armed conflict. There is no corresponding prohibition in the NPT.
- The concept of jurisdiction refers primarily to a state's sovereign territory, while control extends to areas that the state party occupies or otherwise controls extraterritorially. This is irrespective of the legality of this control under international law.
- Deployment is the broadest of the three types of prohibited conduct. A violation would not require any prolonged duration, agreement, or infrastructure. Thus, although transit of nuclear weapons is not explicitly prohibited by the TPNW, if movement into the sovereign territory of a state party is not swiftly followed by exit, this might amount to assistance and encouragement to possess nuclear weapons as well as a violation of 1(1)(g).

arrangements as state secrets. In 2013, two former Dutch prime ministers publicly confirmed that the Netherlands hosts nuclear weapons. Ruud Lubbers, prime minister from 1982 to 1994, stated that he 'would never have thought those silly things [nuclear bombs] would still be there in 2013'. Dries van Agt, prime minister from 1977 to 1982, said the bombs 'are there and it's crazy they still are'.¹⁷⁶ Both were threatened with prosecution,¹⁷⁷ but formal charges were never laid.

In 2019, a draft report by the General Rapporteur, Canadian Senator Joseph A. Day, of NATO's Defence and Security Committee (DSC) disclosed the number (150 at the time) and locations (as stated above) of these forward-deployed nuclear weapons, while in later

171 See, e.g., V. A. Orlov and Nikita S. Degtyarev, 'NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements'. At the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences Mexico, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Egypt questioned the legality of the arrangements in place.

172 See, e.g., W. Alberque, 'The NPT and the Origins of NATO's Nuclear Sharing Arrangements', *IFRI*, Proliferation Papers 57, February 2017, at: <https://bit.ly/3qXiSTW>.

173 For a review of this issue, see: T. S. Sechser, 'Sharing the Bomb', 2017, at: <https://bit.ly/3obsOph>.

174 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, 'United States nuclear weapons, 2021', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (2021), p. 56.

175 Ibid. p. 55.

176 H. M. Kristensen, 'Nukes in Europe: Secrecy under Siege', *Federation of American Scientists*, 13 June 2013, at: <https://bit.ly/2L68B37>.

177 Nuclear Threat Initiative, 'One-time Leaders May Face Charges for Discussing Dutch-Based Nukes', 14 June 2013, at: <https://bit.ly/2zw6Jda>.


versions the report references 'open sources' as the basis for the information.¹⁷⁸

In 2021, investigative journalists uncovered a data leak in the US military (within a learning app), exposing information about the numbers, locations, and security procedures surrounding US nuclear weapons in Europe, congruent with experts' estimates.¹⁷⁹ Thus, while the locations and numbers of weapons are publicly known, their classification as state secrets have rendered the hosting arrangements intangible for democratic processes. One expert, Jeffrey Lewis, commented in 2021 that 'secrecy about US nuclear weapons deployments

in Europe does not exist to protect the weapons from terrorists, but only to protect politicians and military leaders from having to answer tough questions about whether NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements still make sense today.'¹⁸⁰

Concerns have been raised about the security of the US nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey since a failed coup attempt and concerns regarding possible terrorist attacks in 2016.¹⁸¹ While in 2017 there were suspicions that the weapons were 'quietly removed',¹⁸² it is assumed that in 2021, 20 B61 bombs were still stationed in Incirlik, after a reduction from the previous total of 50.

Figure 14: Locations of foreign-deployed nuclear weapons, 2021.



178 The adapted version, at: <https://bit.ly/3H1fa1m>.

179 This information was uncovered by an investigation by journalists from Bellingcat. Bellingcat, 'US Soldiers Expose Nuclear Weapons Secrets via Flashcard Apps', 28 May 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3fWG9iM>.

180 Ibid.

181 See, e.g., S. Pifer, 'It's Time to Get US Nukes out of Turkey', Brookings Institute, 5 November 2019; H. M. Kristensen, 'Urgent: Move US Nuclear Weapons Out Of Turkey', Federation of American Scientists, 16 October 2019.

182 J. Hammond, 'The Future of Incirlik Air Base', *RealClearDefense*, 30 November 2017, at: <https://bit.ly/3s3VapR>.

4 THE POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS OF THE TPNW

In addition to its comprehensive prohibitions, the TPNW obligates its states parties to take a number of positive measures to implement the Treaty. By pairing prohibitions with positive obligations, the TPNW provides a broad response to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use and testing of nuclear weapons.

In the following sections, interpretations of the TPNW's positive obligations are set out and their significance discussed. For some of the positive obligations, an assessment of the states parties' compliance is also included. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor does not yet offer a compliance and compatibility assessment for all of the positive obligations and for all states in the same way as it does for the prohibitions. This is because not all of the TPNW's positive obligations apply to all states parties and no nuclear-armed states or states with foreign nuclear weapons on their territory have yet adhered to the Treaty, as well as because implementation of the positive obligations is in its early stages. Most of the positive obligations do not set out specific deadlines or criteria for the states parties to meet, but are rather long-term goals to work towards in good faith.

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor does, however, review the global status of observance of the norms that the TPNW's positive obligations seek to promote or establish in order to prevent and remediate harm inflicted by nuclear weapons. Specifically, this relates to the obligations regarding safeguards agreements with the IAEA, the elimination of nuclear weapons, the removal of foreign nuclear weapons, victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance.

Positive obligations are key elements of humanitarian disarmament treaties. The parallel positive obligations in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) have significantly enhanced their humanitarian impact. While much work remains to be done, the positive obligations in those treaties have led to a dramatic reduction in the stockpiles of banned weapons, clearance of wide swathes of land, vital support for victims, and an increase in international assistance from states parties as well as states not party. The positive obligations of the TPNW will similarly advance the Treaty's broader humanitarian and developmental goals.

The obligation to **SUBMIT DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS**



The Cook Islands was the first state party to the TPNW to submit a declaration to the UN Secretary-General as required by Article 2 of the Treaty. Siai Taylor, a foreign affairs officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Cook Islands, deposited the country's instrument of accession to the TPNW with the Office of the UN Secretary-General on 4 September 2019, and simultaneously submitted its Article 2 declaration. (Photo: Office of Legal Affairs, UN)

The first 56 states parties duly submitted the declaration required by Article 2 of the Treaty detailing their nuclear-weapons status. Five of the states parties – Dominica, The Gambia, Honduras, San Marino, and the Seychelles – submitted their respective declarations after their 30-day deadline, however.

For a further three states parties – Mongolia, Guinea-Bissau, and Peru¹⁸³ – the deadline to submit a declaration is in 2022. The applicable deadlines for all states parties and the dates the declarations were received can be found in their respective state profiles in this report. The declarations are all posted on the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website, at: <https://bit.ly/3bc7BYk>.¹⁸⁴

KAZAKHSTAN

Of the 59 states parties, Kazakhstan and South Africa are former nuclear-armed states. In its Article 2 declaration, Kazakhstan recalled the ‘devastating consequences’ of the 456 nuclear tests conducted on its soil over four decades and the ‘bold and historic’ decision in 1991 of the First President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and ‘renounce the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world’.¹⁸⁵ It declared that, in accordance with the 1992 Protocol (Lisbon Protocol) to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), on 14 February 1994 Kazakhstan acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state party, and ‘in that connection it voluntarily renounced its inherited part of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal and dismantled all related military and technical infrastructure’. It further confirmed that ‘all nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices on its territory were transported to the Russian Federation while all nuclear-weapons-related facilities were irretrievably eliminated’.¹⁸⁶

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa declared that it had developed nuclear explosive devices in the 1970s and 1980s but had abandoned its nuclear-weapons programme in 1989.¹⁸⁷ It further noted that in 1994 the IAEA had confirmed that one partially completed nuclear weapon and six completed weapons had been dismantled by South Africa. Since abandoning its nuclear-weapons programme and adhering to the NPT, ‘no other nuclear explosive devices have ever been manufactured, stationed or tested in the South African territory’.¹⁸⁸

ARTICLES 2 AND 4 – INTERPRETATION

- Article 2 of the TPNW imposes a duty on each state to submit a declaration to the UN Secretary-General within 30 days of becoming party to the Treaty.
- The declaration must clarify whether the state party has ever owned, possessed, or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If it has, it must further declare whether it has already eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including by destroying or irreversibly converting all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, or whether it still owns, possesses, or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- Finally, the declaration must state whether foreign weapons or devices are located – stockpiled, stationed, deployed, or installed – either in its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control.
- The overwhelming majority of potential states parties are non-nuclear-armed. Once the requisite Article 2 declaration has been submitted by a non-nuclear-armed state party, there is no further obligation to submit reports on compliance with, and implementation of, the Treaty. (This does not preclude the voluntary submission of reports, however, and the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor recommends that each State Party submit a report to each meeting of states parties and each review conference on the measures it has taken to adopt national implementation measures, implement victim assistance, remediation of affected territory, cooperation and assistance among states parties, and the promotion of universality of the Treaty.)
- For potential states parties that formerly possessed or currently possess nuclear weapons and states that have foreign nuclear weapons on their territory or in any place under their jurisdiction or control, Article 4 imposes a duty to submit a report to each meeting of states parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under that article, until such time as they are fulfilled.

¹⁸³ Peru submitted its declaration on the same day that it deposited its instrument of ratification on 23 December 2021.

¹⁸⁴ Given the delay that may occur between submission of a declaration and its formal receipt being registered by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor considers that a state party has violated its Article 2 obligation if receipt of the requisite declaration by UNODA is recorded more than five days after its treaty deadline.

¹⁸⁵ TPNW Article 2 Declaration of Kazakhstan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 18 February 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/2MtrpN1>, first and third preambular paras.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁸⁷ TPNW Article 2 Declaration of South Africa, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Pretoria, 18 February 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3aEen8W>, p. 1.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

PALESTINE

Palestine, part of whose territory is occupied by Israel, stated that 'the occupying Power bears full and sole responsibility for any actions in relation to its unlawful nuclear programme undertaken in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in violation of the treaty and of the State of Palestine's sovereignty and rights'.¹⁸⁹

CUBA

Cuba, which famously had Soviet nuclear missiles covertly stationed on its territory in 1962 leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis, submitted a declaration stating that part of its own sovereign territory was illegally occupied by the United States and that 'it does not know' whether the United States, 'in violation of Article 1' of the Treaty,

has developed, produced, or deployed nuclear weapons there, or whether it intends to do so.¹⁹⁰ Cuba had stated upon ratification of the TPNW that the declarations that states parties are required to make under Article 2 'must include information on any activity they carry out that is prohibited under Article 1'.¹⁹¹

KIRIBATI

Kiribati's declaration to the UN Secretary-General under Article 2 of the TPNW confirmed that 'there may be remnants of nuclear materials or other nuclear waste on and around Kiritimati Island which used to be owned, possessed or controlled by the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America during the pre-independence period'.¹⁹²

189 Declaration of Dr Riad Malki, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, 'Declaration of the State of Palestine pursuant to the treaty on prohibition of nuclear weapons', Ramallah, 21 February 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3lFAyFX>.

190 Note No. 83/2021, Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations in New York, dated 21 February 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/30EsaGr>.

191 Declaration of Cuba, 30 January 2018, UN Treaty Collection website, at: <http://bit.ly/3b8X4Nq>.

192 'FAI: 51/164/029', the Government of Kiribati, 19 February 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3JqcWt6>.

The obligation to
**HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL WITH THE IAEA**



Nuclear safeguards inspectors, here pictured in training at the Dukovany nuclear power plant in Czechia, travel to nuclear facilities around the world to verify that states comply with their obligations. (Photo: Dean Calma/IAEA)

Two states parties — Guinea-Bissau and Palestine — did not already have in force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) when they adhered to the TPNW. They had both, however, already concluded and signed such agreements. Guinea-Bissau's deadline under the TPNW to bring its CSA into force is 15 September 2023, while Palestine's deadline is 22 July 2022.

All of the other 57 states parties to the TPNW had a CSA in force, as required by both the NPT and the TPNW, as well as by the respective NWFZ treaties.¹⁹³

The status of safeguards agreements among the states parties to the TPNW as of 31 December 2021 is shown in Figure 15 and Table F overleaf. Of the 59 states parties, 39 had brought into force both a CSA and an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA, thereby committing to the current 'gold standard' of safeguards. These obligations must be maintained in force consonant with Article 3 of the TPNW.

A total of 20 states parties, however, had not yet brought into force an AP. Five of these states — Bolivia, Guinea-

Bissau, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), and Malaysia — had concluded and signed an AP. The remaining 15 states parties to the TPNW had thus far not taken any formal steps towards an AP.

In total, 38 of the states parties to the TPNW as of end 2021 had brought into force a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to their CSA: 23 states had Modified SQPs, while 15 states retained Original SQPs.

The state profiles in this report contain information on all states' respective safeguards agreements or lack thereof, as well as recommended actions. States that have not brought into force both a CSA and an AP should do so as a matter of urgency; and states that maintain an Original SQP should upgrade to a Modified SQP, or in case the state no longer meets the criteria for scaled down safeguards, rescind it.

The TPNW is an additional forum where diplomats, civil society, and the IAEA can advocate for the universal application of CSAs and APs. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor calls on the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW to adopt a recommendation similar to that agreed on in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan, urging all states parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP.¹⁹⁴

ARTICLES 3(1), 3(2), 4(1), AND 4(3) – INTERPRETATION

- It is mandatory for all non-nuclear-armed states parties to the TPNW to maintain in force or conclude and bring into force (and thereafter maintain) a CSA with the IAEA. The TPNW specifies that the CSA must be based on INFCIRC 153 (Corrected).
- An Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA, or an instrument of equivalent or higher standard, is also mandatory for all non-nuclear-armed states parties that had one in force upon the entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021.
- These are only minimum requirements, and the TPNW implicitly encourages states parties to adhere to the highest safeguards standard. At present, this is the above-mentioned CSA and an AP.
- If a nuclear-armed state eliminates its nuclear-weapons programme and then adheres to the TPNW it will be obliged to conclude a safeguards agreement that provides 'credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole'. (Article 4(1)). This formulation equates to, at least, a CSA and a full AP. This means that the state in question will have to upgrade its existing safeguards agreement to a CSA and the requisite AP. Negotiations on these safeguards must start within 180 days, with the resultant treaty entering into force within 18 months, of the TPNW's entry into force for the state in question. These states must maintain, as a minimum, these safeguards, but may adopt more far-reaching safeguards in the future.
- If a nuclear-armed state adheres to the TPNW before eliminating its nuclear-weapons programme it will also be obliged to conclude a safeguards agreement that provides 'credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole'. (Article 4(3)). Again, this formulation equates to, at least, a CSA and an AP. Negotiation on these safeguards are mandated to start no later than the completion of nuclear elimination, with the resultant treaty entering into force within 18 months. These states must maintain, as a minimum, these safeguards but may adopt further safeguards in the future. The Treaty does not specify safeguards that should be applied between entry into force and the completion of nuclear elimination for these states, but these may be agreed in the legally-binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of these states' nuclear-weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities.

¹⁹³ All of the five regional NWFZ treaties obligate their states parties to conclude CSAs with the IAEA. The Central Asian NWFZ Treaty goes one step further than any other existing treaty and requires that its states parties also adopt an AP with the IAEA.

¹⁹⁴ 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final Document, Action 28, at: <https://bit.ly/34mNQwb>.

Since the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017, a total of four states have brought into force a CSA and nine states have brought into force an AP. Most of this progress has taken place in states that are not only states parties to the NPT, but are also either states parties, signatories, or

other supporters of the TPNW.¹⁹⁵ Over the same period of time, a further five states concluded and/or signed an AP, all of which were either states parties, signatories, or other supporters of the TPNW.¹⁹⁶

Figure 15: Safeguards agreements in states parties to the TPNW (as of end 2021)¹⁹⁷




Table F: Safeguards agreements in states parties to the TPNW (as of end 2021)¹⁹⁸

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS	STATES
CSA and an AP in force (39 states)	Antigua and Barbuda,* Austria, Bangladesh, Benin,* Botswana, Cambodia,* Chile, Comoros,* Costa Rica,* Cuba, Ecuador,* El Salvador,* Fiji,† Gambia,* Holy See,* Honduras,* Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lesotho,* Malta, Mexico, Mongolia,† Namibia,† New Zealand,* Nicaragua,* Nigeria, Palau,* Panama,* Paraguay,* Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis,* Seychelles,* South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, Vanuatu,* Viet Nam.
CSA in force, AP signed (4 states)	Bolivia†, Kiribati†, Lao PDR†, Malaysia.
CSA in force, no steps towards AP (14 states)	Belize,* Cook Islands,†§ Dominica,† Guyana,† Maldives,* Nauru,† Niue,†§ Saint Lucia,* Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,† Samoa,† San Marino,* Trinidad and Tobago,† Tuvalu,† Venezuela.
CSA signed, AP signed (1 state)	Guinea-Bissau.
CSA signed, no steps towards AP (1 state)	Palestine.
* States with a CSA in force that have also brought into force a Modified SQP (23 states).	
† States with a CSA in force that also retain in force an Original SQP (15 states).	
§ New Zealand's CSA and Original SQP also apply to Cook Islands and Niue.	

195 TPNW states parties: Benin brought into force a CSA and an AP in 2019, and Honduras and Thailand brought into force APs in 2017; Signatories: Zimbabwe brought into force an AP in 2021; Other supporters: Liberia brought into force a CSA and an AP in 2018, and Eritrea a CSA and an AP in 2021, while Ethiopia brought into force an AP in 2019, and Senegal an AP in 2017. In addition, Serbia (opposed) brought into force an AP in 2018, and Micronesia (opposed) brought into force a CSA in 2021.

196 TPNW states parties: Bolivia signed an AP in 2019; Signatories: Algeria signed an AP in 2019, and Sao Tome and Principe concluded an AP; Other supporters: Sri Lanka concluded an AP in 2018, and Sierra Leone approved an AP in 2021.

197 IAEA, 'Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols', as of 31 December 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3298sXA>.

198 Ibid.

WHAT ARE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS?

- The NPT, NWFZ treaties and the TPNW oblige non-nuclear-armed states parties to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards agreements are important both to prevent further states from developing nuclear weapons and to maintain a nuclear-weapons free world once nuclear disarmament has been achieved.
- Under these agreements, the IAEA applies safeguards to nuclear facilities and material in order to verify that those facilities are not misused, and that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The IAEA analyses state declarations, data derived from IAEA safeguards activities in-country (such as visits and inspections) and at IAEA headquarters, and other sources of information in order to reach a safeguards conclusion. If positive, this is intended to provide credible assurance to the international community that states are abiding by their safeguards obligations.
- There are three types of safeguards agreements: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) with NPT non-nuclear-weapon states; voluntary offer safeguards agreements with NPT nuclear-weapon states; and item-specific safeguards agreements with NPT states not party.
- The CSA provides for safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful activities in non-nuclear-armed states, to verify that it is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The objective is to ensure the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.
- The IAEA Board of Governors approved a Model Additional Protocol (AP) to safeguards agreements in 1997, which expands the Agency's access to information and sites, including to undeclared facilities, and authority to investigate inconsistencies in states' declarations. According to the IAEA, it is only in countries with both a CSA and an AP in force that the Agency has sufficient information and access to provide credible assurances of both the non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
- Non-nuclear-armed states with minimal quantities of nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility may conclude a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to their CSA, which suspends certain CSA safeguards under specific conditions, to reduce their safeguards burden while still enabling effective verification of their non-proliferation obligations. The IAEA Board of Governors approved a Modified SQP in 2005 to reduce the number of suspended provisions of the CSA, and strengthen declaration and inspection procedures. Many states are yet to upgrade their SQP to this new standard, and some of these are yet to conclude an AP, meaning the IAEA's authority to conduct activities to detect any undeclared material and facilities is reduced.

For more information, see: IAEA, 'Safeguards explained', at: <https://bit.ly/3oEfhYu>; and IAEA, 'Safeguards Basics', at: <https://bit.ly/3Hh0CuL>.

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS IN NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

The NPT's five nuclear-weapon-states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) have concluded so-called 'voluntary offer' safeguards agreements, based on the CSA model, which involve safeguards only on certain nuclear material and facilities in their nuclear fuel cycle. They have also concluded limited APs to their voluntary offer agreements. Three nuclear-armed states not party to the NPT (India, Israel, and Pakistan) have concluded item-specific safeguards

agreements, which prohibit the use of specified items under safeguards for military purposes or the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.¹⁹⁹ India has concluded a limited AP to its item-specific agreement. North Korea had originally brought into force a CSA, but the IAEA's in-country verification activities ceased in April 2009.²⁰⁰ As discussed in the above interpretation of the TPNW's safeguards requirements, upon adherence to the Treaty nuclear-armed states will have, as a minimum, to upgrade their existing safeguards agreements to a CSA and the requisite AP.²⁰¹

199 Ibid.

200 See IAEA, 'Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards', at: <https://bit.ly/3x4e7cB>.

201 NPT states parties also agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, and reaffirmed at the 2010 Review Conference, that once nuclear weapons have been eliminated, all states should have comprehensive safeguards and an AP in force. See '2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final Document', Action 30, at: <https://bit.ly/34mNQwb>.

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS IN ALL NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES


Figure 16 below and Table G opposite summarize the status of safeguards agreements in all of the 188 non-nuclear-armed states as of 31 December 2021. In total, 132 of the non-nuclear-armed states, or 70%, had both a CSA and an AP in force, while 47 states (25%) had a CSA in force but not yet an AP. These outliers on the AP are all states parties to the NPT. The 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences urged all states parties to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible.²⁰² A quarter of the 47 outliers have, however, already concluded or signed an AP and need only bring it into force.

Finally, nine states (5%) did not yet have a CSA in force, and therefore also not an AP: Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Palestine, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, South Sudan, and Timor Leste. This is so, despite the fact that all of these states apart from South Sudan are states parties to the NPT and

have a pre-existing obligation under that Treaty — and arguably also under customary law — to conclude and bring into force a CSA.²⁰³ Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau are also obligated under the Pelindaba NWFZ Treaty to conclude and bring into force a CSA. Of the outliers on the CSA, however, all but Somalia and South Sudan have already concluded or even signed CSAs with the IAEA, and all that remains is for them to bring the agreement into force. As noted above, Guinea-Bissau and Palestine are now also states parties to the TPNW and must therefore comply with this Treaty's 18-month deadline to bring their CSAs into force. The remaining seven non-nuclear-armed states without a CSA in force are all signatories to or other supporters of the TPNW and will also have to meet the TPNW's deadline for a CSA upon their adherence to the Treaty.

In total, 179 non-nuclear-armed states had a CSA in force at the end of 2021. Of these, 99 states had brought into force an SQP, of which 70 were Modified SQPs while the other 29 states retained Original SQPs.

Figure 16: Safeguards agreements in all non-nuclear-armed states (as of end 2021)²⁰⁴



202 '2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final Document', Action 28, at: <https://bit.ly/34mNQwb>.

203 Art. III, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

204 Source: IAEA, 'Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols', as of 31 December 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3298sXA>.

Table G: Safeguards agreements in all non-nuclear-armed states (as of end 2021)²⁰⁵

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS	STATES
CSA and AP in force (132 states)	Afghanistan,* Albania, Andorra,* Angola,* Antigua and Barbuda,* Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,* Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin,* Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,* Burundi,* Cambodia,* Cameroon,* Canada, Central African Republic,* Chad,* Chile, Colombia, Comoros,* Congo,* Costa Rica,* Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti,* Dominican Republic,* DR Congo, Ecuador,* El Salvador,* Eritrea,* Estonia, Eswatini,* Ethiopia,* Fiji,† Finland, Gabon,* Gambia,* Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,* Haiti,* Holy See,* Honduras,* Hungary, Iceland,* Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,* Kuwait,* Kyrgyzstan,† Latvia, Lesotho,* Liberia,* Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,* Malawi,* Mali,* Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,* Mauritius,* Mexico, Moldova,* Monaco,* Mongolia,† Montenegro,* Morocco, Mozambique,* Namibia,† Netherlands,† New Zealand,* Nicaragua,* Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia,* Norway, Palau,* Panama,* Paraguay,* Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda,* Saint Kitts and Nevis,* Senegal,* Serbia, Seychelles,* Singapore,* Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania,* Thailand, Togo,* Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,* Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,* Viet Nam, Zimbabwe.*
CSA in force, AP signed (10 states)	Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia,† Iran,# Kiribati,† Lao PDR,† Malaysia, Myanmar,† Tunisia, Zambia.†
CSA in force, AP concluded (2 states)	Sierra Leone,† Sri Lanka.
CSA in force, no steps towards AP (35 states)	Argentina, Bahamas,* Barbados,† Belize,* Bhutan,† Brazil, Brunei,* Cook Islands,†§ Dominica,† Egypt, Grenada,† Guyana,† Lebanon,* Maldives,* Micronesia,* Nauru,† Nepal,† Niue,†§ Oman,† Papua New Guinea,* Qatar,* Saint Lucia,* Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,† Samoa,† San Marino,* Saudi Arabia,† Solomon Islands,† Sudan,* Suriname,† Syria, Tonga,* Trinidad and Tobago,† Tuvalu,† Venezuela, Yemen.†
CSA signed, AP signed (4 states)	Cabo Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste.
CSA signed, no steps towards AP (1 state)	Palestine.
CSA concluded, AP concluded (1 state)	Sao Tome and Principe.
CSA concluded, no steps towards AP (1 state)	Equatorial Guinea.
No steps towards CSA or AP (2 states)	Somalia, South Sudan.
<p>* States with a CSA in force that have also brought into force a Modified SQP (70 states). † States with a CSA in force that also retain in force an Original SQP (29 states). § New Zealand's CSA and Original SQP also apply to Cook Islands and Niue. # Iran was implementing its AP provisionally but suspended this in February 2021.</p>	

205 Ibid.

The obligation to **ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS**



*Russia's President Vladimir Putin (left) and US President Joe Biden shake hands before their first meeting, at Villa La Grange in Geneva, 16 June 2021.
(Photo: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/NTB)*

All of the nine nuclear-armed states remain unwilling to adhere to, or even engage constructively with, the TPNW. Their conduct in 2021 was manifestly incompatible with the Treaty's obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor estimates that a few hundred retired, older nuclear warheads were dismantled in Russia and the United States during the course of the year. However, no warheads were dismantled as part of a coherent plan to ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.

According to the Federation of American Scientists, the number of nuclear weapons in the world peaked in 1986 at around 70,300 warheads.²⁰⁶ That number has since been reduced by 82%, to the estimated 12,705 warheads²⁰⁷ at the beginning of 2022. These reductions were mainly done in the 1990s and early 2000s and mainly because of cuts in the massive US and Russian arsenals. Each year since then, including in 2021, the total number of warheads in the world has decreased slightly, but this is only because Russia and the United States each year dismantle a small number of their retired, older nuclear warheads.

As shown in Figure 17 overleaf, there has not been a parallel and continued gradual reduction of the number of warheads that are in fact available for use by the nuclear-armed states. The global total of usable stockpiles of nuclear warheads, or in other words the actual threat, plateaued from around the year 2007, and has been increasing since 2017.²⁰⁸ At the beginning of 2022, the global usable stockpile was approximately 9,440 warheads, while in 2017 it was 9,227.

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor estimates that Russia and the United States together had 3,265 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement in January 2022. Dismantlement of retired, Cold-War-era nuclear weapons will soon be exhausted as a course of action to reduce the global nuclear arsenal.²⁰⁹ No further progress in nuclear disarmament will then be in sight, unless nuclear-armed states can agree that their current usable stockpiles are not indispensable.

As of the end of 2021, however, there was no evidence that any of the nuclear-armed states have the will to purposefully pursue nuclear disarmament, or to develop plans for its realization. This is so, despite the fact that all of the nuclear-armed states claim to support nuclear disarmament and the pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons.²¹⁰

ARTICLE 4(1), (2), AND (6) – INTERPRETATION

- In accordance with Article 4(6) of the TPNW, the states parties are explicitly obligated to designate a 'competent international authority or authorities' to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons programmes.
- The TPNW provides two pathways to the future adherence of nuclear-armed states: one for so-called destroy-and-join states ('Article 4(1) states') and a second for so-called join-and-destroy states ('Article 4(2) states').
- Article 4(1) obligates those nuclear-armed states that destroy their nuclear weapons and eliminate their nuclear-weapons programme before adhering to the TPNW, to cooperate with the 'competent international authority' that states parties will designate to verify nuclear disarmament, in order to ascertain that its nuclear-weapon programme has been irreversibly eliminated.
- Article 4(2) obligates those nuclear-armed states that decide to adhere to the Treaty before completing nuclear disarmament, to immediately remove the weapons or devices from operational status and to destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the First Meeting of States Parties. The process of destruction must be detailed in a legally binding, time-bound plan that provides for the verified and irreversible elimination of that state party's nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. Such a state must submit a draft of the plan to the other states parties or to the competent international authority within 60 days of becoming a party. The plan must then be negotiated with this authority and submitted to the next meeting of states parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval.

The nuclear-weapon states that have adhered to the NPT are already subject to legally-binding nuclear disarmament obligations under that Treaty. Disarmament commitments made at the NPT's review conferences – such as the '13 Steps' to implement the Treaty's Article VI on disarmament, adopted in 2000, and the 'Action Plan' agreed upon in 2010 – have

²⁰⁶ H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, 'Status of World Nuclear Forces', Federation of American Scientists, September 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/33nQ7Uk>.


²⁰⁷ See the section above on the prohibition on possession and stockpiling.

²⁰⁸ *ibid.*

²⁰⁹ See, e.g., remarks by the former US Assistant Secretary Chris Ford presented to the conference on 'The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime - Towards the 2020 NPT Review Conference' at Wilton Park, United Kingdom, 10 December 2018, at: <https://bit.ly/3s6YvEJ>.

²¹⁰ See above Chapter 1: The Context of the TPNW.

Figure 17: Global inventory of nuclear warheads compared with global usable stockpiles of nuclear warheads



not been honoured. Nor have the four nuclear-armed states outside the NPT (North Korea, India, Israel, and Pakistan) taken steps towards disarmament.

The stance of the nuclear-armed states is that the prevailing security environment is not conducive to further reductions.²¹¹ Ultimately, they reject the commitment to actually *achieve* nuclear disarmament (and by extension the objective of both the NPT and the TPNW), in favour of an open-ended commitment to work *towards* it, seemingly in perpetuity. Their focus is not on nuclear disarmament, but rather on risk reduction, non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and arms control measures, where the underlying logic is that nuclear weapons have value and that nuclear deterrence as a system will, and indeed must, continue.

Despite their repeated claims that they are pursuing nuclear disarmament, the United States and Russia have not engaged in nuclear disarmament negotiations of any kind for more than a decade.²¹² Not since the Reagan–Gorbachev summit meeting in Reykjavik in 1986 have the

two discussed the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals, or even the reduction to a maximum of for instance 1,000 nuclear weapons each. The first summit between presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin, which took place in Geneva in June 2021, was therefore a unique opportunity. But while the two presidents agreed to ‘lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk mitigation measures’,²¹³ there was no similar ambition for nuclear disarmament.

ADVANCING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The TPNW is stimulating political processes to advance nuclear disarmament by challenging the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. The Treaty is also helping to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament by establishing a framework for verified and irreversible elimination of states’ nuclear-weapons programmes.²¹⁴

The value of the TPNW as a contribution to disarmament goals should therefore be recognized even by those states not yet ready to adhere to the Treaty themselves.

²¹¹ See, e.g., remarks of former US Assistant Secretary Chris Ford to a conference at Wilton Park, 10 December 2018, at: <https://bit.ly/3LILfUi>.

²¹² New START, which did not limit stockpiles but limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons each state could deploy at any given time, was negotiated in 2009.

²¹³ U.S. – Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability, 16 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3Lk79XI>.

²¹⁴ As recognized by 56 former presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and defence ministers from 20 NATO member states, including two former Secretaries-General of NATO, as well as Japan and South Korea, in their ‘Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, 21 September 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3GhdmA4>.

