

NUCLEAR WEAPONS **BAN** **MONITOR** 2019

Tracking Progress towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons



TPNW STATUS AND COMPLIANCE

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Executive Summary

Nuclear disarmament, including the elimination of all nuclear weapons and related development programmes, has been a central goal of the international community for decades. Under international law, only the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) obligates all its states parties to destroy all nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices under their jurisdiction or control and to never develop, produce, or control any such devices, much less test or use them. This comprehensive rejection by law of a uniquely inhumane and indiscriminate weapon is the embodiment of Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a legally binding provision that has been violated by nuclear-armed states for far too long.

Using the TPNW as a yardstick against which progress towards a world without nuclear weapons may be measured, the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor* records progress related to signature, ratification, entry into force, and universalization of the Treaty. It also evaluates the compatibility of each state's behaviour with the prohibitions of the TPNW, regardless of whether the state in question has adhered to the Treaty.

The TPNW is moving steadily towards early entry into force, despite obstructionism from nuclear-armed states. At the time of writing, the TPNW had, by a close margin, the second fastest speed of adherence of the treaties on weapons of mass destruction. Adopted at the United Nations on 7 July 2017, as of 1 October 2019, 32 states were party to the TPNW, along with a further 48 signatories. The Treaty will formally become binding international law 90 days after a further 18 states ratify or accede to it. Adhering states already include Kazakhstan and South Africa, both of which once had nuclear weapons but subsequently disarmed; two of only four states ever to do so. The international legal landscape governing nuclear weapons is being transformed and their fundamental illegitimacy further underscored.

At the same time, international tensions in recent months have reaffirmed the critical importance of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-armed states India and Pakistan engaged in a short-lived but exceptionally dangerous armed conflict in April 2019, with India implicitly threatening to use nuclear weapons, and the Indian prime minister provocatively declaring that it was "now Pakistan's turn to weep". On 23 July 2019, ahead of a meeting with Pakistan's

prime minister, the United States president asserted that "I have plans on Afghanistan that if I wanted to win that war, Afghanistan would be wiped off the face of the earth, it would be gone, it would be over in literally 10 days." The comment was widely read as an allusion to plans to use nuclear weapons. North Korea has restarted ballistic missile testing, firing missiles into the Sea of Japan and ratcheting up tensions in the region.

The Ban Monitor records that 135 (or more than two thirds) of all states today support the TPNW and its unequivocal renunciation of nuclear weapons, while 45 states are categorized as non-supporters, and 17 states as undecided. Despite voting in favour of adopting the TPNW in 2017, Sweden announced in July 2019 that it would "refrain from signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the present time" though it has also indicated that it might reassess its position following the next NPT review conference in 2020. Switzerland's government is defying an instruction from both houses of the Swiss Parliament to sign and ratify the TPNW "without delay". The Swiss government has committed to review its decision by the end of 2020.

Moreover, the Ban Monitor finds that a total of 155 of the world's 197 states currently maintain policies and practices that are compliant with all the Treaty's core prohibitions. These are states that have already signed or adhered to the TPNW and fully comply with its provisions, or which are in a position to adhere without making changes to existing practices or policies.

In stark contrast, all nine nuclear-armed states are currently investing heavily in their nuclear forces. Most are branding their ongoing development efforts as "modernisation", a euphemism for what has been termed a "ritual squandering of national resources on weapons of horror that can never reasonably be used." China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States also retain large stocks of fissile material even though they stopped production for nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Russia and the United States, in particular, possess enormous quantities of fissile material that could be used to produce tens of thousands of new nuclear explosive devices.

In total, 42 states engage in conduct that contravenes one or more of the TPNW core prohibitions. The non-compliant states are first and foremost the nine nuclear-armed

states. A further 31 non-nuclear-armed states are “nuclear-weapon complicit” because they endorse the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on their behalf, through arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence. Two states, Kazakhstan and the Marshall Islands, have rejected any role for nuclear weapons in their security policies, but do not comply with the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance because they host sites where missiles designed to deliver nuclear warheads are periodically tested by foreign powers (Russia and the United States, respectively). Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the TPNW. It will need to exercise due diligence to ensure that any unlawful testing ends. The other 40 non-compliant states may of course also lawfully sign and ratify the TPNW, but they too would have to make changes to their policies and practices to become compliant.

Europe is the region with the most states whose practices and policies contravene the TPNW. A total of 30 of the 49 states in Europe (61%) currently maintain policies and practices that contravene one or more of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW.

In the other regions, compliance is generally high. In Africa, all states have been found to be compliant. In the Americas, only 2 states – Canada and the United States – of the 35

across the region (less than 6%) are not compliant. In Asia, where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of the 43 states (almost 19%) are not compliant: China, India, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Korea. In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands are the 2 states among the total of 16 that are not compliant with the TPNW.

The prohibitions in Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW on assisting, encouraging, or inducing prohibited acts are the ones that are contravened by the greatest number of states. A total of 11 states (Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, the Marshall Islands, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and United States) assist acts that are prohibited by the TPNW. Thirty-four states currently encourage or induce such acts: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The prohibition on allowing the “hosting” (stationing, installation, or deployment) of nuclear weapons is contravened by five states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey).

1 Introduction

Nuclear disarmament has been a central goal of the international community for more than seven decades. Through its first-ever resolution, adopted on 24 January 1946, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly called for the establishment of a commission that would make proposals for the “elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”¹

A lack of political will on the part of a minority of states still stands in the way of disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. For decades, the focus of the international community has been on non-proliferation and limited arms control measures, where the very logic is that nuclear weapons have value and that nuclear deterrence as a system will continue. This approach has helped to limit and reduce nuclear arsenals, yet the failure to consider nuclear weapons as illegitimate has brought us to the beginning of a new nuclear arms race focused on qualitative “improvements” that risk destabilizing the world and triggering the use of these weapons.

The world has on several occasions been brought to the brink of nuclear war or nuclear accidents through miscommunication, misunderstandings, and technical malfunctions.² The intellectual “straightjacket” of nuclear deterrence has prevented states from drawing lessons from these dangerous realities and thus from pursuing sustainable security solutions.³

If we have learned one thing from the last couple of decades of non-compliance with the disarmament requirements of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it is that nuclear-armed states consider nuclear weapons to be acceptable, desirable, and even essential for their security needs, and that they do not intend at any point in the foreseeable future to eliminate their arsenals. They have been unable on their own to overcome their dependence on nuclear weapons. Action by the entire global community, which would pay the price of a nuclear conflagration, is a prerequisite for progress.

As long as nuclear weapons are seen as acceptable, the vision of a world without nuclear weapons will remain an empty, rhetorical shell.

All successful treaty-based efforts on a global level to eliminate specific weapons (including chemical weapons, biological weapons, anti-personnel landmines, and cluster munitions) have been based on a widespread understanding that the weapon in question is indiscriminate or excessively harmful (or both) and should be made illegal in international law. Until the adoption in July 2017 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), this international affirmation by treaty of the fundamental unacceptability of nuclear weapons had been lacking.

By prohibiting its states parties from developing, testing, possessing, hosting, using, and threatening to use nuclear weapons, as well as assisting, encouraging, or inducing those prohibited acts, the TPNW codifies the norms and actions that are needed to create and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty institutes a comprehensive rejection of nuclear weapons on moral, humanitarian, security, and legal grounds.

Despite the absence of nuclear-armed states from the TPNW negotiations at the UN, the Treaty provides a pathway to their adherence and lays down a mechanism for the adoption of “a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of [a] State Party’s nuclear-weapon programme”. Similarly, the Treaty imposes an obligation on states parties that host nuclear weapons to ensure their prompt removal.

Non-nuclear-armed states (including Kazakhstan and South Africa, both of which once had nuclear weapons but subsequently gave them up) are now taking the lead by becoming the first states parties to the TPNW. In doing so, these states are creating a long-overdue international framework for elimination of nuclear weapons. They and the other states parties have a responsibility to go beyond mere adherence to the TPNW to use this tool to break decades of acquiescence to the nuclear threat and to encourage other states to stop justifying the “benefits” of nuclear weapons. The impact of the TPNW will be built gradually and will depend on how it is received and used by each and every UN member state.

In the current international environment in which nuclear weapons are a source of continuous tension and a

1 UN General Assembly, Resolution 1(I), “Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy”, London (1946).

2 P. Lewis et al., “Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy”. Chatham House (2014), at: bit.ly/2zxFAGE.

3 B. Pelopidas, “The Nuclear Straitjacket: American Extended Deterrence and Nonproliferation”, pp. 73–105 in S. von Hlatky and A. Wenger (eds), *The Future of Extended Deterrence*. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press (2015).

potential trigger for catastrophic war, the TPNW is the only global initiative that provides an adequate response. The value of the TPNW as a contribution to both disarmament and non-proliferation goals should be explicitly recognised even by those states not yet ready to adhere to the Treaty themselves.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 for its advocacy for the TPNW, calls for the universalisation and faithful implementation of the TPNW to advance progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In support of the Treaty and ICAN's objectives, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) researches and publishes the *Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor*. Data collection and analysis are assisted by research institutes, particularly the Norwegian Academy of International Law (NAIL).

Using the TPNW as a yardstick against which progress towards a world without nuclear weapons may be measured, the *Ban Monitor* records progress related to signature, ratification, entry into force, and universalization of the Treaty. It also evaluates the extent to which the policies and practices of all states comply with the core obligations in the TPNW. The term "compliance" is used in a broad sense to refer to the compatibility of each state's behaviour with the prohibitions of the TPNW, regardless

of whether the state in question has adhered to the TPNW. A central purpose of the *Ban Monitor* is to highlight the specific activities that stand between the international community and the fulfilment of one of its most urgent and universally accepted goals: the elimination of nuclear weapons. This edition tracks compliance during 2018 and the first nine months of 2019.

In addition to its comprehensive prohibitions on all nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the TPNW contains a series of positive obligations. These include reporting; accepting international safeguards on nuclear material; the duty to destroy any stockpiles and eliminate nuclear-weapon programmes; the duty to ensure the removal of any foreign nuclear weapons from a state party's territory; the duty to implement the Treaty at domestic level, including through the adoption of national legislation; the duty to assist victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons and to remediate contaminated land; and the duty to promote adherence to the Treaty. The *Ban Monitor* will also be evaluating states parties' compliance with these positive obligations once the Treaty has entered into force.

The report is based entirely on open sources. We welcome comments, clarifications, and corrections.

2 The Nuclear Condition in 2019

Only 25 states are known (or credibly suspected) to have pursued or seriously explored nuclear weapons,⁴ and only ten states have manufactured some form of nuclear explosive device. One of them, South Africa, subsequently disarmed. Three states – Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine – inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union but gave up those weapons in the 1990s. Disarmament is possible.


According to the Federation of American Scientists, the number of nuclear weapons in the world peaked in 1986 at around 70,300 warheads (see Figure 1). That number was subsequently hugely reduced, and in early 2019 the global estimate was of 13,890 nuclear warheads remaining.⁵ A large portion of this reduction in nuclear weapon stockpiles took place in the 1990s, and nearly all of the reduction occurred in the massive US and Russian arsenals, but there were also reductions in France and the United Kingdom, and, as noted above, South Africa destroyed its entire (small) arsenal of nuclear explosive devices.

Studies published more than a decade ago showed that a war between India and Pakistan involving 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs could kill 22 million people directly in less than a week, and that the fires triggered by these weapons would cause worldwide climate disruption and a global famine that would put two billion people at risk.⁶

A new study in *Science Advances*, published in early October 2019, which updates those earlier reports, makes similarly sobering reading. The study examines a specific scenario in which India employs 100 nuclear weapons against urban targets in Pakistan and Pakistan uses 150 warheads against urban Indian targets. The authors considered a range of consequences depending on the size of the weapons used. If all the weapons are relatively small Hiroshima-sized 15 kiloton bombs, 50 million people would be killed as a direct result of the explosions, fires, and initial radiation effects. If 100 kiloton weapons were used, the immediate death toll would be 125 million. The study also shows that the global climate effects would be even more catastrophic and the impact on food supplies much more severe than that predicted in the earlier studies of a more limited nuclear war.⁷

The number of nuclear weapons in the world is only one dimension of the “arms race”. Other important indicators include the average and maximum yields of each warhead, the extent of financial investments in nuclear weapons technology, and the precision and nature of delivery platforms. Measuring nuclear “lethality” as a combination of warhead yield and the precision of the available means of delivery, Lynn Eden, Senior Research Scholar Emeritus at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, asserts that the US nuclear arsenal “peaked” not in the 1960s or 1980s, as the conventional narrative of the history of arms control has it, but in the 2000s.⁸

Fig 1: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945–2019.



4 S. Singh and C. R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 1 (2007), Appendix.

5 SIPRI, “World Nuclear Forces”, *SIPRI Yearbook* (2010).

6 I. Helfand, “Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk?”, PSR and IPPNW (2013), at: bit.ly/2ZyqwmX.

7 bit.ly/31KsUJ3. See also J. Coupe, C. G. Bardeen, A. Robock, and O. B. Toon, (2019). “Nuclear winter responses to nuclear war between the United States and Russia in the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model Version 4 and the Goddard Institute for Space Studies Model E”, *Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres*, 124, 8522–8543, at: bit.ly/2OpXILC.

8 See e.g. L. Eden, “The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal and Zero”, pp. 69–88, in C. M. Kelleher and J. Reppy (eds), *Getting to Zero*. Stanford: Stanford University Press (2011).