Supporters of the TPNW do not claim the new Treaty will 'magically' lead to nuclear disarmament, as critics sometimes suggest. They recognize that it must be complemented by other steps and agreements. They do, however, argue that the global legal-normative context of nuclear weapons matters, and accordingly that changing this context in support of nuclear disarmament is an essential process.²¹⁵

Some nuclear-armed states, umbrella states, and NATO have in 2021 framed the TPNW as a call for 'unilateral' and 'unverifiable' disarmament.²¹⁶ These claims are misleading. It is certainly possible for a nuclear-armed state to adhere to the Treaty and disarm without other nuclear-armed states doing the same, and it is important that such an option exists. (Indeed, many critics of the TPNW insist that for example North Korea should disarm unilaterally). Few would, however, expect for instance the United States or Russia to do so, and nuclear-armed states may therefore of course also commit under the TPNW to eliminate their nuclear-weapons programme through bilateral or multilateral disarmament arrangements that provide for mutual elimination.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION

No matter whether nuclear disarmament is achieved through unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral decision, or through a UN Security Council mandate or process,²¹⁷ effective nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) is needed to generate trust that declared actions have in fact been carried out. The TPNW is the first and only legally binding multilateral instrument that specifically provides for and requires verification of nuclear disarmament.

The TPNW does not elaborate a comprehensive NDV regime, nor does it prescribe modalities for the conduct of verification activities. More helpfully, at a point in time when suitable verification techniques, technologies, and concepts are still being elaborated by interested states, international organizations, and civil society organizations (and indeed much technical work remains), the TPNW provides for appropriate and effective verification measures to be determined once nuclear-armed states decide to join the Treaty. In this way, the TPNW deliberately provides for a 'multi-stage process' with the Treaty containing commitments and

objectives, which will be complemented in due course by 'a follow-on agreement or agreements on specific verification solutions'.²¹⁸

There are documented examples of nuclear-armed states reducing their nuclear-weapons stockpiles, such as by dismantling retired warheads, or, in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, as a result of bilateral arms control agreements. In addition, three states that hosted Soviet Union nuclear weapons (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) transferred the warheads to Russia in the early 1990s, while South Africa eliminated its nuclear-weapons programme altogether between 1989 and 1991. Those four states then acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. These examples demonstrated that nuclear reductions can be achieved, and useful lessons from those experiences can be applied to verifying future nuclear disarmament. That said, more transparency about warhead dismantlement in the nuclear-armed states would certainly be welcome (and an important confidence-building measure).²¹⁹

Some argue that nuclear disarmament should be undertaken solely pursuant to the NPT. However, the NPT is not a treaty-making forum. Further, the NPT's nuclear disarmament commitments only apply to five of the nine currently nuclear-armed states, and disarmament by the four nuclear-armed states outside the NPT is often cited as a critical precondition for progress on disarmament pursuant to the NPT. The TPNW provides an avenue for nuclear-armed states outside the NPT to pursue verified nuclear disarmament, and realistically achieve reciprocity across the NPT and TPNW regimes. Thus, if demands for reciprocal, verified nuclear disarmament are sincere, then nuclear-armed states could help formulate the establishment of the TPNW's verification regime.

Verifying the irreversible elimination of a state's nuclear-weapons programme, whether it occurs before that state has joined the TPNW or while it is a state party, will be a complex and costly process. While the process for dismantling a nuclear weapon is well understood and descriptions abound in the public domain,²²⁰ there remain significant technical challenges in designing, resourcing, and overseeing the comprehensive tasks involved in verifying the irreversible destruction of an entire nuclear-weapons programme.

215 A prohibition treaty has often preceded the elimination of unacceptable weapons, such as chemical weapons (whose use was first banned in warfare by a treaty adopted at the Hague Peace Conference in 1899, 93 years before the adoption of the Chemical Weapons Convention).

216 See, e.g., S. Jenssen, 'Veien mot en verden uten atomvåpen' ('The road to a world without nuclear weapons'), *Verdens Gang*, 27 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3rx5p5H>.

217 For example with respect to Iraq, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 687, adopted on 3 April 1991, and North Korea, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted on 14 October 2006.

218 T. Erästö, U. Komžaitė and P. Topychkanov, 'Operationalizing nuclear disarmament verification', *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*, No. 2019/3, April 2019, at: <https://bit.ly/3FIMkZg>, p. 14.

219 M. Kütt and Z. Mian, 'Setting the Deadline for Nuclear Weapon Destruction under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2019) at: <https://bit.ly/3xuJMo1>, p. 412.

220 Ibid, p. 413.

SETTING A DEADLINE FOR DESTRUCTION

The First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW will set a deadline for the destruction of a state party's nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor recommends that it considers setting a deadline of ten years, renewable, where necessary, for a set period upon request to the other states parties (and with the provision of all relevant supporting information justifying the request). In a single ten-year period, it might even be feasible to achieve elimination of even the largest nuclear-weapon stockpiles (i.e. those of the United States and Russia).²²¹ States parties might wish to consider the impact of the permitted destruction period on a nuclear-armed state's decision whether to 'destroy-and join', for which no deadline for stockpile destruction is mandated under the TPNW, or 'join-and-destroy', and the desirability of nuclear-armed states adhering to the TPNW as soon as possible and achieving stockpile destruction under simultaneous verification.

DESIGNATING THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY OR AUTHORITIES

The states parties to the TPNW will also designate a 'competent international authority or authorities' to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes of destroy-and-join states and join-and-destroy states. The TPNW explicitly assigns certain verification responsibilities to the IAEA, through the obligations on states parties to maintain nuclear safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA's statutory mandate to apply safeguards on any nuclear activities in a state, on request, allows the Agency to verify a range of activities relating to nuclear disarmament. It has been involved in missions to verify the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, the closure and destruction of clandestine weapon programmes, and the verified disposition of classified forms of military plutonium, on request by the respective states or the UN Security Council.²²²

Several IAEA member states have made statements supporting a role for the Agency in verifying nuclear disarmament at the annual General Conference sessions.²²³ A survey of IAEA member states in 2014–15 found that most non-nuclear-armed states supported the IAEA having a broad role in verifying nuclear disarmament, and that IAEA personnel from non-nuclear-armed states could have an active role in disarmament verification activities as long as appropriate information control systems were put in place to protect proliferation-sensitive information.²²⁴ Further clarification is now needed on whether the Agency might have a more central and regular role in future NDV.

Several experts have suggested that the states parties to the TPNW should establish one or more new authorities in addition to the IAEA, which would cooperate with the IAEA and other relevant organizations through a division of tasks.²²⁵ One group of experts at Princeton University and Harvard University has recommended a phased approach, with the early establishment of a two-part organizational structure, comprising an implementation support unit and a dedicated scientific and technical advisory body. This would enable substantive work to identify implementation and verification challenges and finding solutions by the time one or more nuclear-armed states join the TPNW, and the structure could then be scaled up.²²⁶ As a starting point, TPNW states parties might consider establishing a working group on verifying nuclear elimination to strengthen the knowledge and capacity of states parties on these issues. States parties need to give considerable attention to which entity or entities to designate as 'competent international authority or authorities' to verify the elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes pursuant to the TPNW.

²²¹ Kütt and Mian (2019), pp. 411–12.

²²² VERTIC, 'Member State views on an IAEA role in verifying nuclear disarmament', *Verification Matters*, No. 10, September 2015, p. 7, at: <https://bit.ly/3dmAykb>.

²²³ Ibid, p. 8.

²²⁴ Ibid, p. 20.

²²⁵ See T. Shea (2019), *Verifying Nuclear Disarmament*, Routledge, New York/London; and T. Patton, S. Philippe, and Z. Mian, 'Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2019).

²²⁶ Patton, Philippe, and Mian, 'Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons'.

The obligation to **REMOVE FOREIGN NUCLEAR WEAPONS**



Ahead of the negotiations about a new coalition government in Germany, campaigners organized a demonstration outside the Reichstag building in Berlin on 5 November 2021 to ask the leaders of the involved political parties what they will do with the US nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. (Photo: Xanthe Hall/IPPNW)

The five states that host foreign nuclear weapons on their territory (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey) would be obliged to ensure their removal upon adhering to the TPNW.

The United States is the only country known to station nuclear weapons in other countries today, while Russia and the United Kingdom also did so in the past. A total of 19 states are believed to have previously hosted such deployments, in some cases without their knowledge.²²⁷

Most nuclear hosting arrangements were put in place in the 1950s and 1960s, and all but the above-mentioned five cases in Europe are believed to have since been discontinued. The majority of weapons were withdrawn from Europe after the Cold War. Hosting arrangements with Greece ended in 2001, while the United States also withdrew its nuclear weapons from RAF Lakenheath (United Kingdom) and from RAF Ramstein (Germany) in 2006. Further reductions of the US arsenals in Aviano (Italy) and Incirlik (Turkey) were conducted in 2016.

There have been several attempts by European policymakers to have the remaining weapons removed from these five states. Numerous non-governmental organizations have continued to advocate for removal. In four of the five host states – excluding Turkey – public opinion polls have shown clear support for withdrawal of the nuclear weapons on their soil.²²⁸

In Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands several political initiatives, involving parliamentary debates and motions, have also sought to achieve the removal of nuclear weapons. The Belgian Senate in 2005 unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the removal of nuclear weapons from Belgian territory.²²⁹ In January 2020, a similar motion – calling also for the signature of the TPNW – failed to pass but gained considerable support from parliamentarians.²³⁰

The Dutch parliament has been very vocal in its support to remove the nuclear weapons on its territory, and has adopted several motions explicitly calling on the government to do so.²³¹

ARTICLE 4(4) – INTERPRETATION

- Under Article 4(4), any state party with foreign nuclear weapons in its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control is obligated to ensure their prompt removal as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the First Meeting of States Parties.
- Upon their removal, the territorial state party is required to submit a declaration of full compliance to the UN Secretary-General.
- The First Meeting of States Parties in 2022 will need to set a deadline for such removal. Several experts have made workable propositions for this. See, e.g., M. Kütt and Z. Mian, 'Setting the Deadline for Nuclear Weapon Removal from Host States under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', 2022. The authors conclude that foreign nuclear weapons could be safely removed within 90 days.

In 2009, the German coalition government committed through its governing platform to have the remaining nuclear weapons in Germany withdrawn. The then Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, promoted the initiative enthusiastically for some time, but the United States responded negatively, and the initiative was quietly shelved the next year.²³²

The national debate on Germany's role in nuclear sharing, has not subsided, however. It was particularly questioned in the run-up to the federal elections of 2021, prompting NATO's Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to publish an op-ed in the German newspaper, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, reiterating the importance of Germany's support for nuclear sharing for transatlantic peace and security.²³³ After the elections, in November 2021, Stoltenberg sought to put pressure on the coalition party negotiations, saying: 'I count on Germany to remain committed to NATO's nuclear sharing. It is our ultimate security guarantee.' Stoltenberg also pondered

227 Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark (Greenland), France, East Germany and West Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom. The figure does not include territories that during the relevant period were under the direct jurisdiction or administration of a nuclear-armed state (Guam, Okinawa, and the Marshall Islands). Sources: H. M. Kristensen, 'Where the Bombs Are', Federation of American Scientists (9 November 2006); M. Furrmann and T. S. Sechser, 'Appendices for "Signalling Alliance Commitments"' (6 April 2014); R. S. Norris, W. M. Arkin, and W. Burr, 'Where they Were', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 55, No. 6 (1999); E. N. Rózsa and A. Péczelli, 'Nuclear Attitudes in Central Europe', EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, No. 42 (2015).

228 See, e.g., ICAN, 'Polls: Public Opinion in EU Host States Firmly Opposes Nuclear Weapons', 25 October 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3nVmEeN>.

229 Nuclear Threat Initiative, 'Belgian Senate Calls for Removal of U.S. Nukes' (22 April 2005), at: <https://bit.ly/2NH12BI>.

230 The motion was defeated by a vote of 74 to 66. Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Plenary Session, 16 January 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3nX5GMV>.

231 See all motions in the Dutch Parliament regarding nuclear disarmament here: Pax No Nukes 'Overview motions on nuclear disarmament adopted by the Dutch parliament since 2010', Last updated 29 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3tY0vjV>.

232 M. Skjønberg, 'Nato og amerikanske kjernevåpen i Europa', *Internasjonal Politikk*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (2017), pp. 187–88.

233 J. Stoltenberg, 'Germany's Support for Nuclear Sharing is Vital to Protect Peace and Freedom', NATO, 11 May 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3H6Duhk>.

that if Germany opts out of nuclear sharing, other states in Eastern Europe (namely Poland, as was already floated as an idea in 2020²³⁴) would have to take over this role.²³⁵ The coalition agreement of 24 November 2021 in Germany includes a strong commitment to NATO and the importance of being part of 'strategic discussions and planning processes' within the alliance. While committing to uphold a 'credible deterrent capability' in the alliance, the coalition government also reiterates the goal of Global Zero and a Germany free of nuclear weapons.²³⁶

In both Turkey and Italy, removal of nuclear weapons is not as frequently discussed as in the other three host nations. The Italian parliament in September 2017 passed

a motion to explore 'the possibility of adhering to the legally binding [ban] treaty' but 'in a way compatible with [Italy's] NATO obligations and with the positioning of allied states.'²³⁷ While Italian civil society organizations have been very active in the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the TPNW,²³⁸ the government has subsequently taken no action to move closer to the TPNW and away from nuclear sharing commitments.

Turkey is adamant in its support for upholding current NATO nuclear sharing arrangements and there has been no perceptible support for their removal and the TPNW within society or political parties. This is so, except for former Turkish defence minister, Hikmet Sami Türk, signing the ICAN open letter in support of the TPNW.²³⁹

234 On the debate in 2020, see, e.g., S. Pifer, 'US nukes in Poland are a truly bad idea', Brookings Institute, 18 May 2020, at: <https://brook.gs/3AvIWc6>.

235 J. Stoltenberg, 'Speech. NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg at the German Atlantic Association "NATO Talk" Conference 2021', 19 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3nYyWDg>.

236 'Embracing Progress. Coalition for Freedom, Justice and Sustainability. Coalition Agreement Between the SPD, the Green Party and the Liberal Party', [Mehr Fortschritt wagen. Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit. Koalitionsvertrag 2021 – 2025 zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (SPD), BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN und den Freien Demokraten (FDP)], Berlin, 24 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3KH21g7>.

237 Italian Parliament, High Chamber, 'Mozione 1-01699', [Motion 1-0169], at: <https://bit.ly/3lAmXDH>.

238 See, e.g., ICAN [@nuclearban], 'It's #SupportingSunday! A massive shoutout today to our Italian partner @senzatomica! Through the #ItaliaRipensaci campaign which they coordinate with @RetePaceDisarmo they have been raising awareness on the urgency to eliminate nuclear weapons all across Italy. (1/2)', 20 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3AIsipD>.

239 ICAN, '56 former leaders and ministers of US allies urge states to join the nuclear weapon ban treaty', 21 September 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/334uV8U>.

The obligation to **ADOPT NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES**



The Parliament of Ireland adopted the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Bill in 2019. (Archive photo courtesy of the Houses of the Oireachtas Service, Ireland)

National implementation measures build greater confidence between states parties that obligations are being fully implemented, and are an obligation under the TPNW. Ireland and Algeria are examples of states that have already adopted such national implementation measures; one of a legal nature and one of an administrative nature.

To the knowledge of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, Ireland is the only state party that thus far has adopted national legislation specifically to implement the TPNW. Algeria, which has signed but not yet ratified the TPNW, has taken other early action that would constitute national implementation measures by establishing a National Agency for the rehabilitation of areas contaminated after nuclear-weapons testing.

LEGISLATION

New national legislation should be adopted by each state party to the TPNW that does not yet have in place laws to criminalize the acts prohibited by the Treaty and, where necessary, to implement its positive obligations. Most non-nuclear-armed states are already today implementing most of the core prohibitions of the TPNW. As illustrated by Table H overleaf, this is because they practise nuclear-weapon-free security policies, are states parties to the NPT, the CTBT, and NWFZ treaties, and because they have safeguards agreements with the IAEA. They therefore typically already have in place appropriate national measures, including legislation that addresses some or all of the obligations under the TPNW. Accordingly, the adoption of new national legislation to implement the TPNW may not be necessary.

Crucially, however, all states parties to the TPNW have to establish whether their existing national laws would make it illegal for a national or any other person under their jurisdiction or control to develop, produce, possess, transfer, or use nuclear weapons or to assist any other person to do so, and whether they could prosecute them. If the answer is a clear yes, they have the required national legislation. In most states, engaging in conduct prohibited by the TPNW would ordinarily be a crime even if it is not specifically outlawed, because the handling of dangerous substances (which would encompass nuclear material) is prohibited. Another reason why a state party may not see the need to adopt new legislation is that in many cases (those with a monist constitutional law system), a ratified international treaty may automatically become part of national law.

That said, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor recommends that all states parties adopt dedicated

ARTICLE 5 – INTERPRETATION

- Article 5 of the TPNW obligates every state party to take ‘the necessary measures’ to implement its obligations under the Treaty. This paragraph applies to all of the Treaty’s obligations, whether prohibitions or positive obligations.
- Paragraph 2 of Article 5 stipulates that the duty to implement the Treaty nationally includes the taking of ‘all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress’ any prohibited activity. It concerns any such prohibited activity whether it is undertaken by natural or legal persons under its jurisdiction or control or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.
- Appropriate national legislation should cover at the least all of the core prohibitions set forth in Article 1 of the Treaty.
- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has developed and published a model law for common-law States which can serve as a valuable basis for States Parties to the TPNW to draft and enact such legislation (at: <http://bit.ly/3faEDXV>).
- The CTBT and the CWC also require national implementation measures, but there is no such obligation in the NPT or the NWFZ treaties.

legislation to implement the TPNW. This can also be the simplest and best solution, rather than undertaking a complex mapping of existing legislation.

TPNW state party Ireland adopted its Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act in 2019. The Act, which was signed into law by the Irish President in December 2019, is formally entitled an ‘Act to give effect to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons done at New York on 7 July 2017 and for those purposes to provide for offences relating to acts prohibited by that Treaty; and to provide for related matters’. The list of offences in Section 2 of the Act reflects Article 1(1) of the TPNW and an offence may be committed by both an individual and a company.²⁴⁰

The Irish Act defines a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device a little narrowly as ‘any weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy that is designed for a hostile purpose or for use in armed conflict, and includes such a weapon or device in unassembled or partly assembled forms but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from, and not an indivisible

²⁴⁰ Section 6(1) of the Irish Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act 2019 stipulates that where an offence under the Act is committed by a company (‘body corporate’) and where an officer of the company consented to or was guilty of wilful neglect, both the human and legal person is guilty of an offence.

part of, such a weapon or device'.²⁴¹ Of course, a nuclear explosive device designed for 'peaceful purposes' would also be unlawful under the TPNW. Accordingly, a late amendment to the Bill, presented without opposition in the Irish Parliament on 20 November 2019, incorporated a presumption that any weapon or explosive device releasing nuclear energy is 'presumed to be designed for a hostile purpose'.²⁴²

TPNW states parties New Zealand and Mongolia are examples of countries that already before adhering to the TPNW had in place comprehensive existing legislation that addresses some or all of the obligations under the Treaty. The 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, possession, or taking control over any nuclear explosive device as well as the transport on land or inland waters or internal waters and deployment of any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.²⁴³

Mongolia adopted a Law on its nuclear-weapon-free status in 2000.²⁴⁴ Article 4 of the Law prohibits any natural or legal person or any foreign state from involvement in

the development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, or control over nuclear weapons, their stationing or transportation, or their testing or use anywhere on Mongolian territory.

Further valuable additional information on national implementation measures was provided to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor by a number of TPNW States Parties in 2021, in response to a questionnaire that was sent to all states parties. Saint Kitts and Nevis intends to adopt specific implementing legislation on the Treaty, if possible in 2022.²⁴⁵ Currently, many of the prohibitions are effectively covered by the country's 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act.²⁴⁶ The new legislation would seek also to cover the TPNW's positive obligations, which are not addressed by existing laws in force in Saint Kitts and Nevis.²⁴⁷

According to Article 133 of Mexico's Federal Constitution, international treaties signed by the President of the Republic and ratified by the Senate, are the supreme law of the country. Already in 1967, Mexico signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Mexico is also the depositary of that Treaty. Mexico has also

Table H: Nuclear-weapons related prohibitions in the TPNW, NPT, CTBT, NWFZ treaties, and IAEA safeguards.

PROHIBITION	TPNW	NPT	CTBT	BANGKOK	PELINDABA	RAROTONGA	TLATELOLCO	SEMIPALATINSK	CSA/AP
Develop, produce									
Test									
Possess, stockpile									
Transfer									
Receive transfer									
Use									
Threaten to use									
Assist, encourage, induce									
Allow stationing									

241 Section 1, Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act 2019 (Act 40 of 2019), at: <http://bit.ly/39vSI4b>.

242 A recording of the oral proceedings of the Irish Parliament on this issue is available at: <https://bit.ly/301sO4k>, timing 6:44.

243 Sections 4–6, 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act.

244 Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status, adopted on 3 February 2000.

245 Attachment to email to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor from Michael Penny, Senior Foreign Service Officer, Security and Legal Matters, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Aviation, Basseterre, 13 November 2021, para. 2.

246 Saint Christopher and Nevis Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 (No. 21 of 2002).

247 Attachment to email to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor from Michael Penny, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Aviation, Basseterre, 13 November 2021, para. 8.

informed the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor that while existing provisions of its criminal law largely address the prohibitions in the Treaty,²⁴⁸ it is in the process of finalizing a draft of a Non-Proliferation Law, which will include specific provisions on the implementation of the TPNW. Indeed, existing laws do not apply to the actions of nationals abroad, unless they committed a crime at any place under its jurisdiction.²⁴⁹

The Gambia has also stated that it intends to take measures to give effect to the TPNW at domestic level. The Gambia already has 'a self-imposed moratorium on the development, production, use, transfer of nuclear material (e.g. uranium) and provision of assistance to the development, production, transfer or use of nuclear weapons or their key components'. The Gambia further notes that it does not have the capability to develop or produce nuclear weapons and that the country does not have uranium deposits.²⁵⁰

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

Beyond the adoption of legislation, other measures, including of an administrative nature, need to be taken to implement the Treaty. Clear instructions should for instance be given to a state party's diplomats to promote adherence to the Treaty among other states. Preparation may also be needed within government for how to respond to requests for international cooperation and assistance from other states parties. In particular, clear instructions should be given to the administrators of the national health system to ensure the provision of assistance to any victims of nuclear-weapons use or testing who are resident in each state party. For some states, there may also be a need for national measures to enable environmental remediation of affected land.

As mentioned above, TPNW signatory Algeria already in May 2021 adopted a Prime Ministerial Decree that created and mandated a National Agency for the rehabilitation of the former French nuclear test sites in the south of Algeria. The Agency is empowered to contract and manage rehabilitation works and to seek national and international assistance for these operations.²⁵¹

248 Among others, Article 414 of the Federal Penal Code. The text of the provision is available at: <https://bit.ly/3DsmQqP>. General provisions on assistance are set forth in Article 13(VI) of the Federal Penal Code.

249 Attachment to email from the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations and other International Organizations based in Geneva, 30 November 2021.

250 Response to Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor Questionnaire by The Gambia, 1 December 2021, paras. 1 and 2.

251 Decree No. 21-243 of 31 May 2021 on the creation, organisation, and functioning of the National Agency for the Rehabilitation of the Former French Nuclear Test Sites in the South of Algeria.

The obligation to **ASSIST VICTIMS**



France's President Emmanuel Macron speaks with a victim of French nuclear tests during his visit to Moorea island in July 2021.
(Photo: Ludovic Marin/AFP/NTB)

Victim assistance is crucial to address the unnecessary suffering experienced by populations affected by the use and testing of nuclear weapons and to help safeguard their rights. In most cases, however, affected populations have received inadequate support. The TPNW's obligation for victim assistance seeks to change this situation.

The use and testing of nuclear weapons have caused countless deaths, horrific injuries, long-term illnesses, socio-economic exclusion, and displacement. Exacerbating the situation, illnesses can manifest themselves years later; and the harm inflicted by radiation, often altering DNA, sometimes crosses generations.

The suffering caused by the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is well known, but a comprehensive overview is not available of populations around the world that are affected by nuclear-weapons testing and their ongoing needs for assistance. Between 1945 and 2017, more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions were carried out at locations within what are today 15

states, and radioactive fallout dispersed around the world.²⁵² A review was published in 2021 of the current state of knowledge about past nuclear-weapons activities in different countries and their confirmed and possible consequences today. As the review points out, there is a surprising lacuna of adequate research on this topic – which is partly the result of concerted efforts by nuclear-armed states to suppress open scientific inquiry into the effects of nuclear weapons.²⁵³

There is also a need to articulate with greater clarity the full scope of victim assistance to be ensured to all those who are 'affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons'. Article 6(1) of the TPNW refers to medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as measures to provide for the social and economic inclusion of victims. But it is explicit that these activities are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

Kazakhstan and Kiribati are serving as co-facilitators on Articles 6 and 7 for the First Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW, at the request of Austria, the Meeting's president designate. In that role, Kazakhstan and Kiribati

ARTICLE 6(1) – INTERPRETATION

- To address the ongoing suffering inflicted by use and testing of nuclear weapons, Article 6(1) of the TPNW obliges each state party to provide 'adequate' assistance to affected individuals within its jurisdiction. It is not required that the harm be caused by the state under whose jurisdiction they fall or that it occurred within that territory.
- Assistance includes, but is not limited to, medical care, rehabilitation, and psychological support, as well as support for social and economic inclusion.
- Assistance under Article 6(1) must be provided in accordance with international human rights law and, where applicable, international humanitarian law. In all cases, assistance must be age-appropriate and gender-sensitive. It must be provided to all on the basis of need 'without discrimination'.^a
- While addressing the human impacts of nuclear weapons can be daunting, the TPNW facilitates the process by creating a framework of shared responsibility for victim assistance (as well as environmental remediation, discussed in the next section). Affected states parties bear the primary responsibility as this protects their sovereignty and follows the precedent of international human rights law and humanitarian

disarmament law. But other states parties are required to provide international cooperation and assistance to help affected states parties meet their victim assistance (and environmental remediation) obligations.^b

- To make victim assistance more manageable, Article 6(1) can also be understood to allow affected states parties to realize some of their obligations, particularly those related to economic, social, and cultural rights, progressively. International human rights law requires a state to take steps to achieve those rights 'to the maximum of its available resources', while recognizing that full realization may be a gradual process.^c

a) This caveat ensures that States Parties do not adversely distinguish among recipients based on adverse distinction on the basis of sex, race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, political opinion, or other status identified in international human rights law. For prohibited grounds for discrimination, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 16 December 1966; entered into force 23 March 1976, Art. 2(1); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008, Art. 5(2); and see also UN Human Rights Council Resolution 17/19: 'Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity', preamble.

b) See the section on the obligation to cooperate and assist.

c) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, Art. 2(1).

252 M. Bolton and E. Minor, 'Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: An Introductory Review', *Global Policy*, Vol. 12, Issue 1 (February 2021), at: <https://bit.ly/3lgsTI3>.

253 Ibid.

have produced working papers and held consultations with states, international organizations, and civil society. Their goal is to generate recommendations to advance the Treaty's implementation that will be included in the Meeting's outcome documents.

JURISDICTION

States are more likely to have jurisdiction for individuals affected by nuclear-weapons use and testing if: 1) their territory was the site of nuclear detonations; 2) they have populations (such as military 'atomic veterans') that were in the vicinity of nuclear detonations or contaminated areas in other states' territories; and/or 3) their territory was downwind of atmospheric nuclear detonations that produced fallout. In the following, non-exhaustive examples are provided of states in these categories.

In the first category, TPNW states parties Kazakhstan and Kiribati were the scene of repeated, massive nuclear test detonations. The Soviet Union tested almost 500 nuclear devices in Kazakhstan, one quarter of which were atmospheric tests.²⁵⁴ About 500 Kiribati civilians lived on Christmas Island (now Kiritimati) during the period of 33 UK and US atmospheric detonations there and at Malden Island in Kiribati, from 1957 to 1963. In TPNW signatory Algeria, France tested 17 nuclear devices (4 atmospheric, 13 underground).²⁵⁵

Two further TPNW states parties — New Zealand and Fiji — are included in the second category. According to New Zealand Veteran Affairs, 12,000 New Zealand personnel served with the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in Hiroshima following the Second World War. In the 1950s, 11 members from New Zealand's armed forces attended British and US nuclear tests in Australia; and the New Zealand Navy deployed 551 sailors to protest French nuclear tests at Moruroa Atoll in 1973.²⁵⁶

Almost 300 Fijian sailors participated in the UK nuclear test programme in Kiribati. It is currently unclear whether any troops from what is now TPNW state party Bangladesh served in the British Indian contingent of the BCOF in Hiroshima. An unconfirmed number of Gurkha soldiers, recruited from TPNW signatory Nepal, served in BCOF in Hiroshima.²⁵⁷

The third category is more complex, given that fallout from atmospheric nuclear testing spread across the globe. Some states that were downwind of such tests have released dose estimates of resulting radiation exposure. For example, New Zealand's National Radiation Laboratory estimated that an average person living in the South Pacific region covered by its monitoring network (including TPNW states parties Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Samoa, and Tuvalu, as well as Tokelau, a Non-Self-Governing Territory administered by New Zealand) would have received radiation doses from all atmospheric nuclear tests that would, according to the most widely-used scientific models, have raised the cancer rate by about 1 in 9,000 people alive at the time. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that people in the region experienced Pacific nuclear testing not just as a risk to their health but also as a threat to their culture and spiritual ways of life.²⁵⁸

A number of states parties and states not party to the TPNW have adopted programmes or established funds to address the harm caused by the use or testing of nuclear weapons. Illustrative examples follow below. While lessons may be learned from these examples, none constitutes a comprehensive and adequate response to the harm experienced by affected individuals.²⁵⁹

VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN TPNW STATES PARTIES AND SIGNATORIES

FIJI

In a 2018 statement to the UN, Fiji lamented the 'tragic health circumstances' of Fijian test veterans, who have been 'denied support and recognition from colonial authorities'.²⁶⁰ In 2015, the Fijian government provided one-off grants of about US\$5,000 for each veteran (or their surviving family). Fiji Nuclear Veterans Association assisted the government in distributing the funds. The Fiji government states that the payment is a form of assistance, not compensation, as the latter should be the responsibility of the UK government. At the ceremony announcing the grants, Fiji's Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama said, 'Fiji is not prepared to wait for Britain to do the right thing.... We need to erase this blight on our history. We need to lift the burden on our collective

254 Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), 'Locations of Nuclear Explosions', 2018, at: <https://bit.ly/3Az080c>; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 'Radiological Conditions at the Semipalatinsk Test Site', Vienna, 1998.

255 IAEA, 'Radiological Conditions at the Former French Nuclear Test Sites in Algeria: Preliminary Assessment and Recommendations', Vienna, 2005.

256 New Zealand Veterans' Affairs. (n.d.) 'Research about New Zealand's nuclear veterans', at: <https://bit.ly/3k8HMNd>.

257 M. Bolton and E. Minor, 'Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: An Introductory Review', *Global Policy*, Vol. 12, Issue 1 (February 2021), at: <https://bit.ly/3lgsTl3>.

258 T. A. Ruff 'The humanitarian impact and implications of nuclear test explosions in the Pacific region', *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 97, No. 899 (2015), 775–813, at: <https://bit.ly/2LFzzMb>.

259 N. Van Duzer and A. Sanders-Zakre, 'Policy Approaches Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: A Commentary', *Global Policy*, 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3g05B6P>.

260 'Statement by H. E. Dr Satyendra Prasad, Permanent Representative of Fiji to the United Nations at the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly to Commemorate and Promote the International Day Against Nuclear Tests', 2018, available at: <https://bit.ly/3KGmB02>.

conscience. ... [T]hese men have been denied justice long enough.' Veterans also receive a US\$50 monthly pension and help with medical bills. However, the Fiji Nuclear Veterans Association has stated that many veterans living in more remote areas have difficulty accessing government clinics.²⁶¹

KAZAKHSTAN

After achieving independence, Kazakhstan conducted a study of the health of 10,000 people potentially affected by the testing and compared the results with a control group of another 10,000 people far away from the former Soviet nuclear Test Site in Semipalatinsk. The study found a significantly higher risk of stomach, lung, oesophageal, and, among women, breast cancers.²⁶² Other studies have found elevated risks of transgenerational harm among the children and grandchildren of those directly affected by the testing.²⁶³

UNDP, in partnership with other UN agencies and with Japanese government funding, supported a programme at the Test Site in Semipalatinsk in the 2000s. The aim of the programme was to 'ensure access to quality basic health and social services for vulnerable groups, ... build capacities for entrepreneurship and business skills, ... provide economic and employment opportunities and ... mobilize communities and support NGOs and CBOs'.²⁶⁴ This builds on a law adopted in 1992 in Kazakhstan, which 'is intended to provide social protection to citizens who suffered from lengthy nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site'.²⁶⁵

The law prescribes the main measures of support for those who suffered from activities at the Test Site. Citizens with the status 'suffered' are entitled to lump-sum compensation and a higher pension (in areas of extraordinary and maximal radiation risk), while state employees receive a salary top-up and additional paid holiday. Women living in areas exposed to radiation are entitled to maternity leave of up to 170 days which is increased in case of problems with complicated childbirth or a multiple birth. Children living in areas exposed to radiation are entitled to free treatment at health centres.²⁶⁶ Due to the economic situation in Kazakhstan in the 1990s, however, the government was partly unable to fulfil its obligations, and many had to wait years before they received the compensation to which they were entitled.²⁶⁷

IMPLEMENTING VICTIM ASSISTANCE

- A report by the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic and the Conflict and Environment Observatory identifies fourteen principles for assisting victims of toxic remnants of war, which can inform implementation of the TPNW's victim assistance obligation.
- To start the victim assistance process, affected states parties should look to accepted victim assistance standards such as those developed for the implementation of the victim assistance obligations of the APMBC and the CCM.
- They should develop a national plan and budget, appoint a government focal point, and adopt relevant laws and policies. They should also collect and disseminate information about the ongoing threats posed by contamination, the needs of victims, and their capacity to address them. These practical steps promote efficiency, coordination, and accountability.
- Key principles that victim assistance programmes should follow are transparency, accessibility, non-discrimination, and inclusivity. The principle of inclusivity means that states parties should involve affected individuals and their representatives during the design, implementation, evaluation, and monitoring of victim assistance. Those individuals can describe the harm they have experienced, articulate their current needs, and offer expert insights on how best to address those needs.

Source: Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic and Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), *Confronting Conflict Pollution: Principles for Assisting Victims of Toxic Remnants of War* (September 2020), at: <http://bit.ly/32vl2fT>.

In her 2022 work, *Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb*, Togzhan Kassenova describes how victims of the testing can fall outside the protection of the 1992 Law. She cites the example of Dimitri who is not classified as disabled even though he loses the use of his arms and legs every few months. His rare disease is not on the list of those recognized under the Law.²⁶⁸ Those who do meet the criteria of being a victim, and who also are employees

261 B. Alexis-Martin et al., 'Addressing the Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests: A Case Study of UK and US Test Programs at Kiritimati (Christmas) and Malden Islands, Republic of Kiribati', *Global Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February 2021), at: <https://bit.ly/3o2OTZ8>.

262 T. Kassenova, *Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb*, Stanford University Press, CA, 2022, p. 267.

263 Ibid., p. 268.

264 UNDP, 'Kazakhstan still recovering 60 years after Soviet bombing', News release, 29 August 2009. Online URL no longer available.

265 Art. 1, On social protection of citizens who suffered from nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of December 18, 1992 N 1787-XII (Unofficial translation), at: <https://bit.ly/3rrcm8b>.

266 R. Vakulchuk and K. Gjerde with T. Belikhina and K. Apsalikov, 'Semipalatinsk nuclear testing: the humanitarian consequences', Report, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 2014, p. 26.

267 Ibid.

268 Kassenova, *Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb*, p. 244.

of the State health or education system, receive the equivalent of US\$8 per month. The delays in receiving healthcare mean that they may opt to go privately for the blood tests they need. This costs more than four times the monthly stipend they receive.²⁶⁹

KIRIBATI

The Association of Cancer Patients Affected by the British and American Bomb Tests in Kiribati has been campaigning for recognition of the rights to victim assistance and to compensation of those who were affected by the tests on Christmas and Malden islands and those of their descendants who have also endured the consequences of ionizing radiation.²⁷⁰ As of 2018, the Association had identified at least 48 first generation survivors in Kiribati who had experienced the tests first-hand as well as 800 descendants.²⁷¹ Kiribati's Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Makurita Baaro, stated in 2015: 'Today, our communities still suffer from the long-term impacts of the tests, experiencing higher rates of cancer, particularly thyroid cancer, due to exposure to radiation.' There is a small hospital and three clinics in Kiritimati. However, survivors have found the facilities inadequate for treating the diseases they attribute to the testing, particularly cancer.²⁷² The Government of Kiribati is said to be considering how to address compensation of I-Kiribati survivors of nuclear tests.²⁷³

NEW ZEALAND

In 2001, in response to public concern, the New Zealand government followed up with the eleven New Zealand Forces observers that had attended British and US nuclear tests in Australia in the 1950s, to see if they had suffered adverse health effects from their observation of the nuclear tests. Six were alive, aged between 71 years and 87 years, while the five deceased had been aged 54, 59, 67, 71, and 81 at time of death. The Ministry of Health advised it was extremely unlikely that any of the recorded causes of death was linked to observation of the tests.²⁷⁴ Despite sometimes contesting the link to nuclear testing, New Zealand has provided a range of support to New

Zealand nuclear veterans. This includes access to a war disablement pension provided their illness is on any of the 'presumptive lists'. These lists include illnesses linked to potential exposure to ionizing radiation modelled on a US Department of Veterans Affairs list, although concerns have been expressed as to its coverage.²⁷⁵ A New Zealand Nuclear Test Veterans Association continues to campaign for the rights of nuclear veterans.²⁷⁶

ALGERIA

France carried out 17 nuclear tests in Algeria between 1960 and 1966 and nearly 200 in the Pacific. With respect to Algeria, no good data are available on the effects of the explosions on public health and the environment, but locals note that some people living near the test sites have suffered cancers and birth defects typically caused by radiation.²⁷⁷ Algeria has also complained to France about the challenges to its citizens in obtaining compensation under a French scheme established by a 2010 Law. Among the total of 545 that had been granted such compensation as of January 2021, only one concerned an Algerian citizen. In turn, local associations such as the Association of 13 February 1960 at Reggane or The Association of victims of Taourirt in In-Ekker, feel that they have not received adequate support from the Algerian government to pursue their claims.²⁷⁸

VICTIM ASSISTANCE AFTER THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN

Japan has a law that provides a certain amount of aid to the hibakusha. Hibakusha are eligible for payments from the Japanese government that include a health management allowance (roughly 34,000 yen per month) based on the Atomic Bomb Survivors' Assistance Act.²⁷⁹ The Act requires the Japanese government to assume the responsibility of implementing comprehensive relief measures for the health, medical care, and welfare of the atomic bomb survivors.²⁸⁰ In 1974, the Ministry of Health informed survivors that allowances would not be provided to those who left the country. This order was not revoked until 2003. In a lawsuit filed by a group of 40 South Korean

269 Ibid., pp. 272, 273.

270 B. Alexis-Martin, et al. 'Addressing the Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests: A Case Study of UK and US Test Programs at Kiritimati (Christmas) and Malden Islands, Republic of Kiribati', *Global Policy*, Vol. 12, Issue 1 (February 2021), at: <https://bit.ly/3o2OTZ8>.

271 World Council of Churches, '35th session of the UPR, stakeholder report on Kiribati: Human rights violations resulting from Nuclear Testing', Paper submitted to the Universal Periodic Review of Kiribati.

272 M. B. Bolton, 'The Devastating Legacy of British and American Nuclear Testing at Kiritimati (Christmas) and Malden Islands', Blog post, Just Security, 11 May 2018, at: <https://bit.ly/3tDRhch>.

273 World Council of Churches, '35th session of the UPR, stakeholder report on Kiribati: Human rights violations resulting from Nuclear Testing'.

274 New Zealand Veterans' Affairs, 'Research about New Zealand's nuclear veterans', at: <https://bit.ly/3k8HMNd>.

275 See, e.g., J. Dockerty et al., 'The New Zealand nuclear veteran and families study, exploring the options to assess heritable health outcomes', *New Zealand Medical Journal*, Vol. 133, No. 1515 (22 May 2020), at: <https://bit.ly/3BaajbX>.

276 At: <https://www.facebook.com/NZNTVA/>.

277 'The long legacy of France's nuclear tests in Algeria', *The Economist*, 26 June 2021.

278 D. M. Kellou and F. Bobin, 'Essais nucléaires: Alger hausse le ton après un long silence', *Le Monde*, 21 January 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3hH4REe>.

279 Enacted in 1994, the law integrated two previous laws: the Law Concerning Special Measures for the Atomic Bomb Exposed and the A-bomb Survivors Medical Treatment Law. Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), 'Atomic Bomb Survivors Support Law', at: <https://bit.ly/3usRq2S>. Under the earlier 1957 Atomic Bomb Survivors Medical Care Law, an atomic bomb survivor's certificate was issued to about 200,000 survivors from Nagasaki and Hiroshima cities and some of the surrounding areas.

280 RERF, 'Atomic Bomb Survivors Support Law'.

hibakusha who experienced the Hiroshima bombing, the Supreme Court of Japan in 2007 upheld a Hiroshima High Court decision which declared that the state's policy of refusing coverage to survivors living overseas was illegal.²⁸¹ The ruling ordered the government to pay 1.2 million yen to each of the plaintiffs in compensation.²⁸²

In July 2021, the Hiroshima High Court ruled that 84 people in Hiroshima Prefecture were eligible to receive State healthcare benefits who were exposed to radioactive 'black rain' outside the area currently recognized by the Japanese government. The government in Tokyo had designated an oval-shaped area measuring only 19 kilometres long and 11 kilometres wide stretching north-west of the hypocentre of the bombing on 6 August 1945 as the zone where black rain fell for an hour or longer. The Court ruling also accepted the claim that internal radiation exposure might have occurred due to the ingestion of contaminated food and well water. The court held that the plaintiffs should receive the same benefits as those provided for survivors who were in the recognized zone. To be recognized as victims of the atomic bomb, 'it is sufficient to prove that the possibility of damage to their health due to atomic bomb radiation cannot be ruled out', Presiding Judge Kazuto Nishii declared.²⁸³

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES AND THEIR DUTY OF ASSISTANCE TO THE VICTIMS OF THEIR NUCLEAR TESTING

Nuclear-armed states often conducted tests in areas that they considered peripheral. Since they have not yet adhered to the TPNW, they are not bound by the Treaty's obligations for victim assistance and environmental remediation. As discussed in the section on the TPNW's obligation of international cooperation and assistance, however, nothing prevents states not party from contributing to the implementation of the positive obligations of the Treaty. Article 7(6) of the TPNW also provides that any state party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices 'shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance' to affected states parties for victim assistance and environmental remediation. This provision was especially important to affected states during the drafting of the Treaty; they argued user and testing states should be legally as well as morally responsible for their actions.

The nuclear-armed states do have moral duties, as well as obligations under national and international law, including under human rights law and in some cases through bilateral agreements, towards the foreign and domestic victims of their tests. For the most part, however, they are not fulfilling these obligations. An overview below describes relevant — though wholly insufficient — programmes or funds established by nuclear-armed states. It is hoped that the TPNW will provide an impetus for the nuclear-armed states to increase their provision of assistance to victims resulting from the harm that they have caused.

FRANCE

In January 2010, the French parliament passed the Morin Law, which is intended to compensate those with health problems resulting from exposure to any nuclear tests.²⁸⁴ But the law only covers certain illnesses and requires claimants to meet high thresholds of proof. Complainants must demonstrate that they are affected by a radioactively induced pathology, that they lived at a test area (in the Algerian Sahara or French Polynesia), and that this residence was during or after the test period. Since the entry into force of the Morin Law, a total of more than 1,700 requests have been made for compensation.²⁸⁵ In 2020, the French Senate (Upper Chamber of the Parliament) adopted a measure that reduced the threshold of requisite risk that a cancer would be caused by the tests.²⁸⁶ As a consequence, in the course of 2020, of 223 requests considered, 109 were accepted. This represented a very significant increase from the less than 10 per cent previously accepted.²⁸⁷

UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom has provided some assistance to its own military personnel and, to a limited extent, made ex gratia payments to other nations whose civilian populations were affected by its nuclear tests.²⁸⁸ More often, the United Kingdom government has argued that high rates of cancer among local populations and their descendants were not caused by the tests.

More than 20,000 military personnel were present at the UK nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1967 in Australia and the South Pacific. In 2020, Veterans UK and the UK Ministry of Defence updated guidance to veterans

281 Supreme Court of Japan, Overseas Hibakusha Case, 2005 (Ju) 1977, *Minshu*, Vol. 61, No. 8 (2007), at: <https://bit.ly/3hlrecj>.

282 'Japan gov't to refuse settlement with some overseas A-bomb survivors' families', *The Mainichi*, 25 November 2017, at: <https://bit.ly/3AAWUJL>.

283 'Japan high court rules 84 A-bomb "black rain" victims eligible for aid', *Kyodo News*, 14 July 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3inb5JB>.

Law No. 2010-2 of 5 January 2010. Original text at: <https://bit.ly/3yrXp6H>.

284 Law No. 2010-2 of 5 January 2010. Original text at: <https://bit.ly/3yrXp6H>.

285 A. Dufour, 'Où en est l'indemnisation des victimes des essais nucléaires français ?' ('What is the status of compensation for the victims of the French nuclear tests?'), *La Croix*, 9 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3qQMOiY>.

286 Agence France-Presse, 'Essais nucléaires: le Sénat vote une mesure sécurisant la politique d'indemnisation', *Le Figaro*, 4 March 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/2VeSwZA>.

287 Dufour, 'Où en est l'indemnisation des victimes des essais nucléaires français ?'

288 In the case of Australia, for example, the UK and Australian governments signed an agreement on 11 December 1993 under which Britain agreed to pay Australia £20 million in an ex-gratia settlement of Australia's claims concerning the British nuclear test programme in Australia. Senate of Australia, Official Hansard No. 14, 2001, 27 September 2001, at: <https://bit.ly/3orl2cY>, p. 23805.

on the possibility of obtaining no-fault compensation under the War Pensions Scheme. The guidance states that: 'War Pensions are payable in respect of illness or injury due to Service in HM Armed Forces before 6 April 2005, with the benefit of reasonable doubt always given to the claimant. Decisions are medically certified and follow consideration of available service and medical evidence, where evidence supports a causal link to service, entitlement will be given.'²⁸⁹

Although the United Kingdom has not accepted any duty to pay compensation to those who believe their illnesses result from the nuclear tests, at least two UK veterans, present near the blast site during US tests, received compensation under US legislation (see below).²⁹⁰

UNITED STATES

In the United States, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act awards compensation to some of the individuals affected by nuclear testing and uranium mining in the western United States. The Act was passed by Congress in October 1990 initially to compensate miners and other workers involved in US testing at the Nevada test site and later amended to cover those involved in other test sites. The Act offers fixed sums of US\$50,000 to US\$100,000 based on a combination of exposure to radiation and development of certain illnesses (similar to those under the UK policy), without the need to prove any link between them in individual cases. Possible eligible

claimants include individuals from many Native American tribes; people who lived downwind from the Nevada test site (known as 'Downwinders'); atomic veterans; on-site participants, both civilians and military personnel; uranium industry miners, millers, and transporters; and nuclear-weapons workers (those who worked for the Atomic Energy Commission, Department of Energy, or Beryllium Vender).²⁹¹

The United States also set up health-care programmes for residents of the most affected atolls in the Marshall Islands. In late 2020, after more than two decades of struggle, victims of US nuclear tests were finally granted the eligibility for Medicaid that was promised to them. The US Congress had accidentally stripped the islanders' Medicaid coverage in the 1990s, heightening their risks during the COVID-19 pandemic.²⁹² The assistance being provided does not, however, include compensation. Ensuring US government funding for the health-care programmes has also continued to be challenging.²⁹³ A separate programme under the US Department of Energy, the Radiological Health Care Program, has supported the medical care of some 100 survivors from the Castle Bravo test in 1954. Support has involved annual comprehensive medical screening for those who were living in Rongelap and Utrok atolls at the time of the test.²⁹⁴

The United States has never acknowledged that it has a legal responsibility towards the victims of its use of nuclear weapons in Japan in August 1945.

289 Veterans UK, 'New guidance for British Nuclear Test Veterans', News Story, 26 August 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3hLYKyk>. Anyone serving in the British Armed Forces at the time, irrespective of nationality, is able to apply for support. Those who were serving in the armed forces of another state, however, are not liable to receive a war pension from the United Kingdom.

290 P. Richards, 'Nuclear test veterans – compensation', Standard Note: SNSC-05145, House of Commons Library, Last updated 31 January 2013, at: <https://bit.ly/3hMxa4b>, p. 10.

291 'Atomic Veterans® Cancer Benefit Program', at: <https://bit.ly/36gaq7n>.

292 'How 100,000 Pacific Islanders got their health care back', *Politico*, 1 January 2021, at: <https://politi.co/3dMwieH>.

293 T. Harris Joshua, 'Interior Moves to Protect Continuity of Healthcare for Four Atoll Communities in Marshall Islands', US Department of the Interior, 21 December 2017 (Last updated 30 November 2020), at: <https://on.doi.gov/34heM0o>.

294 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, Calin Georgescu, Addendum: Mission to the Marshall Islands (27-30 March 2012) and the United States of America (24-27 April 2012), UN doc. A/HRC/21/48/Add.1, 3 September 2012, para. 53.

The obligation to **REMEDIATE AFFECTED TERRITORY**



It has been more than 30 years since the last Soviet nuclear test shook the Semipalatinsk Polygon in Kazakhstan. The victims, now in their fourth generation, continue to pay the price for the Soviet nuclear programme. The picture shows an educational trip to the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site organized by the Center for International Security and Policy (CISP) for young diplomats and interns. (Photo: Oleg Butenko)

Environmental contamination from the testing of nuclear weapons is a particularly under-addressed humanitarian challenge. In most cases, the necessary assessment has not been conducted of whether contamination remains that requires environmental remediation. Affected populations often do not even have access to knowledge about the level of threat, how to protect themselves, which areas not to enter, and which food types to avoid.

In situations of use or testing of nuclear weapons, environmental remediation of contaminated areas is key to protect affected populations from harm and to help secure their rights. It also benefits the environment by helping to restore damaged ecosystems and promoting biodiversity. As is the case for victim assistance, however, no comprehensive overview yet exists of areas with ongoing contamination from decades of nuclear-weapons testing.

Illustrative examples follow below of areas affected by the testing of nuclear weapons, where environmental remediation measures have been undertaken, albeit with varying or disputed quality.²⁹⁵ The thresholds applied to determine when environmental remediation measures are necessary, and when they can be considered completed, vary considerably. This is because different national, and international bodies set different regulatory standards for human health. The thresholds may also not account for how some populations are more vulnerable to the health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation through biological or behavioural factors.²⁹⁶ For instance, the common practice of basing standards on adult male bodies means that increased harm among women, boys, and girls is not captured.²⁹⁷

ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN TPNW STATES PARTIES AND SIGNATORIES

KAZAKHSTAN

The territory of Kazakhstan, which is now a state party to the TPNW, was subject to repeated nuclear-weapons testing conducted by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As discussed in the previous section on the obligation to assist victims, almost 500 nuclear tests

ARTICLE 6(2) – INTERPRETATION

- States parties are obligated to remediate any areas in territory under their jurisdiction or control that have been contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- Given that nuclear fallout causes significant levels of contamination that spread across time and space, the TPNW recognizes that environmental remediation is a long-term commitment. It is thus difficult, and often impossible, to return areas affected by nuclear weapons to their pre-detonation condition. Accordingly, Article 6(2) stipulates that affected states parties must take ‘necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of [contaminated] areas’. Although they may never achieve complete remediation, they must work in good faith towards that goal.
- Certain interim activities, however, such as risk education, marking of contaminated areas, and national planning, can be accomplished in the near term. An essential step in each case is for a state party (or other affected state) to conduct an environmental remediation needs assessment.

were conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Site between 1949 and 1989, a quarter of which were atmospheric.²⁹⁸ Soil, water, and air may still be contaminated in the fallout area around the city of Semey (renamed from Semipalatinsk in 2007).²⁹⁹ While likely insufficient,³⁰⁰ efforts to improve the ecological condition of affected areas³⁰¹ and minimize potential risks around the Test Site have been undertaken.

In October 2012, at Degelen Mountain, Kazakh, Russian, and American nuclear scientists and engineers gathered to mark the completion of a 17-year, US\$150 million operation to secure residual plutonium in the tunnels of the site and in surrounding bore holes, which were filled with a special concrete.³⁰² In 2012–14, specialists from Kazakhstan’s Institute of Radiation Safety and Ecology

295 N. Van Duzer and A. Sanders-Zakre, ‘Policy Approaches Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: A Commentary’, *Global Policy*, 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3g05B6P>.

296 Ibid.

297 M. Olson, ‘Disproportionate Impact of Radiation and Radiation Regulation’, *Interdisciplinary Science Reviews*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2019), pp. 131–39.

298 W. Yan, ‘The nuclear sins of the Soviet Union live on in Kazakhstan’, *Nature*, 3 April 2019, at: <https://go.nature.com/3fCZC7P>; and see also M. B. Bolton and E. Minor, ‘Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: An Introductory Review’, *Global Policy*, 23 January 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3lgsTl3>.

299 A. Genova, ‘This Is What Nuclear Weapons Leave in Their Wake’, *National Geographic*, 3 October 2017, at: <http://on.natgeo.com/3av8R60>. See also ‘Slow Death In Kazakhstan’s Land Of Nuclear Tests’, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 29 August 2011, at: <http://bit.ly/2wQrhiW>; and UNDP, ‘Kazakhstan Still Recovering 60 Years after Soviet Bombing’, News Release, 29 August 2009. Online URL no longer available.

300 M. Stawkowski, ‘The continuing danger of Semipalatinsk’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 2016, at: <https://bit.ly/3LhgZto>.

301 Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/75/237, International cooperation and coordination for the human and ecological rehabilitation and economic development of the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan, 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3rwWlhg>.

302 E. Harrell and D. E. Hoffman, ‘Plutonium Mountain: Inside the 17-Year Mission to Secure a Legacy of Soviet Nuclear Testing’, Report, Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 15 August 2013, at: <https://bit.ly/34cFZRK>.

conducted the most comprehensive study to date of the site's Experimental Field, an area of approximately 300 square kilometres where atmospheric tests were conducted. This provided a detailed understanding of the radioecological situation in this area, including the location of hot spots.³⁰³

KIRIBATI

Kiribati's declaration to the UN Secretary-General under Article 2 of the TPNW confirmed that 'there may be remnants of nuclear materials or other nuclear waste on and around Kiritimati Island which used to be owned, possessed or controlled by the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America during the pre-independence period'.³⁰⁴ More than 30 tests were conducted by the United Kingdom and the United States on Kiritimati (Christmas Island) and Malden Island that form part of Kiribati in the Pacific. In 2006, 300 former Christmas Island residents submitted a petition to the European Parliament, accusing the United Kingdom of knowingly exposing them to radioactive fallout. Declassified government documents from the time warned that radioactive fallout could cause 'very hazardous contamination', yet the islanders received insufficient warnings or protection.³⁰⁵ To date, there has never been a comprehensive, independent analysis of the environmental impact of nuclear testing in the region and the scale of contamination and its potential long-term impact remain in dispute.³⁰⁶

ALGERIA

Considerable atmospheric and underground testing (totalling 17 nuclear explosive devices) was also carried out in TPNW signatory state Algeria by colonial power France in 1960–66.³⁰⁷ Of the 13 underground nuclear tests that took place near In Ecker (Tan Afella mountain), four (Beryl, Amethyst, Ruby, Jade) were not completely contained or confined, resulting in the release of radioactive gases, aerosols and lava into the environment.³⁰⁸ At the two former French test sites in Algeria, while Algerian representatives have stated a desire to do more, virtually no additional environmental remediation has been performed at either site, apart from the erection of fences.³⁰⁹ However, as mentioned above, a Prime Ministerial Decree in May 2021 created

IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION

- The Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic has identified principles for implementing the TPNW's obligation to remediate the environment affected by nuclear weapons use and testing. These principles draw from humanitarian disarmament and international environmental law.
- To start with, affected states should develop a national plan and budget, appoint a government focal point, and adopt relevant laws and policies. They should also collect and disseminate information about the extent and nature of contamination and their capacity to address it. Such practical steps promote efficiency, coordination, and accountability.
- After assessing the situation and identifying which areas to prioritize, affected states parties should determine the remediation methods that will produce the greatest net benefits; contain, treat, or remove the contamination; and manage the contamination as long as risks remain.
- Throughout the process, they should conduct risk reduction education and limit access to contaminated sites, including by marking, fencing, and posting warning signs.
- Affected states parties should adopt a precautionary and iterative approach to environmental remediation. They should also uphold the principles of transparency, non-discrimination, and inclusivity.

Source: Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, 'Implementing Environmental Remediation under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', July 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3H4ubiZ>.

and mandated a National Agency for the rehabilitation of the former French nuclear test sites in the south of Algeria. The Agency is empowered to contract and manage rehabilitation works and to seek national and international assistance for these operations.³¹⁰

303 T. Kassenova, *Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb*, Stanford University Press, 2022, p. 265.

304 'FAI: 51/164/029', the Government of Kiribati, 19 February 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3JqcWt6>.

305 B. Alexis-Martin et al., 'Addressing the Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests: A Case Study of UK and US Test Programs at Kiritimati (Christmas) and Malden Islands, Republic of Kiribati', *Global Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February 2021), at: <https://bit.ly/3o2OTZ8>.

306 Ibid.

307 E. Bryant, 'Algeria: 60 years on, French nuclear tests leave bitter fallout', *Deutsche Welle*, 13 February 2020, at: <http://bit.ly/2yf7qtZ>. See also J. Magdaleno, 'Algerians suffering from French atomic legacy, 55 years after nuke tests', *Aljazeera*, 1 March 2015, at: <http://bit.ly/2UW3KFs>.

308 J.-M. Collin and P. Bouveret, 'Radioactivity Under the Sand: The Waste From French Nuclear Tests in Algeria. Analysis with regard to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', Heinrich Boll Stiftung, July 2020. See also BBC, 'France-Algeria relations: The lingering fallout from nuclear tests in the Sahara', 27 April 2021, at: <https://bbc.in/32de08B>.

309 L. M. Simohamed, Country Presentation: Algeria (PowerPoint slides), International Atomic Energy Agency, 17 October 2011, at: <https://bit.ly/3JErghD>.

310 Decree No. 21-243 of 31 May 2021 on the creation, organisation, and functioning of the National Agency for the Rehabilitation of the Former French Nuclear Test Sites in the South of Algeria.

ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN STATES NOT PARTY TO THE TPNW

Among states not party to the TPNW and which have areas on their territories where nuclear weapons were tested,³¹¹ the Marshall Islands is one of the most heavily affected by the grave humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear testing. In 1946–58, the United States conducted 67 tests in the Marshall Islands. The tests have particularly affected four atolls: Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utirik. The entire Bikini Atoll and parts of the Enewetak Atoll are still uninhabitable, and contamination has made it unsafe to hunt, fish, or grow food in other areas. As a result, large numbers of Marshallese remain displaced.

In an effort to contain radiation in the late 1970s, the United States dumped contaminated soil from Enewetak into an unlined pit and covered it with the concrete Runit Dome. Rising tides due to climate change now

threaten the integrity of the structure.³¹² A report by the US Department of Energy in 2020 concluded that the Runit Dome ‘is not in any immediate danger of collapse or failure’, but stated that the Department is ‘in the process of establishing a groundwater radiochemical analysis program that is designed to provide scientifically substantiated data that can be used to determine what, if any, effects the dome contents are having, or will have, on the surrounding environment now and in the future’.³¹³

Another example of environmental remediation took place in Maralinga, Australia. The United Kingdom first implemented clean-up projects in the 1960s and declared the site to be safe. New studies in the 1980s revealed that contamination was much worse than claimed and the Australian government then conducted its own clean-up in 1995–2000, with the United Kingdom covering half of the cost.³¹⁴ The quality of the second clean-up has also been called into doubt.³¹⁵

311 These include Australia, China, France (French Polynesia), India, Pakistan, the Marshall Islands, North Korea, Russia, and the United States.

312 See, e.g., S. Rust, ‘How the U.S. Betrayed the Marshall Islands, Kindling the Next Nuclear Disaster’, *Los Angeles Times*, 10 November 2019, at: <http://lat.ms/3pdm9f6>.

313 US Department of Energy, Report on the Status of the Runit Dome in the Marshall Islands, Report to Congress, 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3ugLDL5>, p. iii.

314 Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee (2003) ‘Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test Sites at Emu and Maralinga (Australia)’, at: <https://bit.ly/3HxY639>.

315 A. Parkinson, ‘Maralinga: The Clean-Up of a Nuclear Test Site’, *Medicine & Global Survival*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002), pp. 77–81, at: <https://bit.ly/33BgDgh>.

The obligation to **COOPERATE WITH AND ASSIST OTHER STATES PARTIES**



Article 7 of the TPNW provides a mechanism for states to work in close partnership on the implementation of the Treaty. This photo of diplomats from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ireland, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa was taken after the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017.
(Photo: Ambassador Juan Sandoval Mandiolea, Mexico's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York)

The TPNW's Article 7 spreads the burden of addressing the effects of nuclear-weapons use and testing across all states parties and places this humanitarian challenge on the agenda also of donor states that are not party to the Treaty. Such support, which contributes to saving lives, alleviating suffering, promoting human dignity, and protecting the environment, has for too long been inadequate.

Assistance and cooperation under the TPNW will enhance the ability of affected states parties to take meaningful ownership of their own situation, secure resources, and build capacity to assist victims and remediate the environment. States parties are not obligated to report on international cooperation and assistance under the TPNW, but the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor encourages them to submit voluntary reports to the Meetings of States Parties and Review Conferences.

Assistance can come in a variety of forms. For example, donor states parties can provide technical support in the form of medical, scientific, or environmental expertise; material support, such as health care or remediation equipment; or financial support to fund affected states' victim assistance and environmental remediation programmes. Given the range of types of assistance, all states should be in a position to provide some sort of support. This would also extend to the release of official information and documents regarding nuclear testing and fallout monitoring.

Significant evidence exists in other disarmament treaties of the effectiveness of an obligation to cooperate and assist. Comparable provisions in the APMBC and the CCM, for example, have generated extensive international assistance. In 2020, donor states provided US\$565 million to mine action. The funds have supported clearance of landmines and cluster munition remnants (which is analogous to environmental clean-up), risk education, victim assistance, and capacity building. The top five recipient states — Iraq, Lao PDR, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Croatia — received a combined total of US\$252.8 million for mine action in 2020.

STATES NOT PARTY

States not party to the TPNW, and particularly nuclear-armed states that have tested nuclear weapons on the territories of other states, can also contribute to the implementation of the Treaty's obligations to assist victims and remediate contaminated areas, as evidenced by the fact that the United States — which is not a state party to either the APMBC or the CCM — for many years has made significant contributions to the clearance of mines and cluster munitions under the corresponding positive obligations of those treaties. In 2020, the United States was the largest donor for mine action, followed

ARTICLE 7 – INTERPRETATION

- The obligations in the TPNW's Article 6 to assist victims and remediate the environment should be read in conjunction with Article 7 of the Treaty.
- Article 7(1) obligates each state party to the TPNW to cooperate with other states parties to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty and grants all states parties 'the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible'. In addition, under paragraph 3 of Article 7 each state party 'in a position to do so' is required to provide technical, material, and financial assistance to states parties affected by nuclear-weapon use or testing.
- Article 7(6) of the TPNW provides that any state party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices 'shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance' to affected states parties for victim assistance and environmental remediation. This responsibility is without prejudice to any other duty or obligation the state may have under international law. This provision was especially important to affected States during the drafting of the Treaty; they argued user and testing states should be legally as well as morally responsible for their actions.
- International and non-governmental organizations also have a role to play. As referenced in Article 7(5) of the TPNW, assistance may be provided through the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, civil society groups, or other organizations.
- While most of Article 7 is directed at supporting victim assistance and environmental remediation, assistance can, for example, also be provided for the development of national implementation legislation or destruction of nuclear-weapons stockpiles.

by the European Union (EU), Germany, Japan, and Norway. Nuclear-armed states in particular should also support affected states by releasing information like relevant medical records and other documents regarding their nuclear testing.