It should also be noted that the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons is not, in itself, an indicator of intent to move towards the *elimination* of nuclear weapons. The reductions made thus far were results of arms limitations agreements and stockpile management, and arguably did not form part of a coherent plan to “ultimately eliminate” such weapons. In fact, while the overall trend towards fewer nuclear warheads in the world is positive, other developments point in the opposite direction:

1. **Disarmament obligations and commitments are not being implemented:** Almost fifty years after the entry into force of the NPT, a shocking image of non-compliance with the Treaty’s Article VI disarmament obligation presents itself. Despite praising the 2010 NPT Action Plan as a “realistic”⁹ and “practical step-by-step”¹⁰ approach to non-proliferation and disarmament, the five NPT nuclear-weapon states have simply refused to implement a large number of the disarmament commitments contained in the Plan. Nor have the four nuclear-armed states outside the NPT (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), India, Israel, and Pakistan) taken steps towards disarmament. One important area where progress has been lacking is in reducing the roles of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies. Since the adoption of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, the only noteworthy advance in multilateral nuclear disarmament and in fulfilling the collective Article VI obligation of all states parties to the NPT was the adoption in 2017 of the TPNW.
2. **The pace of nuclear reductions has slowed considerably since the 1990s:** China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan appear to be increasing their stockpiles. And despite their repeated claims that they are pursuing nuclear disarmament, there have been no negotiations about total nuclear disarmament between the United States and the Russian Federation (Russia) since the Reagan–Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in 1986, or even on reductions to 1,000 nuclear weapons each. The United States has recently stated that the security environment is not conducive to further reductions, seemingly abandoning even the “step-by-step” or “progressive” approach to nuclear disarmament in favour of a new initiative labelled “creating the environment for nuclear disarmament” (CEND).
3. **Three additional states have acquired nuclear weapons:** Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea, India,¹¹ and Pakistan have become nuclear-armed states, increasing the number of locations where nuclear accidents or escalation to nuclear war could take place. Brinkmanship during fighting between India and Pakistan in early 2019 showed the potential for rapid escalation between nuclear-armed states (despite bold claims of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence).¹² The prospect of nuclear war between North Korea and the United States has also loomed large.
4. **All nine nuclear-armed states are “modernising” their nuclear arsenals:** They have continued to develop new nuclear delivery vehicles and/or warheads, spending vast sums on upgrading and perpetuating their nuclear capabilities. Several observers have argued that the world has entered a “new nuclear arms race”.¹³ Many of the systems currently being developed are set to remain operational for at least another fifty years. This demonstrates the nuclear-armed states’ intent to possess nuclear weapons for the coming decades, if not indefinitely.
5. **There is a “trend among some leaders to glorify the world’s most destructive weapons”:**¹⁴ In recent years, leaders of nuclear-armed states have on several occasions engaged in aggressive rhetoric and issued threats to use nuclear weapons, challenging the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons, increasing the risk of nuclear accidents and war, and worsening the environment for disarmament.
6. **The existing arms control and disarmament architecture is eroding:** The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has broken down and is now dead letter. The prospects for an extension of New START, set to expire in February 2021, look bleak. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains in limbo, still not in force more than two decades after its adoption. And after decades at the top of the disarmament community’s to-do list, negotiations on a Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty have not even begun. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has entered its third decade of inaction.
7. **The risks of nuclear weapon use have increased:** The organization Global Zero documented some 650 “military incidents” over three years (2014–2017) involving nuclear-weapon states or their allies that occurred in Europe, East Asia, and South Asia – levels not seen since the Cold War.¹⁵ Of these, 54 incidents were classified as “provocative”, risking escalation and the possibility of

9 United States, Statement to the UN General Assembly First Committee, New York. UN doc: A/C.1/69/PV.11 (20 October 2014).

10 P5 announcement, available at: bit.ly/2m5J2EZ.

11 India completed a so-called “peaceful” nuclear explosion before the end of the Cold War, in 1974. In 1998, it test-detonated two nuclear explosive devices and declared itself a nuclear-weapon state.

12 *Al Jazeera*, “India–Pakistan tensions: All the latest updates” (10 March 2019), at: bit.ly/2L299XG.

13 See, e.g., M. Gorbechev, “A New Nuclear Arms Race has begun”, *The New York Times* (25 October 2018), at: nyti.ms/2ELCaFP.

14 N. Tannenwald, “The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo”, *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 6 (2018), p. 17.

15 Global Zero, “Global Zero Military Incidents Study” (1 May 2017), at: bit.ly/32k4p5z.

armed conflict. Former US Defence Secretary William Perry stated in 2016 that the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe is “greater than during the Cold War and rising”.¹⁶ And in April 2018, the UN Secretary-General informed the UN Security Council that the Cold War “is back ... but with a difference. The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present”.¹⁷

Nuclear-Weapon Policies

The vast majority of states already reject nuclear weapons. The *Ban Monitor* finds that, as of 1 October 2019, 157 states – four-fifths of the world’s 197 states¹⁸ – have excluded any role for nuclear weapons in their military postures. A total of 135 states have signed, ratified, acceded to, and/or voted in favour of the TPNW and are identified by the *Ban Monitor* as “TPNW supporters” (see Chapter 3). Twenty-two further states also maintain non-nuclear security policies but have not yet adhered to or voted in favour of the TPNW. For the purposes of this report, they are classified as “other non-nuclear-armed states”.

A minority of 40 states, however, explicitly base their security strategies on the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons, perpetuating nuclear risks and undermining the international community’s longstanding goal of nuclear disarmament. Nine of these 40 are nuclear-armed states: China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The remaining 31 states do not possess nuclear weapons but have outsourced their nuclear postures to one or more nuclear-armed allies. In this report they are referred to as “nuclear-weapon-complicit states”. A nuclear-weapon-complicit state is a state that assists, encourages, or induces activities prohibited under the TPNW.

Table 1 below and Figure 2 overleaf categorize the world’s states according to their basic nuclear-weapons policies.

Table 1: The world’s 197 states by nuclear-weapons policy

Category	States
Nuclear-armed states (9 states)	China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.
Nuclear-weapon-complicit states (31 states)	Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey.
TPNW supporters (135 states)	Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, DR Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Other non-nuclear-armed states (22)	Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Niue, North Macedonia,* Serbia, Singapore, Somalia, South Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.


* As of writing, North Macedonia was in the process of joining NATO. If it does so without repudiating the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, it will be deemed to be a nuclear-weapon-complicit state.

16 Cited in J. Borger, “Nuclear weapons risk greater than in cold war, says ex-Pentagon chief”, *The Guardian* (7 January 2016), at: bit.ly/2UgUfQd.

17 UN, “UN Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council” (13 April 2018), at: bit.ly/2MJIC3i.

18 As of 1 October 2019, the Secretary-General of the UN considered that a total of 197 states could become party to global treaties for which he is the depository: all 193 UN member states, the two UN observer states (the Holy See and the State of Palestine), and two other states (Cook Islands and Niue).

Fig 2: States by nuclear-weapons policies



Extended-Nuclear-Deterrence Arrangements

The role of the nuclear-weapon-licit states in assisting, encouraging, and/or inducing continued retention of nuclear weapons had not been given much attention prior to the humanitarian initiative and the process that led to the negotiation and adoption of the TPNW.

The nuclear-weapon-licit states have incorporated extended nuclear deterrence (sometimes called a nuclear “umbrella”) in their military doctrines. They have officially endorsed or acquiesced in the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on their behalf. Even with the obvious credibility problem inherent in the policy of extended nuclear deterrence (a nuclear-armed state is exceedingly unlikely to risk nuclear war for anything other than serious or even existential threats to its own national security) these 31 states function as enablers of nuclear armament and share responsibility for the perpetuation of nuclear risks. All of the nuclear-armed members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – France, the United Kingdom, and the United States – frequently use their allies’ avowed demand for nuclear protection as an argument for their own nuclear possession and modernisation. In the case of the United States, NATO’s institutionally enshrined plea for alliance-wide nuclear defence functions not only as a justification for nuclear armament in general, but also as an argument for the retention of “numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it [the United States] might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense.”¹⁹

Note, however, that not all military alliances that include a nuclear-armed state are automatically an extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangement or nuclear “umbrella”. For example, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Tajikistan, and Thailand all maintain military alliances with either Russia or the United States but have through national statements, or signature and ratification of international agreements signalled that they do not support the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

The 29 (soon to be 30)²⁰ members of NATO have accepted potential nuclear weapon use through their endorsement of various alliance documents. According to NATO’s 2012 “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review”, the “supreme guarantee” of the allies’ security “is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the alliance”.²¹ While some of the alliance’s members maintain policies not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, none of them has so far rejected the use, or even the first use, of nuclear weapons on its behalf.

US allies Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) have also made explicit statements or published strategy documents endorsing the potential use of nuclear weapons on their behalf. The governments of the United States and Japan expressed through a joint statement in 2013 that they remained committed to the security of Japan “through the full range of US military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional.”²² South Korea has endorsed similar statements.²³ With respect to

19 W. Perry et al., *America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States* (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2009), p. 8.

20 As noted above, as of writing, the Republic of North Macedonia was in the process of joining NATO.

21 NATO, “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review” (20 May 2012), para.11(9).

22 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities”, 3 October 2013, at: bit.ly/2MeBsVk.

23 See, e.g., The White House, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea”, 16 June 2009, at: on.cfr.org/2KckdS0.

Australia, a 2016 Australian White Paper on defence appears to directly encourage the United States to retain nuclear weapons: “Only the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia.”²⁴

The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has also been understood by certain observers as a nuclear alliance. In 2010, the CSTO’s Secretary-General suggested Russia had extended a “nuclear umbrella” over all members of the alliance.²⁵ Yet, the CSTO’s members do not appear to have adopted official documents stipulating a nuclear dimension to the alliance. On the contrary, three of the CSTO’s members have actively distanced themselves from nuclear deterrence. Through the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk – the treaty establishing Central Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) –

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have committed never to “assist or encourage” the development, manufacture, or possession of nuclear weapons.²⁶ Kazakhstan has also signed and ratified the TPNW.

Belarus, however, which is allied to Russia through the CSTO and the Union State, has previously expressed public support for nuclear deterrence.²⁷ Armenia, the last CSTO member, has, to our knowledge, not explicitly endorsed the potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, but has also not publicly rejected this (or the statement of the CSTO Secretary-General). Armenia is therefore in this report included among the list of nuclear-weapon-complicit states.

An overview of the members of extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangements is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangements

Nuclear alliance	States
NATO	Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Bilateral	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Russia, Belarus (CSTO/Union State). - Russia, Armenia (CSTO). - United States, Australia (ANZUS). - United States, Japan (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (Anpo)). - United States, South Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty).

24 Australian Department of Defence, “Defence White Paper”, 2016, p. 121, at: bit.ly/2HMbnJ9.

25 International Law and Policy Institute, “Under my Umbrella”, Report, 2016, p. 8, at: bit.ly/2mWvRHp.

26 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (adopted 2006, in force 2009), Art. 1(1)(c).

27 Ibid.

Fig 3: Locations of foreign deployed nuclear weapons, 2019



Host States

Among the nuclear-weapon-competent states, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey have a particular, operational role in assisting and encouraging the retention of nuclear weapons. They host approximately 150 American B-61 nuclear gravity bombs between them on their metropolitan territories,²⁸ as shown in Figure 3 above. The B-61 bombs are assumed to have explosive yields ranging from an equivalent of 0.3 to 170 kilotons of TNT. They are believed to be located at six bases: Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium; Büchel Air Base in Germany; Aviano and Ghedi air bases in Italy; Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands; and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The “deterrent” value of these foreign-deployed nuclear weapons is a subject of debate.²⁹

The respective hosting arrangements are thought to be governed by classified bilateral agreements between the United States and the host states. Representatives of the host states have traditionally been reluctant to discuss their governments’ hosting policies, in part due to the

classification of the respective hosting arrangements as state secrets. In 2013, two former Dutch prime ministers publicly confirmed that the Netherlands hosts nuclear weapons. Ruud Lubbers, prime minister from 1982 to 1994, stated that he “would never have thought those silly things [nuclear bombs] would still be there in 2013”. Dries van Agt, prime minister from 1977 to 1982, said the bombs “are there and it’s crazy they still are”.³⁰ Both were threatened with prosecution,³¹ but formal charges were never laid.

The nuclear weapons stored in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey are all believed to be under the control of the United States. Yet arrangements are reportedly in place for the bombs to be transferred to and used by the host state in an emergency. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands all have a nuclear role and retain nuclear-capable aircraft and pilots trained in the use of the weapons at the bases in question. The aircraft are sometimes referred to as “dual-key”, as their employment of nuclear weapons would have to be approved both by

28 T. Sauer and B. van der Zwaan, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe After NATO’s Lisbon Summit”, Harvard Kennedy School (2011), at: bit.ly/32cXbA4.

29 For a review of this issue see: Todd Sescher, “Sharing the Bomb” (2017), at: at.virginia.edu/2PIVDIW.

30 H. M. Kristensen, “Nukes in Europe: Secrecy Under Siege”, Federation of American Scientists (13 June 2013), at: bit.ly/2L68B37.