To help donor states determine how best to distribute support, states requesting international assistance should present their needs, national plans, and existing resources, and provide regular updates on their progress in implementation. Donor states should, in turn, commit to provide multi-year assistance packages and work closely with recipients to ensure support is used effectively and efficiently.

Communities affected by landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war, and small arms have benefited from a humanitarian sector dedicated to demining, victim

assistance, and risk reduction education. But there has been no comparable global architecture for addressing the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons. Responses have generally been limited to the national and even the local levels, with approaches (and support) differing considerably. The international community must therefore urgently strengthen its efforts to assist states and communities impacted by nuclear-weapons testing, by supporting research, education, organizations representing affected communities, and victim assistance and environmental remediation measures.

NEEDS ASSESSMENT

While each affected state party should urgently begin assessment and prioritization of its needs for victim

assistance and environmental remediation and prepare a national plan of action to address them, a key step for the international community should also be to implement a long-overdue global survey of the ongoing contamination caused by nuclear weapons and the associated needs for both environmental remediation and victim assistance. Drawing together such information would enable prioritization of available donor resources for the most affected areas and populations. If conducted in a manner that serves to empower and learn from affected communities, it would also create conditions for the humanitarian sector to finally start working with these communities in a systematic, comprehensive, and cost-effective way to address the harm resulting from nuclear-weapon testing.

The obligation to **PROMOTE UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY**



Malta's Ministry of Foreign Affairs marked the entry into force of the TPNW by arranging for a projection of the text 'Nuclear Weapons Now Illegal 22 Jan 2021' on the facade of the famous Fort St Angelo in its Grand Harbour. (Photo: MFEA Malta)

Implementation of the obligation under the TPNW to promote universal adherence to the Treaty was extremely impressive in its first effective year. All of the 59 states parties and all of the 30 signatories to the Treaty acted in 2021 to comply with this obligation. A large number of other supporters also encouraged other states to adhere to the TPNW.

These states promoted universal adherence by calling directly on other states to join, as well as indirectly by promoting the significance of the Treaty. They did so through a range of activities, including through powerful national and regional statements in the UN³¹⁶ and other multilateral forums;³¹⁷ public statements³¹⁸ and press releases;³¹⁹ and participation in public events and webinars.³²⁰ They also raised adherence to and engagement with the TPNW in meetings and consultations between states. One example is a bilateral meeting at political level in May 2021, where Mexico recognized and appreciated Switzerland's decision to participate in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW as an observer and expressed 'hope that in the near future Switzerland can also become a state party to the treaty'.³²¹ In addition, many politicians and diplomats will have encouraged adherence to the TPNW in closed meetings and in private conversations with representatives of other states.

A total of 70 states — both states parties, signatories, and other supporters — co-sponsored the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which, as in previous years, called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³²²

ARTICLE 12 – INTERPRETATION

- This provision obligates each state party to encourage states not party to sign, ratify, or accede to the TPNW, 'with the goal of universal adherence'.
- The manner and frequency of the actions to be taken are not set out in the provision and are therefore left to the discretion of the state party. That said, any state party that sought to discourage adherence to the TPNW by a state not party would be in violation of this obligation.

Certain states parties have started to use the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process (review under the auspices of the Human Rights Council of the human rights records of all UN member states) to promote universalization of the TPNW. This is based on the view expressed by the UN Human Rights Committee in 2018 that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 'is incompatible with respect for the right to life'.³²³ For instance, Panama and Honduras in 2021 submitted recommendations that Oman ratify or accede to the TPNW.³²⁴

Many ministers, ambassadors, and other diplomats also spoke about the significance of the TPNW in media interviews³²⁵ or published op-eds,³²⁶ and social media were widely used to promote the Treaty, via government and personal accounts. Several states organized or participated in celebrations on the occasion of the entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021.^{327, 328}

Preparations for the First Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in 2022, which will be an important arena for

316 See, particularly, a large number of the statements in First Committee of the UN General Assembly in 2021, which are collected by Reaching Critical Will at: <https://bit.ly/3498nnR>, and the majority of the statements delivered during the UN General Assembly's High-Level plenary meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, at: <https://bit.ly/34QBcpF>.

317 See, e.g., a statement by South Africa at the opening session of the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty, 21 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/33SUK5N>.

318 See, e.g., 'Statement by the Government of Maldives on the Occasion of the entry into force of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', at: <https://bit.ly/3sDtZBl>.

319 See, e.g., a press release issued by Uruguay's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3rQ3xUr>.

320 See, e.g., a webinar on 21 October 2021 hosted by ICAN, Mayors for Peace, and Nuclear Free Local Authorities, where representatives from the Holy See, Ireland, and Malta participated, at: <https://bit.ly/3u5fU11>. See also the Summer School on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation for young diplomats from Latin America and the Caribbean, where representatives from Austria, Costa Rica, and Mexico participated, at: <https://bit.ly/3KMunFG>.

321 See: Comunicado No. 247, Mexico's government website, at: <https://bit.ly/3rWEkb9>.

322 The text of the draft resolution submitted (A/C.1/76/L.17) and final list of co-sponsors can be found in the Report of the First Committee, at: <https://undocs.org/en/A/76/444>.

323 Human Rights Committee, 'General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life', 30 October 2018, at: <https://bit.ly/3IDLXtJ>.

324 Human Rights Council, Forty-seventh session 21 June–9 July 2021, Agenda item 6: 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Oman', at: <https://bit.ly/3H8ANG4>.

325 See, e.g., J. Letman, 'Support for nuclear ban treaty is rising. Nuclear nations are on the defensive', *Truthout*, 24 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/35sHAU3>; L. Blagonravova, 'Nuclear threat 'as realistic as ever', says Kazakhstan's UN Ambassador', *UN News*, 28 August 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3KMjIjH>; and S. Chase, 'New nuclear arms race is upon us, and architect of weapons ban treaty warns', *The Globe and Mail*, 29 November 2021, at: <https://tgam.ca/3IA9b3K>.

326 See, e.g., H. Lagos Koller, 'The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty (TPNW): Wishful daydream or historic milestone?', *Modern Diplomacy*, 1 December 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3G2Wehw>.

327 See, e.g., <https://bit.ly/3gZHcif>.

328 See, e.g., Tweet with photos from Malta's mission to the UN in Geneva, at: <https://bit.ly/3fWNcbc>.

universalization, institutionalization, and implementation of the TPNW, formed part of states' efforts to promote the TPNW throughout the year. For example, Thailand hosted consultations in New York between states parties from Asia, 'prepping for fruitful dialogue' at the Meeting.³²⁹ New Zealand hosted a virtual roundtable on 7 December 2021 with Pacific island states, including states that have not yet adhered to the TPNW, to prepare for the Meeting.³³⁰ As the host of the First Meeting of States Parties, Austria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its President-Designate for the Meeting, Alexander Kmentt, were of course particularly active in 2021. The many outreach activities undertaken by Ambassador Kmentt included a

visit to Canada, where among other activities he gave a talk about the TPNW at the University of Ottawa.³³¹

In reviewing the multitude of activities and statements in 2021 by the states supportive of the TPNW, it is clear that a great many of them are highly committed to driving nuclear disarmament and in so doing making the most of the opportunities presented by the new Treaty. Some examples of their compelling messages are included below. Documented examples of statements and activities by states to encourage universality of the TPNW, which are not exhaustive, can also be found in their respective state profiles in this report.



South Africa's Ambassador Mathu Joyini speaking on 4 October 2021 in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly.

“The total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction remains one of South Africa's key foreign policy priorities. We therefore welcome the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the start of its implementation, including the convening of its First Meeting of States Parties. ... We commit ourselves to tirelessly work towards its implementation and universalization and encourage all States that have not done so, to ratify the Treaty without further delay.



Malta's Foreign Minister Evarist Bartolo in video message to an event in the UN on the occasion of the entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021.

“In the middle of a pandemic and while facing a climate emergency, it is surprising that instead of mobilizing our resources to save the planet, countries are still investing in their nuclear arsenals. This is not an abstract, pacifist principle and wishful thinking. It is our own survival. ... We stand as states parties to the [TPNW], keeping in mind that no state, big or small, possessing nuclear capabilities or not, is immune from the array of humanitarian consequences that would transcend national borders if these weapons were to be deployed again. No state is immune to the climate disruption, agricultural and economic collapse, mass human displacement, and famine that would inevitably follow even a so called limited nuclear war. ... The entry into force of this Treaty comes as a victory for the preservation of international humanitarian law. ... Ensuring the success of the Treaty is now our collective responsibility. It is our duty to promote the benefits of such a Treaty, help fight misconceptions about it, and ensure that its obligations are adhered to. Moving forward, the entry into force of the Treaty has the potential to stimulate further action on disarmament and take us closer to a world without nuclear weapons.



The Foreign Minister of Jamaica Kamina Johnson Smith in a virtual statement on 28 September 2021 during the UN General Assembly.

“We must, through education, challenge the view that the possession of nuclear weapons is a viable security strategy. We must cease the manufacturing and modernisation of nuclear weapons, destroy existing stockpiles and universalise the TPNW, the NPT and the CTBT.

³²⁹ See: Tweet by Thailand's Mission to the UN in New York on 25 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3tZoOx0>.

³³⁰ Chair's Statement, at: <https://bit.ly/3r3ETR8>.

³³¹ See: <https://bit.ly/3fXbstG>.

STATE PROFILES

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor prepares state profiles for each of the 197 states that can become party to global treaties for which the UN Secretary-General is the depositary. The state profiles are categorized according to each state's position on the TPNW, with separate sections for states parties, signatories, other supporters, undecided states, and opposed states. Within each of the five categories, the state profiles are presented in alphabetical order.

The state profiles contain summary data on the status of the 197 states in relation to the TPNW as well as other treaties and regimes relating to weapons of mass destruction, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) treaties, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT), Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with the IAEA, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as well as membership in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). They also present an overview of each state's compliance (for states parties and signatories) or compatibility (for states not party) with the prohibitions of the TPNW, information on latest developments, and relevant further information.

The data in the state profiles are drawn from NPA's Disarmament Treaty Database, which is a continuation of a database project first initiated in 2012 by the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI). In addition to data from the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor's own analysis and research, the state profiles bring together information from a wide range of open sources, including the UN Treaty Collection,³³² the website of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs,³³³ the Dag Hammarskjöld Library,³³⁴ the IAEA's status list,³³⁵ ICAN's state profiles,³³⁶ the International Panel on Fissile Materials,³³⁷ the Missile Threat website,³³⁸ and Reaching Critical Will's monitoring of disarmament forums.³³⁹

The state profiles of the nuclear-armed states also contain information about their nuclear-weapons systems under development, production and acquisition in 2021, and their nuclear-weapons arsenals at the beginning of 2022. The arrows refer to general trends

in the stockpiles over the last few years. Red upwards arrows indicate that the stockpile is increasing, and green downward arrows that they are decreasing. This information is compiled for the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor by Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda from country-specific editions of the Federation of American Scientists' 'Nuclear Notebook' series, which is published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and accessible via the Federation of American Scientists' website.³⁴⁰ Additional details and in-depth citations for each data point can be found in those publications. In certain cases, specific citations have been added below.

The availability of reliable information on the status of the nuclear arsenals and capabilities of the nuclear-armed states varies considerably. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have declared some information. Russia refuses to publicly disclose the detailed breakdown of its nuclear forces, even though it shares its strategic forces information with the United States. China releases little information about force numbers or future development plans. The governments of India and Pakistan make statements about some of their missile tests but provide no information about the status or size of their arsenals. North Korea has acknowledged conducting nuclear weapon and missile tests but provides no information about the size of its nuclear arsenal. Israel has a long-standing policy of not commenting on its nuclear arsenal.

To the extent known, all information about nuclear arsenals and capabilities is current and accurate as of January 2022, and all other data in the state profiles as of 31 December 2021.

The state profiles are also available and continuously updated on www.banmonitor.org, which also has a report-back function. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor welcomes all information that can assist us in updating the state profiles.

332 At: <http://bit.ly/2DjbN8l>.

333 At: <https://bit.ly/33r0r1e>.

334 At: <https://research.un.org/en>.

335 At: <https://bit.ly/3dFm8L0>.

336 At: <https://bit.ly/34lgU1p>.

337 At: <https://bit.ly/3Ju8vgV>.

338 At: <https://bit.ly/3ghd6ou>.

339 At: <https://bit.ly/3gApdlc>.

340 At: <https://bit.ly/34litT7>.

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Antigua and Barbuda



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

25 Nov 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Feb 2021

Antigua and Barbuda was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

Antigua and Barbuda associated itself with a statement by CARICOM in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'Although CARICOM is located in a nuclear free zone, we are not immune from the consequences of the most dangerous weapons on earth. In this regard we welcome the TPNW's entry into force of January of 2021 and view this as an extraordinary achievement. CARICOM looks forward to engage constructively in the first meeting of state parties'.²

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Antigua and Barbuda noted that 'nuclear weapons are not deterrents, but cultivate a false sense of security, with consequences that will fall on all of us. It is disingenuous to promote multilateralism and international peace and security while stockpiling tools of mass destruction'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Antigua and Barbuda should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Antigua and Barbuda should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tmU0oS>

² <https://bit.ly/3tuBoU1>

³ <https://bit.ly/3fiXxgA>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021





(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

			
SIGNATURE	DEPOSIT WITH UNSG	ENTRY INTO FORCE	DECLARATION
20 Sep 2017	8 May 2018 (Ratification)	22 Jan 2021	Received 9 Feb 2021

Austria is hosting the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022. Austria was one of the states that played a leading role in bringing about the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and ensuring the ultimate success of the negotiations in 2017.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Austria said: ‘The clear majority of the world has rejected the dangerous illusion of security through nuclear deterrence by adopting the TPNW. Following the Treaty’s entry into force this year [2021], we look forward to the First Meeting of States Parties in Vienna [...], where we aim to strengthen and foster engagement with the TPNW’s important humanitarian and security arguments. We invite all States to sign and ratify the Treaty and join the meeting as States parties or observers.’¹

Also in the First Committee, Austria said: ‘The entry into force of the TPNW constitutes an urgently needed strengthening of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime – a regime that is built through mutually reinforcing instruments. Moreover, the TPNW strengthens the taboo against nuclear weapons, irrespective of who possesses them.’²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Austria should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Austria should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	21%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3lJmnUM>

² <https://bit.ly/3hAHjRP>



Bangladesh



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

26 Sep 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 21 Feb 2021

Bangladesh was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Bangladesh said that its 'commitment to general and complete disarmament is total and unyielding. It is our constitutional obligation and remains a fundamental tenet for our peace and foreign policy objectives. Guided by these principles Bangladesh continues to remain at the forefront in assuming higher obligations under all major multilateral disarmament treaties. It falls from that same conviction that we ratified the TPNW. We welcome the coming into force of the treaty and would like to see as a matter of priority its full implementation by all, including the nuclear-weapon possessing states.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bangladesh should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Bangladesh should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/35mNQnq>

² <https://bit.ly/35mNYwo>



Belize



SIGNATURE

6 Feb 2020



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

19 May 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 22 Feb 2021

Belize was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

Belize associated itself with a statement by CARICOM in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'Although CARICOM is located in a nuclear free zone, we are not immune from the consequences of the most dangerous weapons on earth. In this regard we welcome the TPNW's entry into force of January of 2021 and view this as an extraordinary achievement. CARICOM looks forward to engage constructively in the first meeting of state parties'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Belize should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Belize should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Belize should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3huV58z>

² <https://bit.ly/3tuBoU1>



Benin



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

11 Dec 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

11 Mar 2021



DECLARATION

Received 9 Apr 2021

Benin was the first state to ratify the TPNW after the Treaty reached the required 50 ratifications or accessions to enter into force, depositing its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General on 11 December 2020. It was also the first francophone African state to ratify the Treaty.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Benin associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Benin should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Benin should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3KbrH3y>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021





(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

			
SIGNATURE	DEPOSIT WITH UNSG	ENTRY INTO FORCE	DECLARATION
16 Apr 2018	6 Aug 2019 (Ratification)	22 Jan 2021	Received 18 Feb 2021

Bolivia was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called ‘upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.¹

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Bolivia said: ‘Nuclear disarmament is not only an international legal obligation. It is a moral imperative. We believe that it is neither defensible nor sustainable that some States argue that nuclear weapons are an indispensable guarantor, legitimate and timeless protection of its own safety and that of its allies. As long as such weapons exist, it is almost inconceivable that one day they will not be used, either by accident, miscalculation or deliberately. And that would be catastrophic. There is no doubt, as long as a single State has nuclear weapons, there will be others who want to have them. For this reason, we value and highlight the entry into force of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which, being a legally binding international agreement, gives us hope that one day nuclear weapons will be eliminated in their entirety.’²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bolivia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Bolivia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Bolivia should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2019)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3CeSyJ5>

² <https://bit.ly/3pwUx6u>



Botswana



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

15 Jul 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 8 Feb 2021

Botswana was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Defence Minister of Botswana, Thomas Kagiso Mmusi, described the TPNW as 'a necessary foundation as well as a stimulus for future further steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons'.²

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Botswana said: 'Botswana welcomes the entry into force of the TPNW, which is a clear commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons and to multilateral disarmament. We further encourage those member states who have not yet signed and ratified to do so without further delay'.³

Botswana ratified the TPNW on the 11th anniversary of the establishment of the African NWFZ. In a statement on the occasion, Botswana called on 'all other peace-loving nations to collectively join hands and contribute to this noble endeavor for the prohibition of all nuclear weapons'.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Botswana should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Botswana should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tpbTDf>

² <https://bit.ly/3trsciS>

³ <https://bit.ly/3hwa16b>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/2VKo39C>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	25%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Cambodia



SIGNATURE

9 Jan 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

22 Jan 2021 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Apr 2021



DECLARATION

Received 12 May 2021

Cambodia ratified the TPNW on 22 January 2021, the day that the Treaty as a whole entered into force. The National Assembly and Senate had unanimously approved the ratification in November 2020.

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Minister Attached to the Prime Minister, Ouch Borith, said that Cambodia 'strongly support[s] the universalisation of this instrument to achieve the ultimate objective of a nuclear-weapons-free world and look[s] forward to the First Meeting of States Parties'.¹ In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Cambodia again welcomed the TPNW's entry into force, adding: 'Through this first legally binding international agreement, we have made substantial progress toward our common objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.' It said that Cambodia's ratification of the TPNW 'confirms the country's commitment to the nuclear disarmament endeavour'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cambodia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cambodia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	25%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tsjPUB>
² <https://bit.ly/3lFYBZM>
³ <https://bit.ly/3Mku6dR>



Chile



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

23 Sep 2021 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Dec 2021



DECLARATION

Received 23 Sep 2021

In a statement to the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Chile said that, by ratifying the TPNW, it 'wishes to support the multilateral system and order in the fight against the possession of this type of weapon'.¹

Chile was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.² On 22 February 2021, in the Conference on Disarmament, Chile described the TPNW's entry into force as 'one of the most important milestones on our path towards global and complete disarmament'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Chile should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Chile should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	14%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tsjPUB>

² <https://bit.ly/3lFYBZM>

³ <https://bit.ly/3Mku6dR>



Comoros



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

19 Feb 2021 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

20 May 2021



DECLARATION

Received 4 May 2021

Comoros ratified the TPNW and the CTBT on the same day, 19 February 2021, demonstrating how the TPNW complements and promotes the CTBT.

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Comoros said: 'Each new signature and ratification of this important legal instrument strengthens the global norm against the possession of nuclear weapons, and brings us closer to a world free from the nuclear weapons.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Comoros should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Comoros should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Comoros should adhere to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFEZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3szNHPk>



Cook Islands



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

4 Sep 2018 (Accession)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 4 Sep 2018

Cook Islands participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.¹

Cook Islands' High Commissioner Elizabeth Wright-Koteka participated in a celebration of the TPNW's entry into force in Wellington and online on 21 January 2021.² Cook Islands was the first state party to comply with the obligation to submit the declaration required by the Treaty's Article 2.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cook Islands should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cook Islands should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Cook Islands should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes*
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes*
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)*
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

* Through territorial application by New Zealand

1 <https://bit.ly/3tnsVSv>

2 <https://bit.ly/3tskdT3>



Costa Rica



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

5 Jul 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 22 Jan 2021

Costa Rica was one of the states that played a leading role in bringing about the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, and Costa Rica's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez, chaired the negotiations in 2017 that resulted in the adoption of the TPNW.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Costa Rica said that the TPNW 'shows us some ways in which it is possible to create a more inclusive and secure future for all'. It added that 'that future will only be possible when the nuclear-weapon states stop multiplying and modernising their nuclear arsenals, when the reductions are verifiable, transparent and carried out with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency'.¹

Costa Rica was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Costa Rica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Costa Rica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	75%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/36LtKg4>

² <https://bit.ly/3HBMv2f>



Cuba



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

30 Jan 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 26 Feb 2021 (Late)

Cuba was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called ‘upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.¹

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Minister of Cuba, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, said: ‘We call for the universalisation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which clearly states not only the inhumane, immoral and ethically indefensible character of these weapons, but also their illegal nature. Cuba takes pride in having been the fifth State to ratify it; of being part of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area of the planet and belonging to the first region of the world to proclaim itself as a zone of peace.’²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cuba should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cuba should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	43%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/35huF7S>

² <https://bit.ly/3hDLufr>



Dominica



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

18 Oct 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 26 Apr 2021 (Late)

Dominica is one of the states that did not take part in the adoption of the TPNW in 2017 but that have joined the Treaty as a state party.

Dominica associated itself with a statement by CARICOM in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'CARICOM remains convinced that it is only through the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction that international peace and security can be guaranteed, and that their continued existence, accumulation and modernization actually increases the threat level to our collective security. As part of a region, which established the first Nuclear Weapons Free Zone pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, CARICOM was pleased to join the international community in welcoming the entry into force of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons earlier this year. CARICOM looks forward to the convening of the First Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW in 2022 and hopes that reassuring platitudes of responsible conduct on the part of nuclear weapons states will be matched by commitments of bold and decisive action in the right direction.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Dominica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Dominica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Dominica should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol. Dominica should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3KdahTQ>



Ecuador



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

25 Sep 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Feb 2021

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Minister of Ecuador, Mauricio Montalvo, said that the TPNW's entry into force was 'undoubtedly a victory for humanity', and he pledged to continue promoting its universalization.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Ecuador said: 'Ecuador celebrates the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and invites all States to sign and ratify it. We support the ongoing process towards the First Meeting of States Parties'.²

Ecuador was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ecuador should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Ecuador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C8Uind>

² <https://bit.ly/3IO06Da>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>



El Salvador



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

30 Jan 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 1 Feb 2021

El Salvador was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.'¹

El Salvador associated itself with a declaration issued by OPANAL on the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2021. In this statement, the 33 member states of OPANAL reiterated 'the call upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defence doctrines', recalled 'their participation in the adoption and recent entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,' and considered 'that, with the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, for the first time joins the path towards the total elimination of those weapons of mass destruction, in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner and within clearly established time frame, that have marked the [Treaty of Tlatelolco] and the [NPT].' The statement also noted that the TPNW, Treaty of Tlatelolco, NPT and CTBT, once in force, 'are not mere declarations of intention, since they are a suitable legal basis for the process aimed at completely eliminating all nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner forever.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- El Salvador should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- El Salvador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/3lCtbn3>


Fiji

SIGNATURE
20 Sep 2017

DEPOSIT WITH UNSG
7 Jul 2020 (Ratification)

ENTRY INTO FORCE
22 Jan 2021

DECLARATION
Received 15 Feb 2021

Fiji participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.¹

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Prime Minister of Fiji, Frank Bainimarama, said: 'Fiji signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) because it was the right thing to do, for ourselves, our communities, and for the global family. Fiji urges all Member States to join and ratify the new TPNW, to free the world of nuclear weapons and make our world safer for today and for future generations.'²

When the TPNW entered into force on 22 January 2021, Bainimarama stated: 'We will never forget the painful past of nuclear testing in the Pacific. We are now one step closer to ridding the world of the scourge of these senseless weapons once and for all.'³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Fiji should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Fiji should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Fiji should upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3Mh5JO7>

² <https://bit.ly/3psXpBq>

³ <https://bit.ly/3pspDvW>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021





(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

			
SIGNATURE	DEPOSIT WITH UNSG	ENTRY INTO FORCE	DECLARATION
20 Sep 2017	26 Sep 2018 (Ratification)	22 Jan 2021	Received 15 Mar 2021 (Late)

In the 2021 UN General Assembly, Gambia associated itself with a statement in the First Committee by the African Group, which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons.'

The statement continued: 'It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

Speaking at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Gambia called upon 'the international community to intensify its efforts towards convincing the nuclear-weapons states not to abandon their commitments, especially as they concern non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Gambia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Gambia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- The Gambia should ratify the CTBT.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sBNjF>

² <https://bit.ly/3C9UqTj>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	25%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Guinea-Bissau



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

15 Dec 2021 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

15 Mar 2022



DECLARATION

Deadline 14 Apr 2022

On the occasion of Guinea-Bissau's deposit of its instrument of ratification of the TPNW with the UN Secretary-General on 15 December 2021, the Foreign Minister of Guinea-Bissau, Suzi Barbosa, said: 'The ratification of the [TPNW] constitutes the last and important step towards the unequivocal affirmation of Guinea-Bissau's commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons.'¹

Guinea-Bissau was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

In the 2021 UN General Assembly, Guinea-Bissau associated itself with a statement in the First Committee by the African Group, which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, The TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Guinea-Bissau should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Guinea-Bissau should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Guinea-Bissau should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA by its deadline under the TPNW's Article 3(2), which is 15 September 2023. It should also bring into force its Additional Protocol.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3szbuPn>
² <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>
³ <https://bit.ly/3sBNjjF>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021





(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	No (Signed 2013)
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	15 Sep 2023
Small Quantities Protocol	No (Signed 2013)
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2013)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

			
SIGNATURE	DEPOSIT WITH UNSG	ENTRY INTO FORCE	DECLARATION
20 Sep 2017	20 Sep 2017 (Ratification)	22 Jan 2021	Received 21 Feb 2021

Guyana was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called ‘upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.¹

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the President of Guyana, Mohamed Irfaan Ali, said: ‘The entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on 22 January [2021] was a watershed moment for the disarmament agenda. There is now a legally binding international agreement that comprehensively prohibits the development, testing, manufacturing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. We have now closed the legal gap which previously existed in the international disarmament regime. Guyana is proud to have contributed to this historic achievement. While the entry into force of the TPNW is a step in the right direction, its intended legal effect is undermined when one considers that no nuclear-weapon state has signed, let alone ratified, the Treaty.’²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Guyana should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Guyana should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Guyana should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/3HDJVZH>



Holy See



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

20 Sep 2017 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 15 Feb 2021

The Holy See and Pope Francis have on multiple occasions expressed grave concern over the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons, and condemned the possession of nuclear weapons.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, the Holy See welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW as a loud and clear reaffirmation of 'the illegality of these immoral weapons of war'. It added: 'The movement that led to the drafting of the Treaty is itself encouraging and surely represents the aspiration of millions of men and women everywhere for a world free of nuclear weapons. The large number of States that voted in 2017 to adopt the Treaty, as well as the growing number of States that have ratified it, is a positive indicator that one day nuclear weapons will at last be confined to the history books.'¹

Also in the First Committee, the Holy See said that the TPNW 'has established a legal prohibition on nuclear weapon possession, and will in due course be a basis for the nuclear-weapon-possessing states to become parties upon eliminating their programs. [...] For now, the current parties to the Treaty can work to develop the procedures that will be necessary for the verification authority or authorities established by the Treaty reliably to assure that the relevant nuclear weapons programs have indeed been eliminated.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Holy See should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Holy See should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3K7hpkM>

² <https://bit.ly/3CaaV1D>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	22%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Honduras



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

24 Oct 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 15 Mar 2021 (Late)

In the 2021 Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council, Honduras made recommendations to a number of states that they sign and ratify the TPNW. Honduras was the 50th state to deposit its instrument of ratification of the TPNW with the UN Secretary-General, ensuring the Treaty's entry into force.

In a statement to the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Honduras welcomed the TPNW's entry into force as a 'historic moment', and said that the task now is to universalise the Treaty 'in pursuit of peace and security for all humanity and the sustainability of the planet'.¹

Honduras was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Honduras should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Honduras should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	75%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sz48vh>

² <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>



Ireland



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

6 Aug 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 22 Jan 2021

Ireland was one of the states that played a leading role in bringing about the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and ensuring the ultimate success of the negotiations in 2017.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Ireland said: 'A vision of a more peaceful world, underpinned by the political will to achieve it, led Ireland and a large majority of States to adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Ireland is proud of its role in the negotiation of the Treaty, which entered into force in January this year. We look forward to the First Meeting of States Parties, which will take place in Vienna in March next year, where States Parties will set out concrete plans for the full implementation of the Treaty's humanitarian-centred objectives. The Treaty has already re-energised debate on nuclear disarmament, and for many States acts as a practical expression of their commitment to implement Article VI of the NPT. The Meeting of States Parties is open to all states to attend as observers and Ireland reiterates that states not party to the Treaty are most welcome to join as observers in Vienna; we encourage all shades of opinion to participate and engage in constructive discussion.'¹

Ireland was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ireland should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Ireland should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3HCxVrx>

² <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Jamaica



SIGNATURE

8 Dec 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

23 Oct 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Feb 2021

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Minister of Jamaica, Kamina Johnson Smith, said: "We must, [...] through education, challenge the view that the possession of nuclear weapons is a viable security strategy. We must cease the manufacturing and modernisation of nuclear weapons, destroy existing stockpiles and universalise the TPNW, the NPT and the CTBT."

Johnson Smith also said: 'Jamaica was honoured to be the 48th ratifying state to bring the treaty across the line to meet the 50th State requirement, and we look forward to working in earnest at the First Meeting of State Parties scheduled for March 2022, to ensure the full and effective implementation of the treaty.'¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Jamaica welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW, and said: 'Although there is evidence that the support for the Treaty is rising, Jamaica remains concerned with the strong opposition to the Treaty. Notwithstanding, we call on all member states that have neither signed nor ratified the agreement to consider doing so as their action would signify their commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and to regional and international peace and security.'²

Jamaica was also one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Jamaica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Jamaica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tnee1M>

² <https://bit.ly/3hvtx2D>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Kazakhstan



SIGNATURE

2 Mar 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

29 Aug 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Feb 2021

Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union but renounced them and has since advocated for nuclear disarmament. Together with Kiribati, Kazakhstan is serving as co-facilitator on Articles 6 and 7 for the TPNW's First Meeting of States Parties in 2022. In that role, they have produced working papers and held consultations with states, international organizations, and civil society, with the goal of generating recommendations to advance the Treaty's implementation that would be included in the Meeting's outcome documents.

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW as a 'positive development', and noted: 'Circumstances and strategic thinking can and do change rapidly – nuclear weapons are a political choice.'¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Kazakhstan said: 'The obvious lack of progress in disarmament resulted in the recent adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which should complement the [Non-Proliferation Treaty].'²

Kazakhstan was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kazakhstan should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Kazakhstan should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures, including by requesting that Russia continue to refrain from all testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Sary Shagan.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3hvlSww>

² <https://bit.ly/3lBxA9v>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	1,000–10,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Kiribati



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

26 Sep 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 20 Feb 2021

Together with Kazakhstan, Kiribati is serving as co-facilitator on the TPNW's Articles 6 and 7 for the Treaty's First Meeting of States Parties in 2022. In that role, Kazakhstan and Kiribati have produced working papers and held consultations with states, international organizations, and civil society, with the goal of generating recommendations to advance the Treaty's implementation that would be included in the Meeting's outcome documents.

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the President of Kiribati, Taneti Maamau, encouraged states parties to the TPNW to adopt 'a robust action plan that enumerates practical steps for victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance' at the First Meeting of States Parties in 2022. He added that his government is prepared 'to host a regional centre of learning for the TPNW'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Kiribati said: 'Kiribati is proud to have signed and ratified the TPNW, as we believe that the TPNW not only brings comfort to the victims of past nuclear weapon tests, but it also reignites a glimpse of hope for a more peaceful, loving, caring and trustful world in the future. We [...] call upon all states to sign and ratify the TPNW'.²

Kiribati was also one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date',³ and participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kiribati should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Kiribati should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Kiribati should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol. Kiribati should also adhere to the BWC.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vwVQGH>
³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/3swUfhL>
⁴ <https://bit.ly/3Mh5JO7>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2004)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Lao People's Democratic Republic



SIGNATURE

21 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

26 Sep 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 2 Feb 2021

Lao PDR was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Lao PDR said that it 'welcomes the entry into force of a historic agreement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons', describing it as 'a significant milestone to further strengthen the global norms against nuclear weapons'. It added that it is 'looking forward to continuing its constructive engagement in the forthcoming First Meeting of State Parties to the [TPNW]'.²

In another statement in the First Committee, Lao PDR said that 'we should increase our efforts for raising public awareness and promoting education on the danger of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to help realising the Treaty's objective'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lao PDR should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Lao PDR should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Lao PDR should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/3pvUNT6>

³ <https://bit.ly/3HCwLff>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2014)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Lesotho



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

6 Jun 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 18 Feb 2021

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Minister of Lesotho, Matšepo Ramakoa, hailed the TPNW's entry into force as an 'important milestone' and 'the pinnacle of worldwide movement to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons'.¹

Speaking in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Lesotho said: 'The disarmament and international security landscape has seen some progress recently with the ratification and subsequent entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). However, there is still more that needs to be done particularly by nuclear weapon states in the area of nuclear disarmament.'²

Lesotho was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lesotho should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Lesotho should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	75%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3pyoF1f>

² <https://bit.ly/3HC2s8D>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>



Malaysia



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

30 Sep 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 17 Feb 2021

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Saifuddin Abdullah, welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW and said that the Treaty 'further strengthens the global norms that nuclear weapons are unacceptable'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Malaysia pledged to 'continue its constructive engagement' in the lead-up to the First Meeting of States Parties in 2022.² It also called 'on all States to become Party to the TPNW as a manifestation of their commitment towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and, more importantly, for a safer and secure world'.³

Malaysia was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Malaysia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Malaysia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Malaysia should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	40%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2005)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3v0e4Dx>

² <https://bit.ly/3K1ArZU>

³ <https://bit.ly/35D2vUt>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>



Maldives



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

26 Sep 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 22 Feb 2021

The Government of Maldives issued a statement on the occasion of the TPNW's entry into force on 22 January 2021, describing the Treaty as 'a clear manifestation of the importance attached by the international community to find common solutions'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Maldives urged 'those states who have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible'.²

Maldives was also one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Maldives should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Maldives should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- The Maldives should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote*

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

* After the vote on the TPNW on 7 July 2017, the Maldives informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour (A/72/206, note 2)

1 <https://bit.ly/3sALJhH>

2 <https://bit.ly/3Ka3ZEz>

3 <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>



Malta



SIGNATURE

25 Aug 2020



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

21 Sep 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 27 Jan 2021

The Foreign Minister of Malta, Evarist Bartolo, said in the Conference on Disarmament on 22 February 2021 that the TPNW has 'strengthened the global norm against the worst weapons of mass destruction', and it is 'our duty to promote the benefits of such [a] treaty, help fight misconceptions about it, and ensure that its obligations are adhered to'.¹

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Minister Bartolo said: 'Malta was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. As this Treaty has now entered into force, we urge all States to accede to this important Treaty, which would send a strong political signal against the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons. We hope that increased universalisation of this important Treaty will create the necessary momentum to embark on serious disarmament talks which have been stalled for too long.'²

The Foreign Minister participated in a webinar hosted by ICAN, Mayors for Peace, and Nuclear Free Local Authorities on 21 October to talk about the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW and strategy to encourage more states to support the Treaty.³

Malta was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Malta should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Malta should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3lDUYU4>

² <https://bit.ly/3sALsvb>

³ <https://bit.ly/3hzVITQ>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021





(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

			
SIGNATURE	DEPOSIT WITH UNSG	ENTRY INTO FORCE	DECLARATION
20 Sep 2017	16 Jan 2018 (Ratification)	22 Jan 2021	Received 22 Jan 2021

Mexico was one of the states that played a leading role in bringing about the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and ensuring the ultimate success of the negotiations in 2017.

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Secretary of Mexico, Marcelo Ebrard, hailed the TPNW's entry into force as a 'milestone' and a 'special moment in the history of the United Nations'. He called upon all states that have not yet done so to join the TPNW and 'to welcome this development that contributes to a safer and more peaceful world'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Mexico said that the entry into force of the TPNW 'has strengthened the norm that stigmatises a type of weapon that is inherently immoral'.²

Mexico was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mexico should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Mexico should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	38%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vCrB0C>

² <https://bit.ly/35EfXYe>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>



Mongolia



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

10 Dec 2021 (Accession)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

10 Mar 2022



DECLARATION

Deadline 9 Apr 2022

Introducing the law on Mongolia's accession to the TPNW, which was adopted by the parliament on 22 October 2021, Battsetseg Batmunkh, the Foreign Minister of Mongolia, said that joining the TPNW would strengthen Mongolia's position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and 'meet the fundamental interests of national security'.¹

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Mongolia said: 'The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is instrumental in achieving the objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons continue to pose a serious threat to humanity, thus the Treaty's entry into force in January 2021 set a milestone in the international efforts in banning these disastrous weapons.'²

Mongolia was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mongolia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Mongolia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Mongolia should upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA.

¹ <https://bit.ly/36WyOOW>

² <https://bit.ly/35lqktW>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (unilateral)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Namibia



SIGNATURE

8 Dec 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

20 Mar 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 21 Feb 2021

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Namibia said: 'We are pleased that [the TPNW] entered into force in January this year, as we consider it an ethical and moral imperative in the quest to advance international law and a big leap towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.'¹

Namibia was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

Namibia also associated itself with a statement by the African Group in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, The TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Namibia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Namibia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Namibia should upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA. Namibia should also adhere to the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	20%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3K53awl>

² <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

³ <https://bit.ly/3sBNjF>



Nauru



SIGNATURE

22 Nov 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

23 Oct 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Jan 2021

Nauru was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In a statement on the occasion of its ratification of the TPNW on 23 October 2020, Nauru said: 'In line with our national position which is to never acquire nuclear weapons, the Republic of Nauru supports and recognizes the important role the treaty plays in achieving its goal towards total elimination of nuclear weapons. The continued existence of nuclear weapons and the prospect of use or threat of use of such weapons continue to pose danger to humanity; therefore we reiterate our call to other countries to complete all steps for treaty ratification as soon possible.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nauru should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nauru should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Nauru should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material





Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/2LdXTtR>



New Zealand

			
SIGNATURE	DEPOSIT WITH UNSG	ENTRY INTO FORCE	DECLARATION
20 Sep 2017	31 Jul 2018 (Ratification)	22 Jan 2021	Received 18 Jan 2021

New Zealand was one of the states that played a leading role in bringing about the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and ensuring the ultimate success of the negotiations in 2017.

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Disarmament and Arms Control Minister of New Zealand, Phil Twyford, said: 'As we plan for [the TPNW's] First Meeting of States Parties, we encourage all countries to consider taking part, as parties, signatories, or observers. The TPNW coexists alongside the NPT, building on its vision for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Over time, it will strengthen the global norm against nuclear weapons.'¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, New Zealand said that it: 'is proud to be a TPNW State Party – one of ten from the Pacific, a region free of nuclear weapons, but with nuclear legacy issues to be overcome.'²

New Zealand hosted a virtual conference on 7 December 2021 with Pacific island states to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW and to promote universal adherence to the Treaty.³ It was also one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- New Zealand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- New Zealand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

1 <https://bit.ly/3pvLK10>
 2 <https://bit.ly/3KsIFf5>
 3 <https://bit.ly/3Mh5JO7>
 4 <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	83%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Nicaragua



SIGNATURE

22 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

19 Jul 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 13 Jan 2021

Nicaragua was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In a statement to the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Nicaragua said: 'Nicaragua once again takes advantage of this opportunity to insist before the international community the importance to move once and for all towards disarmament general and complete, in which the highest priority remains the elimination of nuclear weapons. The greatest desire of the inhabitants of Mother Earth is that the nuclear weapons that are a threat disappear for the entire Humanity, including for the Peoples of the countries that manufacture and own them. We welcome the entry into force of the historic Treaty on the Prohibition of Weapons Nuclear, which prohibits for the first time the existence, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, which Nicaragua has ratified. We will continue to state that there is no Plan B to save Mother Earth from a nuclear catastrophe, the sole guarantee to prevent the use or threat of the weapons of mass destruction and their non-proliferation, is the total and absolute elimination of nuclear weapons.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nicaragua should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nicaragua should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/3syWPDR>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Nigeria



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

6 Aug 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 20 Feb 2021

Nigeria was one of the states that played a leading role in bringing about the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and ensuring the ultimate success of the negotiations in 2017. Nigeria ratified the Treaty on 6 August 2020, the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

At the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-level plenary for the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari congratulated member states on the entry into force of the TPNW. He said that Nigeria was 'honored to join other countries in the core group to co-sponsor the resolution that led to the adoption of the Treaty,' that it calls upon 'other member states who have yet to sign and ratify the treaty to follow suit.' Finally, he said that Nigeria 'reiterate[s] the need for all the prohibitions identified in the new treaty to be observed by all member states of the United Nations.'¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Nigeria said that the TPNW will 'contribute to furthering the global objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons' and that it looked forward to the First Meeting of States Parties in 2022.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nigeria should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nigeria should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C4Wqwg>

² <https://bit.ly/3HvvvL6>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Niue



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

6 Aug 2020 (Accession)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 17 Feb 2021

Niue participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.¹

Niue acceded to the TPNW on 6 August 2020, the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The Premier of Niue, Dalton Tagelagi, issued a national statement on the occasion that said: 'Niue is honoured to accede to the Treaty on the 2017 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and draw us closer to witnessing this very significant Treaty enter into force. [...] [N]o state is immune to the threats and consequences of nuclear weapons. [...] We recall the vision and values of our Pacific Leaders for a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy and productive lives. As a global citizen we renew our pledge to ensuring the achievement of this vision and endeavour to uphold Niue's commitment to the international community in the enforcement and implementation of this treaty including the enactment of national legislation in Niue. [...] We are hopeful that more States join us in this united commitment to enter this Treaty into force in the near future and eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Niue should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Niue should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Niue should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	NZ Territorial Application
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes*
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)*
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

* Through territorial application by New Zealand

1 <https://bit.ly/3Mh5JO7>

2 <https://bit.ly/3m29EB9>



Palau



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

3 May 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 7 Jan 2021

Palau was the first state from the Pacific to ratify or accede to the TPNW, and among the first 50 states parties that brought the Treaty into force on 22 January 2021.

Palau was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Palau's President, Tommy E. Remengesau Jr, remarked that the TPNW is '[a] sign of what is possible when we are committed to dialogue, solidarity and peaceful cooperation. This work of fostering new norms for peace and security is one of the strengths of the United Nations. That nuclear possession is as immoral as nuclear use. Palau was one of the first countries to ratify this treaty, and our Constitution enshrines a commitment against the possession of nuclear weapons. [...] We urge all other member states to join us'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Palau should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Palau should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/2J41x8D>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Panama



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

11 Apr 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Feb 2021

In the 2021 Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council, Panama made recommendations to a number of states that they sign and ratify the TPNW.

Panama associated itself with a statement by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'NAM's state parties to the TPNW are fully committed to its implementation and look forward to the first meeting of state parties'. The statement also reiterated NAM's 'concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons as well as the lack of progress shown by nuclear-weapon states in eliminating their nuclear weapons'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Panama noted that it 'is proud to be one of the first countries to have signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, so it considers that its entry into force, will bring us closer to guaranteeing international peace and security towards the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is a matter of the utmost concern, if its total elimination is not guaranteed'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Panama should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Panama should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tpx4Fu>

² <https://bit.ly/2J43wtB>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	60%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Paraguay



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

23 Jan 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Feb 2021

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Paraguay hailed the TPNW's entry into force as a 'transcendental step towards the elimination of these weapons' and 'a milestone in the evolution of international law, as it is based on the recognition of human suffering caused by nuclear weapons'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Paraguay reaffirmed its 'commitment to actively participate in discussions with other States, civil society organisations, and international organisations' and 'encourage[d] the other member countries to maintain the momentum and continue with the preparations' for both the Review Conference for the NPT and the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.²

Paraguay was also one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Paraguay should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Paraguay should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tr0L8T>

² <https://bit.ly/3szX7dE>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>



Peru



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

23 Dec 2021 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

23 Mar 2022



DECLARATION

Received 23 Dec 2021

Peru deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General on 23 December 2021, becoming the 59th state party to the TPNW. The Congress of Peru had unanimously approved a law to ratify the TPNW on 9 December 2021, following a review and positive recommendation by its parliamentary foreign affairs committee.¹

In a press statement, the foreign ministry said that Peru's ratification of the TPNW highlights its 'high commitment to its obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law', adding that it 'is in line with Peru's commitment to promoting international peace and security to facilitate the development and growth of our peoples'.²

Addressing the 2021 UN General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Peru, Óscar Maúrtua, hailed the TPNW's entry into force as a 'great achievement' and 'a legal and moral starting point on a long road to achieve nuclear disarmament'.³

Peru was also one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Peru should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Peru should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tHBVIF>

² <https://bit.ly/3tmnsLy>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vzktCe>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Philippines



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

18 Feb 2021 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

19 May 2021



DECLARATION

Received 17 Jun 2021

The Philippines' Foreign Ministry held an event on 19 May 2021 to commemorate entry into force of the TPNW for the Philippines. President Rodrigo Duterte hailed the ratification as a milestone and reiterated his country's commitment to work with others to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world for 'peace, security, and the survival of all humanity'.¹

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Philippines said: 'In addition to the NPT, the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, the Philippines takes pride in being the 53rd country to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The treaty represents efforts towards the universalization of global norms against nuclear weapons and is in line with the Philippine Constitution and the Bangkok Treaty. It also fulfills the goal set out in the NPT and delegitimizes, once and for all, the use of nuclear weapons.'²

The Philippines was also one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Philippines should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Philippines should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sytxW7>

² <https://bit.ly/3th2wFC>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	53%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Saint Kitts and Nevis



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

9 Aug 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 18 Jan 2021

Saint Kitts and Nevis ratified the TPNW on 9 August 2020, 75 years after the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Nagasaki, to honour the victims and survivors of the attack. On the occasion, Mark Brantley, the Foreign Minister of Saint Kitts and Nevis, said: 'The bombing of Nagasaki was the apogee of human cruelty and inhumanity. As a small nation committed to global peace, Saint Kitts and Nevis can see no useful purpose for nuclear armaments in today's world. May all nations work towards peace and mutual respect for all mankind.'¹

Saint Kitts and Nevis was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

Saint Kitts and Nevis associated itself with CARICOM's statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'Although CARICOM is located in a nuclear free zone, we are not immune from the consequences of the most dangerous weapons on earth. In this regard we welcome the TPNW's entry into force of January of 2021 and view this as an extraordinary achievement. CARICOM looks forward to engage constructively in the first meeting of state parties'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saint Kitts and Nevis should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Saint Kitts and Nevis should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/2UYmlB8>

² <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

³ <https://bit.ly/3tuBoU1>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Saint Lucia



SIGNATURE

27 Sep 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

23 Jan 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Jan 2021

Saint Lucia was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

Saint Lucia associated itself with CARICOM's statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'Although CARICOM is located in a nuclear free zone, we are not immune from the consequences of the most dangerous weapons on earth. In this regard we welcome the TPNW's entry into force of January of 2021 and view this as an extraordinary achievement. CARICOM looks forward to engage constructively in the first meeting of state parties'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saint Lucia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Saint Lucia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Saint Lucia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	75%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/3tuBoU1>



Saint Vincent and the Grenadines



SIGNATURE

8 Dec 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

31 Jul 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 1 Feb 2021

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines associated itself with a statement by CARICOM in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'Although CARICOM is located in a nuclear free zone, we are not immune from the consequences of the most dangerous weapons on earth. In this regard we welcome the TPNW's entry into force of January of 2021 and view this as an extraordinary achievement. CARICOM looks forward to engage constructively in the first meeting of state parties'.¹

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also associated itself with a declaration issued by OPANAL on the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2021. In this statement, the 33 member states of OPANAL reiterated 'the call upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defence doctrines', recalled 'their participation in the adoption and recent entry into force of the [TPNW]', and noted that the TPNW, Treaty of Tlatelolco, NPT and CTBT, once in force, 'are not mere declarations of intention, since they are a suitable legal basis for the process aimed at completely eliminating all nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner forever'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tuBoU1>

² <https://bit.ly/3lCtbn3>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Samoa



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

26 Sep 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 23 Feb 2021

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Samoa said: 'We welcome the Treaty's entry into force on 22 January this year. Being part of such historical timelines is uplifting and empowering.'¹

Samoa was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

Samoa also participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Samoa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Samoa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Samoa should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	60%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3MhzTRt>

² <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

³ <https://bit.ly/3Mh5JO7>



San Marino



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

26 Sep 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 9 Mar 2021 (Late)

San Marino was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, San Marino said: 'The entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons represents a historic milestone. San Marino is thrilled for the great number of countries that have already signed and ratified this instrument in such a short period of time. This proves that the majority of countries supports a total ban of nuclear weapons. We strongly encourage other countries to join this instrument and we look forward to participating in the First Meeting of States Parties next year.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- San Marino should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- San Marino should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- San Marino should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/3hDRNj7>



Seychelles



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

9 Jul 2021 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

7 Oct 2021



DECLARATION

Received 3 Mar 2022 (Late)

When the Seychelles' National Assembly approved a motion to ratify the TPNW on 30 June 2021, the Leader of Government Business, Bernard Georges, said: 'Seychelles has always been vulnerable to nuclear weapons. Ever since the island of Diego Garcia became a military base, Seychelles has been at the centre of nuclear weapons and, with numerous other military bases being set up in the region, we are surrounded by a nuclear presence.'¹

The chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, Waven William, said that Seychelles also had rallied to get other countries to ratify this treaty as soon as possible.²

In the 2021 UN General Assembly, Seychelles associated itself with a statement on the First Committee by the African Group, which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, The TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Seychelles should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Seychelles should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sAlGav>

² Ibid.

³ <https://bit.ly/3sBNjjF>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



South Africa



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

25 Feb 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 18 Feb 2021

South Africa produced nuclear weapons in the late 1970s but decided in 1989 to give them up and has since advocated for nuclear disarmament. It was one of the states that played a leading role in bringing about the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and ensuring the ultimate success of the negotiations in 2017.

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Minister of South Africa, Naledi Pandor, said: 'The TPNW is the result of an increased focus by the international community on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapon explosion ... The TPNW complements the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which remains the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It should also serve as a catalyst for much overdue progress in the disarmament pillar of the NPT in fulfilment of the historic bargain between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states.'¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, South Africa said that the entry into force of the 'milestone' TPNW was 'one of the most important developments towards nuclear disarmament' since the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, and continued: 'We commit ourselves to tirelessly work towards its implementation and universalization and encourage all States that have not done so, to ratify the Treaty without further delay.'² South Africa was also one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- South Africa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- South Africa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sCARQk>

² <https://bit.ly/35LLOq5>

³ <https://bit.ly/3Cb1SO3>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	30%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	100–1,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



State of Palestine



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

22 Mar 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 21 Feb 2021

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Palestine said: ‘There is no justification for the exceptional status enjoyed by nuclear weapons. [...] There is no situation, no circumstances, in which their use can be justified. Their very existence is an insult to those who perished and those who survived. They are a threat to innocent people around the world, an existential threat for humankind and our planet that can only be addressed by their elimination.’

The statement continued: ‘The indefinite extension of the NPT was never intended and can never be interpreted as granting any legality or validity to the existence or indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. The NPT has three pillars, and we look forward to advancing on all three fronts at the upcoming 10th NPT Review Conference. If nuclear disarmament falters, the whole edifice will collapse. In this sense, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the natural extension and the indispensable corollary of the NPT. The State of Palestine is proud to have been among the States that elaborated the treaty and among the first countries to ratify it, contributing to its early entry into force. We can not stand by and wait till the environment is ripe, till the circumstances are right, as there will always be a reason or a pretext not to move ahead. If it is about security then we are all entitled to security, if it is about deterrence then we are all entitled to deterrence. And if we can achieve those by any means necessary, then all weapons of mass destruction are fair game. But that is not the international law-based order we built. We have among the States that possess nuclear weapons friends and foes, but in all cases nuclear weapons are the enemy.’¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Palestine should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Palestine should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Palestine should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA by its deadline under the TPNW’s Article 3(2), which is 22 July 2022. It should also conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol. Palestine should sign and ratify the CTBT.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3hzNKEO>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	60%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	No (Signed 2019)
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	22 Jul 2022
Small Quantities Protocol	No (Signed 2019)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Thailand



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

20 Sep 2017 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 15 Feb 2021

Thailand was one of the states that played a leading role in bringing about the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and ensuring the ultimate success of the negotiations in 2017.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Thailand said: '22 January this year marks the historic entry into force of the [TPNW], the first international legal instrument to completely delegitimise nuclear weapons. Now that we have successfully cemented our nuclear disarmament efforts under international law, we should turn our focus towards implementing the text of the Treaty. Thailand wishes to reaffirm its support throughout and beyond the First Meeting of States Parties'.¹

Thailand also said: 'Nuclear disarmament is not only a legal obligation, but also a moral and ethical imperative. As such, Member States are sending a clear message that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to guarantee against their use or threat of use. This is well reflected by the swift entry into force of the TPNW. As we plan for the First Meeting of States Parties in Vienna next spring, we would encourage all Member States, States Parties and non-States Parties alike, to participate at the meeting. Thailand strongly believes that both the TPNW and the NPT are complementary and collectively contribute to the common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.'²

Thailand was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Thailand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Thailand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3HzXU2M>

² <https://bit.ly/3lBYdLz>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	46%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Trinidad and Tobago



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

26 Sep 2019 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Feb 2021

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Amery Browne, encouraged states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the TPNW, and he implored states to work together 'towards removing the threat of nuclear obliteration'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Trinidad and Tobago said that it 'has noted, with much concern, the modernization and acceleration of the accumulation of nuclear and other arsenals by some States. An unchecked nuclear arms race could potentially put the world, either through miscalculation or through pre-meditation, on a certain path to catastrophic human and environmental consequences. The evidence suggests that contrary to the conventional wisdom, deterrence, in fact, breathes escalation. We remain convinced that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction offers the only effective guarantee of international peace and security. [...] Along with the international community, we welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons earlier this year and we look forward to the First Meeting of States Parties in 2022'.²

Trinidad and Tobago was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Trinidad and Tobago should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Trinidad and Tobago should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Trinidad and Tobago should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sB2kID>

² <https://bit.ly/35HWrKy>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	75%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Tuvalu



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

12 Oct 2020 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 18 Feb 2021

Tuvalu participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.¹

Tuvalu was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Tuvalu said that it 'stands in solidarity with the victims of nuclear weapon use and testing, including in the Pacific' and that it joined the TPNW 'because it does not want history to repeat itself'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tuvalu should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Tuvalu should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Tuvalu should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol. Tuvalu should adhere to the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3Mh5JO7>

² <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

³ <https://bit.ly/3m2l1sK>



Uruguay



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

25 Jul 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 3 Feb 2021

On the occasion of the entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021, Uruguay's Foreign Ministry issued a press release that called the Treaty 'a milestone in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as a significant commitment to international peace and security.'¹

The press release also said: 'The use of nuclear weapons leads to catastrophic humanitarian consequences that constitute a risk to the security and survival of all humanity. That is why today we celebrate that the international community has taken this significant step towards a more stable and secure world, with a sense of collective purpose.'²

Uruguay was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Uruguay should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Uruguay should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3K8KQmp>

² <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>



Vanuatu



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

26 Sep 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 17 Feb 2021

Vanuatu participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.¹

In the 2021 Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council, Vanuatu made recommendations to a number of states that they sign and ratify the TPNW.

Vanuatu associated itself with a statement by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'NAM's state parties to the TPNW are fully committed to its implementation and look forward to the first meeting of state of parties'. The statement also reiterated NAM's 'concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons as well as the lack of progress shown by nuclear-weapon states in eliminating their nuclear weapons'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Vanuatu should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Vanuatu should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3Mh5JO7>

² <https://bit.ly/3tpx4Fu>



Venezuela



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

27 Mar 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Feb 2021

In a statement to the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Foreign Minister of Venezuela, Félix Plasencia, said about the TPNW: 'We hope that this legal instrument will allow us to move towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.'¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Venezuela said that as long as the existence of nuclear weapons persists, they 'constitute a latent risk that threatens all forms of life on the planet,' and expressed hope 'that the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will bring us closer, sooner rather than later, to the global goal of eliminating nuclear weapons'.²

Venezuela was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Venezuela should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Venezuela should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Venezuela should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	25%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3swX7v8>

² <https://bit.ly/3K1oYtk>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>



Viet Nam



SIGNATURE

22 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

17 May 2018 (Ratification)



ENTRY INTO FORCE

22 Jan 2021



DECLARATION

Received 19 Feb 2021

Viet Nam was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called ‘upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly on 11 October 2021, Viet Nam said that ‘the TPNW completes the total ban on all weapons of mass destruction’ and pledged to ‘work with all partners for the success of’ the Treaty’s First Meeting of State Parties in 2022 and for ‘its universalisation’.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Viet Nam should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Viet Nam should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vC2Wcz>

² <https://bit.ly/3vO3fkT>



Algeria



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In 2020, Algeria said that it intended to ratify the TPNW in the very near future.¹

The Prime Minister of Algeria, Benabderrahmane Aymane, signed a decree in June 2021 to establish a national authority to remediate former French nuclear test sites.¹

Speaking in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Algeria said: 'Having actively participated in the process leading to its drafting and adoption, Algeria was among the first countries to sign this Treaty, and remains confident that this instrument constitutes a milestone achieved towards delegitimising nuclear weapons and achieving their total elimination.'²

Algeria co-sponsored the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.'

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Algeria should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Algeria should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2018)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3pv7tK4>

² <https://bit.ly/3lD8A1l>

³ <https://bit.ly/3sIOwWt>



Angola



SIGNATURE

27 Sep 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Angola was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Angola associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Angola should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/35iGw5A>

² <https://bit.ly/3vt7jGL>



Brazil



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Brazil was one of the states that played a leading role in bringing about the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and ensuring the ultimate success of the negotiations in 2017. Brazil was also the first state to sign the TPNW. In a statement on the occasion of the TPNW's entry into force on 22 January 2021, Brazil said: 'The [TPNW] is currently under consideration by the Brazilian National Congress with a view to its ratification.'¹

Addressing the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Brazil said: 'The TPNW complements and reinforces the NPT, and represents an evolutionary leap for the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. The entry into force of the TPNW is a historic achievement, which embodies the growing international consensus that nuclear weapons must never again be used by anyone, anywhere, at any time.'²

Brazil was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Brazil should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Brazil should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	30%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

1 <https://bit.ly/3lvaWjf>
 2 <https://bit.ly/3lAd3Cw>
 3 <https://bit.ly/3CadlO6>



Brunei



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Brunei said: 'As a vital step towards global nuclear disarmament, which complements the existing non-proliferation and global nuclear-weapon-related instruments, we welcome the entry into force of the [TPNW] and hope that its First Meeting of State Parties next year would mark another important milestone.'¹

Brunei also associated itself with a statement on behalf of ASEAN in the First Committee, which said that the TPNW 'is a historic agreement which contributes towards nuclear disarmament and complements other existing instruments'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Brunei should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Brunei should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFEZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/35os4Jd>

² <https://bit.ly/3pvLp1L>



Cabo Verde



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The TPNW was submitted to Cabo Verde's national assembly in December 2021 for ratification.

Cabo Verde was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Cabo Verde associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cabo Verde should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Cabo Verde should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	No (Signed 2005)
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2005)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3MgkK2P>

² <https://bit.ly/3pqWoJW>



Central African Republic



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Central African Republic did not take part in the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017 but was one of the first states to sign the Treaty.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, the Central African Republic associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Central African Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C73WGL>



Colombia



SIGNATURE

3 Aug 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In March 2020, Colombia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that 'the internal legislative process leading to [Colombia's] eventual ratification is pending'.¹

In First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Colombia said: 'We are concerned about qualification of nuclear weapons, their inclusion in the military doctrines of some States, and proliferation. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of its use make total removal essential'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Colombia should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/36Ww9on>

² <https://bit.ly/3vx07JL>



Congo



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Senate of the Republic of the Congo approved ratification of the TPNW on 1 December 2021 and the National Assembly approved it on 20 December 2021.¹

Congo was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Congo associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Congo should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C4Ouep>

² <https://bit.ly/3MhHFuu>

³ <https://bit.ly/3KcEC4X>



Côte d'Ivoire



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The National Assembly of Côte d'Ivoire approved ratification of the TPNW on 14 September 2021 and the Senate approved it on 20 December 2021.¹

Côte d'Ivoire was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Côte d'Ivoire associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Côte d'Ivoire should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3K3BQiu>

² <https://bit.ly/3HwuJNT>

³ <https://bit.ly/3HC0RQ6>



Democratic Republic of the Congo



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) has notified the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs that it will participate in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in Vienna in 2022 and is in the process of completing its ratification.

DR Congo was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, DR Congo welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW and said that it looked forward to the convening of the First Meeting of States Parties in 2022.²

Cri de Secours contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères en Afrique (CRISPAL) and other partner organizations of ICAN in DR Congo met with members of Parliament in October 2021 to encourage swift action to ratify the TPNW.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- DR Congo should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	29%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3humU0u>

² <https://bit.ly/349297K>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vuYbBs>



Dominican Republic



SIGNATURE

7 Jun 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Dominican Republic's constitutional tribunal approved the ratification of the TPNW in October 2020, but it must still be approved by the Congress.¹

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Dominican Republic said: '[W]e salute the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and we urge States that have not done so to adhere to it.'²

The Dominican Republic was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Dominican Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/37DDSnX>

² <https://bit.ly/3hxELLE4>

³ <https://bit.ly/3lDaxv4>



Ghana



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Ghana said: 'As a signatory State, Ghana welcomes the entry into force on 22 January 2021 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. National processes are currently under way in Ghana for the ratification of the Treaty and the subsequent deposit of our instrument of ratification.'¹

Ghana was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

On behalf of the African Group, Ghana delivered a statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ghana should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	18%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/36Wx2xd>

² <https://bit.ly/3tk1GYN>

³ <https://bit.ly/3MfDrnl>



Grenada



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Treaties Committee of Grenada said in December 2021 that 'ratification of the TPNW remains a priority', and that Grenada hoped to become a State party early in 2022. The Treaty had been reviewed by the Committee and was awaiting approval by the Cabinet.¹

Grenada associated itself with a statement by CARICOM in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'CARICOM remains convinced that it is only through the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction that international peace and security can be guaranteed, and that their continued existence, accumulation and modernization actually increases the threat level to our collective security. As part of a region, which established the first Nuclear Weapons Free Zone pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, CARICOM was pleased to join the international community in welcoming the entry into force of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons earlier this year. CARICOM looks forward to the convening of the First Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW in 2022 and hopes that reassuring platitudes of responsible conduct on the part of nuclear weapons states will be matched by commitments of bold and decisive action in the right direction.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Grenada should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Grenada should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	100%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ Email from the Treaties Committee to ICAN, 22 December 2021

² <https://bit.ly/3sxnFMS>



Guatemala



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Guatemala said that it 'is currently in the internal final phase of ratification of the [TPNW]'.¹ The matter was before the Congress.²

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Guatemala said: 'As a nation with a peaceful vocation, we celebrate the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which constitutes a firm step that legally obliges the elimination of nuclear weapons [...] My country reiterates its position that the Treaty complements the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and strengthens its three fundamental pillars.'³

Guatemala was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Guatemala should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	60%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3thGKa>

² <https://bit.ly/3Md6iJ1>

³ <https://bit.ly/3lDb7ce>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/35EpKxp>



Indonesia



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In a statement on 22 January 2021 marking the entry into force of the TPNW, Indonesia said that it is 'very hopeful that, by the time that the first meeting of states parties is held [...], Indonesia will be joining as a state party'.¹

Addressing the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Retno Marsudi, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, described the TPNW's entry into force as 'a very important milestone', providing a 'legal framework to delegitimise nuclear weapons' and raising 'moral barriers against their threat'. She called on 'countries that have not signed the treaty to do so and be part of the positive force towards global nuclear disarmament'.²

Indonesia was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Indonesia should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3MfaaJk>

² <https://bit.ly/3lvdbmF>

³ <https://bit.ly/3vCgl4B>



Libya



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In a statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Libya said about the TPNW: 'We urge nuclear weapon states to sincerely engage with all efforts to rid the world of these lethal weapons and to accede to this treaty, so that it will be a universal treaty towards collective security.'¹

Libya also associated itself with a statement by the Arab Group in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which welcomed the TPNW and said the Treaty 'places nuclear weapons in its logical place as weapons whose possession or use or threat of use is a violation of the most basic rules of international humanitarian law in addition to the fact that it threatens international peace and security'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Libya should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3pvNDhD>

² <https://bit.ly/3MfEeVI>



Liechtenstein



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Speaking in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Liechtenstein said: 'Liechtenstein reiterates our commitment to ratifying the TPNW after having signed the Treaty in 2017 at the earliest possibility.'