31 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “One-time Leaders May Face Charges for Discussing Dutch-Based Nukes” (14 June 2013), at: bit.ly/2zw6Jda.

the US government and the government of the respective host state. In the case of the B-61 bombs stationed at Incirlik in Turkey, however, any use of the weapons would reportedly be carried out by aircraft stationed at other bases, but it is not known whether they are US or Turkish aircraft. There are ostensibly no nuclear-capable aircraft at Incirlik.³²

Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands have recently, or are still, undergoing processes to procure new fighter aircraft. In October 2018, after years of debate, the Belgian government announced its decision to replace Belgium's fleet of nuclear-capable F-16s with a fleet of nuclear-capable F-35s. Italy was involved in the development of F-35 from the mid-2000s and decided in 2012 to purchase 90 planes.³³ The F-35s will replace Italy's nuclear-capable Tornado fighters. The Netherlands was also heavily involved in the development of the F-35 and decided in 2013 to buy 37 planes. However, a majority of Dutch MPs supported a motion in the Dutch parliament stating that the F-35s should have no nuclear role, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands' military doctrine.³⁴ Yet the Dutch government decided to ignore the parliamentary vote, opting for nuclear-capable F-35s after all. In 2018, the government decided to increase the number of planes being ordered from 37 to 67.³⁵ The final technical adjustments necessary to make the F-35 able to employ nuclear weapons ("Block 4") are expected to be implemented across the relevant host states between 2019 and 2024. Germany is due to replace its fleet of Tornado fighters over the next few decades. In January 2019, the German government announced that it would pick either the Eurofighter or Boeing's F/A-18. Sources reportedly specified that any replacement aircraft "must be able to carry U.S. nuclear weapons".³⁶

There have been several attempts by European policymakers to have the remaining weapons removed from European soil. For example, in 2005, the Belgian Senate unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the removal of nuclear weapons from Belgian territory.³⁷ In 2009, the German coalition government committed through its governing platform to have the remaining nuclear weapons in Germany withdrawn. The then Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle promoted the initiative enthusiastically for some time, but the United States responded negatively, and the initiative was quietly shelved the next year.³⁸ At the NATO summit in 2018, the allies collectively declared that NATO's deterrence posture "relies on the United States' nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned."³⁹

Only the United States is believed to station nuclear weapons in other countries today, but Russia and the United Kingdom have also done so in the past. A total of 23 states are believed to have hosted such deployments, in some cases without their knowledge (see Table 3 overleaf).⁴⁰ Most nuclear hosting arrangements were put in place in the 1950s and 1960s, and all but the above-mentioned five cases in Europe are believed to have since been discontinued. Most deployments were ended in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when British, Soviet, and US nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Mongolia, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Korea, and Spain. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons they inherited upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from Greece in 2001, however, the rate of discontinuance of nuclear hosting arrangements has effectively ground to a halt.

32 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, "Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 73, no. 5 (2017), at: bit.ly/2NEA1yL.

33 *Reuters*, "Italy cuts spending on F-35 fighter plane" (14 February 2012), at: reut.rs/2ZjrsAe.

34 *DutchNews.nl*, "Ministers ignore vote, JSF jet fighter could carry nuclear weapons" (14 January 2014), at: bit.ly/2Zp6NuS.

35 *De Telegraaf*, "Ruimer budget aanschaf F-35" (18 September 2019).

36 A. Shalal, "Germany drops F-35 from fighter tender; Boeing F/A-18 and Eurofighter to battle on", *Reuters* (31 January 2019).

37 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Belgian Senate Calls for Removal of U.S. Nukes" (22 April 2005), at: bit.ly/2NH12Bl.

38 M. Skjønberg, "Nato og amerikanske kjernevåpen i Europa", *Internasjonal Politikk* 75, no. 2 (2017), pp. 187–88.

39 NATO, "Brussels Summit Declaration" (11 July 2018), at: bit.ly/30HwYc.

40 The figure does not include territories that during the relevant period were under the direct jurisdiction or administration of a nuclear-armed state (Guam, Okinawa, and the Marshall Islands). Sources: H. M. Kristensen, "Where the Bombs Are", *FAS* (9 November 2006); M. Furmann and T. S. Sechser, "Appendices for 'Signalling Alliance Commitments'" (6 April 2014); R. S. Norris, W. M. Arkin, and W. Burr, "Where they Were", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 6 (1999), E. N. Rózsa and A. Péczelli, "Nuclear Attitudes in Central Europe", *EU Non-Proliferation Consortium*, no. 42 (2015).

Table 3: Nuclear-weapon hosting, 1945–2019⁴¹

State	Owner	Start of deployment	End of deployment
Belgium	United States	1963	Active
(West) Germany	United States; United Kingdom*	1955	Active
Italy	United States	1957	Active
Netherlands	United States	1960	Active
Turkey	United States	1959	Active
United Kingdom	United States	1954	2008
Greece	United States	1960	2001
Mongolia	Soviet Union	1967	1992
East Germany	United States	1958	1991
South Korea	United States	1958	1991
Czechoslovakia	Soviet Union	1968	1990
Poland	Soviet Union	1968	1990
Hungary	Soviet Union	1974	1988
Canada	United States	1963	1984
Philippines	United States	1957	1977
Spain	United States	1958	1976
Cyprus	United Kingdom	1961	1975
Taiwan	United States	1958	1975
Singapore**	United Kingdom	1963	1970
Morocco	United States	1954	1963
Cuba	Soviet Union	1962	1962
Iceland	United States	1956	1959
Denmark (Greenland)	United States	1958	1958

* The United Kingdom stationed nuclear weapons in (West) Germany from 1972 to 1998.

** Singapore initially formed part of the British Empire, then merged with the independent state of Malaysia in 1963, before gaining independence in 1965.


41 H. M. Kristensen, "Where the Bombs Are", *FAS* (9 November 2006); M. Furmann and T. S. Sechser, "Appendices for 'Signaling Alliance Commitments'" (6 April 2014); R. S. Norris, W.M. Arkin, and W. Burr, "Where they Were", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 6 (1999); E. N. Rózsa and A. Péczelli, "Nuclear Attitudes in Central Europe", *EU Non-Proliferation Consortium*, no. 42 (2015).

Fig 4: The world's nuclear arsenals.

The world's nuclear arsenals


RUSSIA

 Total 6,500




FRANCE

 Total 300



CHINA

 Total 290



UK

 Total 215




- **Deployed:** Nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental missiles and at heavy bomber bases or on bases with operational short-range delivery systems.
- **Stockpiled:** Nuclear warheads not deployed on launchers but in storage.
- **Retired:** Retired, but still intact, nuclear warheads awaiting dismantlement.

The deployed and stockpiled warheads together constitute a state's active nuclear arsenal, available for use by its armed forces. The active arsenal and retired warheads together constitute a state's total inventory of nuclear warheads. All numbers are approximate estimates.

Source: Hans. M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists (May 2019).

USA

 Total 6,185



PAKISTAN

 Total 140–50



INDIA

 Total 130–40



ISRAEL

 Total 80



NORTH KOREA

 Total 20–30



Nuclear Arsenals

As of May 2019, the nine nuclear-armed states retained approximately 13,890 nuclear warheads between them. Of these, 9,335 warheads were deployed or in storage, forming the active stockpile available for use by these states' armed forces. The rest were retired nuclear warheads awaiting dismantlement.⁴² The United States and Russia together possess about 93 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenal (see Figure 4 above).

The *Ban Monitor's* estimate is that the total explosive yield of the nine nuclear-armed states' active stockpiles of nuclear warheads is equivalent to almost 1.9 gigatons (1.9 million kilotons) of TNT. With a world population of 7.7 billion, this means that a minority of nine states have a combined, active nuclear arsenal capable of unleashing firepower equal to around 245 kilograms of TNT per person on earth. The estimated yield of each nuclear-armed state's active arsenal is shown in Figure 5.⁴³

For context, Figure 6 also translates the estimated yield of the active nuclear arsenals into Hiroshima-bomb equivalents. Most nuclear weapons today have an explosive yield that is many times higher than that of the nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, whose explosive force was the equivalent of 15 kilotons of TNT and ultimately led to the deaths of an estimated 200,000 people.⁴⁴

A typical nuclear weapon in today's global arsenal has a yield of around 100 kilotons, approximately seven times that of the Hiroshima-bomb. For further context, Figure 7 overleaf provides an overview of the immediate estimated fatalities and injuries which a 100-kiloton nuclear weapon would cause if it were dropped today on Pyongyang, Tehran, New York City, Beijing, or Moscow.⁴⁵

Fig 5: Estimated total yield of active nuclear arsenals (kilotons)





Fig 6: Active nuclear arsenals in Hiroshima-bomb equivalents




42 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists (May 2019), at: bit.ly/2Ph4KUH.

43 Calculations of explosive yield were largely based on data from the Nuclear Notebooks by Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2miTj16. For warheads with a range of yields listed by the Federation of American Scientists, the average yield was used in the calculation. For warheads without previously estimated yields or undefined numbers, a best approximation was made based on average warhead sizes and known information about the country's arsenal. Total arsenals and yield estimates are based on active arsenals and do not include warheads waiting to be retired.

44 M. Hall, "By the Numbers: World War II's atomic bombs", *CNN* (6 August 2013), at: cnn.it/2NOW9XI.

45 Statistics on the number of fatalities and injured are from NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein, using population density information and nuclear effects information, at: bit.ly/2kTpBiH. Fatalities and injuries are based on the immediate impact of the detonation and do not account for long-term radiation deaths and injuries or the lasting environmental impact a large-scale nuclear detonation could cause. All of the detonations calculated were airbursts, not surface detonations.

Fig 7: Immediate fatalities and injuries from one 100 kiloton nuclear weapon



Policies on Use

Five of the nine nuclear-armed states – France, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – maintain written nuclear doctrines that allow for the “first use” of nuclear weapons. Two of the nine, India and China, have long had so-called no-first-use policies, declaring that they will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation to the use of such weapons by an adversary (Indian policy allowed for the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attack in 2003). Yet both are in the process of expanding their arsenals, which many analysts have interpreted to suggesting that they might be envisioning pre-emptive use under certain circumstances.⁴⁶ Kim Jong-un stated in 2016 and 2018 that North Korea will not use nuclear weapons unless “its sovereignty is encroached upon by any hostile force with nuclear weapons”.⁴⁷ However, other statements issued by the same government, including threats of a “pre-emptive nuclear strike of justice” against Japan and South Korea, have negated the credibility of these comments. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s apparent claim in October 2018 that Russia would not use nuclear weapons first is not reflected in Russia’s official nuclear-weapons doctrine, which explicitly stipulates that Russia would consider their

use in response to the use of “weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy”.⁴⁸ The last nuclear-armed state, Israel, has not formally admitted to possessing nuclear weapons, and has thus not made clear its policy on use.

Theorists often distinguish between strategies aimed at destroying the adversary’s missile bases and other nuclear assets (“counter-force”) and strategies aimed at killing civilians and destroying the adversary’s population centres (“counter-value”). Counter-force strategies are commonly presumed to require larger nuclear arsenals and more sophisticated command and control structures than do counter-value strategies. Russia and the United States are believed to have maintained plans for both counter-value and counter-force strikes since the 1960s. The remaining seven nuclear-armed states have maintained smaller nuclear arsenals primarily structured to facilitate counter-value strikes in response to an initial attack. However, there are now signs that certain nuclear-armed states, China and India in particular, are expanding their arsenals in such a way as to enable counter-force strikes against certain potential opponents.

Facilities and Deployments

As of 2017, nuclear weapons were believed to be stored or deployed at a minimum of 108 locations across the nine nuclear-armed states and the five host states.⁴⁹ Nuclear weapons are also frequently transported between these locations, be it for deployment, retirement, maintenance, or modifications. A significant number of nuclear weapons are also on active patrol, carried through the world’s oceans on nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs⁵⁰) (often referred to as “continuous-at-sea-deterrence”). Between them, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are believed to have around 15 SSBNs on active duty at any given time. Each of these submarines carries incredible nuclear firepower. For example, a single UK Vanguard-class submarine carries 40 nuclear warheads with estimated explosive yields equivalent to 100 kilotons of TNT each, meaning that a single UK SSBN carries firepower more than 250 times greater than the yield from the Hiroshima bomb. The United States retains 14 SSBNs, Russia 10, the UK 4, and France 4. All are in the process of building or procuring a new generation of submarines.

46 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 75, no. 4 (2019), at: bit.ly/2ZuCOYx; H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Indian nuclear forces, 2018”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 74, no. 6 (2018), at: bit.ly/32fNiS7.

47 R. Smart, “North Korea will not use nuclear weapons first, says Kim Jon-un”, *The Guardian* (8 May 2016), at: bit.ly/2mvie1C.

48 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), at: bit.ly/2neZDH8.

49 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 73, no. 5 (2017), at: bit.ly/2NEA1yL.

50 SSBN stands for “submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear powered”.

France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States all maintain nuclear weapons on alert, that is, warheads mated with means of delivery and ready to be launched on short notice (within 5 minutes). Combined, these four states are estimated to deploy about 1,800 alert nuclear warheads between them, with Russia and the United States accounting for more than 90 per cent of that number.⁵¹ As discussed above, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States all have SSBNs on duty at all times. Russia and the United States also deploy several hundred alert ground-launched nuclear missiles.

The remaining nuclear-armed states are thought not to maintain nuclear weapons on alert, storing their nuclear warheads separately from their respective delivery vehicles. However, it has been suggested that this might change as China, India, Israel, and Pakistan are in the process of fielding or upgrading their submarine forces. It is not clear whether China, which has already fielded a fleet of such submarines, equips its SSBNs with nuclear weapons in peacetime.⁵² Table 4 below summarizes best available knowledge on the alert status of nuclear forces.

Table 4: Alert status of nuclear forces

State	Capability	Alert status
China	Air-delivered nuclear weapons	Not on alert
	Land-based nuclear missiles	Not on alert
	Nuclear-armed submarines	Unknown
France	Air-delivered nuclear weapons	Not on alert
	Nuclear-armed submarines	On alert
India	Air-delivered nuclear weapons	Not on alert
	Land-based nuclear missiles	Not on alert
	Ship-launched nuclear weapons	Not on alert
Israel	Air-delivered nuclear weapons	Unknown
	Land-based nuclear missiles	Unknown
	Nuclear-armed submarines	Unknown
North Korea	Land-based nuclear missiles	Unknown
Pakistan	Air-delivered nuclear weapons	Not on alert
	Land-based nuclear missiles	Not on alert
Russia	Air-delivered nuclear weapons	Not on alert
	Land-based nuclear missiles	On alert
	Nuclear-armed submarines	On alert
United Kingdom	Nuclear-armed submarines	On alert
United States	Air-delivered nuclear weapons	Not on alert
	Land-based nuclear missiles	On alert
	Nuclear-armed submarines	On alert

51 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists (May 2019), at: bit.ly/2Ph4KUH.

52 T. Zhao, *Tides of Change* (Washington DC: Carnegie, 2018), pp. 16–17.

War Games and Missile Tests

The nuclear-armed states routinely engage in military exercises involving manoeuvres by nuclear-capable aircraft, submarines, and surface ships. They also routinely test their nuclear command-and-control infrastructure and missiles.