The statement continued: 'Liechtenstein has joined the collective effort to abolish nuclear weapons, and therefore welcomes the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in January 2021. The TPNW enhances the legal framework for nuclear disarmament and brings it into line with regimes for the other weapons of mass destruction. We look forward to contributing to the First Meeting of States Parties'.¹

In response to questions asked in Parliament in 2020, Liechtenstein's government said that, before ratifying the TPNW, it must address issues related to its customs union with Switzerland.

Liechtenstein was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Liechtenstein should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	40%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3Cks6Ot>

² <https://bit.ly/3K75MdE>

³ <https://bit.ly/3pvax92>



Madagascar



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In 2021, Madagascar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, along with the national institute on nuclear issues, prepared a ratification memorandum for the TPNW. Approval by the Council of Ministers and Parliament is still pending.

In First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Madagascar stated: 'Nuclear weapons are still today, and rightly so, the first threat to humanity. Madagascar supports efforts in favor of any progress in the context of disarmament and non-proliferation in the nuclear field'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Madagascar should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3HEX35w>



Malawi



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Malawi's Office of the President and Cabinet said in December 2021 that the government had approved ratification of the TPNW, and that the Permanent Mission of Malawi to the UN would soon deposit the instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General.¹

As part of the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council, Malawi accepted a recommendation in 2021 to ratify the TPNW.²

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Malawi associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.³

In the First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, Malawi said that it supports all nuclear disarmament initiatives, including the NPT, the TPNW, CTBT, and the Pelindaba Treaty. Malawi also urged states to stop paying lip service to disarmament, and encouraged them to 'use multilateral diplomacy to implement these agreements so we can achieve our disarmament agenda'.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Malawi should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ Communications from the Office of the President and Cabinet to ICAN, 13 December 2021

² A/HRC/46/7

³ <https://bit.ly/3ttW3aO>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/3716EOX>



Mozambique



SIGNATURE

18 Aug 2020



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The government of Mozambique and the International Committee of the Red Cross held a workshop in October 2021 to discuss ratification of the TPNW.¹

Mozambique was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Mozambique associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mozambique should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/35H2hvJ>

² <https://bit.ly/35BICx3>

³ <https://bit.ly/3tl8CVC>



Myanmar



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Myanmar said of the TPNW: 'we sincerely wish to ratify it as soon as possible'.

In the statement, Myanmar also said: 'The dangers of nuclear weapons posed by their very continued existences and modernization of any sorts may not be easily visible to the general populace, but everything could go wrong if anything went wrong with nuclear weapons, and the history tells us that there have been numerous nuclear close calls. Therefore, the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threats of use. [...] Even though we are still yet nowhere near our ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, we believe the [TPNW] is the quintessential instrument in reinforcing norms against nuclear weapons. The entry into force of this treaty on 22 January of this year is welcome progress and a crucial achievement for the nuclear disarmament agenda. We believe that it will contribute to making the world free of nuclear weapons.'¹

Myanmar was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Myanmar should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Myanmar should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sxxgZyf>

² <https://bit.ly/3pxg04a>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2013)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Nepal



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Nepal is reported to have discussed the TPNW in 2021, but action to approve ratification is still pending. In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Nepal said of the TPNW that it 'is committed to ratifying the treaty at the earliest possible.'¹

As part of the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council, Nepal accepted a recommendation in 2021 to ratify the TPNW.²

Nepal was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Nepal spoke of the trust deficit among nuclear states and resulting rise in geopolitical tension, and added: 'Amid uncertainty, this year on 22 January, we have witnessed a sliver of hope when the "Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" entered into force despite the apathy in some quarters. [T]he billions of dollars aimed for nuclear programs should be redirected to fight the COVID-19 pandemic and in achieving the SDGs. [...] We call for the strengthening of the NPT, CTBT and TPNW regimes.'⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nepal should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Nepal should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol. Nepal should also ratify the CTBT.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vuBsWk>

² A/HRC/47/10 and A/HRC/47/10/Add.1

³ <https://bit.ly/3hz3jMU>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/3MrSVou>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	25%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFEZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Niger



SIGNATURE

9 Dec 2020



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The issue of ratification of the TPNW is believed to be under the consideration of Niger's government.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Niger associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

Niger participated in the negotiation of the TPNW at the UN in New York in 2017 but was not formally registered, and thus did not vote on its adoption.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Niger should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tkq8cJ>



Sao Tome and Principe



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in July 2021 that a ratification memorandum for the TPNW had been prepared and would soon be submitted to the Cabinet, after which the approval of the Parliament would be sought.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Sao Tome and Principe associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sao Tome and Principe should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Sao Tome and Principe should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Sao Tome and Principe should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	No (Approved 2019)
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Approved 2019
Additional Protocol	No (Approved 2019)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ Communications from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ICAN, 1 July 2021

² <https://bit.ly/3ps3zl6>


SIGNATURE
22 Jul 2020

DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

ENTRY INTO FORCE

DECLARATION

Sudan is believed to be working on upgrading its status from TPNW signatory to state party.

Speaking in the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Sudan said that the TPNW has a 'complementary role' to the NPT, and that Sudan had signed the Treaty and was 'undertaking an internal process to ratify it.' Sudan also called on all other states to sign and ratify the TPNW.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Sudan associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sudan should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Sudan should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFEZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3m3pjA4>

² <https://bit.ly/3CePBlv>



Timor-Leste



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2018



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Timor-Leste announced that it 'is currently working on the fulfilment of the internal procedures for the ratification of the TPNW'.¹

In First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Timor-Leste described the TPNW as 'an important international humanitarian norm for our common security, protection of human life, and peace in the world', and hailed its entry into force as 'an extraordinary achievement and a step towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Timor-Leste should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Timor-Leste should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Timor-Leste should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	100%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	No (Signed 2009)
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No (Signed 2009)
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2009)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3HuTdHq>

² <https://bit.ly/3IEd4Fw>



Togo



SIGNATURE

20 Sep 2017



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In the First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, Togo said its ratification procedure for the TPNW was 'nearly complete'. Cabinet and parliamentary approval is still believed to be pending.

Togo was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.² In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Togo said: 'Togo welcomes the entry into force of the treaty banning nuclear weapons and invites the States non-parties, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to seize this historic opportunity to join it'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Togo should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2UTH2hg>

² <https://bit.ly/3Cb1SO3>

³ <https://bit.ly/3HAo4IV>



United Republic of Tanzania



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Tanzania said that its 'ratification process [for the TPNW] is under way'.¹

In the statement, Tanzania also welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW as 'a big milestone to see in human history', congratulated 'all members for this achievement', and encouraged all states that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty 'to find a way to do so'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Tanzania associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tanzania should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	25%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C5kSh4>

² <https://bit.ly/3ps50A0>



Zambia



SIGNATURE

26 Sep 2019



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Zambia's Ministry of Defence indicated in November 2021 that the government would pursue ratification of the TPNW early in 2022. Together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has prepared a ratification memorandum. Action by the Parliament is still pending.¹

In a statement in the general debate of the 2021 UN General Assembly, the President of Zambia, Hakainde Hichilema, said: 'In the quest for promoting global peace and security, Zambia notes with satisfaction the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which became operative on 22 January 2021. The entry into force of the TPNW is a tangible feat towards advancing the cause of nuclear disarmament on the international stage. Zambia encourages other states that are yet to ratify the TPNW to come on board so that we can continue making advances towards achieving our aspirations towards eradicating nuclear weapons.'²

Zambia was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Zambia should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Zambia should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

¹ Communications from the Ministry of Defence of Zambia to ICAN, 23 November 2021.

² <https://bit.ly/3C7poeN>

³ <https://bit.ly/35th3Gm>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2009)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Zimbabwe



SIGNATURE

4 Dec 2020



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Zimbabwe was the first state to sign the TPNW after the Treaty's 50th ratification. In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Zimbabwe said that it 'signed this important Treaty in December 2020 and consultations, as well as administrative processes for ratification, are ongoing.'

In the statement, Zimbabwe also welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW and expressed hope that it will achieve universal adherence.¹ Zimbabwe was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Zimbabwe should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Zimbabwe should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	20%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compliant
Test	Compliant
Possess or stockpile	Compliant
(b) Transfer	Compliant
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compliant
(d) Use	Compliant
Threaten to use	Compliant
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compliant
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compliant
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compliant

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/35th7G6>

² <https://bit.ly/3sCOmQI>



Afghanistan



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

It is believed that Afghanistan has considered accession to the TPNW. With the change of government, it is likely that this process has stalled. Afghanistan voted in favour of the adoption of the TPNW in 2017 and voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2019, 2020, and 2021.

Afghanistan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Afghanistan said: 'The situation of nuclear disarmament remains at an impasse and a source of great concern in the context of international peace and security. A new focus and commitment is needed on the part of the international community to reverse the trend and pave the ground for the decrease and total elimination of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Afghanistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sjvNQO>



Andorra



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Accession to the TPNW remained on Andorra's governmental agenda in 2021. Maria Ubach i Font, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Andorra, wrote in 2019: 'I am confident that soon, once we complete our internal procedures, Andorra will be in a position to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.'¹

Andorra voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2021, and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Andorra maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Andorra should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	100%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3444kcA>



Azerbaijan



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Azerbaijan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Azerbaijan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Azerbaijan said that it 'supports all multilateral efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation'.¹

In the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Azerbaijan delivered a statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and said: 'Being a staunch proponent of multilateral diplomacy, the Non-Aligned Movement reiterate its determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The Movement takes note of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021. It is hoped that the Treaty would contribute to furthering the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Azerbaijan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3toS2UM>

² <https://bit.ly/3pqjWY>



Bahamas



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Bahamas voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. It was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, the Bahamas stated that '[a]s a committed party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established Latin America and the Caribbean as the First Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, we understand that it is important not only to lead by example, but to also build on achievements made. The Bahamas, therefore, has been encouraged by the signatures and ratifications, several of which represent Caribbean States, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and hopes to be in a position to join on to the Treaty, following the completion of internal review.'²

The Bahamas maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Bahamas should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- The Bahamas should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	75%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/35eWoWN>

² <https://bit.ly/3IP4qbO>



Bahrain



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Bahrain voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Bahrain maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Bahrain associated itself with a statement by the Arab Group in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which welcomed the TPNW and said the Treaty 'places nuclear weapons in its logical place as weapons whose possession or use or threat of use is a violation of the most basic rules of international humanitarian law in addition to the fact that it threatens international peace and security'.¹

In the First Committee in the 2020 UN General Assembly, Bahrain called on all states to renounce nuclear weapons.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bahrain should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	100%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tkpMCH>

² <https://bit.ly/3fkUWmi>



Barbados



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Barbados did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Barbados maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Barbados associated itself with a statement by CARICOM in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said: 'Although CARICOM is located in a nuclear free zone, we are not immune from the consequences of the most dangerous weapons on earth. In this regard we welcome the TPNW's entry into force of January of 2021 and view this as an extraordinary achievement. CARICOM looks forward to engage constructively in the first meeting of state parties'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Barbados should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Barbados should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	75%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tuBoU1>



Bhutan



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Bhutan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Bhutan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Bhutan associated itself with a statement by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which said: 'Being a staunch proponent of multilateral diplomacy, the Non-Aligned Movement reiterate its determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The Movement takes note of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021. It is hoped that the Treaty would contribute to furthering the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bhutan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Bhutan should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol. Bhutan should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3K7zjin>



Burkina Faso



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Burkina Faso voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

In the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Burkina Faso hailed the TPNW's entry into force as 'a great victory for all the peoples of the world and a very significant event in the history of humanity'.¹

Burkina Faso maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Burkina Faso should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	40%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vrDTJj>



Burundi



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Burundi voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Burundi maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Burundi associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Burundi should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3hwC3Pa>



Cameroon



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Cameroon participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. Its only vote on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW was in 2018, when it voted yes.

Cameroon maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Cameroon associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cameroon should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tgz7eS>



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Chad voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. It voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2020, and 2021, and did not cast a vote in 2019.

Chad maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Chad associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Chad should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Chad should also adhere to the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vv9wBv>



Cyprus



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Cyprus voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Cyprus maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cyprus should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Egypt



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Egypt voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021. In a letter to ICAN dated 2 December 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt indicated that the matter of signing and ratifying the TPNW 'is subject to an ongoing internal review and assessment by the Egyptian government'.¹

Egypt maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Egypt associated itself with a statement by the Arab Group in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which welcomed the TPNW and said the Treaty 'places nuclear weapons in its logical place as weapons whose possession or use or threat of use is a violation of the most basic rules of international humanitarian law in addition to the fact that it threatens international peace and security'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Egypt should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Egypt should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Egypt should also ratify the CTBT and the BWC, and adhere to the CWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)
Party to the CWC	No
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3HvoJVD>

² <https://bit.ly/3K83k6J>



Equatorial Guinea



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In a statement during the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Equatorial Guinea indicated that it is taking steps to become a state party to the TPNW.¹

Equatorial Guinea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. In 2021, Equatorial Guinea was one of the co-sponsors of the 2021 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.²

Equatorial Guinea maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Equatorial Guinea should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Equatorial Guinea should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol. Equatorial Guinea should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	No (Approved 1986)
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Approved 1986
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3hxQJNJ>

² <https://bit.ly/3teGEL2>



Eritrea



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Eritrea has indicated that it intends to adhere to the TPNW. It voted in favour of the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. In 2021, it was one of the co-sponsors of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, which called 'upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date'.¹

Eritrea maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct. It also brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA on 20 April 2021.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Eritrea said: 'The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is illegal and immoral. Legally binding negative assurances, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, the universalisation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the recently adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are critical steps to complete denuclearisation'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Eritrea should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Eritrea should also adhere to the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vLHrGz>

² <https://bit.ly/3hsR44m>



Eswatini



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

It is believed that the TPNW was submitted to Eswatini's Parliament for ratification in 2021, but no action has yet been taken.

Eswatini did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021, when it was also a co-sponsor of the resolution.¹

Eswatini said in the First Committee of the 2018 UN General Assembly that it welcomed the adoption of the TPNW as an 'essential building block' to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that it was 'involved in internal processes to become a party to the treaty soon'.²

Eswatini maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Eswatini should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vvU8VK>

² <https://bit.ly/3kW3bpL>



Ethiopia



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Ethiopia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021. Speaking of the TPNW at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Ethiopia said: 'We have fully supported the treaty and we look forward to ratifying it to facilitate its entry into force.'¹

Ethiopia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Ethiopia associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ethiopia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/39PXSq6>

² <https://bit.ly/3lz9bSg>



Gabon



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Gabon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly Resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Gabon maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Gabon associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Gabon should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFEZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3lBszOs>



Guinea



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Guinea did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

ICAN's partner organizations in Guinea met with the country's then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ibrahima Khalil Kaba, in June 2021 to discuss the TPNW.¹

Guinea maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Guinea associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Guinea should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Guinea should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	No (Signed 2011)
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No (Signed 2011)
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2011)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3KbiJTY>

² <https://bit.ly/3ICPzfT>



Haiti



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Haiti welcomed the entry in force of the TPNW and said that the government 'has taken due note and committed to complete its membership of the TPNW before the First Meeting of States Parties'.¹

Haiti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. It voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW for the first time in 2021, after not having cast a vote in the previous years.

Haiti maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Haiti should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Haiti should also ratify the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	25%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3pul2rT>



Iran



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

If Iran were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the Treaty's prohibition on development of nuclear weapons, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor has therefore listed Iran as a state of concern.

Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the treaty, including in 2021.

Following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran restarted uranium enrichment beyond levels previously permitted by the agreement. As of the end of 2021, Iran had effectively reduced its potential nuclear breakout time from approximately a year under the JCPOA to just a couple of months, although there is currently little public indication that Tehran intends to take that highly consequential step at this time. It is particularly concerning, however, that since February 2021 Iran has refused to allow the IAEA access to a facility where advanced centrifuge components are being produced. As of writing, the United States and the remaining parties to the JCPOA were in the midst of negotiations over a potential US return to the deal (or perhaps the conclusion of a new interim deal).

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Iran said of the TPNW: 'The adoption of this treaty was a right step in the right direction. As such, we continue to support its overall objective. The TPNW complements the NPT. However, the TPNW should also be complemented by the urgent commencement of negotiations and the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner. The entry into force of the treaty from [2021], is considered a successful achievement for the global movement towards nuclear disarmament.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Iran should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Iran should return to compliance with the JCPOA, and bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Iran should also ratify the CTBT.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vtjFij>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Of concern
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2003)
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	100-1,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Iraq



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Iraq has indicated that the issue of adhering to the TPNW is still under consideration by the government. Iraq voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Iraq maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Iraq warned of the risks of nuclear weapons for people and the planet, called for universality of all relevant treaties, and said it supported the adoption of the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Iraq should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/397FJUz>



Jordan



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Jordan has indicated that it is studying the TPNW. Jordan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Jordan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Jordan said: '[W]e support all international efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and all weapons of mass destruction, and we reiterate the importance of supporting all initiatives aimed at achieving the common goal in the field of disarmament.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Jordan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3pulaHT>



Kenya



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Kenya voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

In a statement to the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Kenya said that it 'calls for the banning of nuclear weapons and endorses the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – a critical milestone in achieving a nuclear-free world'.¹

Kenyan parliamentarians, government officials, and representatives of civil society participated in two workshops in 2021 to advance Kenya's accession to the TPNW.²

Kenya maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kenya should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	20%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFEZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

1) <https://bit.ly/3lySUwz>

2) <https://bit.ly/3HyfKmH>


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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG


ENTRY INTO FORCE


DECLARATION

Kuwait voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Kuwait maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Kuwait associated itself with a statement by the Arab Group in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which welcomed the TPNW and said the Treaty 'places nuclear weapons in its logical place as weapons whose possession or use or threat of use is a violation of the most basic rules of international humanitarian law in addition to the fact that it threatens international peace and security'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kuwait should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sAg052>



Lebanon



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Lebanon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Lebanon maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Lebanon welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW, as well as the extension of the 'New START' bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States and Russia. These two developments 'give a glimmer of hope of a better future on the proliferation and the arms control fronts', it said.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lebanon should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Lebanon should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	40%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFEZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tiXxEt>



Liberia



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

As part of the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council, Liberia accepted a recommendation in 2021 to sign and ratify the TPNW.¹ Liberia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Liberia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Speaking at the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Liberia said: 'The time has come for us to stigmatize and denounce nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and policy rhetoric of the Nuclear Weapon states. We also reiterate our concerns regarding arguments which set preconditions for the implementation of existing nuclear disarmament obligations.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Liberia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes





Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3IApIL7>

² <https://bit.ly/394T144>

			
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It is believed that Mali's government is considering accession to the TPNW. Mali did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2020 and 2021.

Mali maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Mali associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mali should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3MilovQ>



Mauritania



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Mauritania has confirmed that it will participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW. Mauritania voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021, when it was also a co-sponsor of the resolution.

Mauritania maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Mauritania noted that it was one of 122 states that voted in favour of adopting the TPNW, 'a treaty that makes a sizeable contribution to working towards our common goal and is undeniably an historical step.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mauritania should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3fq5od>



Mauritius



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

It is believed that the question of whether Mauritius will adhere to the TPNW was still under consideration in the government in 2021. Mauritius voted in favour of the adoption of the TPNW in the UN Diplomatic Meeting in 2017 and has consistently voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Alan Ganoo, noted the entry into force of the TPNW and described the Treaty as 'among the outstanding achievements of the United Nations'.¹

Mauritius maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

ICAN's partner organizations met with the then Prime Minister of Mauritius, Pravin Kumar Jugnauth, on 27 August 2020 to discuss the TPNW.² He noted the problem of the colonial administration of the Chagos Islands by the United Kingdom and Mauritius' lack of control over this archipelago, which includes a US air base on Diego Garcia. This dispute over sovereignty of part of Mauritian territory would not prevent Mauritius from adhering to the TPNW, however. Without effective control of the Chagos Islands, Mauritius is precluded from being able to implement the TPNW across those territories. If it secures full sovereignty over the Chagos Islands, it would need to seek the removal of any unlawful weapons and prohibit any unlawful activities by any States not party to the TPNW on that territory.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mauritius should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Mauritius should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3swBUBI>

² <https://bit.ly/36VMutx>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	20%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Morocco



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Morocco served as a vice-president representing Africa at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and voted in favour of adopting the TPNW. It has also consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Morocco maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Morocco described the adoption of the TPNW in 2017 as 'a major step in the evolution of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Morocco should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3M7XaoS>



Oman



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

As part of the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council, Oman noted recommendations that it should sign and ratify the TPNW and stated that it would consider doing so, without making any prior commitment.¹ Oman voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Oman maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Oman associated itself with a statement by the Arab Group in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which welcomed the TPNW and said the Treaty 'places nuclear weapons in its logical place as weapons whose possession or use or threat of use is a violation of the most basic rules of international humanitarian law in addition to the fact that it threatens international peace and security'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Oman should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Oman should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ A/HRC/47/11 and A/HRC/47/11/Add.1

² <https://bit.ly/35mJqGm>



Papua New Guinea



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Papua New Guinea participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, where it stated that it hoped to become a state party to the TPNW soon.¹ Approval by the National Executive Council and Parliament is still pending.

Papua New Guinea maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In March 2020, the State Solicitor's Office at Papua New Guinea's Department of Attorney General advised that it had completed a legal analysis of the TPNW and provided legal clearance to the government to proceed with signature and ratification.²

Papua New Guinea voted in favour of the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Papua New Guinea should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Papua New Guinea should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Papua New Guinea should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vuvRze>

² Email from the State Solicitor's Office to ICAN, 4 March 2020.



Qatar



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Qatar voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Qatar maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Qatar associated itself with a statement by the Arab Group in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which welcomed the TPNW and said the Treaty 'places nuclear weapons in its logical place as weapons whose possession or use or threat of use is a violation of the most basic rules of international humanitarian law in addition to the fact that it threatens international peace and security'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Qatar should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Qatar should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3szh7gC>



Republic of Moldova



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Moldova voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Moldova maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Moldova should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	40%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Rwanda



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In December 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Rwanda advised that it is undergoing consultations with relevant national authorities on the question of Rwanda's signature and ratification of the TPNW.¹

Rwanda maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Rwanda did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 but voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty in 2018, 2020, and 2021.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Rwanda associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Rwanda should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ Report from ICAN's partner organization in Rwanda, Association des Jeunes de Saint Charles Lwanga (AJECL), 7 December 2021

² <https://bit.ly/3ICZvWT>



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Government officials indicated in November 2021 that Senegal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of the Interior were engaged in consultations on the TPNW.¹

Senegal voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021, when it was also a co-sponsor of the resolution.

Senegal maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Senegal reiterated its commitment to preservation of the NPT but also to the entry into force of the TPNW and CTBT and added that for these to be effective, nuclear-armed states must act.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Senegal should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ Communications from the Permanent Mission of Senegal to the UN to ICAN, 2 November 2021

² <https://bit.ly/3m0CG3S>



Sierra Leone



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Sierra Leone said that it 'remains committed to the signing and ratification of the TPNW'.

In the statement, Sierra Leone also said that it was 'pleased with the progress made so far with the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons' but noted that 'more remains to be done, especially by nuclear-weapon states, as less progress has been made on nuclear disarmament'.¹

Sierra Leone voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Sierra Leone maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sierra Leone should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Sierra Leone should bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No (Approved June 2021)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C5WThl>



Solomon Islands



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DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

It is believed that the government of Solomon Islands is considering accession to the TPNW. Solomon Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Solomon Islands maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the 2020 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Solomon Islands associated itself with a statement by the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), which said: 'The world does not need nuclear weapons. The challenges of nuclear disarmament can only be resolved by a strengthened multilateral system that sets the conditions for transparency, confidence-building and co-operation. The NPT, the CTBT and the TPNW are crucial if we are to further the objective of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Today, we PSIDSs say no to nuclear weapons, and we reiterate our commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. We encourage member states to ratify the CTBT and the TPNW. It is morally right, and we owe it to ourselves and our future generations.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Solomon Islands should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Solomon Islands should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol. Solomon Islands should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible





Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/36QVwUU>

			
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Somalia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. In 2021, Somalia for the first time voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW. In the previous years, it had not cast a vote.

Somalia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Somalia associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Somalia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Somalia should conclude and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Somalia should also sign and ratify the CTBT, and ratify the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	No
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3lCc58y>



South Sudan



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in February 2020 that South Sudan supports the TPNW and the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons and intends to become a State party 'in due course'.¹

South Sudan participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. In 2021, it voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW for the first time. In previous years, it had not cast a vote.

South Sudan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- South Sudan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- South Sudan should conclude and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. South Sudan should also adhere to the NPT, the CTBT, the BWC, and the CWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	No
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	No (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	No
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ Meeting between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Sudan and ICAN in Geneva, 27 February 2020.



Sri Lanka



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

On 20 December 2021, Sri Lanka's cabinet of ministers 'agreed to the proposal submitted by the minister of foreign affairs to sign the [TPNW] and to initiate the applicable national legal formulation review with the objective of finalising the ratification process as soon as possible'.¹

Sri Lanka voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Sri Lanka maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sri Lanka should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Sri Lanka should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Sri Lanka should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No (Approved 2018)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3syNNXD>



Suriname



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In September 2021, the Foreign Minister of Suriname, Albert Ramdin, stated: 'The TPNW is currently under consideration.' Suriname voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Suriname maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Suriname associated itself with a declaration issued by OPANAL on the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2021. In this statement, the 33 member states of OPANAL reiterated 'the call upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defence doctrines', recalled 'their participation in the adoption and recent entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,' and considered 'that, with the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, for the first time joins the path towards the total elimination of those weapons of mass destruction, in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner and within clearly established time frame, that have marked the [Treaty of Tlatelolco] and the [NPT].' The statement also noted that the TPNW, Treaty of Tlatelolco, NPT and CTBT, once in force, 'are not mere declarations of intention, since they are a suitable legal basis for the process aimed at completely eliminating all nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner forever.'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Suriname should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Suriname should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ Letter to ICAN, 8 September 2021, <https://bit.ly/3HMebln>

² <https://bit.ly/3hMliP3>



Tunisia



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Tunisia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Tunisia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Tunisia welcomed the TPNW's entry into force and said that it strengthens the NPT.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tunisia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Tunisia should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFEZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2005)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C2VMzg>



Turkmenistan



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

It is believed that the issue of accession to the TPNW is under the consideration of the government of Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty. In 2021 it was also was one of the co-sponsors of the resolution.

Turkmenistan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Turkmenistan associated itself with a statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which said: 'Being a staunch proponent of multilateral diplomacy, the Non-Aligned Movement reiterate its determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The Movement takes note of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021. It is hoped that the Treaty would contribute to furthering the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Turkmenistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C7Gw4f>



Uganda



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In October 2021, a parliamentary motion urging the government to sign and ratify the TPNW was referred to Uganda's foreign affairs committee. Uganda voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Uganda maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Speaking in the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Uganda, John Mulimba, said that Uganda welcomed the adoption of the 'landmark' TPNW, 'which complements other existing international instruments, like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Uganda should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	29%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vwbZM1>

² <https://bit.ly/3vsHXJj>



United Arab Emirates



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

The UAE maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

The UAE associated itself with a statement by the Arab Group in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which welcomed the TPNW and said the Treaty 'places nuclear weapons in its logical place as weapons whose possession or use or threat of use is a violation of the most basic rules of international humanitarian law in addition to the fact that it threatens international peace and security'.¹

In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, the UAE said that it 'supports all international efforts aimed to support progress in achieving the common goal of establishing a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We also express our concern regarding the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, and the continuous instances of noncompliance with the regime of nuclear non-proliferation'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The UAE should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	14%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/348ZCug>

² <https://bit.ly/33d8cEG>



Uzbekistan



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Uzbekistan did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2019, 2020, and 2021.

Uzbekistan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the 2021 UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Uzbekistan associated itself with a statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which said: 'Being a staunch proponent of multilateral diplomacy, the Non-Aligned Movement reiterate its determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The Movement takes note of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021. It is hoped that the Treaty would contribute to furthering the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Uzbekistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3hypR06>



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Yemen voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Yemen maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Yemen's government has said that it is not currently in a position to accede to the TPNW due to its internal situation.

Yemen associated itself with a statement by the Arab Group in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which welcomed the TPNW and said the Treaty 'places nuclear weapons in its logical place as weapons whose possession or use or threat of use is a violation of the most basic rules of international humanitarian law in addition to the fact that it threatens international peace and security'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Yemen should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Yemen should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol. Yemen should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3lDaUFU>



Argentina



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Argentina voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017, but has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Argentina has repeatedly said that it is continuing its analysis of the TPNW and supports its objective.¹

Argentina maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Argentina should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Argentina should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	40%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C95pg3>



Armenia

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH RUSSIA)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Armenia is deemed to be part of an arrangement of extended nuclear deterrence. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

Armenia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Armenian officials have indicated that the issue of adhering to the TPNW is not currently on the government's political agenda.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Armenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Armenia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	0%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Belarus

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH RUSSIA)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Belarus did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 but has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021. Although Belarus therefore meets the criteria set by the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor for inclusion in the undecided category, the statements in 2021 of its president Alexander Lukashenko clearly demonstrate support for nuclear weapons.

In an interview on 30 November 2021, Lukashenko said that Belarus is willing to host Russian nuclear weapons.¹

As an umbrella state, Belarus may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Belarus should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Belarus should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Belarus should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Not compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No (Signed 2005)
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	100–1,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3yk9sE6>



Djibouti



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Djibouti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. In 2021, for the first time, it abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW. In previous years, it had voted in favour of these resolutions.

Djibouti maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Djibouti associated itself with a statement by the African Group which said: 'Given the slow progress and frustration that has characterized nuclear disarmament for so many years, the TPNW marks a watershed in the drive to rid the world of nuclear weapons. [...] It is our hope that the nuclear weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella would seize this opportunity to sign and ratify the treaty as well as pursue the goal of a nuclear weapon free world'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Djibouti should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Djibouti should also adhere to the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	25%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sBNjjF>



Finland



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In June 2021, the Parliament of Finland adopted a policy 'to continue analysing' the TPNW, and the government confirmed its intention to participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty in 2022.¹

Three of the five political parties that form the coalition government in Finland have expressed their support for the TPNW: the Social Democratic Party, the Green League, and the Left Alliance.² The former Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja has called on the government to join the TPNW.³

Since 1987 Finland has had national legislation in place (in its Nuclear Energy Act) which forbids the importation, manufacturing, possession and detonation of nuclear explosive devices in Finland.⁴

Finland did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Finland maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Finland should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3sAwzZP>

² <https://bit.ly/3pydEgp>

³ <https://bit.ly/3meEw16>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/3i3oZiB>



Georgia



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Georgia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Georgia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Speaking in the General Debate of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Georgia's Prime Minister, Giorgi Gakharia, did not touch upon the TPNW, but reflected on the need for global cooperation on common challenges, when he said: 'It has been voiced repeatedly here that all UN member states are equal, and the pandemic has made this clear; it showed us that in the face of common adversity, we must unite and use the unique capabilities of each state.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Georgia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/39d0ail>



Kyrgyzstan



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Kyrgyzstan participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. The government has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Kyrgyzstan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

On behalf of the states parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan delivered a statement in the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, where it stressed that ‘for the states of Central Asia, the establishment of a zone was a practical necessity, driven by the need to ensure that the people of our region will never again suffer the consequences of a nuclear arms race.’¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kyrgyzstan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Kyrgyzstan should upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3l3fOQb>



Marshall Islands



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Marshall Islands announced in September 2021 that it is 'still studying' the TPNW and plans to participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty, in particular, 'to see what concrete victim assistance provisions actually come forward by states parties and if they are at scale'.¹

The Marshall Islands also participated as an observer in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties.²

The Marshall Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Marshall Islands should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- The Marshall Islands should request that the United States cease testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Kwajalein Atoll.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3pyt3NT>

² <https://bit.ly/3Mh5JO7>



Saudi Arabia



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Saudi Arabia has explicitly threatened to swiftly acquire nuclear weapons should Iran do so. Thus, if Saudi Arabia were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the Treaty's prohibition on development of nuclear weapons, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor has therefore listed Saudi Arabia as a state of concern.

Saudi Arabia possesses a sizable stockpile of mineable uranium ore; has announced an intention to build several nuclear reactors across the country; and possesses several types of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear warheads. While these factors do not necessarily indicate the country's interest in developing nuclear weapons at this time, Saudi Arabia's Small Quantities Protocol exempts the country from IAEA monitoring and inspections obligations, which increases ambiguity around the country's nuclear intentions and capabilities.

Saudi Arabia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. After having voted in favour of the previous annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, Saudi Arabia abstained on the vote in 2021.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saudi Arabia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Saudi Arabia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and rescind its Small Quantities Protocol. Saudi Arabia should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	25%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Of concern
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Serbia



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Serbia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Serbia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Serbia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Singapore



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Singapore participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but was the only state to abstain on the vote when the Treaty was adopted. The government has also consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Singapore maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

The Permanent Mission of Singapore to the United Nations said in February 2021 that there had 'been no changes to Singapore's position' on the TPNW.¹

Singapore associated itself with a statement on behalf of ASEAN in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, which said that the TPNW 'is a historic agreement which contributes towards nuclear disarmament and complements other existing instruments'.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Singapore should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	17%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Abstained

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes





Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ Email from the Permanent Mission of Singapore to the UN to ICAN, 16 February 2021

² <https://bit.ly/3tsoypj>

			
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Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Sweden maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In February 2021, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Ann Linde, informed the Swedish parliament that Sweden would attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022 as an observer.¹ In November 2021, the governing Swedish Social Democratic Party adopted a platform in which it stated unequivocally that ‘the goal is that Sweden will join’ the TPNW.² This followed the tabling of 48 motions in favour of Sweden’s accession to the TPNW and a public appeal by one hundred prominent members of the party.³ In July 2019, the Swedish government announced that it would ‘refrain from signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the present time.’⁴ It has also indicated that Sweden might reassess its position following the NPT review conference, which is scheduled for 2022.

Sweden has launched the Stockholm Initiative, which is aimed at unlocking disarmament diplomacy through constructive engagement and a ‘stepping stones’ approach.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sweden should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

1 <https://bit.ly/3psKD5W>
 2 <https://bit.ly/3trwtTs>
 3 <https://bit.ly/345KvSa>
 4 <https://bit.ly/2kr6r3l>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	45%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Switzerland



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Switzerland voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Switzerland maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Switzerland said that it will participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022. It added: 'Irrespective of the still open question of Switzerland's accession to the TPNW, we are ready to contribute to a constructive relationship between the NPT and the TPNW. We also emphasise that the humanitarian consequences must remain a driving force for nuclear disarmament.'¹

In June 2018, the Swiss Government published an interdepartmental working group (IDAG) report on the implications of accession to the TPNW. 'At the current stage', the report concluded, 'the reasons against an accession of Switzerland outweigh the potential opportunities accompanying a signature and ratification of this treaty.' Both houses of the Swiss Parliament subsequently instructed the government to sign and ratify without delay.² The Swiss Government plans to update the IDAG report and review its decision after the NPT Review Conference, to be held in 2022, and contends that this fulfils the mandate given by Parliament. Parliament and NGOs disagree.

Responding to a question in Parliament on 16 March 2021, the head of the foreign ministry, Ignazio Cassis, said that 'there will be no problem in joining this treaty' if concerns expressed by some other states about the Treaty's impact on the NPT are 'abandoned'.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Switzerland should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C63yIP>

² <https://bit.ly/2kTeiqI>

³ <https://bit.ly/3pvHEte>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	14%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/Less than 2 kg



Syrian Arab Republic



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Syria participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. It has also never cast a vote on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW.

Syria maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Syria should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Syria should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Syria should also sign and ratify the CTBT and ratify the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	11%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	About 1 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Tajikistan



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Tajikistan participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Tajikistan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Tajikistan associated itself with a statement delivered in the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly on behalf of the states parties to the NWFZ Treaty in Central Asia, which stressed that 'for the states of Central Asia, the establishment of a zone was a practical necessity, driven by the need to ensure that the people of our region will never again suffer the consequences of a nuclear arms race.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tajikistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	No data available
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3l3fOQb>



Tonga



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

In September 2021, the government of Tonga said that the question of Tonga's accession to the TPNW was being discussed 'at the highest level'.¹

Tonga participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.²

Tonga maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without the need for a change in conduct.

Tonga voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. It abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty in 2020 and 2021.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tonga should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Tonga should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Tonga should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Did not vote
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	33%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted yes

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ Communications from the government of Tonga to ICAN, 7 September 2021

² <https://bit.ly/3Mh5JO7>



Ukraine



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Ukraine did not participate in the negotiations on the TPNW in 2017 and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Ukraine maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without the need for a change in conduct.

In a statement to the 2020 UN General Assembly, Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelensky, said: 'Consider also this. Coronavirus spares no one. It does not care whether the country has nuclear weapons or what is the level of its GDP, [...] The COVID-19 showed that global world is not just the world without borders. It is also about global responsibility, when counteracting joint threats should involve not 7, not 20, but at least 193 countries.' He also said: 'We don't have a planet B. We live here and just once.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ukraine should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2KCyfyC>



Albania

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Albania boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

Albania may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The former Albanian president Rexhep Meidani and former prime ministers Ylli Bufi and Fatos Nano were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Albania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Albania should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3HzqQHZ>



Australia

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Australia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

The current Liberal-National government in Australia opposes the TPNW, arguing that the Treaty 'seeks to delegitimise extended deterrence' and 'would be inconsistent with our US alliance obligations'.¹ The opposition Labor Party in 2018 made a formal commitment to 'sign and ratify the Ban treaty' when in government, after taking into account the need to ensure complementarity with the NPT and an effective verification and enforcement architecture.² It reaffirmed this commitment in 2021. A federal election in Australia is expected no later than May 2022. More than 90 federal parliamentarians in Australia (around 40% of the parliament) have signed ICAN's Parliamentary Pledge. Canberra, Melbourne, and Sydney are among close to 40 cities in Australia that have committed to ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Australia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Australia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/2mX63ek>

² <https://bit.ly/2mmfEdT>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	1–10 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Belgium

UMBRELLA STATE HOSTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Belgium boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Belgium may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In January 2020, a resolution urging the Belgian government to remove the US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory and join the TPNW was narrowly rejected by parliament (74 votes against and 66 votes in favour).¹ In September 2020, the country's new coalition government agreed on a government declaration which included a commitment to 'explore [...] how the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons can give new impetus to multilateral nuclear disarmament'.²

Four former prime ministers and foreign ministers of Belgium (Willy Claes, Erik Derycke, Yves Leterme and Guy Verhofstadt) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.³ A total of 39 cities and municipalities in Belgium have joined ICAN's Cities' Appeal. In September 2019, 152 Belgian mayors signed an open letter urging Belgium to join the TPNW.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Belgium should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Belgium should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3K2wGDl>
³ <https://bit.ly/3ICduvR>

² <https://bit.ly/3HsC6pG>
⁴ <https://bit.ly/31JwyF5>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Not compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	100–1,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/Less than 50 kg



Bosnia and Herzegovina



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a nuclear-weapons-free defence posture and maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. It can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need to make changes in its conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bosnia and Herzegovina should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021


(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Bulgaria

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Bulgaria boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Bulgaria may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In the First Committee of the 2018 UN General Assembly, Bulgaria, on behalf of a number of countries, argued that the TPNW will not contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bulgaria should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Bulgaria should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3Cdms0s>



Canada

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Canada boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Canada may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In a written statement on 26 October 2020, Global Affairs Canada said: 'We acknowledge the widespread frustration with the pace of global efforts toward nuclear disarmament, which clearly motivated the negotiation of the TPNW.'¹ A month earlier, two former Canadian prime ministers (Jean Chrétien, the now late John Turner), three former foreign ministers (Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham, John Manley) and two former defence ministers (Jean-Jacques Blais, John McCallum) were among the signatories to an open letter calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.²

Toronto and Vancouver are among ten Canadian cities that have committed to ICAN's Cities Appeal. Polling in 2021 showed high levels of public support for the TPNW in Canada.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Canada should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Canada should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3hslvD0>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	1000–10,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



China

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

China boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, China, together with France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- China should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- China should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. China should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. China should also ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Voluntary offer agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Partial
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	14,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	2,900 kg/40 kg

¹ <https://bit.ly/3rHaetn>

CHINA'S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS INVENTORY AT THE BEGINNING OF 2022

Estimated total inventory of warheads:	350 ↑
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement:	0
Usable stockpile of warheads:	350 ↑
Total yield of usable stockpile:	148 MT, or 9,887 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents

China keeps nearly all of its warheads at a central storage facility and likely does not normally mate them with their delivery vehicles during peacetime, although some missile training with warheads is thought to have begun recently. A breakdown is provided below of China's warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned.



Approximately 60 warheads are assigned to China's 20 siloed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including the DF-5A and DF-5B. The former is capable of carrying a single warhead to a range of up to 12,000 km, while the latter can carry up to five multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) to a range of up to 13,000 km.



Approximately 138 warheads are assigned to China's mobile ICBMs, including the DF-4, DF-31/A/AG, and DF-41. These ICBMs can deliver warheads to distances between 5,500 km and 12,000 km.



Approximately 60 warheads are assigned to China's sizable arsenal of dual-capable mobile medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21A/E and DF-26. These missiles can deliver warheads to ranges in excess of 2,100 kilometres and 4,000 kilometres, respectively.



Approximately 72 warheads are assigned to China's six operational *Jin*-class Type 094/A ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each of which are capable of launching up to 12 JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Each missile can carry one warhead.

Approximately 20 gravity bombs and/or air-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads may be assigned to the People's Liberation Army Air Force for delivery by China's H-6 heavy bombers.

DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN 2021

China's nuclear stockpile is expected to increase significantly in the next decade, but is expected to remain significantly smaller than that of either Russia or the United States. The growth of China's nuclear arsenal is dominated by the construction of more than 300 ballistic missiles silos, additional ballistic missile submarines, and new bombers.

LAND

Commercial satellite imagery indicates that China appears to be building more than 300 missile silos in three distinct complexes across northern China.¹ This would constitute the most significant expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal ever. These silos could be filled with new DF-41 or DF-31A ICBMs, although it remains unclear how China intends to operationalize the silos, whether it intends to fill all of them with missiles, and how many warheads will be assigned to each missile.

China is upgrading its older liquid-fuelled, silo-based DF-5 ICBMs; one version (known as the DF-5B) has been modified to carry up to five MIRVs, and China also appears to be developing a newer version, the DF-5C.²

In 2021, US officials announced that China might be building a new 'long-range' DF-27 ballistic missile, which could have a range between 5,000 and 8,000 kilometres.³

China is developing and deploying several new types of ICBM, including the DF-31AG and DF-41, the latter of which is likely to carry MIRVs.

China is significantly increasing its arsenal of dual-capable medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21 and DF-26, although most of these are thought to serve a conventional role. A new missile carrying a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle – the DF-17 – is also being integrated into several brigades, although it is unclear at this stage whether the system will be assigned a nuclear mission.

SEA

In addition to its fifth and sixth *Jin*-class (Type 094) SSBNs added in 2021, China has begun construction of a quieter SSBN class, known as Type 096.⁴ This new class of submarine will eventually be deployed with a new type of SLBM, the JL-3, whose extended range would allow China to target the north-west of the continental United States and all of Europe from Chinese waters. US officials suggest that the JL-3 will be capable of carrying MIRVs.⁵

AIR

To replace its current bomber fleet, China is developing a new nuclear-capable bomber, the H-20, with enhanced range and stealth capabilities. Production on the new aircraft will likely begin within the next decade.

China is developing at least one new – and possibly dual-capable – air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) for its newly-upgraded H-6N bomber. According to the US Department of Defense, this capability will 'for the first time, provide China with a viable nuclear triad of delivery systems dispersed across land, sea, and air forces'.⁶

1 M. Korda and H. M. Kristensen, 'A Closer Look at China's Missile Silo Construction,' FAS Strategic Stability Blog, 2 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3v3Zx6a>.

2 US Department of Defense, 'Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,' Office of the Secretary of Defense, 3 November 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3sSqlDG>, pp. 61–62.

3 Ibid.

4 H. I. Sutton, 'First Image Of China's New Nuclear Submarine Under Construction,' *Naval News*, 1 February 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3v9JiV2>.

5 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 'Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,' US Air Force, January 2020, p. 33, at: <https://bit.ly/3vfW8RE>.

6 US Department of Defense, 'Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,' Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2 May 2019, at: <https://bit.ly/3LRVqzU>, p. 67.



Croatia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Croatia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Croatia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The former Croatian foreign ministers Zdravko Mršić and Vesna Pusić were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Croatia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Croatia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Czechia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Czechia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Czechia may sign and ratify or accede the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

Jan Kavan, a former Czech foreign minister and former president of the UN General Assembly, was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Czechia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Czechia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Democratic People's Republic of Korea

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

North Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

North Korea is the only state to have tested a nuclear weapon in the 21st century.

After having abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018 and 2019, North Korea voted against in 2020 and 2021.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- North Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- North Korea should return to the NPT regime. North Korea should implement its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol. North Korea should also adhere to the CTBT and the CWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Abstained
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	No
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	No (1985-2003)
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes


IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes (Not implemented)
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	700 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	40 kg/No

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS INVENTORY AT BEGINNING OF 2022

Estimated total inventory of warheads:	20 ↑
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement:	0
Usable stockpile of warheads:	20 ↑
Total yield of usable stockpile:	1.3 MT, or 87 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents

There is great uncertainty surrounding North Korea's stockpile. North Korea is thought to have enough fissile material to produce between 40 and 50 warheads, but has probably produced considerably fewer, perhaps around 20. It is also currently unclear how many operational delivery vehicles North Korea possesses and which of these would be assigned a nuclear mission.



North Korea's estimated 20 warheads are thought to be assigned to its arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles. These potentially include the short-range, modernized *Hwasong-5* and *Hwasong-6*; the medium-range *Hwasong-7*, *Hwasong-9*, and *Pukguksong-2*; the intermediate-range *Hwasong-10* and *Hwasong-12*; and the intercontinental *Hwasong-14*, *Hwasong-15*, and *Hwasong-17* ballistic missiles. The operational nuclear capability of these systems is uncertain.



North Korea has one ballistic missile submarine (SSB), which has been used for test launches of nuclear-capable missiles like the *Pukguksong-1* and -3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), but it is not considered operational.

DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN 2021

After developing a rudimentary long-range nuclear strike capability, North Korea now appears to be developing new types of shorter-range, solid-fuel missiles to potentially enable a strategy of regional nuclear warfighting.

LAND

North Korea is building new missile bases and modernizing existing ones to incorporate additional missile types.¹

In September 2021, North Korea launched two *KN23* SRBMs using a rail-mobile launcher for the first time. Following the successful test, North Korea announced its intention to create a brigade of rail-mobile missiles.² This would allow them to move missiles around the country quickly and conduct rapid strikes from hidden locations.

In September 2021, North Korea tested a new missile called the *Hwasong-8*, which appeared to include a hypersonic glide vehicle. The *Hwasong-8* is reportedly the first North Korean missile to be 'ampoulized', which allows pre-fuelled missiles to be stored in temperature-controlled canisters to facilitate faster launches.³

In September 2021, North Korea tested a new land-attack cruise missile to a range of 1,500 kilometres.⁴ Given that this system is designed to circumvent radars or missile defence systems, it could offer North Korea a new and unique capability to attack regional targets.

North Korea is developing a new liquid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), known as the *Hwasong-17*, which is significantly larger than the country's previous ICBMs. If it is eventually deployed, it is possible that the missile could deliver a large warhead – or potentially a small number of multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) with penetration aids – to the continental United States.

SEA

North Korea is developing several new types of solid-fuelled SLBMs, including the *Pukguksong-3*, *Pukguksong-4*, and *Pukguksong-5*. The *Pukguksong-5* was unveiled for the first time at a January 2021 military parade. The larger lengths and diameters of these missiles could indicate that North Korea is working towards the capability for its SLBMs to carry penetration aids or perhaps even multiple warheads to longer ranges.⁵

In October 2021, North Korea tested a 'new type' of smaller SLBM with an unknown designation to a range of 590 kilometres. The missile appears to bear similar characteristics to North Korea's newer SRBM designs.⁶

North Korea is developing a new *Sinpo-C* submarine, which is expected to have at least three launch tubes. The UN Panel of Experts estimates that given the size of the new *Sinpo-C* and the expansion of the Sinpo South shipyard, three submarines could potentially be built concurrently.⁷

1 For additional information about North Korea's missile base modernizations, see: 'Beyond Parallel', Center for Strategic and International Studies, at: <https://bit.ly/3BJJxY4>.

2 KCNA, 'Secretary Pak Jong Chon guides launching drill of Railway Mobile Missile Regiment for inspection', 16 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3JM2cW5>.

3 KCNA, 'Hypersonic Missile Newly Developed by Academy of Defence Science Test-fired', 30 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3H9HAp5>.

4 M. J. Kim, 'North Korea says it has tested a new long-range cruise missile', *Washington Post*, 13 September 2021, at: <https://wapo.st/35ix8yc>.

5 United Nations, 'Letter Dated 2 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) Addressed to the President of the Security Council', 2 March 2021, p. S/2021/211, 21-01747, p. 96/419, at: <https://bit.ly/3JPj0f8>.

6 T. Xu, 'Brief on the 19 October 2021 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea', Open Nuclear Network, 21 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3sbF50Y>.

7 United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts, Report, UN doc. S/2020/151, 2 March 2020, Annex 60, at: <https://bit.ly/3lgbFVw>.



Denmark

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Denmark boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Denmark may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

On 25 June 2021, the Foreign Minister of Denmark, Jeppe Kofod, confirmed that there is no legal barrier to Denmark's accession to the TPNW. However, it would breach NATO 'solidarity', he informed a parliamentary committee.¹

Three former Danish foreign ministers (Mogens Lykketoft, Holger K. Nielsen and Kjeld Olesen) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.²

Polling in 2021 showed high levels of public support for the TPNW in Denmark.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Denmark should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Denmark should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3HJI9rT>
² <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>
³ <https://bit.ly/3pZDSJr>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Estonia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Estonia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Estonia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Estonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Estonia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



France

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

France boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, France, together with China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.¹

In July 2018, an information mission set up by the parliamentary foreign affairs commission concluded that France should 'mitigate its criticism' of the TPNW 'and the countries that have contributed to its adoption, to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of States and their desire for more balanced global governance.'²

Paris and a dozen other French cities have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- France should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- France should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. France should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Not compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Voluntary offer agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Partial
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	30,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	6,000 kg/74,700 kg


¹ <https://bit.ly/3rHaetn>

² <https://bit.ly/3C50yuq>


FRANCE’S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS INVENTORY AT THE BEGINNING OF 2022

Estimated total inventory of warheads:	290
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement:	0
Usable stockpile of warheads:	290
Total yield of usable stockpile:	29 MT, or 1,933 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents


Of France’s stockpile, 280 warheads are thought to be operationally available for deployment, while the remaining 10 are in storage. A breakdown is provided below of France’s warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned.



Approximately 240 TNO warheads are assigned to France’s four ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) for delivery by a total of 48 M51.2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). France maintains a policy of continuous at-sea deterrence, meaning that at least one of its SSBNs – capable of carrying up to 16 missiles – is on deterrence patrol with nuclear weapons on alert status at all times. One or two other operational boats can deploy on relatively short notice, while the fourth boat is in refit.



An estimated 10 TNA warheads on medium-range ASMP-A air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) are assigned to the Rafale MF3 aircraft on the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier. Under normal circumstances these warheads are stored on land.



Approximately 40 TNA warheads on ASMP-A ALCMs are assigned to two squadrons of Rafale BF3 aircraft of the French Air and Space Force.

DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN 2021

France is modernizing both of its nuclear delivery systems – its SLBMs and ALCMs – and has also recently begun a programme to build a new fleet of SSBNs. This programme is expected to keep nuclear weapons in the French arsenal until at least 2070.

SEA

France's programme to replace its current SSBNs with a new class (currently known as the SNLE 3G) was officially launched in early 2021. Construction of the first submarine is scheduled to begin in 2023.¹

France is modernizing its SLBMs and associated warheads, and has just completed the replacement of its older M45 and M51.1 SLBMs with newer M51.2 SLBMs, which are designed to carry TNO warheads.

France is also planning to replace the newer M51.2 SLBMs with an enhanced version (the M51.3) in 2025.

AIR

France is conducting a mid-life refurbishment programme for its medium-range air-to-surface ASMP-A cruise missiles, which will be completed in the early 2020s. A replacement missile, the ASN4G, is scheduled to replace the ASMP-A in 2035.²

¹ X. Vavasseur, 'France Launches Third Generation Ssbn Program – SNLE 3G,' *Naval News*, 21 February 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/36CijTn>.

² French Ministry of the Armed Forces, 'Projet de loi de programmation militaire, 2019–2025', February 2018, at: <https://bit.ly/3HaQW3Z>.



Germany

UMBRELLA STATE HOSTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Germany boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Germany may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In November 2021, three political parties in Germany reached an agreement for the formation of a new government. The agreement committed Germany to participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022. While committing to uphold a 'credible deterrent capability' in the alliance, the coalition government also reiterates the goal of Global Zero and a Germany free of nuclear weapons.¹ The party programme of the Green Party, which is part of the government coalition, confirms that it is a foreign policy priority for the Green Party to get Germany to join the TPNW.² 168 federal parliamentarians have signed the ICAN Parliamentary Pledge. A cross-party working group on the TPNW (Parlamentskreis Atomwaffenverbot) was established in the Parliament in September 2019.³ The former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer and former defence minister Rudolf Scharping were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Germany should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Germany should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3vAYPC>

³ <https://bit.ly/2ojf2GU>

² <https://bit.ly/3tgV16u>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Not compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	100–1,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Greece

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Greece boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Greece may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The former Greek foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Greece should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Greece should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Hungary

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Hungary boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Hungary may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The former Hungarian defence minister Szekeres Imre was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Hungary should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Hungary should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Iceland

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Iceland boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Iceland may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In Iceland's Parliament, the Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, and Pirate Party are supportive of the TPNW.

The former Icelandic prime minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir and former foreign ministers Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir and Össur Skarphéðinsson were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

Polling in 2021 showed high levels of support for the TPNW in Iceland.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Iceland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Iceland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>

² <https://bit.ly/3pZDSJr>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



India

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

India boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

In First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, India said that it did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and therefore will not join the Treaty or be bound by its obligations. It further said that the TPNW does not constitute or contribute to customary international law.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- India should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. India should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. India should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Partial
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	5,200 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	600 kg/8,200 kg

¹ <https://bit.ly/3kX0fsZ>

INDIA'S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS INVENTORY AT THE BEGINNING OF 2022

Estimated total inventory of warheads:	160 ↑
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement:	0
Usable stockpile of warheads:	160 ↑
Total yield of usable stockpile:	3.9 MT, or 260 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents

Of India's stockpile, approximately 128 warheads are thought to be available for use by operational delivery vehicles, but kept in central storage under normal circumstances. A breakdown is provided below of the delivery vehicles to which they are assigned. The remaining 32 warheads are thought to have been produced to eventually arm India's newer land- and submarine-launched ballistic missile systems, which are nearing deployment.



Approximately 64 warheads are assigned to India's operational arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, including the short-range *Prithvi-II* and *Agni-I*, the medium-range *Agni-II*, and the intermediate-range *Agni-III*.



Approximately 12 warheads are assigned to India's one operational ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) – *INS Arihant* – which is capable of carrying up to 12 K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).



The Indian Navy also operates a small number of short-range ballistic missiles (perhaps four) for two surface ships, although this system is expected to be retired as the SSBN fleet matures.



Approximately 48 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are assigned to India's Mirage and Jaguar fighter-bomber aircraft.

DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN 2021

India is in the midst of completing and operationalizing its nascent nuclear triad, and is modernizing its existing nuclear forces to place increased emphasis on prompt missile launches.

LAND

India is in the process of developing several longer-range ballistic missiles that will increase coverage of Pakistan and China from deeper inside India.

Deployment of the intermedium-range rail-mobile *Agni III* has begun. It will be followed by the intermediate-range road-mobile *Agni V*, which is nearing operational status and will be capable of targeting most of China.¹ Unlike earlier versions of *Agni* missiles, *Agni V* will be deployed in a new mobile canister system, which will reduce the time required to launch the missile in a crisis because it can be transported with the warhead installed.

India is also developing a new canistered medium-range road-mobile missile, known as *Agni-P*, which the Indian Ministry of Defence calls a 'Next-Generation Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile'.² The *Agni P* might eventually replace India's current *Agni I* and *Agni II* missiles.³

India is also thought to be developing an intercontinental-range missile known as the *Agni VI*.

SEA

India is further developing the naval component of its nascent nuclear triad, as it prepared to commission its second SSBN – the *INS Arighat* – in early 2022.⁴ The second SSBN will also be able to carry up to 12 K-15 SLBMs (3 missiles in each tube), but a third SSBN launched in 2021 has eight launch tubes.

To replace the short-range K-15, India is developing a new series of SLBMs, including the 3,500-kilometre-range K-4, the 5,000-kilometre-range K-5, and potentially even a longer range K-6.

AIR

India is in the process of receiving 36 Rafale aircraft from France; the final aircraft was scheduled in January 2022.⁵ The Rafale is used for the nuclear strike mission in the French Air Force and might eventually take over the nuclear strike role in the Indian Air Force.

1 S. Gupta, 'Strategic Forces Command conducts Agni V trial, hits target 5,000 km away', *Hindustan Times*, 28 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3BFxAmm>.

2 Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD), 'DRDO successfully flight tests New Generation Agni P Ballistic Missile', 28 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3sbCAw4>; H. K. Rout, 'India test fires new generation nuclear capable Agni-Prime missile off Odisha coast', *The New Indian Express*, 28 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3LROyxM>.

3 S. A. Philip, 'Agni Prime is the new missile in India's nuclear arsenal. This is why it's special', *The Print*, 30 June 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3lfbUQr>; L. Zhen, 'India's latest Agni-P missile no great threat to China: experts', *South China Morning Post*, 1 July 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3BEUSZH>.

4 S. Gupta, 'PM Modi to discuss maritime security as Indian Navy set to enhance its sea-power', *Hindustan Times*, 9 August 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3sbQQVs>.

5 S. Gupta, 'France to deliver 35 Rafales by 2021-end, a solo fighter will join in Jan 2022', *Hindustan Times*, 27 July 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3v9OGYh>; S. Gupta, '36th Rafale to have all India specific enhancements, arrives Jan 2022', *Hindustan Times*, 10 September 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3sacdX4>; Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD), 'Year End Review - 2020 Ministry of Defence', 1 January 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3h3Vq1M>.



Israel

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Israel boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

In a statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Israel spoke of the TPNW and said that it has 'deep reservations regarding this initiative ... based on substantive as well as procedural considerations'. It emphasised that the TPNW's entry into force 'is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it, hence Israel is not obliged by it in any way'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Israel should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Israel should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and conclude and bring into force and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Israel should also ratify the CTBT and the CWC, and adhere to the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	No (Signatory)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	300 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	900 kg/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/339OzQS>

ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS INVENTORY AT THE BEGINNING OF 2022

Estimated total inventory of warheads:	90
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement:	0
Usable stockpile of warheads:	90
Total yield of usable stockpile:	2.5 MT, or 167 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents

Unlike the other eight nuclear-armed states, Israel has not acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons. It is believed that Israel's warheads are stored partially disassembled without the nuclear cores and separate from the military, but the warheads could be assembled quickly in a nuclear crisis. A breakdown is provided below of Israel's warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned.



Approximately 50 warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel's arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, including the medium-range *Jericho II* and intermediate-range *Jericho III*.



Approximately 10 warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel's fleet of two *Dolphin II*-class attack submarines, for delivery by sea-launched cruise missiles.



Approximately 30 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel's F-16I and/or F-15I fighter-bomber aircraft.

DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN 2021

Although it is thought that the size of Israel's nuclear arsenal is largely stable, the country is modernizing its arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles and may be upgrading its plutonium and warhead production facility.

LAND

Israel is thought to be upgrading its *Jericho II* ballistic missile force to the *Jericho III* with construction visible at its missile base southwest of Jerusalem. Israel has conducted several rocket engine propulsion tests in recent years – including a likely test in 2021 – which could be related to the Jericho modernization programme.¹

AIR

As of September 2021, Israel had received 30 of its planned purchase of 50 F-35 aircraft from the United States, becoming the first non-US country to operate the aircraft.² The United States is upgrading its F-35s to carry nuclear weapons, although it is unclear whether the F-35 will eventually have a nuclear strike role in the Israeli Air Force.

GENERAL

Commercial satellite imagery indicates that Israel has begun a major construction project at its Negev Nuclear Research Center.³ The Dimona plutonium production reactor at the Center is nearing the end of its useful life and the construction could potentially be part of a life-extension programme.

¹ J. Lewis, 'Israeli Rocket Motor Test,' Arms Control Wonk website, 23 April 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/33T8DYg>.

² J. A. Gross, 'Israel receives 3 more F-35 fighter jets,' *Times of Israel*, 25 April 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3Hk3tCh>.

³ J. Gambrell, 'Secretive Israeli nuclear facility undergoes major project,' *Associated Press*, 25 February 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3JYGVZz>.