Several non-nuclear-armed states have in recent years taken part in such exercises, in particular through NATO's nuclear sharing scheme. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are all believed to engage in exercises to use the US nuclear weapons stationed on their territory with their own dual-capable aircraft. Czechia and Poland have practised the support of nuclear operations with conventional aircraft (the so-called "SNOWCAT"⁵³ mission).⁵⁴

Tests of nuclear-capable missiles in particular may function as sabre-rattling and escalate tensions. As explained in Chapter 5, tests of nuclear-capable missiles amount to development of nuclear weapons and are as such prohibited by the TPNW. In some situations, missile tests may also amount to threatening to use nuclear weapons, which is also prohibited by the TPNW.

Table 5 lists tests of nuclear-capable missiles from September 2018 to August 2019. Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the United States stand out as the most active testers of such missiles. Note that the list is based on public reports and may therefore not be exhaustive.

Table 5: Nuclear-capable-missile tests, Sept. 2018–Aug. 2019⁵⁵

State	Date	Missile	Location
China	24 November 2018	SLBM (JL-3)	Bohai Sea.
China	January 2019	IRBM (DF-26)	Launched from Northwest China.
China	January 2019	ICBM launch reported (suspected DF-41)	Unknown.
China	2 June 2019	SLBM (JL-3)	Flight from the Bohai Sea to a desert area in western China.
France	4 February 2019	ALCM (ASMP-A)	Bordeaux.
India	20 September 2018	SRBM (Prahaar)	Flight from Chandipur, Odisha to the Bay of Bengal.
India	6 October 2018	SRBM (Prithvi II)	Flight from Chandipur, Odisha to the Bay of Bengal.
India	30 October 2018	SRBM (Agni I)	Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.
India	10 December 2018	ICBM (Agni V)	Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.
India	23 December 2018	IRBM (Agni IV)	Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.
India	15 April 2019	GLCM (Nirbhay)	Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.
India	27 June 2019	SRBM (Prithvi-II)	Flight from Chandipur, Odisha.
North Korea	3 May 2019	Multiple short-range missiles	Flight from Wonsan, Kangwŏn Province to the Sea of Japan.
North Korea	9 May 2019	2 short-range ballistic missile (SRBMs)	Flight from North Pyongan, possibly Kusong.
North Korea	25 July 2019	2 SRBMs	Flight from Wonsan, Kangwŏn Province to the Sea of Japan.
North Korea	30 July	2 unidentified rockets	Flight from Wonsan, Kangwŏn Province to the Sea of Japan.
North Korea	2 August 2019	2 SRBM (likely KN-23)	Missiles landed in the Sea of Japan.
North Korea	5 August 2019	2 SRBMs (likely KN-23)	Flight from Kwail, South Hwanghae Province, to the Sea of Japan.
North Korea	6 August 2019	2 SRBMs (KN-23)	Flight from Kwail, South Hwanghae Province, to an islet in the Sea of Japan.
North Korea	10 August 2019	2 SRBMs	Flight from Hamhŭng, Hamgyŏng Province, to the Sea of Japan.
North Korea	16 August 2019	2 unidentified missiles	Flight from Tongchon, Kangwŏn Province, to the Sea of Japan.

⁵³ Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics.

⁵⁴ H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, "United States nuclear forces, 2018", 5 March 2018, at: bit.ly/33vDyoo.

⁵⁵ The list summarises reporting by Ankit Panda and Franz-Stefan Gady in *The Diplomat* and news updates published by Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

State	Date	Missile	Location
Pakistan	8 October 2018	IRBM (Hatf-5)	Unknown.
Pakistan	24 January 2019	4 SRBMs (Nasr)	Unknown.
Pakistan	29 January 2019	SRBM (Nasr)	Unknown.
Pakistan	31 January 2019	SRBM (Nasr)	Unknown.
Pakistan	23 April 2019	SLCM (likely nuclear capable)	Flight from the Arabian Sea to a target on land.
Pakistan	23 May 2019	IRBM (Shaheen II)	Missile landed in the Arabian Sea.
Pakistan	29 August 2019	SRBM (Hatf 3)	Unknown.
Russia	2017–2018	SRBM (Iskander-M)	In December 2018, the Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed that Russia had used multiple Iskander-M missiles – with conventional warheads – in Syria.
Russia	11–17 September 2018	Several anti-ballistic/air-defence missiles	Siberia (“Vostok” war games).
Russia	26 September 2018	Multiple ASCMs (Onyx)	Launched from Kotelny Island, Bulunsky.
Russia	6 October 2018	2 SLCMs (3M-14 Kalibr)	Caspian Sea (flight to Chechen Island).
Russia	11 October 2018	Several ballistic and cruise missiles	Barents and Okhotsk seas (annual nuclear war games).
Russia	1 December 2018	Anti-ballistic missile (likely nuclear-capable)	Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan.
Russia	6 December 2019	SRBM (Iskander-M)	Flight from Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan Oblast.
Russia	23 December 2018	Anti-satellite missile (PL-19 Nudol)	Flight likely from Plesetsk range, Arkhangelsk Oblast.
Russia	29 January 2019	GLCM (Burevrestnik)	Flight from Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan Oblast.
Russia	5 February 2019	ICBM (RS-24 Yars)	Flight from Plesetsk Cosmodrome, Arkhangelsk Oblast to the Kura missile-test range, Kamchatka peninsula.
Russia	5 April 2019	SLCM (Kalibr)	Launched from port in Zapadnaya Litsa, Kola Peninsula.
Russia	1 July 2019	Anti-ballistic missile (likely 53T6M)	Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan.
United States	6 November 2018	ICBM (Minuteman III)	Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands.
United States	5 February 2019	ICBM (Minuteman III)	Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands.
United States	25 March 2019	ICBM and ICBM interceptors	ICBM flight from Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands. Target shot down by interceptor missiles launched from Vandenberg, California.
United States	1 May 2019	ICBM (Minuteman III)	Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands.
United States	9 May 2019	ICBM (Minuteman III)	Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands.
United States	9 May 2019	SLBM (Trident II)	Flight from Cape Canaveral, Florida to the South Atlantic, off the coast of Namibia.
United States	19 May 2019	GLCM (Tomahawk)	Flight from San Nicolas Island, California. The missile was, according to the US Department of Defense, “conventionally configured”.

Dangerous Nuclear Rhetoric and Threats

The last few years have seen a spike in dangerous nuclear rhetoric and outright threats to use nuclear weapons. During the Cold War period, it was widely understood that a conflict involving nuclear-armed states could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. “Signalling” of nuclear intentions was usually understated and often occurred in the context of military-to-military contacts. In contrast, today’s reality involves much more explicit threats and aggressive rhetoric. Recent explicit and implicit threats of nuclear-weapon use by leaders of several nuclear-armed states have contributed to the creation of an unstable

security environment. While certain threats and/or aggressive statements were made in the context of escalating tensions, others were issued almost entirely without preface and were ostensibly designed to achieve political objectives. This trend of using threatening rhetoric involving nuclear weapons against specific states for political purposes entails a broadening of their role beyond nuclear deterrence towards their use in nuclear “blackmail” or “compellence”.

For example, in 2015, the Russian ambassador to Denmark stated that “Danish warships will be targets for Russian

nuclear missiles” should Denmark join NATO’s missile defence system.⁵⁶ In March 2016, in reaction to the commencement of a US-South Korean military exercise, North Korea threatened to turn Washington and Seoul into “flames and ashes”.⁵⁷ In August 2017, US President Donald Trump asserted that North Korea “best not make any more threats to the United States”, or “they will be met with fire and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen before.”⁵⁸ The next month, following the adoption by the UN Security Council of new sanctions against North Korea, the Korea Asia-Pacific “Peace Committee”, which oversees the country’s external relations, stated that the United States should be “beaten to death like a rabid dog” and Japan “sunken into the sea by the nuclear bomb of Juche”.⁵⁹ The trend has continued in 2018 and 2019:

- In his New-Year’s-Day speech of 1 January 2018, the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un stated: “The entire United States is within range of our nuclear weapons, and a nuclear button is always on my desk. This is reality, not a threat”.⁶⁰
- On 2 January 2018, in response to Kim Jong-un’s “button” comment, US President Donald Trump tweeted: “Will someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!”⁶¹
- On 1 March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the development of an “invincible” new nuclear cruise missile. An accompanying video showed a computer animation of missiles raining down on Florida.⁶²
- On 12 March 2018, in the context of UK investigations into the attempted murder of a former Russian double-agent and his daughter in Salisbury, a spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned: “Who does Britain think it is, issuing ultimatums to a nuclear power?”⁶³
- On 22 July 2018, US President Trump tweeted (in capital letters) to Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani: “Never, ever threaten the United States again or you will suffer consequences the likes of which few throughout history have ever suffered before.”⁶⁴
- Visiting the Dimona facility on 29 August 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Israel’s enemies that Israel has the means to destroy them. Netanyahu stated: “Those who threaten to wipe us out put themselves in a similar danger”.⁶⁵ The Dimona reactor is believed to have produced the fissile material for Israel’s nuclear weapons.
- On 20 February 2019, in his annual State of the Nation speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that, if the US stationed intermediate-range missiles on the European continent, “Russia would aim its weapons at those missiles and at targets in the United States.”⁶⁶
- On 26 February 2019, amid rising tensions between India and Pakistan, the latter publicly announced that it would convene a meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA), which oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. According to one observer, the disclosure of the NCA meeting was “clearly meant to be a threat of nuclear retaliation. ‘I hope you know what that [convening the meeting] means,’ the Pakistani spokesperson said. They also declared that Pakistan would ‘dominate the escalation ladder.’”⁶⁷
- On 27 March 2019, US President Donald Trump stated that Russia had to “get out” of Venezuela, and that “all options” were on the table if they did not.⁶⁸
- On 17 April 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated: “In the past our people would weep, go around the world saying Pakistan did this, did that. It is now Pakistan’s turn to weep.” He further noted that India has “the mother of nuclear bombs”, and that he had told Pakistan: “do whatever you want to do but we will retaliate.”⁶⁹
- On 19 May 2019, US President Donald Trump declared on Twitter that he would bring about “the official end of Iran” should the latter want to fight.⁷⁰ US nuclear-capable bombers had been deployed to a US base in Qatar, neighbouring Iran, the week before.
- On 23 July 2019, ahead of a meeting with Pakistan’s prime minister, US President Donald Trump asserted that “I have plans on Afghanistan that if I wanted to win that war, Afghanistan would be wiped off the face of the earth, it would be gone, it would be over in literally 10 days.” The comment was widely read as an allusion to

56 Reuters, “Russia threatens to aim nuclear missiles at Denmark ships if it joins NATO shield” (22 March 2015), at: reut.rs/348UNfr.

57 AP, “North Korea threatens to reduce US and South Korea to ‘Flames and Ash,’” *The Guardian* (7 March 2016), at: bit.ly/2ZvHxOt.

58 P. Baker and C. Sang-Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.,” *New York Times* (8 August 2017), at: nyti.ms/2HtI02s.

59 J. McCurry, “We will sink Japan and turn US to ‘ashes and darkness’, says North Korea,” *The Guardian* (13 September 2017), at: bit.ly/30L7Zol. “Juche” is North Korea’s state ideology of self-reliance.

60 Newshub, “Nuclear button is always on my desk” (1 January 2018), at: bit.ly/2MlJn1l.

61 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (2 January 2018), at: bit.ly/2UgleeP.

62 BBC, “Russia’s Putin unveils ‘invincible’ nuclear weapons” (1 March 2018), at: bbc.in/2ZvgHdn.

63 P. Gourtsyannis, “Russia warns UK,” *The Scotsman* (13 March 2018), at: bit.ly/2zrSZjG.

64 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (22 July 2018), at: bit.ly/2Zvhc7f.

65 D. Williams, “At Dimona reactor, Netanyahu warns Israel’s foes they risk ruin,” *Reuters* (29 August 2018), at: reut.rs/2UdDNAe.

66 N. MacFarquhar, “Threatening U.S., Putin Promises Russians Both Missiles and Butter,” *New York Times* (20 February 2019), at: nyti.ms/2ZtakDq.

67 J. Trevitchick, “Pakistan Promises Retaliation, Makes Nuclear Threats After Indian Jets Bomb Its Territory,” *The Drive* (26 February 2019), at: bit.ly/2NDaxS9.

68 E. Zuesse, “Trump Threatens Nuclear War if Russia Protects Venezuela,” *Modern Diplomacy* (1 April 2019), at: bit.ly/32dGwvs.

69 C. McGrath, “Modi Warns Pakistan Against ‘Threats,’” *Express* (18 April 2019), at: bit.ly/2ZrqCl2.

70 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (19 May 2019), at: bit.ly/2HyN3tB.

plans to use nuclear weapons.⁷¹ At a news conference with Australia's prime minister on 20 September 2019, Trump repeated this point, saying that "We've been very effective in Afghanistan, and if we wanted to do a certain method of war, we could win that very quickly, but many, many, really, tens of millions of people would be killed, and we think it's unnecessary."⁷²

While many of these outbursts arguably do not qualify as "threatening" to use nuclear weapons in a legal sense, they nevertheless challenge the norms of nuclear restraint and tradition of non-use. They also further increase incentives for nuclear proliferation and are incompatible with the NPT and the 2010 NPT Action Plan commitments to adopt policies compatible with achieving a world without nuclear weapons and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military and security policies. See Chapter 5 and the section on Article 1(1)(d) for an analysis of the TPNW prohibition on threatening to use nuclear weapons.

Development, Production, and Maintenance of Nuclear Weapons

All nine nuclear-armed states are currently investing heavily in their nuclear forces. Most of the nuclear-armed states brand their ongoing development efforts as "modernisation", a euphemism for what the editor in chief of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* has labelled a "ritual squandering of national resources on weapons of horror that can never reasonably be used."⁷³

The nuclear weapon "modernisation" programmes are the most visible sign that the commitment in Action 1 in the NPT 2010 Action plan to adopt policies "fully compatible with the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons"⁷⁴ is not being respected. Many weapon systems currently being built are set to remain operational into the 2070s and 2080s, meaning that the states in question are committing themselves to nuclear armament for at least half a century into the future. In other words, ongoing modernisation projects "indicate that genuine progress towards nuclear disarmament will remain a distant goal".⁷⁵ They also generate a dynamic that has been described as a "new nuclear arms race".⁷⁶

Russia is reportedly adding a range of new nuclear-weapon systems, including a nuclear-powered cruise missile and a nuclear-armed underwater drone capable of delivering a "radioactive tsunami".⁷⁷ Russia is also building new ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Russia is also widely believed to have developed and deployed a new missile system with a range exceeding 500 km, precipitating the demise of the INF Treaty in 2018–2019.

The United States is in the midst of a full overhaul of all three legs of its nuclear triad, an effort that will, over the next 30 years, commit expenditure on nuclear weapons of as much as \$2 trillion (accounting for inflation).⁷⁸ The United States is also developing new low-yield capabilities as outlined in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, and in 2018 the US Congress approved funds to begin developing a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile of INF range (500–5,500 km).⁷⁹

China is developing a new generation of ICBMs capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).⁸⁰ France is in the process of acquiring a new generation of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. Development of a new class of ballistic missile submarines is expected to begin during the 2019–24 military planning period.⁸¹ The United Kingdom is already in the process of building a new class of ballistic missile submarines. India, North Korea, and Pakistan continue to build new warheads and are reportedly working to develop ICBMs and sea-based nuclear forces.

Although some features of the modernisation projects now underway are intended to increase safety and ensure better command and control, they also involve an expansion in capabilities, including making the weapons smaller and faster. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), "[i]n some respects, TNWs [tactical nuclear weapons] are more dangerous than strategic weapons. Their small size, vulnerability to theft, and perceived usability make the existence of TNWs in national arsenals a risk to global security. And the new perception of the usability of nuclear weapons in both Russia and the United

71 A. Ward, "Trump says he could wipe Afghanistan off face of the earth in 10 days", *Vox* (22 July 2019), at: bit.ly/2ZCuRWp.

72 J. Wagner, "Trump says he could end Afghanistan war quickly but 'tens of millions' of people would die", *Washington Post* (20 September 2019), at: wapo.st/2m6agLK.

73 J. Mecklin, "The wasteful and dangerous worldwide nuclear modernization craze", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2Zm3VPf.

74 NPT 2010 Action Plan, at: bit.ly/2nnMJ9M.

75 S. Kyle, "Modernization of nuclear weapons continues", SIPRI (18 June 2018), at: bit.ly/2MK3CHE.

76 B. Zala, "How the next nuclear arms race will be different from the last one", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (2 January 2019), at: bit.ly/2UgyjVj.

77 F. S. Gady, "Russia (Once Again) Announces Start of Sea Trials of 'Doomsday Weapon'", *The Diplomat* (27 December 2018), at: bit.ly/2NFuloa.

78 K. Reif with A. Sanders-Zakre, "U.S. Nuclear Excess", *Arms Control Association* (April 2019), at: bit.ly/2zt2yyL.

79 K. Reif, "Congress Funds Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead", *Arms Control Today* (November 2018), at: bit.ly/3270Jly.

80 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2019", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 75, no. 4 (2019), at: bit.ly/2ZuCOYx.

81 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, "French nuclear forces, 2019", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2MKHqBr.

States, albeit for different reasons, could create a dangerous precedent for other countries.”⁸² Other aspects of ongoing modernisation efforts increase the dependence of nuclear command and control systems on digital technologies. This may make such systems vulnerable to cyber interference and result in human errors, false alerts, and malicious hacking by hostile states or even non-state actors.⁸³

All the nuclear-armed states maintain strict government control over their nuclear-weapon programmes. However, a number of private companies are involved in the nuclear-armed states’ development, production, and maintenance of nuclear-weapon systems in various ways. Most of these companies are headquartered in the nuclear-armed states, but some have headquarters or divisions in non-nuclear-armed states. For example, the Belarusian company Minsk Automotive Factory is the only manufacturer of the self-propelled mobile launchers for the Russian Topol-M ICBM.⁸⁴ The multinational company Airbus Group, legally incorporated in the Netherlands is currently involved in the development and production of the French Navy’s M51 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, through its German-headquartered division Airbus Defence and Space. The M51 will, over time, represent the main delivery system for France’s strategic nuclear weapons. The French Air Force’s ASMP-A missiles – designed to deliver nuclear warheads by air – were developed by the joint venture company MDBA, which was made up of Dutch/German-headquartered Airbus, UK-headquartered BAE Systems, and Italian-headquartered Leonardo (formerly known as Finmeccanica).

The development and production of nuclear weapons constitutes a multi-billion-dollar industry, with numerous large companies and universities profiting from, and lending their legitimacy to, the industrial effort.⁸⁵ Investment in the major nuclear-weapon developers is continuing to increase, although the number of investors is declining. A report published in June 2019 by PAX and ICAN found that a total of US\$748 billion has been invested in nuclear weapon-producing companies by 325 banks and other financial institutions in the last two years.⁸⁶

Under the TPNW, a company that develops or produces key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device would be engaging in prohibited assistance. See Chapter 5 for the *Ban Monitor’s* analysis of the prohibition on assistance and corporate and state responsibility.

Fissile Material

Fissile Material Production

Fissile material – highly enriched uranium or reprocessed plutonium – is the key ingredient in nuclear weapons. Production of fissile material for nuclear weapons continues in North Korea, India, Pakistan, and, possibly, Israel (see Table 6). Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States produce or procure nuclear material that could potentially be used for non-peaceful purposes (see Table 7).

To enrich uranium is to increase the percentage of U₂₃₅ it contains. Natural uranium contains almost all U₂₃₈ and very little U₂₃₅. Conventional nuclear reactors require the fuel to be only about 3.5-4.5% U₂₃₅. Although small amounts of uranium enriched to up to about 20% may be used in research, highly enriched uranium beyond that threshold is not needed for standard power generation. Atypical modern HEU-based weapon requires the amount of U₂₃₅ to be at least 90%.⁸⁷

Enrichment of uranium may be accomplished using a range of methods, including, gaseous or thermal diffusion, by use of laser, or through electromagnetic isotope separation. Today, however, this occurs most often by means of centrifuges. Plutonium is normally generated as a by-product of the operation of nuclear reactors by transmutation of individual atoms of a uranium isotope.

The NPT guarantees the “inalienable right” of all its states parties to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, and the preamble of the TPNW confirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting that right. There is some disagreement about whether the “right” under the NPT and the TPNW to develop nuclear energy extends to a right to produce fissile material. Such production is not explicitly prohibited by either the NPT or the TPNW. Under the TPNW, production of fissile material amounts to prohibited development when it is done with a view to producing nuclear weapons (see Chapter 5, in particular the section on Article 1(1)(a)).

82 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “French nuclear forces, 2019”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2MKhqBr.

83 For an overview see: NTI, “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age” (26 September 2018), at: bit.ly/2Ug00T7.

84 A. M. Dyer, “The Armed Forces of Belarus”, *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2017), p. 54.

85 See, e.g., S. Snyder, *Producing Mass Destruction: Private Companies and the Nuclear Weapon Industry*, PAX, Utrecht, The Netherlands, May 2019.

86 S. Snyder, *Shorting our Security – Financing the Companies that Make Nuclear Weapons*, PAX and ICAN, Utrecht, The Netherlands, June 2019, at: bit.ly/2KwIGBH.

87 J. MacDonald, “What Is Enriched Uranium?”, *JSTOR*, 8 August 2019, at: bit.ly/2mA2SIW.

Table 6: States producing fissile material for nuclear weapons⁸⁸

Facilities	States
Uranium enrichment	North Korea (suspected), Pakistan.
Plutonium production	India, Israel (suspected), North Korea (suspected), Pakistan.

Table 7: States producing fissile material for civilian use⁸⁹


Facilities	States
Uranium enrichment (low-enriched)	Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.
Plutonium production	China, France, India, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom.

Fissile Material Stocks

China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States stopped producing fissile material for nuclear weapons in the 1990s but retain large stocks. Russia and the United States, in particular, possess enormous quantities of fissile material that could be used to produce tens of thousands of new nuclear explosive devices (see Figure 8 and Table 8).

There is also highly enriched uranium held by non-nuclear-armed states, as Table 9 summarizes. A total of 15 non-nuclear-armed states have highly enriched uranium stockpiles and one of these – Japan – also has a very large plutonium stockpile on its territory, sufficient for the production of 1,800 nuclear weapons.

Fig 8: Fissile material stocks in nuclear-armed states, weapon equivalents 2018



88 IPFM, "Fissile material stocks" (February 2018), at: fissilematerials.org/.

89 Ibid.

Table 8: Fissile material stocks in nuclear-armed states⁹⁰

State	Highly enriched uranium		Military plutonium		Civilian plutonium		Approx. total weapon equivalents
	Tons	Approx. nuclear weapons potential	Tons	Approx. nuclear weapons potential	Tons	Approx. nuclear weapons potential	
China	14	933	2.9	967	0.04	8	1,908
France	30.6	2,040	6	2,000	65.4	13,080	17,120
India	4	267	7.07	2,357	0.4	80	2,704
Israel	0.3	20	0.9	300	-	-	320
North Korea	0	0	0.04	13	-	-	13
Pakistan	3.4	227	0.28	93	-	-	320
Russia	679	45,267	128	42,667	59	11,800	99,734
United Kingdom	21.2	1,413	3.2	1,067	110.3	22,060	24,540
United States	574.5	38,300	79.8	26,600	8	1,600	66,500

Table 9: Fissile material stocks in non-nuclear-armed states⁹¹

State	Highly enriched uranium stockpiles (tons)	Approx. nuclear weapons potential	Civilian plutonium stockpiles (tons)	Approx. nuclear weapons potential
Japan	< 10	~350	9*	~1,800
Canada	< 10	~350	0	N/A
Kazakhstan	< 10	~350	0	N/A
Belgium	< 1	~35	0	N/A
Belarus	< 1	~35	0	N/A
Germany	< 1	~35	0	N/A
Italy	< 1	~35	0	N/A
Netherlands	< 1	~35	0	N/A
South Africa	< 1	~35	0	N/A
Australia	< 0.01	0	0	N/A
Iran*	< 0.01	0	0	N/A
Norway	< 0.01	0	0	N/A
Syria	< 0.001	0	0	N/A
Argentina	0	N/A	0	N/A
Brazil	0	N/A	0	N/A

* "Status of plutonium management in Japan in 2018", IPFM Blog, 30 July 2019, at: bit.ly/2n8ZkxE. Japan also holds a further 36.7 tons of civilian plutonium abroad in France and the United Kingdom.

** In July 2019, Iran exceeded the limit on the amount of low enriched uranium in its stockpile set out in the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal according to the IAEA. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was reported by the state-run Iranian broadcaster IRIB as saying that Iran's next step would be to enrich uranium beyond the 3.67% cap allowed by the 2015 JCPOA. "Iran nuclear deal: Tehran exceeds enriched uranium limit", *Aljazeera*, 1 July 2019, at: bit.ly/2n4n59T.

90 Ibid. HEU conversion rate is 15kg per nuclear weapon. Military plutonium conversion rate is 3kg per nuclear weapon. Civilian plutonium conversion rate is 5kg per nuclear weapon. See: See Z. Mian and A. Glaser, "Global Fissile Material Report 2015", International Panel on Fissile Materials (May 2015), at: bit.ly/2Pj8NzY.

91 Sources: International Panel on Fissile Material data, at: bit.ly/2kNa83B and bit.ly/2mkjYKO. Information on HEU stockpiles as at December 2018 and information on Pu stockpiles as at December 2016.

3 Status of the TPNW



Moment of adoption of the TPNW, 7 July 2017. Photo, Clare Conboy.

The TPNW was adopted on 7 July 2017 at a diplomatic conference established by the UN General Assembly. A total of 122 states, more than three-fifths of the world's 197 states, voted in favour of the Treaty's adoption.⁹² Only one state participating in the conference, the Netherlands, voted against, while a second, Singapore, abstained. The Treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017, with Brazil becoming its first signatory. It can be signed by any state, also after its entry into force. The TPNW will enter into force 90 days after the 50th state has ratified or acceded to it.

TPNW Support

Two years after the TPNW was opened for signature, the *Ban Monitor* identifies a total of 135 states, or more than two thirds of the world's states, as "TPNW supporters". These are states that have signed, ratified, acceded to and/or voted in favour of the TPNW at the UN.⁹³

As of 1 October 2019, 80 states had adhered to or signed the TPNW. Seventy-nine states had signed, of which 31 had also ratified. In addition, one state – Cook Islands –

had acceded. Thus, 32 states have adhered to the TPNW, and a further 48 states are signatories that have not yet ratified the Treaty. This is illustrated in Figure 9 and Table 10 overleaf.

In addition, the *Ban Monitor* includes among the TPNW supporters the category "other supporters", which consists of an additional 55 states that have not yet signed or adhered to the Treaty, but which adopted the TPNW at the UN diplomatic conference in July 2017 and/or voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. If a state that voted in favour of the adoption of the TPNW later votes against or abstains on the TPNW resolution at the UN General Assembly, the *Ban Monitor* will remove it from the "other supporters" category.

The 55 other supporters make up the most immediate potential for new signatories to the TPNW. Many have already started the process to sign. For details about the level of backing that the TPNW has in the respective states in the other-supporters category, see the state profiles in Chapter 8. The *Ban Monitor* encourages those states that have not yet done so to move swiftly to full adherence.

⁹² Subsequently, the delegation of Maldives informed the Secretariat that it too had intended to vote in favour of the Treaty's adoption. This was noted in the report of the conference. See: undocs.org/A/72/206.

⁹³ Thus far, there have been two opportunities for states to signal their views on the TPNW during votes at the UN: when the Treaty was adopted in July 2017, and on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. The TPNW resolution is expected to become an annual feature at the UN General Assembly.