Italy

UMBRELLA STATE HOSTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Italy boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Italy may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In September 2017, the Italian parliament adopted a resolution committing the government to 'pursue a nuclear weapon free world' and 'in a way compatible with its NATO obligations and with the positioning of allied states, to explore the possibility of becoming a party to the legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons'.¹ The former Italian prime minister Enrico Letta and former foreign minister Franco Frattini were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.²

Polling in 2021 showed high levels of public support for the TPNW in Italy.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Italy should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Italy should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3IAmXDH>

² <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>

³ <https://bit.ly/3pZDSJr>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Not compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	100–1,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/Stored abroad



Japan

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Japan boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Japan may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

Japan's new prime minister, Fumio Kishida, a parliamentarian elected in Hiroshima, has stated a number of times that 'the TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons'.¹ The question of observing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW was highly debated before and during the general election which took place in October 2021 and subsequent Diet sessions, including by members of the coalition government.²

More than 600 local assemblies of some 1,700 municipalities throughout the country have adopted opinions urging the government to sign and ratify the treaty.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Japan should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Japan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3J7AVNB>

² <https://bit.ly/3J478oW>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	1,000–10,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/45,500 kg



Latvia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Latvia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Latvia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

Three former Latvian defence ministers (Tālav Jundzis, Linda Mūrniece, and Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Latvia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Latvia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Lithuania

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Lithuania boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Lithuania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In 2018, the Lithuanian delegation declared in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly that: 'Given the current geopolitical context, we do not agree that delegitimization of nuclear weapons is a realistic addition to the harmonization of the disarmament and security ends.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lithuania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Lithuania should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2m4sUne>



Luxembourg

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Luxembourg boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Luxembourg may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Luxembourg should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Luxembourg should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Micronesia



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Micronesia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Micronesia has a nuclear-weapons-free defence posture and maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. It can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Micronesia brought a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement into force with the IAEA in September 2021.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Micronesia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Micronesia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Micronesia should also adhere to the BWC.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Monaco



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Monaco participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Monaco has a nuclear-weapons-free defence posture and maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. It can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Monaco should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	67%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Montenegro

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Montenegro boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Montenegro may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Montenegro should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Montenegro should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Netherlands

UMBRELLA STATE HOSTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The Netherlands was the only umbrella state to participate in the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017 and the only state that voted against the adoption of the Treaty. It has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021.

The Dutch government coalition agreement states that 'While respecting our obligations to our allies, we will contribute to a world free of nuclear weapons'.¹ The Dutch parliament has been very vocal in its support to remove the nuclear weapons on its territory, and has adopted several motions explicitly calling on the government to do so.²

In 2021, a motion calling on the Netherlands to join the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW as an observer was defeated in parliament despite support from a majority of political parties.³ In 2018, the Dutch House of Representatives adopted a series of motions calling on the government to intensify its advocacy for nuclear disarmament, including to champion the TPNW within NATO and investigate the compatibility of the TPNW with existing Dutch legislation.⁴ In January 2019, the Dutch foreign and defence ministers informed the Dutch House of Representatives that there are no legal obstacles under Dutch law preventing the Netherlands from joining the TPNW.⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Netherlands should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of nuclear weapons.
- The Netherlands should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- The Netherlands should upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA.

1 <https://bit.ly/3vwjKT>
3 <https://bit.ly/3pt1HbT>
5 <https://bit.ly/2P730d7>

2 <https://bit.ly/3tY0vjV>,
4 <https://bit.ly/3LH0K9m>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	30%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Voted no

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Not compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Original)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	100–1,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/Stored abroad



North Macedonia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

North Macedonia joined NATO in 2021 without reserving itself from the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf. North Macedonia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. It has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW.

North Macedonia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- North Macedonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- North Macedonia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	50%
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	Did not vote

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Norway

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Norway started the initiative on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which resulted in a majority of states negotiating and adopting the TPNW. But Norway boycotted the negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

On 13 October 2021, Norway's newly elected Labour-led government published a coalition agreement committing Norway to participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022. It was the first member of NATO to make such a commitment.¹ Six of the nine political parties in Norway's parliament have adopted party programmes that say that Norway should sign and ratify the TPNW, while a seventh party has said that it should be a goal for Norway and other NATO states to do so.

Two former Norwegian prime ministers (Kjell Magne Bondevik, Thorbjørn Jagland), two former foreign ministers (Bjørn Tore Godal, Knut Vollebæk), and two former defence ministers (Eldbjørg Løwer, Anne-Grete Strøm Erichsen) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.² Norway's capital, Oslo, and 39 other Norwegian cities have endorsed ICAN's Cities Appeal. Polling in 2021 showed high levels of support for the TPNW in Norway.³ Norway may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Norway should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Norway should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/35JIPzz>

² <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>

³ <https://bit.ly/3JQgiqy>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	1–10 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No



Pakistan

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Pakistan boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Pakistan explained that it voted against the TPNW resolution because 'progress on nuclear disarmament and arms control can't be divorced from security challenges'.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Pakistan should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Pakistan should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and conclude and bring into force and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	No
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	3,900 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	410 kg/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/3ITFuQw>

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS INVENTORY AT THE BEGINNING OF 2022

Estimated total inventory of warheads:	165 ↑
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement:	0
Usable stockpile of warheads:	165 ↑
Total yield of usable stockpile:	3.1 MT, or 207 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents

Of Pakistan's stockpile, approximately 154 warheads are thought to be assigned to operational missiles and aircraft, but under normal circumstances are kept in central storage. A breakdown is provided below of these warheads by type of delivery vehicle. The remaining 11 or so warheads are thought to have been produced to eventually arm Pakistan's newer ballistic and cruise missile systems, which are nearing deployment.



Approximately 106 warheads are assigned to Pakistan's operational arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, including the short-range *Abdali*, *Ghaznavi*, *Shaheen-I*, and *NASR*, and the medium-range *Ghauri* and *Shaheen-II*.

Approximately 12 warheads are assigned to Pakistan's family of *Babur* ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which can be launched by transporter-erector-launchers.



Approximately 36 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are thought to be assigned to Pakistan's *Mirage* fighter-bomber aircraft.

DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN 2021

Pakistan's nuclear modernization programme places particular emphasis on developing several short-range, tactical nuclear-capable weapon systems, which, according to Pakistan, are specifically designed to deter India from launching large-scale conventional strikes or incursions against Pakistani territory.

LAND

Pakistan is developing a new medium-range, solid-fuelled ballistic missile known as *Ababeel*, which might be capable of carrying multiple warheads – possibly even multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) – to a distance of up to 2,200 kilometres.

In recent years, Pakistan has improved its ability to conduct salvo- and night-launches of its dual-capable ballistic missiles, including the *Ghaznavi*, *Shaheen-I*, and *NASR* short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and the *Ghauri* and *Shaheen-II* medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).

Pakistan is developing a new two-stage, solid-fuelled MRBM, known as the *Shaheen-III*, which would be capable of delivering either a single nuclear or conventional warhead to a range of up to 2,750 kilometres.¹

In December 2021, Pakistan tested an extended-range version of its dual-capable *Babur* GLCM. This was the system's first successful test since a failure in 2020.²

SEA

Pakistan is developing its *Babur-3* dual-capable sea-launched cruise missile. Once it becomes operational, they will most likely be deployed on existing *Agosta*-class attack submarines or the future *Hangor*-class attack submarines.

AIR

Pakistan is developing and testing a dual-capable *Ra'ad* air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) to reach targets at a distance of up to 350 kilometres, and a follow-on *Ra'ad II* system to reach targets up to 600 kilometres.

1 Inter Services Public Relations, 'Pakistan Conducted Successful Test of Shaheen-III,' Press Release No. PR12/2021-ISPR, 20 January 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3BFsE0Z>.

2 Inter Services Public Relations, 'Pakistan today conducted a successful test of an enhanced range version of the indigenously developed Babur Cruise Missile 1B,' Press Release PR-222/2021-ISPR, 21 December 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3LXkrKa>.



Poland

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Poland boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Poland may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former prime minister Hanna Suchocka, and former foreign ministers Andrzej Olechowski and Dariusz Rosati were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Poland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Poland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Portugal

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Portugal boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Portugal may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The former Portuguese defence minister Nuno Severiano Teixeira was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Portugal should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Portugal should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Republic of Korea

UMBRELLA STATE (BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

South Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

South Korea may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

Ban Ki-moon, a former foreign minister of South Korea and a former UN secretary-general, was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- South Korea should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- South Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Romania

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Romania boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Romania may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

According to the Romanian delegation to the 2018 NPT Preparatory Committee, '[a] viable road to nuclear disarmament in the current security environment should concentrate first and foremost on improving the geopolitical conditions.'¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Romania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Romania should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2mnh6N6>



Russian Federation

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Russia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Russia, together with China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.¹

In a national statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Russia said: 'We understand the views of those who advocate for an immediate and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons. We share the noble goal of achieving a nuclear-free world. At the same time, attempts to impose on the states that possess nuclear weapons a complete and unconditional elimination of their arsenals are hardly practicable without taking into account current strategic realities and legitimate security interests. For these reasons, we consider the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as misguided and counter-productive in its essence. It only aggravates the situation provoking deep divisions in the international community and undermining the foundations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).'²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. Russia should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Russia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Russia should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Russia should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3K7igIE>

² <https://bit.ly/3HyokSk>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Not compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Voluntary offer agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Partial
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	678,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	128,000 kg/63,000 kg

RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS INVENTORY AT THE BEGINNING OF 2022

Estimated total inventory of warheads:	5,977 ↓
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement:	1,500 ↓
Usable stockpile of warheads:	4,477 ↑
Total yield of usable stockpile:	995.8 MT, or 66,388 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents

Approximately 1,588 strategic warheads in Russia's useable stockpile are deployed, and 2,889 strategic and non-strategic warheads are in storage. Both the United States' and Russia's strategic nuclear arsenals are capped by the New START treaty, which limits the number of strategic warheads and launchers that each country is allowed to deploy (though not possess). A breakdown is provided below of Russia's usable stockpile of warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned. In contrast to many other nuclear-armed states, Russia has a significant number of nuclear-capable non-strategic delivery systems.



Approximately 546 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia's 126 siloed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including the SS-18, SS-19 Mod 4, and SS-27 Mods 1 and 2. These siloed missiles can carry single or multiple warheads to ranges greater than 10,000 kilometres. It is assumed that nearly all of Russia's siloed ICBMs are on alert.



Approximately 639 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia's roughly 180 mobile ICBMs, including the SS-25 and SS-27 Mods 1 and 2. These mobile missiles can carry single or multiple warheads to ranges greater than 10,000 kilometres. It is assumed that nearly all of Russia's mobile ICBMs are on alert.

Approximately 90 non-strategic warheads are assigned to Russia's mobile short-range dual-capable ground-launched delivery systems, including the Iskander-M short-range ground-launched ballistic missile and the 9M729 intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed but kept in central storage.



Approximately 800 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia's 10 operational ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), including the *Delta IV*-, *Borei*-, and *Borei-A*-classes. Each SSBN can carry 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), each of which can carry multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). About 576 of these warheads are currently deployed.

A large portion of Russia's 935 non-strategic navy warheads (possibly about 410) are assigned to Russia's eight operational cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), including the *Antey*- (*Oscar*) and *Yasen*- (*Severodvinsk*) classes, as well as Russia's sizable attack submarine fleet, including *Shchuka*- (*Akula*), *Barrakuda*- (*Sierra*) and *Paltus/Varshavyanka*- (*Kilo*) classes.



The remainder of Russia's 935 non-strategic navy warheads (possibly 525) are assigned to Russia's surface ships and naval aircraft, including *Kirov*- and *Slava*-class cruisers, *Udaloy*- and *Admiral Gorshkov*-class destroyers, *Gepard*- and *Admiral Gregorovich*-class frigates, and *Buyan-M* and *Tarantul*-class corvettes. Weapons include cruise missiles such as the Kalibr anti-ship and land-attack systems, depth bombs, and torpedoes. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed on the launchers but are kept on land in storage depots.



Approximately 580 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia's two types of long-range heavy bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95MS Bear. About 200 of these warheads are thought to be deployed at Russia's two strategic air bases at Engels and Ukrainka.

Approximately 500 non-strategic warheads are assigned to Russia's various types of Tu-22M3 Backfire-C intermediate-range bombers, and fighter-bombers such as the Su-24M Fencer-D and Su-34 Fullback. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed, but are kept in central storage.



Approximately 387 non-strategic warheads are assigned to Russia's air, coast, and missile defence systems, including the A-135, P-800, and the S-300 and S-400. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed, but are kept in central storage.

DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN 2021

Russia is currently in the late stages of a decades-long modernization programme to replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear systems with more modern ones. In December 2021, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu declared that modern weapons and equipment now make up 89% of Russia's nuclear triad.¹

LAND

Russia has started preparing silos to replace the SS-18 with the SS-29 (Sarmat) heavy ICBM. Test launches have been delayed but, once completed, will be followed by series production. Sarmat will be able to carry a large number of MIRVs, possibly 10 each, as well as penetration aids in order to evade adversarial missile defences.²

Russia is in the midst of deploying the new Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle atop modified SS-19 ICBMs at Dombarovsky, where the first six-missile regiment became operational in 2021.³ A second regiment will reportedly be completed by the end of 2027.

SEA

In 2021, the Russian Navy accepted its fifth improved Borei SSBN – the *Knyaz Oleg* – for sea trials.⁴ The Navy is expected to receive the remainder of a total of 10 Borei boats over the coming years. These new SSBNs, along with their new Bulava (SS-N-32) SLBMs, will eventually replace Russia's Soviet-era Delta IV SSBNs.

Russia is developing its new Poseidon long-range nuclear-powered torpedo, which is designed to deliver nuclear warheads to intercontinental distances. In 2021, commercial satellite imagery showed new infrastructure under construction that is possibly meant to store and test the Poseidon.⁵ The first submarine to carry these weapons – the special-purpose K-329 *Belgorod* – underwent sea trials in 2021.⁶ Subsequent submarines to carry the Poseidon will be of the *Khabarovsk* class.

After several years of delay, in 2021 the Russian Navy accepted the lead ship of its improved *Yasen-M*-class attack submarine – known as *Kazan* – into service.⁷ These submarines will be able to launch several different types of non-strategic naval nuclear weapons, including the *Kalibr* land-attack cruise missile.

AIR

Russia is upgrading its aging Tu-160 and Tu-95MS strategic bombers with new engines, avionics, and in some cases, entirely new airframes. The first upgraded Tu-160M with a new NK-32-02 engine began its flight-testing programme in March 2021.⁸ The upgraded bombers are capable of launching a new nuclear air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), the AS-23B (Kh-102).

Russia is developing a next-generation nuclear-capable bomber, known as PAK-DA; a demonstration model of the new aircraft is expected to be ready in 2023, with initial production beginning in 2027.⁹

The Russian Aerospace Force is in the midst of receiving its first batch of nuclear-capable Su-57 fighter jets, the full complement of which is expected to be delivered by the end of 2024. These aircraft will be able to launch hypersonic missiles similar to the *Kinzhal*, a new air-launched ballistic missile that can be launched from specially-modified MiG-31K aircraft.¹⁰

1 Russian Federation, 'Expanded meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense', 21 December 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3lcHMP3>.

2 TASS, 'Two test launches of Sarmat ICBM to be made by 2021 year-end – source', 10 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/34VafN0>.

3 TASS, 'Russia's 1st Regiment of Avangard Hypersonic Missiles to Assume Full Strength in 2021', 23 December 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3BlswH8>.

4 Thomas Nilsen, 'Knyaz Oleg' has fired Bulava missile', The Barents Observer, 21 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3saKHc8>.

5 Nick Paton Walsh, 'Satellite images show huge Russian military buildup in the Arctic', CNN, 5 April 2021, at: <https://cnn.it/3sa7DIm>.

6 H. I. Sutton, 'New Satellite Images Hint How Russian Navy Could Use Massive Nuclear Torpedoes', USNI News, 31 August 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3BjYnQn>.

7 Sevmash, 'Атомный подводный крейсер «Красноярск» вывели из эллинга', 30 July 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3LSRP4U>.

8 Rostec, 'Ростех передал первый модернизированный Ту-160М для испытаний', 10 March 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3JNvEv2>.

9 TASS, 'PAK DA demonstrational model to be ready by 2023 – source', 1 August 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3vafiZo>.

10 TASS, 'First Batch-produced Su-57 to Be Used for Testing Hypersonic Weapons', 25 December 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3leungb>.



Slovakia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Slovakia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Slovakia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The former Slovakian foreign minister Juraj Schenk was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Slovakia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Slovakia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Slovenia

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Slovenia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Slovenia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The former Slovenian president Danilo Türk and former defence ministers Ljubica Jelušič and Alojz Krapež were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Slovenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Slovenia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



Spain

UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Spain boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Spain may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House of the Spanish Parliament adopted a resolution on 21 December 2020 which welcomed the TPNW 'as an effort to move towards peace, security and disarmament'.¹

In September 2018, the Spanish government agreed to sign the TPNW. The agreement was made during negotiations on the 2019 budget, when the left-wing party Podemos obtained a commitment from the government to sign the Treaty in exchange for Podemos' support for the 2019 budget.²

Three former Spanish foreign ministers (Ana Palacio, Javier Solana and Carlos Westendorp) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.³

Twelve Spanish cities including Barcelona have signed ICAN's Cities Appeal, and polling in 2021 showed high levels of public support for the TPNW in Spain.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Spain should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Spain should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3C38dey>

² Ibid.

³ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>

⁴ <https://bit.ly/3pZDSJr>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/Stored abroad



Turkey

UMBRELLA STATE HOSTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

Turkey boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.

Turkey may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

The former Turkish defence minister Hikmet Sami Türk was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Turkey should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should ensure the removal of the foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Turkey should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Not compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No
Additional Protocol	Yes
Fissile material production facilities	No
Highly enriched uranium stocks	Cleared
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	No/No

¹ <https://bit.ly/2TwCaOp>



United Kingdom

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The United Kingdom boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, the United Kingdom, together with China, France, Russia, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.¹

In 2017, the government said that the United Kingdom 'does not intend to sign, ratify or become party to' the TPNW. It further stated that '[t]he unpredictable international security environment we face today demands the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.'²

Despite the UK government's position, the devolved government in Scotland has repeatedly voiced its opposition to nuclear weapons and support for the TPNW.³

The cities of Edinburgh and Manchester have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The United Kingdom should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- The United Kingdom should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- The United Kingdom should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. The United Kingdom should also upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3tgxi1w>
² <https://bit.ly/3HtA48B>
³ <https://bit.ly/3sy1XZ2>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Not compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Not compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Voluntary offer agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	No (Signed 1993)
Additional Protocol	Partial
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	22,600 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	3,200 kg/115,800 kg

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS INVENTORY AT THE BEGINNING OF 2022

Estimated total inventory of warheads:	225 ↑ ¹
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement:	45 ↓ ²
Usable stockpile of warheads:	180 ↑
Total yield of usable stockpile:	18 MT, or 1,200 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents

Of the United Kingdom's usable stockpile, 120 warheads are thought to be operationally available for deployment. The remaining 60 are in storage, together with up to 45 retired warheads that will be reconstituted to increase the stockpile to no more than 260. As shown below, the United Kingdom relies on just one type of weapon system for nuclear deterrence.



All of the 180 Holbrooke warheads are assigned to the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that are carried by the United Kingdom's *Vanguard*-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The United Kingdom maintains a policy of continuous at-sea deterrence, meaning that one of its four SSBNs is on deterrence patrol at all times. Two other submarines are available for deployment, while the fourth boat is in refit. Each submarine can carry up to 16 Trident II D5 SLBMs, though each submarine carries only 8, totalling 40 deployed warheads at-sea at any given moment. The patrolling SSBN operates at 'reduced alert' status, meaning that its capability to fire its missiles is measured in days, rather than a few minutes.

DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN 2021

The United Kingdom has committed to a comprehensive nuclear modernization programme that includes replacing its SSBNs, re-entry vehicles, and warheads. This programme is expected to keep nuclear weapons in the UK military arsenal until at least 2065.

SEA

The United Kingdom is replacing its current fleet of *Vanguard*-class SSBNs with a new class, known as *Dreadnought*. These new submarines will likely enter service in the early 2030s.

The United Kingdom is currently refurbishing its warheads for incorporation onto the US-supplied Mk4A aeroshell, which includes new technology – specifically, a new arming, fuzing, and firing system – that significantly increases the system's ability to conduct hard-target kill missions.

The United Kingdom is commencing a new warhead programme based on the United States' new W93 warhead, and is reportedly lobbying the US Congress to expedite the W93 in support of the United Kingdom's warhead replacement programme.³

¹ In the 2020 edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, the estimate provided for the UK nuclear stockpile was 195 warheads. This year's estimate of 225 warheads does not necessarily indicate an increase in the UK's stockpile – rather, this is a revision given new information coming to light. The UK Government declared in 2010 that its inventory would not exceed 225 warheads, and that the UK would reduce the number of warheads in its overall nuclear stockpile to no more than 180; for that reason, it was believed that the UK was gradually lowering the number of nuclear weapons in its active stockpile. It is now understood, however, that despite these stated intentions, throughout the decade the UK's nuclear inventory remained at approximately 225 warheads. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy undertaken in 2020 and published in early 2021 decided, however, that the United Kingdom would increase its nuclear stockpile from no more than 225 warheads today to no more than 260 warheads within the next decade.

² According to the UK Ministry of Defence, a portion of the country's warheads which have been 'identified as no longer being required for service are currently stored and have not yet been disabled or modified [to render them unusable].' UK Ministry of Defence, 'Response to Freedom of Information Act Request Made by Rob Edwards. Ref. 25-03-2013-173601-014,' 25 July 2013, at: <https://bit.ly/3BFqEWx>.

³ J. Borger, 'UK Lobbies US to Support Controversial New Nuclear Warheads,' *The Guardian*, 1 August 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3p7q8vs>.



United States of America

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (NATO)



SIGNATURE



DEPOSIT WITH UNSG



ENTRY INTO FORCE



DECLARATION

The United States boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

The change of the US administration in January 2021 led to the extension of the New START treaty with Russia and resumption of a strategic dialogue with Russia, a proposed dialogue with China, and an effort to re-engage with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, the United States, together with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.¹

Support, primarily through the Back from the Brink campaign, for the ICAN Cities Appeal continues to build in the US, with Boston, Minneapolis, and New York City among the latest endorsers. In December 2021, New York City resolved to pursue divestment of public funds from nuclear weapon makers.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- The United States should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- The United States should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. The United States should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The United States should also ratify the CTBT, and return to compliance with the JCPOA.

¹ <https://bit.ly/3KczTAX>

² <https://bit.ly/3C3JA1I>

TPNW voting and participation

2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW	Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations	No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations	N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)	N/A

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire	Not compatible
Test	Compatible
Possess or stockpile	Not compatible
(b) Transfer	Not compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control	Compatible
(d) Use	Compatible
Threaten to use	Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce	Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance	Not compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment	Compatible

Related treaties and regimes

Party to the BWC	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (1 of 5 NSA protocols)
Member of the CD	Yes

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards Agreement	Voluntary offer agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline	N/A
Small Quantities Protocol	Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol	Partial
Fissile material production facilities	Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks	562,000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)	79,700 kg/8,000 kg

THE UNITED STATES' NUCLEAR-WEAPONS INVENTORY AT THE BEGINNING OF 2022

Estimated total inventory of warheads:	5,428 ↓
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement:	1,720 ↓
Usable stockpile of warheads:	3,708 ↓
Total yield of usable stockpile:	857.6 MT, or 57,840 Hiroshima-bomb equivalents

Approximately 1,644 strategic and 100 non-strategic warheads in the United States' usable stockpile are deployed, and 1,964 strategic and non-strategic warheads are in storage. Both the United States' and Russia's strategic nuclear arsenals are capped by the New START treaty, which limits the number of warheads and launchers that each country is allowed to deploy (though not possess). A breakdown is provided below of the United States' usable stockpile of warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned.



Approximately 800 strategic warheads are assigned to siloed *Minuteman III* intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which can carry single warheads – either the W78 or W87 – to a range of approximately 13,000 kilometres. Around 400 of these warheads are currently deployed on alert across 400 silos, while an additional 50 silos are kept 'warm' to load stored missiles if necessary.



Approximately 1,920 strategic warheads are assigned to 14 *Ohio*-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each of which can carry up to 20 Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Each of these SLBMs can carry up to eight nuclear multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) warheads: either the 90 kiloton W76-1, the 8 kiloton W76-2, or the 455 kiloton W88. Around 945 of these warheads are currently deployed on 12 operational SSBNs, although only four or five of those are thought to be on constant 'hard alert' in their designated patrol areas.



Approximately 788 strategic warheads – including the B61 gravity bomb and the W80-1 carried by the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) – are assigned for delivery by B-2A and B52-H heavy bombers. Around 300 of these warheads are currently deployed at long-range strategic air bases in the United States.

Another 200 or so non-strategic B61 gravity bombs are assigned for delivery by NATO and US dual-capable aircraft. Approximately 100 of these warheads are currently deployed at air bases in Europe.

DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN 2021

The United States is in the midst of a wide-ranging modernization campaign to upgrade or replace every nuclear warhead and delivery system in the US nuclear arsenal. It is expected that the cost of this campaign could reach up to \$2 trillion, and it will serve to keep nuclear weapons in the US nuclear arsenal until at least 2080.

LAND

The United States is replacing its current force of *Minuteman III* ICBMs with a brand-new ICBM fleet known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). This is so, despite the fact that the GBSD imposes significant budgetary and logistical strains on the Pentagon, and that there is no public evidence indicating that the *Minuteman III* ICBMs could not be life-extended at a much lower cost.¹

The United States is upgrading its Weapons Storage Areas at its ICBM bases; construction at the first base, F. E. Warren, is underway and was due to be completed in the course of 2022.²

SEA

The United States is developing a new class of SSBNs, known as the *Columbia*-class, which will be significantly quieter than the current *Ohio*-class. Each Columbia SSBN will be equipped with 16 missile tubes, four less than Ohio SSBNs.³

The US Navy is currently replacing the original Trident II D5 SLBM with a life-extended and upgraded version known as Trident II D5LE, which will reportedly have greater range and accuracy than the original system. A second modification is in development.

The National Nuclear Security Administration is currently life-extending one of its Trident warheads (the W88) and completed the First Production Unit of the new W88 Alt 370 in 2021.⁴

The United States plans to build a new warhead (the W93) to supplement its current sea-launched nuclear weapon capability. This warhead programme would support a parallel warhead replacement programme in the United Kingdom.

At the behest of the Trump administration's Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is developing a non-strategic submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), a capability that was previously retired in 2011. However, it remains unclear at this stage whether the Biden administration will continue the project.

AIR

The United States is developing a new heavy bomber, the B-21 Raider, which is expected to enter service in the mid-2020s. The new bomber will result in an increase in the total number of US nuclear bomber bases.⁵

The United States is in the final stage of certifying its F-35A stealth fighters for a nuclear strike role.

The US Air Force is developing a new nuclear ALCM known as the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), which will carry the W80-4 warhead, replacing the Air Force's current AGM-86B ALCM.

In 2021, the US Air Force completed its final inert drop test of the new B61-12 gravity bomb using the F-35A.⁶ The B61-12 will have a variable yield, as well as a guided tail kit to increase accuracy, and will be integrated onto the B-2 and B-21 bombers and F-35A, F-15E, F-16C/D, and PA-200 fighters.

GENERAL

The United States is upgrading the arming, fuzing, and firing component for its ballistic missile warheads to improve their targeting effectiveness. The Navy's W76-1/Mk4A warhead recently completed the upgrade,⁷ which will also be added to the Air Force's ICBM warheads.

The United States is upgrading and adding nuclear weapons production facilities to increase production of plutonium cores (pits) for new nuclear warheads.

1 M Korda, 'Siloed Thinking: A Closer Look at the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent,' Federation of American Scientists, March 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3s8lmys>.
2 H. M. Kristensen, 'Construction of New Underground Nuclear Warhead Facility at Warren AFB,' FAS Strategic Security Blog, 28 September 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3LVMGsw>.
3 Congressional Research Service, 'Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress', 19 October 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/33Gb7cf>.
4 National Nuclear Security Administration, 'NNSA completes First Production Unit of W88 Alteration 370,' Department of Energy, 13 July 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3BluPAD>.
5 H. M. Kristensen, 'USAF Plans To Expand Nuclear Bomber Bases,' FAS Strategic Security Blog, 17 November 2020, at: <https://bit.ly/3lnndpJ>.
6 F-35 Joint Project Office, 'F-35A Completes Key Milestone with release of B61-12 Joint Test Assemblies (JTAs),' Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, 10 April 2021, at: <https://bit.ly/3s9l624>.
7 H. M. Kristensen, M. McKinzie, and T. A. Postol, 'How US Nuclear Force Modernization Is Undermining Strategic Stability: The Burst-height Compensating Super-fuze,' *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 1 March 2017, at: <https://bit.ly/3H9B5Cz>.

TEXT OF THE TREATY

TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Determined to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the consequent need to completely eliminate such weapons, which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances,

Mindful of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including from any nuclear-weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons,

Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation,

Acknowledging the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is a global public good of the highest order, serving both national and collective security interests,

Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples,

Reaffirming the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law,

Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, the rule of distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary

suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment,

Considering that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law,

Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Recalling also the first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Concerned by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste of economic and human resources on programmes for the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and determined to act towards that end,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security,

Recognizing the vital importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime,

Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Recognizing that the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is an essential factor for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security, and committed to supporting and strengthening the effective participation of women in nuclear disarmament,

Recognizing also the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations, and committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this Treaty,

Stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, other international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians, academics and the hibakusha.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1 PROHIBITIONS

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
 - (a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

- (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- (c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- (d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 2 DECLARATIONS

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration in which it shall:
 - (a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party;
 - (b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns, possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
 - (c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 3 SAFEGUARDS

1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.
2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

ARTICLE 4 TOWARDS THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme. The competent international authority shall report to the States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.
2. Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party's nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure.
3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.
4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.

5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled.
6. The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.

ARTICLE 5 NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty.
2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 6 VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDiation

1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.
2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.
3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under international law or bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE 7 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis.
6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

ARTICLE 8 MEETING OF STATES PARTIES

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear disarmament, including:
 - (a) The implementation and status of this Treaty;
 - (b) Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including additional protocols to this Treaty;
 - (c) Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further

meetings of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, shall apply.

3. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least one third of the States Parties.
4. After a period of five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the Treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene further review conferences at intervals of six years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties.
5. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant entities of the United Nations system, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of States Parties and the review conferences as observers.

ARTICLE 9 COSTS

1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the circulation of declarations under Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
3. The cost related to the implementation of verification measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination

of nuclear-weapon programmes, including the elimination or conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.

ARTICLE 10 AMENDMENTS

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first.
2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.
3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment 90 days following the deposit of such instruments of ratification or acceptance by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party 90 days following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment.

ARTICLE 11 SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 12 UNIVERSALITY

Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.

ARTICLE 13 SIGNATURE

This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.

ARTICLE 14 RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE, APPROVAL OR ACCESSION

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for accession.

ARTICLE 15 ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 16 RESERVATIONS

The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 17 DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.

ARTICLE 18 RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER AGREEMENTS

The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.

ARTICLE 19 DEPOSITARY

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 20 AUTHENTIC TEXTS

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic.

DONE at New York, this seventh day of July, two thousand and seventeen.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AI	Artificial intelligence	NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
ALBM	Air-launched ballistic missile	NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
ALCM	Air-launched cruise missile	NWFZ	Nuclear-weapon-free zone
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (Treaty)	OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
AP	Additional Protocol	OPIR	Overhead Persistent Infra-Red
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	P5	The five permanent, and nuclear-armed, members of the United Nations Security Council: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States
ASMP-A	Air-Sol Moyenne Portée Améliorée (Improved medium-range air to surface missile)	PTBT	Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention	Pu	Plutonium
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	SNOWCAT	Support of nuclear operations with conventional air tactics
CSA	Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement	SLBM	Submarine-launched ballistic missile
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions	SLCM	Submarine-launched cruise missile
CD	Conference on Disarmament	SQP	Small Quantities Protocol
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization	SRBM	Short-range ballistic missile
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	SSB	Submersible ship, ballistic missile
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization	SSBN	Submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear-powered
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention	SSGN	Submersible ship, guided missile, nuclear-powered
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)	START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo	TNT	Trinitrotoluene
EU	European Union	TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
GBSD	Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent	UAE	United Arab Emirates
GLCM	Ground-Launched Cruise Missile	UK	United Kingdom
HEU	Highly enriched uranium	UN	United Nations
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons	UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile	US	United States
INFCIRC	Information Circular	WMD	Weapon of mass destruction
IPFM	International Panel on Fissile Materials		
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile		
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action		
Kt	Kilotons		
Lao PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic		
LRSO	Long-Range Standoff Weapon		
MIRV	Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle		
MRBM	Medium-range ballistic missile		
MRV	Multiple re-entry vehicle		
MT	Megatons		
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization		
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement		
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid		

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