Fig 9: Global status of the TPNW




Table 10: The world's states by their position on the TPNW

Category	States
Adhered (32 states)	Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia, Guyana, Holy See, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Maldives, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam.
Signed, but not yet ratified (48 states)	Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Zambia.
Other supporters (55 states)	Afghanistan, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
Undecided (17 states)	Argentina, Finland, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Serbia, Singapore, Somalia, South Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Non-supporters (45 states)	Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Korea, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Undecided States

A total of 17 states (8.6% of the global total) are, for the purposes of this report, categorised as “undecided”. This means that they have neither signed or adhered to the TPNW nor declared that they will not do so, and their last vote in the UN was not in favour of or against the TPNW.

The current “undecided” states all have nuclear-weapon-free security strategies but are otherwise a mixed group. Some have the Treaty under review domestically. Others are in fact already making preparations to sign. Yet others are, for various reasons, including internal challenges, at this stage not considering whether to join the Treaty or not.

Argentina, the Marshall Islands, and Switzerland all voted in favour of adopting the TPNW in 2017, but the *Ban Monitor* has moved them to the undecided category after they abstained on the TPNW Resolution at the UN General Assembly in 2018. All three states are in protracted processes to arrive at a national position. Argentina’s consistent line has been that they are still examining the Treaty.⁹⁴ The Marshall Islands’ Foreign Minister John Silk has said that his government cannot back the TPNW without US involvement, but has also communicated that ongoing internal consultations have prompted the government to take more time for consideration before joining the Treaty.⁹⁵ In Switzerland, the government decided in 2018 not to join the TPNW “at the present time”.⁹⁶ However, both houses of the Swiss Parliament subsequently instructed the government to sign and ratify without delay.⁹⁷ In response, the government has committed to review its decision by the end of 2020.⁹⁸

Non-Supporters

Forty-five states (22.8%) are categorised as “non-supporters” of the TPNW, meaning that they have taken a stance against signing or adhering to the Treaty. The non-supporters comprise the nine nuclear-armed states and all of the current nuclear-weapon-possessing states. The category also includes North Macedonia, which is in the process of acceding to NATO and joined the NATO states in voting against the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

Finally, the *Ban Monitor* includes among the non-supporters the following four states with nuclear-weapon-free security

strategies: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Micronesia, Monaco, and Sweden. The first three states voted against the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW in 2017 but then abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution in 2018, before announcing in July 2019 that it would “refrain from signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the present time”.⁹⁹ It also indicated, however, that Sweden might reassess its position following the NPT review conference in 2020.¹⁰⁰

The 45 non-supporters are not a uniform group. Most of them voted against the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018, while others, like Sweden, abstained. Interestingly, both Belarus and Armenia – the only two states that have explicit or implicit extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangements with Russia – both abstained on this resolution. By contrast, all the NATO states and states in bilateral extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangements with the United States voted against. Armenia also participated in the negotiations on the TPNW in 2017 but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty.

Many of the non-supporters, and particularly some of the nuclear-armed states, are outspoken opponents of the TPNW. For example, they have fallaciously claimed that the TPNW undermines the NPT. Other states in this category have been more nuanced in their opposition. A 2018 government enquiry in Norway, for instance, concluded that the TPNW reinforces the obligations contained in the NPT. In November 2018, Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Sjøreide stated in Parliament that “there is no legal obligation barring Norway from signing or ratifying [the TPNW], but strong political commitments amounting from the Atlantic Treaty and the strategic documents we have adopted.”¹⁰¹ In France, an information enquiry set up by the parliamentary foreign affairs committee concluded in July 2018 that France should “mitigate its criticism of the [TPNW] and the countries that have contributed to its adoption, to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of States and their desire for more balanced global governance.”¹⁰² The Swedish government on its part has already announced that it will participate as an observer at the meetings of states parties to the TPNW when it enters into force.¹⁰³

Political debate about the merits of the TPNW is ongoing in several of the non-supporter states. In September 2018,

94 Argentina, statement in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 2018, at: bit.ly/2kVHjSF.

95 *The Marshall Islands Journal*, vol. 49, no. 44 (2 November 2018).

96 Press release, at: bit.ly/2nGlhQr.

97 Motion, at: bit.ly/2kTeiql.

98 Press release, at: bit.ly/2ktmTQF.

99 Article from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: bit.ly/2Gc1lZR.

100 *Ibid.*

101 Transcript from meeting in the Norwegian Parliament 14 November 2018, at: bit.ly/2m2RrZP.

102 Report from the French Parliament’s foreign affairs committee, at: bit.ly/2mtx3l2.

103 Article from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: bit.ly/2Gc1lZR.

the left-wing party Podemos obtained a commitment from the Spanish government to sign the TPNW, in exchange for Podemos' support for the 2019 national budget. The government has not commented on how or when it will implement this agreement.¹⁰⁴ The Italian parliament in September 2017 adopted a resolution committing the government to "pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world" and "in a way compatible with its NATO obligations and with the positioning of allied states, to explore the possibility of becoming a party to the legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination, as adopted on 7 July 2017".¹⁰⁵ The Dutch House of Representatives supports the Netherlands joining the TPNW and in November 2018 adopted a series of motions on nuclear disarmament including a call for an investigation into the compatibility of the TPNW with existing Dutch legislation. The Dutch foreign and defence ministers responded that there are no fundamental obstacles within the Dutch law preventing the Netherlands from joining.¹⁰⁶ In Australia, the incumbent government has opposed the idea of a ban on nuclear weapons since the beginning, while the opposition Labor Party has formally acknowledged the "value of the Treaty ... and its aspiration to rid the world of nuclear weapons for all time". In December 2018, the Labor Party committed to "sign and ratify the Ban Treaty" when it next forms a government, after taking into account the need to ensure complementarity with the NPT and an effective verification and enforcement architecture.¹⁰⁷


More information on the latest developments in the states in the non-supporters category can be found in their respective profiles in Chapter 8.

Support by Region

Breaking down the 135 TPNW supporters by region, Figure 10 shows that support for the TPNW is already high in all regions apart from Europe, with more than 94% of the states in Africa supporting it by either having adhered, signed, or voted in favour, followed by the Americas with more than 91%, Asia with 72%, and Oceania with almost 69%.

In Europe only three states (Austria, Holy See, and San Marino) have adhered, and two (Liechtenstein and Ireland) have signed but not yet ratified, while another five (Andorra, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Malta, and Republic of Moldova (Moldova)) have voted in favour of the TPNW at the UN and are in the category of "other supporters".

Fig 10: TPNW support by region



All regions have a small group of undecided states. There is just 1 undecided state in the Americas (Argentina), 3 in Africa, 3 in Oceania, 5 in Europe, and 5 in Asia.

The highest number of non-supporters is in Europe, where 34 states (69%) currently are opposed to signing the TPNW. There are no non-supporters in Africa, 2 in the Americas, 2 in Oceania, and 7 in Asia.

For a clear picture of which states in the respective regions that have adhered, signed but not yet ratified, are other supporters, undecided, and non-supporters, see Figures 11 to 15.

104 ICAN news article, at: bit.ly/2koiOgA.

105 ICAN news article, at: bit.ly/2lY88FY.

106 PAX news article, at: bit.ly/2P730d7.

107 ICAN news article, at: bit.ly/2mmfEdT.

Fig 11: TPNW support in Africa




Fig 12: TPNW support in Americas




Fig 13: TPNW support in Asia




Fig 14: TPNW support in Europe





Fig 15: TPNW support in Oceania



Adherence Speed

Just after two years since the TPNW opened for signature, a total of 32 states had adhered to the Treaty. Thirty-one states had signed and ratified as of 1 October 2019, and one state – the Cook Islands – had acceded. To trigger entry into force, the TPNW needs 18 more states to adhere to the Treaty by means of ratification or accession.

Figure 16 shows the rate of adherence¹⁰⁸ to the TPNW compared to the other treaties on weapons of mass destruction (WMD): the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the NPT. While the TPNW almost 25 months after opening for signature had 32 adherents, the NPT had 52 adherents after 25 months, the BWC 30, the CWC 20, and the CTBT 21. As Figure 16 demonstrates, the TPNW's adherence rate is on average the same as for other WMD treaties. In fact, at the time of writing, the TPNW had, by a close margin, the second fastest speed of adherence of all the WMD treaties –

although significantly slower than for the NPT. This progress is taking place despite the fact that the TPNW is the only treaty in this list whose negotiation and entry into force has been actively opposed by permanent members of the UN Security Council and some of their allies.

On the other hand, Figure 17 clearly illustrates that the number of states that have signed the TPNW is still low compared to all of the other WMD treaties. Since the first edition of the *Ban Monitor* in October 2018, though, ten states have signed the TPNW.

Universalization Efforts

Article 12 of the TPNW obliges all states parties to encourage states not yet party to adhere to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all states.

To promote adherence to the TPNW, a number of regional events took place in 2018 and 2019. South Africa and ICAN co-hosted a regional workshop in Pretoria, on 16–17 August 2018.¹⁰⁹ Thailand, together with New Zealand and the

108 Rate of adherence means rate of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.

109 Chair's summary, at: bit.ly/2kHK228.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), hosted a regional workshop in Bangkok, on 31 August 2018.¹¹⁰ New Zealand hosted a regional workshop in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018.¹¹¹ Guyana and ICAN co-hosted a regional forum for CARICOM states in Georgetown, Guyana, on 19–20 June 2019.¹¹² And finally, ICAN hosted a regional forum for ECOWAS members in Abuja, Nigeria, on 15–16 August 2019.¹¹³

On the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (26 September), Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa and Thailand as long-time champions of the TPNW hosted a special High-Level Ceremony on the TPNW at the UN Headquarters in New York, enabling presidents and foreign ministers from 12 states to sign and/or ratify the Treaty while at the UN General Assembly.¹¹⁴

Fig 17: Status of WMD treaties 25 months after opening for signature





Fig 16: Adherence speed – WMD treaties




110 Press release, at: bit.ly/2m2Succd.
 111 Auckland statement, at: bit.ly/2mnZJfd.
 112 Georgetown Statement, at: bit.ly/2kRrE6R.
 113 ECOWAS members statement, at: bit.ly/2m3doYI.
 114 ICAN news article, at: <https://bit.ly/2mQmJUI>.

4 Compliance with the TPNW

The heart of the TPNW is its Article 1, which contains the Treaty’s core prohibitions. The *Ban Monitor* evaluates the degree to which the world’s 197 states – adherents and non-adherents alike – act in accordance with these core prohibitions. The term “compliance” is used in a broad sense to refer to the compatibility of each state’s behaviour with the Treaty. In this edition of the *Ban Monitor*, compliance is assessed on the basis of active policies and acts carried out in 2018 and 2019, while reference is also made to certain significant earlier events. Interpretations of each of the prohibitions in Article 1 are set out in Chapter 5 of this report.

Overall, compliance with the core prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW across all states continues to be very high. As illustrated in Figure 18 and summarised in Table 11, the *Ban Monitor* finds that a total of 155 states currently maintain policies and practices that are compliant with all the Article 1 prohibitions. These are states that have already signed or adhered to the TPNW and fully comply with its provisions, or which are in a position to adhere without making changes to existing practices or policies.

Fig 18: Overall compliance with the TPNW prohibitions



Box 1: Article 1 of the TPNW

Article 1. Prohibitions

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
 - (a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
 - (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
 - (c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
 - (d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
 - (e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
 - (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
 - (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

A minority of 42 states were found to currently engage in behaviour that contravenes one or more of the Article 1 prohibitions. The non-compliant states are first and foremost the 9 nuclear-armed states and the 31 states which for the purposes of this report are categorised as “nuclear-weapon-possessing states” (see Chapter 2), but also include 2 states that have rejected any role for nuclear weapons in their security policies: Kazakhstan and the Marshall Islands. Kazakhstan has also signed and ratified the TPNW. The two states are, however, not fully compliant with the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance because they host sites where missiles designed to deliver nuclear warheads are periodically tested by foreign powers (Russia and the United States, respectively).¹¹⁵ Both Kazakhstan and the Marshall Islands can lawfully be states parties to the TPNW, but to become fully compliant they will need to exercise due diligence to ensure that any unlawful testing ends. This is discussed further in the section concerning Article 1(1)(e) in Chapter 5. The other 40 non-compliant states may of course also lawfully sign and ratify the TPNW, but they too would have to make varying degrees of changes to their policies and practices to become compliant.

¹¹⁵ For the same reason, Kazakhstan is also contravening the provisions of existing obligations under the regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty to which it is party.


Table 11: Overall compliance with Article 1 of the TPNW

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	42	Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Compliant	155	Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, DR Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia,* Oman, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

* As of writing, North Macedonia was considered to be in full compliance with Art 1 of the TPNW. It was, however, in the process of joining NATO, and if it does so without repudiating the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, it will be deemed to be encouraging assistance with acts prohibited by the TPNW and not in compliance with Art 1(1)(e).

As set out in Figure 19, Europe is the region with the most states whose practices and policies contravene the TPNW. A total of 30 of the 49 states in Europe (61%) currently maintain policies and practices that contravene one or more of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. In the other regions, compliance is generally high. In Africa, all states have been found to be compliant. In the Americas, only 2 states – Canada and the United States – of the 35 across the region (less than 6%) are not compliant. In Asia, where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of the 43 states (almost 19%) are not compliant: China, India, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Korea. In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands are the 2 states that are not compliant with the TPNW among the total of 16 states in the region.

Fig 19: Compliance by region



Compliance by Prohibition

Figure 20 disaggregates compliance for each of the Article 1 prohibitions. Most importantly, the nine nuclear-armed states are not in compliance with either the prohibitions on developing, producing, manufacturing, or acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or the prohibitions on possessing or stockpiling them.

The prohibitions in Article 1(1)(e) on assisting, encouraging, or inducing prohibited acts, however, stand out as the ones that are contravened by the greatest number of states. The nuclear-armed states' retention of nuclear weapons is abetted in many ways. We find that a total of 11 states (Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, the Marshall Islands, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States) assist acts that are prohibited by the TPNW. Thirty-four states (Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,

Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States) currently encourage or induce such acts.

The specific prohibition on allowing the "hosting" (stationing, installation, or deployment) of nuclear weapons is contravened by five states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey).

An overview of which states have been found to be non-compliant with each of the prohibitions is contained in Tables 12 to 16, broken down by region.

For further background on the non-compliant states' policies and practices in relation to each of the prohibitions, see the analysis in Chapter 5.

Fig 20: Compliance by prohibition




Table 12: TPNW Compliance in Africa

TPNW Article	1(1)(a)			1(1)(b)	1(1)(c)	1(1)(d)		1(1)(e)		1(1)(f)	1(1)(g)
	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist prohibited activity	Encourage or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation or deployment
Algeria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Angola	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Benin	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Botswana	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Burkina Faso	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Burundi	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Cabo Verde	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Cameroon	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Central African Republic	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Chad	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Comoros	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Congo	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Côte d'Ivoire	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
DR Congo	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Djibouti	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Egypt	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Equatorial Guinea	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Eritrea	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Eswatini	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Ethiopia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Gabon	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Gambia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Ghana	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Guinea	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Guinea-Bissau	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Kenya	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Lesotho	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Liberia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Libya	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Madagascar	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Malawi	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Mali	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Mauritania	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Mauritius	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Morocco	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Mozambique	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Namibia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Niger	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Nigeria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Rwanda	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sao Tome & Principe	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Senegal	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Seychelles	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sierra Leone	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Somalia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
South Africa	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
South Sudan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sudan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Togo	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Tunisia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Uganda	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Tanzania	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Zambia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Zimbabwe	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Table 13: TPNW Compliance in the Americas

TPNW Article	1(1)(a)			1(1)(b)	1(1)(c)	1(1)(d)		1(1)(e)		1(1)(f)	1(1)(g)
	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist prohibited activity	Encourage or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation or deployment
<i>Antigua and Barbuda</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Argentina</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Bahamas</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Barbados</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Belize</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Bolivia</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Brazil</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Canada</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
<i>Chile</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Colombia</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Costa Rica</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Cuba</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Dominica</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Dominican Rep.</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Ecuador</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>El Salvador</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Grenada</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Guatemala</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Guyana</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Haiti</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Honduras</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Jamaica</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Mexico</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Nicaragua</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Panama</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Paraguay</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Peru</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>St Kitts and Nevis</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Saint Lucia</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>St Vincent & Grenadines</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Suriname</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Trinidad and Tobago</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>United States</i>	▲	●	▲	▲	●	●	▲	▲	▲	▲	●
<i>Uruguay</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Venezuela</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Table 14: TPNW Compliance in Asia

TPNW Article	1(1)(a)			1(1)(b)	1(1)(c)	1(1)(d)		1(1)(e)		1(1)(f)	1(1)(g)
	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist prohibited activity	Encourage or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation or deployment
Afghanistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Bahrain	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Bangladesh	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Bhutan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Brunei	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Cambodia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
China	▲	●	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
India	▲	●	▲	●	●	●	▲	●	●	●	●
Indonesia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Iran	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Iraq	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Israel	▲	●	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Japan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Jordan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Kazakhstan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●	●
Kuwait	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Kyrgyzstan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Lao PDR	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Lebanon	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Malaysia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Maldives	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Mongolia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Myanmar	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Nepal	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
North Korea	▲	●	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Oman	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Pakistan	▲	●	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Philippines	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Qatar	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Saudi Arabia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Singapore	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
South Korea	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Sri Lanka	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Palestine	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Syria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Tajikistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Thailand	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Timor-Leste	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Turkmenistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
United Arab Emirates	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Uzbekistan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Viet Nam	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Yemen	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Table 15: TPNW Compliance in Europe

TPNW Article	1(1)(a)			1(1)(b)	1(1)(c)	1(1)(d)		1(1)(e)		1(1)(f)	1(1)(g)
	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist prohibited activity	Encourage or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation or deployment
Albania	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Andorra	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Armenia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Austria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Azerbaijan	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Belarus	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	▲	●	●
Belgium	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	▲	●	▲
Bosnia & Herzegovina	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Bulgaria	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Croatia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Cyprus	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Czechia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Denmark	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Estonia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Finland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
France	▲	●	▲	●	●	●	●	▲	▲	▲	●
Georgia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Germany	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	▲	●	▲
Greece	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Holy See	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Hungary	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Iceland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Ireland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Italy	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	▲	●	▲
Latvia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Liechtenstein	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Lithuania	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Luxembourg	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Malta	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Moldova	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Monaco	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Montenegro	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Netherlands	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	▲	●	▲
North Macedonia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Norway	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Poland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Portugal	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Romania	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Russia	▲	●	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●
San Marino	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Serbia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Slovakia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Slovenia	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Spain	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Sweden	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Switzerland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Turkey	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	▲	●	▲
Ukraine	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
United Kingdom	▲	●	▲	●	▲	●	●	▲	▲	▲	●

Table 16: TPNW Compliance in Oceania

TPNW Article	1(1)(a)			1(1)(b)	1(1)(c)	1(1)(d)		1(1)(e)		1(1)(f)	1(1)(g)
	Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire	Test	Possess or stockpile	Transfer	Receive transfer or control	Use	Threaten to use	Assist prohibited activity	Encourage or induce prohibited activity	Seek or receive assistance	Allow stationing, installation or deployment
<i>Australia</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
<i>Cook Islands</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Fiji</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Kiribati</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Marshall Islands</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●	●
<i>Micronesia</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Nauru</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>New Zealand</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Niue</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Palau</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Samoa</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Solomon Islands</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Tonga</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Tuvalu</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
<i>Vanuatu</i>	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

5 Interpretations and Analysis

The core prohibitions of the TPNW are all contained in Article 1. States parties undertake never under any circumstances to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, stockpile, transfer, receive the control over, use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is further prohibited to any state party to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity outlawed by the TPNW, or to seek or receive such assistance. Finally, it is prohibited to allow any stationing, installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

These prohibitions apply at all places and in all circumstances, including when an armed conflict is ongoing, and even if a state party is the victim of aggression. In addition, reservations to any of the Treaty's substantive provisions, including those set out in Article 1, are unlawful. That means that the scope and content of the prohibitions and obligations may not be limited by any state party to the TPNW.

This Chapter provides interpretations of each of the prohibitions in Article 1(1) of the TPNW. It also summarises the states that are not in compliance and explains what conduct amounts to the violation of the respective provisions.

For an overview of the core prohibitions and obligations in the TPNW, and a comparison with the core provisions in the NPT, see Table 17 on page 55.

Box 2: The Definition of Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

As is the case with the NPT, the TPNW does not define “nuclear weapons” or “other nuclear explosive devices”. There is, though, a settled understanding among states of what these terms mean. A nuclear explosive device is an explosive device whose effects are derived primarily from nuclear chain reactions. A nuclear weapon is a nuclear explosive device that has been weaponised, meaning that it is contained in and delivered by, for example, a missile, rocket, or bomb. Thus, all nuclear weapons are a form of nuclear explosive device but not all nuclear explosive devices are nuclear weapons.

The key components of a nuclear explosive device are fissile material (typically highly enriched uranium or reprocessed plutonium) and the means of triggering the nuclear chain reaction. Also key components are the precursors to fissile material, which are termed source material (e.g. naturally occurring uranium). As set out in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), fissile material (termed special fissionable material in the Statute) “means plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233...” Source material “means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235...” (Article XX, 1956 Statute of the IAEA (as amended))

In a nuclear weapon, additional key components are widely accepted to be the missile, rocket, or other munition, including both the container and any means of propulsion. Delivery platforms such as bombers and submarines are not key components of nuclear weapons as such, but they may be integral to a nuclear-weapon system and, in certain circumstances, investment in such a system, or the transfer of nuclear-capable bombers or submarines, could amount to prohibited assistance.

Article 1(1)(a): The Prohibition on Developing, Producing, Manufacturing, and Otherwise Acquiring Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	9	China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.

Development, production, manufacture, and other forms of acquisition of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices are prohibited under Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW.

The prohibited development of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device means any of the actions and activities intended to prepare for its production. This covers relevant research, computer modelling of weapons, and the testing of key components, as well as sub-critical testing (i.e. experiments simulating aspects of nuclear explosions using conventional explosives and without achieving uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions). Explosive testing constitutes unlawful development, but as discussed below this is also explicitly prohibited in Article 1(1)(a).

Production or procurement of fissile material constitutes prohibited development when this is done with the intent to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This is the case even though the production or procurement of fissile material is not explicitly mentioned in Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW.

The concepts of production and manufacture overlap significantly, covering the processes that are intended to lead to a completed, useable weapon or device. In general parlance, “production” is a broader term than “manufacture”: manufacture describes the use of machinery to transform inputs into outputs. Taken together, these concepts encompass not only any factory processes, but also any improvisation or adaptation of a nuclear explosive device.

The prohibition on “otherwise acquiring” a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is a catch-all provision that encompasses any means of obtaining nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices other than through production. This could be through import, lease, or borrowing from another source or, in theory, by recovering a lost nuclear weapon or capturing or stealing one. This prohibition overlaps with the one in Article 1(1)(c) not to receive the control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which is discussed below.

Under Article II of the NPT, a similar obligation is imposed not to *manufacture or otherwise acquire* nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but this applies only to non-nuclear-weapon states. That provision – and indeed the NPT as a whole – does not generally prohibit the *development* of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

All the nine nuclear-armed states have been actively engaged in development and production of new nuclear weapons in 2018–2019. Although explosive testing has been curtailed, North Korea has conducted ballistic missile tests and is believed to be continuing to produce fissile material for military purposes.

For more information on the ongoing development and production of nuclear weapons, see the section on Development, Production, and Maintenance in Chapter 2.

There are also potential compliance concerns on the horizon with respect to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran has recently restarted uranium enrichment (albeit not to a level sufficient for use in a nuclear explosive device) and has threatened to no longer comply with its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The United States had previously withdrawn its support for the agreement and re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran.

Saudi Arabia has explicitly threatened to swiftly acquire nuclear weapons should Iran do so. Saudi Arabia has also refused to accept adequate safeguards on nuclear material under its jurisdiction or control. It maintains in force a Small Quantities Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) even though the fissile material it possesses exceeds the maximum allowed under that protocol. In September 2019, Saudi Arabia’s new energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman, announced at a conference in Abu Dhabi that the country wants to extract and enrich uranium for its new nuclear energy programme, including construction of two nuclear reactors. Saudi Arabia is already in talks with companies from the United States, Russia, South Korea, China, and France for the project. However, Saudi Arabia is unwilling to sign a contract that forbids them from enriching uranium or from reusing used raw materials. These are techniques that can also be used to make weapons.¹¹⁶

116 “Saudi Arabia plans uranium enrichment for nuclear reactors”, *Teller Report*, 9 September 2019, at: bit.ly/2kscKnq.

Article 1(1)(a): The Prohibition on Testing of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	0	

The prohibition on testing in Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW bans the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. It is therefore limited to explosive testing. All non-explosive forms of testing are covered by the prohibition on development in the TPNW. All explosive testing is similarly prohibited under the CTBT, but that treaty is, as is the case with the TPNW, not yet in force. (Because of the relative simplicity of the entry-into-force provision of the TPNW, it can be expected that it will enter into force before the CTBT.)

Since the first nuclear test explosion on 16 July 1945, at least eight states have between them conducted an estimated 2,056 nuclear test explosions at dozens of test sites around the world.¹¹⁷ No explosive testing is known to have occurred in the period covered by this edition of the *Ban Monitor*.

North Korea is the only state that is known to have engaged in explosive nuclear testing since 1998, with its last test occurring in 2017. India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear devices in 1998. France completed its last nuclear explosive test in 1996. The United States conducted its last explosive tests in 1992. In November 2017, however, the United States decided to shorten its testing readiness timeline from between 24 and 36 months to only 10 months.¹¹⁸ The United Kingdom undertook its last explosive test in 1991. China's last explosive nuclear test was in July 1996, only a few months prior to the adoption of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly.

The Soviet Union/Russia ostensibly undertook its last explosive test in 1990.¹¹⁹ In late May 2019, a senior United States official accused Russia of *potentially* having conducted low-yield explosive testing of nuclear weapons but did not adduce any evidence in support of this assertion.¹²⁰ Other authorities within the US Government, however, contested the official's allegations, which were also angrily rebutted by Russia.¹²¹

Article 1(1)(a): The Prohibition on Possession and Stockpiling of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	9	China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.

The prohibition on possession of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device under Article 1(1)(a) makes it illegal to have a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. Possession does not necessarily entail ownership. In contrast, the notion of stockpiling implies (but does not require) that the possessor also has ownership of that weapon or device. One nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is sufficient to constitute a stockpile.

As of October 2019, nine states possessed and stockpiled nuclear weapons. Through the Manhattan Project in the first half of the 1940s, the United States became the first state to develop and possess nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China followed in 1949, 1952, 1960, and 1964, respectively. India conducted a "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974 but did not at that time advance to weaponisation of a nuclear explosive device. In 1998, however, India and Pakistan both conducted nuclear explosive tests and proceeded to build up their nuclear arsenals. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and accelerated its nuclear-weapons programme. A first nuclear explosive device was completed and tested in 2006. Israel has never openly admitted to possessing nuclear weapons but is widely believed to have acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1960s.

South Africa produced nuclear weapons in the late 1970s but decided in 1989 to give up its nuclear-weapon capability and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1991. In 1994, the IAEA confirmed that South Africa had converted its nuclear programme to exclusively peaceful applications. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acquired nuclear weapons following the collapse of the Soviet Union but voluntarily handed them over to Russia and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in the 1990s.

117 Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally", Last updated February 2019, at: bit.ly/2Z2t0dz.

118 See, e.g., A. Sanders-Zakre and D. Kimball, "NPR Rejects CTBT Ratification; NNSA Shortens Testing Readiness Timeline", Project for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (2 April 2018), at: bit.ly/2K8mIVs.

119 Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally", Last updated February 2019.

120 M. Eckel, "US: Russia May Be Testing Low-Yield Nukes, in Violation of Treaty", *Radio Free Europe*, 29 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2WyD9ky; see also J. E. Barnes and W. J. Broad, "Russia Has Restarted Low-Yield Nuclear Tests, U.S. Believes", *The New York Times*, 29 May 2019, at: nyti.ms/2XF24Qy.

121 Reuters, "Russia says U.S. nuclear accusation is an attack on global arms control", 30 May 2019, at: reut.rs/2WyCzTK.

Article 1(1)(b): The Prohibition on Transfer of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	1	United States.

The transfer of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device or control over them “to any recipient whatsoever” is prohibited under Article 1(1)(b) of the TPNW. This is so whether this occurs “directly or indirectly”. This makes it illegal to transmit possession or ownership to any other state or to any natural or legal person (e.g. a company or organisation). Unlawful transfer does not necessarily involve payment or other form of consideration. The prohibition on indirect transfer means it is unlawful to transmit the key components of any nuclear explosive device in separate instalments or via intermediaries or third parties where there is knowledge that they will be used to produce a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.

Nuclear sharing was one of the key issues in the NPT negotiations. Several of the 18 participating states disagreed strongly about the degree to which allies should be allowed to share hardware and decision-making powers. In the end, a tacit agreement was made between key states that foreign deployment would be acceptable as long as the weapons were kept under the control of the owner/possessor state. However, any *transfer* of weapons to the control of the host state was deemed unacceptable.

Under Article I of the NPT, the five “nuclear-weapon states” parties have committed never to transfer nuclear weapons “to any recipient whatsoever”. The NPT does not include a corresponding prohibition on non-nuclear-weapon states to transfer nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly. This means that non-nuclear-weapon states are not explicitly prohibited under the NPT from providing others with the key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. This important lacuna is addressed by Article 1(1)(b) and (e) of the TPNW. If a single state provides another state with all the key components of a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device, the former state violates subparagraph (b) on transfer. If a single state provides another state with only one of the key components, the former state would normally violate subparagraph (e) on assistance.

The United States violates this provision by virtue of its export of key components of nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom and the United States have long been engaged in close nuclear

cooperation and trade. The United Kingdom’s nuclear-weapon system is in large measure imported from the United States: the UK Trident warhead design is based on the US W-76 warhead; the Trident SLBM guidance system and a number of Trident warhead components are imported directly from the United States; the Trident detonator is designed and built in the United States; and the United Kingdom’s Trident II SLBMs are on lease from the United States.¹²² This does not comply with the prohibition on indirect transfer of nuclear weapons in the TPNW (and its compliance with the corresponding obligation under the NPT is highly questionable).

Under NATO’s nuclear-sharing scheme, nuclear weapons stationed in Europe by the United States may be transferred to and used by host states Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands prior to their use as part of a “dual key” arrangement. Such transfers, were they to ever occur, would violate both the NPT and the TPNW.

Article 1(1)(c): The Prohibition on Receiving Transfer or Control of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	1	United Kingdom.

Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW prohibits receiving the transfer of or control over any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly. To “receive” a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to take possession or control over it. This broad notion does not require that ownership also passes to the recipient. The prohibition on indirect receipt covers accepting the key components of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device as well as an assembled version. This extends to transfers made through intermediaries.

Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW follows a similarly worded provision in Article II of the NPT, but the corresponding prohibition in that treaty applies only to those states that are designated as non-nuclear-weapon states.

As discussed above, the United Kingdom leases Trident missiles and imports other nuclear components from the United States, which does not comply with the prohibition on receiving the transfer or control of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

If the United States ever handed over control over the nuclear weapons stationed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, or the Netherlands to the host states for use in their aircraft

122 D. Pleasch and J. Ainslie, “Trident: Strategic Dependence & Sovereignty”, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 2006, p. 10, at: bit.ly/30QaA1j; S. Jones, “A wonk’s guide to the Trident nuclear deterrent”, *Financial Times*, 18 July 2016, at: on.ft.com/30ShqDo.

this would amount to a violation of Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW by those four states (as well as of the NPT).

Article 1(1)(d): The Prohibition on Using Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	0	

Under Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW, states parties undertake never under any circumstances to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Preventing use of is a central aim of the Treaty.

To use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to launch, release, deliver, or detonate it with hostile intent or for so-called “peaceful” use.¹²³ Intent can be discerned from the circumstances and does not have to be publicly declared. Possession or deployment of nuclear weapons for the purpose of “deterrence” does not amount to their use for the purpose of the TPNW but is caught by the prohibition on possession in Article 1(1)(a).

Nuclear weapons have not been used since August 1945 when the United States dropped a nuclear weapon first on Hiroshima and then, three days later, on Nagasaki.

Other nuclear explosive devices have not been used in armed conflict, though so-called “peaceful” nuclear explosions were conducted for civil engineering purposes between the second half of the 1950s and the end of the 1980s by the Soviet Union and the United States. The aims of the detonations were to achieve large-scale excavation for canals, ports, and reservoirs; facilitate oil and gas recovery; create underground cavities for gas, oil, or waste storage; and extinguishing fires in gas fields.¹²⁴

Article 1(1)(d): The Prohibition on Threatening to Use Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	2	India, United States.

Threatening to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is also a violation of Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW. This is the case whether such use would itself be a violation of international law or whether the device is used in legitimate self-defence against foreign aggression. It is therefore broader in scope than the prohibition on

threat of force within Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

To violate the TPNW, a threat of use must be **credible in the circumstances**. This means that the threat must emanate from a person in a position to either effect or direct the use of a nuclear explosive device. Typically, therefore, such a threat would be made by a senior government official in a nuclear-armed state.

While some take the view that a policy of nuclear “deterrence” in and of itself constitutes an unlawful threat to use nuclear weapons, the *Ban Monitor* is more conservative. It believes that in addition to being credible in the circumstances, a prohibited threat must also be **specific** as to the target of threatened use. Prohibited threats may, however, be **implicit** as well as **explicit**. A stated threat does not, therefore, have to refer to use of nuclear weapons, though it is more likely to violate the TPNW should it do so. But merely enunciating the circumstances under which nuclear weapons will be used, such as through a policy of “deterrence”, is not sufficient.

In certain circumstances of tension – for example where a nuclear-armed adversary is on the brink of war – a show of force by means of ICBM testing or an explosive test of a nuclear weapon could amount to an unlawful threat to use nuclear weapons (along with other violations of the TPNW).

In mid-April 2019, as India and Pakistan came close to the point of major conflict and the risk of actual use of nuclear weapons loomed large, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said publicly: “We have the mother of nuclear bombs. I decided to tell [Pakistan], do whatever you want to do but we will retaliate.”¹²⁵ In the view of the *Ban Monitor*, this is the most overt instance of a state threatening to use nuclear weapons in recent times.

In July 2018, US President Donald Trump tweeted the following message (all in capitals in the original text) to Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani: “Never, ever threaten the United States again or you will suffer consequences the likes of which few throughout history have ever suffered before.”¹²⁶ This can be considered an implicit threat to use nuclear weapons against Iran. In May 2019, President Trump also declared on Twitter that he would bring about “the official end of Iran” should the latter want to fight.¹²⁷ While ambiguous, some consider this also to constitute threatening to use nuclear weapons.

123 World Nuclear Association, “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions”, Updated December 2018, at: bit.ly/2wGTC7z.

124 Ibid.

125 B. Brown, “India Threatens Pakistan With ‘Mother of Nuclear Bombs’; Where’s Trump?”, *CNN*, 18 April 2019, at: bit.ly/2Qz7J85.

126 Donald J. Trump, Tweet, 22 July 2018, at: bit.ly/2wIkWm6.

127 Donald J. Trump, Tweet, 19 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2EXIVml.

Article 1(1)(e): The Prohibition on Assisting Prohibited Activities

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	11	Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, Marshall Islands, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Under Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, states parties undertake never under any circumstances to assist anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under the Treaty. This paragraph is one of the most discussed and debated of all the provisions in the TPNW. The *Ban Monitor* has concluded that a total of 11 states currently do not comply with this obligation. Their practices contravene the prohibition on assistance in different ways, discussed under the headings below.

The prohibition on assistance in the TPNW means a state party is precluded from knowingly¹²⁸ assisting any other state or natural or legal person to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, stockpile, transfer, receive, threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Also outlawed is assistance for the deployment by any other state of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices anywhere under a state party's jurisdiction or control. The assistance must make a substantive contribution to a prohibited activity.¹²⁹ Insignificant contributions (for example, a screw or bolt that is used in a nuclear missile) would not violate the prohibition.

The forms of assistance that are unlawful can be, among others, financial (such as through economic assistance for nuclear-weapon production); technological (for example, by the export of equipment/components for such production); operational (for instance, by conventional military support for nuclear bombing); technical (through the provision of expert information); or human (such as by seconding nuclear scientists to assist in another state's nuclear-weapon programme).

Under the NPT, there is no general obligation imposed on all states parties not to assist the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Under NPT Article I, each nuclear-weapon state party undertakes not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any *non-nuclear-weapon* state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or

other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. There is, however, no similar prohibition on any of the five nuclear-weapon states parties of assisting, encouraging, or inducing another nuclear-weapon state to engage in those activities.

Trade in Nuclear Material

The transfer of nuclear technology or material is not prohibited by the TPNW unless the state party responsible for the transfer knows that the nuclear technology or material in question is likely to be used in a way that contravenes the prohibitions of the TPNW. Such transfers by nuclear-weapon states to any recipient are also prohibited under Article I of the NPT. Otherwise, states parties to the TPNW – just like parties to the NPT and the CTBT – are implicitly permitted to trade in nuclear raw materials, fuel, and equipment for purely peaceful purposes, including with nuclear-armed states and states not party to the TPNW.

If, for instance, a TPNW state party exports uranium to a nuclear-armed state on the understanding that the uranium would be used for nuclear energy production or research, the exporting state could not be held responsible if the nuclear-armed state unexpectedly decided to use the uranium for weapons development instead. This would, though, be likely to affect the legality of future exports of nuclear material to that state.

Corporate and State Responsibility

A company that develops or produces key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device would be engaging in prohibited assistance under the TPNW. The provision of ballistic missile technology, for example, would amount to unlawful assistance where it was known that the missile programme of the recipient of the assistance was intended to deliver nuclear warheads.

Depending on the circumstances, a parent company can also be legally responsible for the acts of its subsidiary. The general position in domestic law is that a parent company is not liable where its subsidiary acts unlawfully. However, jurisprudence has established a number of exceptions to this general principle, allowing the "veil of separate legal status ... to be pierced".¹³⁰ One is where there is wrongdoing by the parent company; another concerns activity that gives the impression that the parent company has made a commitment on behalf of its subsidiary; and a third is where there is interference by the parent company in the management of its subsidiary.¹³¹ Under international

128 See Article 16 of the International Law Commission (ILC)'s 2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; and its interpretation in: International Court of Justice (ICJ), *Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 420.

129 See the commentary by the Rapporteur on Article 16 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001).

130 C. Murray et al., *The Law and Practice of International Trade*, 12th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, §28-009.

131 See, e.g., Hughes Hubbard & Reed, "Supreme Court ruling clarifies parent company liability", International Law Office, 6 July 2015, at: bit.ly/2YlrQDL.

law, violation of a disarmament treaty or customary disarmament law would suffice to render the state on whose territory the parent company is incorporated and/or where it has its headquarters responsible.

In addition, any company that is engaged in a joint venture that develops or produces key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device could thereby be engaging in prohibited assistance even if it does not itself contribute materially to the nuclear-weapon development or production. This is so wherever a joint venture is akin to a partnership with unlimited liability. It may also occur when the participating companies establish the joint venture as a new body corporate, holding shares in that company. Under international law, the states on the territory of which the participating and shareholding companies are incorporated and/or have their headquarters would be responsible for the acts of the joint venture where those do not comply with an international treaty or customary law on disarmament.

Belarus, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands are not in compliance with the prohibition on assisting development and manufacturing because they allow companies that are incorporated or have headquarters or production facilities on their territory to be involved in activities that constitute assistance for development and/or production of nuclear weapons.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Belarusian company, Minsk Automotive Factory, is the manufacturer of the self-propelled mobile launchers for the Russian Topol-M ICBM. Leonardo (Italy) (formerly Finmeccanica) is involved in the design, development, and delivery of Transporter Erector Replacement Vehicles for the US Minuteman III ICBM arsenal.¹³²

The multinational company Airbus Group is legally incorporated in the Netherlands and falls under Dutch law and jurisdiction. It is currently involved in the development and production of the French Navy's M51 nuclear-tipped SLBM (but not the warhead) through its German-headquartered subdivision Airbus Defence and Space. Since Airbus Group considers that the actions of its subsidiaries form part of the work of Airbus as a group entity, should either Germany or the Netherlands sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, they would not be in compliance with Article 1(1)(e) if Airbus and its subsidiaries were to engage in any further assistance of the development and production of nuclear-capable weapons.

Under Article 5 of the TPNW, states parties are obligated to adopt measures to implement their obligations under the Treaty and to suppress violations by persons, or on territory, under their jurisdiction or control. Allowing private companies to produce or assist in the production of nuclear weapons would clearly constitute a violation of Article 5 of the Treaty as well as Article 1(1)(e).

Financing

The TPNW does not explicitly prohibit financing of nuclear-weapon programmes. However, the prohibition on assistance renders unlawful direct funding of any of the prohibited activities listed in the other subparagraphs of Article 1(1). This prohibition encompasses not only sovereign funds but also private banks and individuals, as discussed above in the section on corporate and state responsibility.

While the mere purchase of shares in a company that is engaged in nuclear-weapon activities is not per se a wrongful act under the TPNW, divestment from such companies is a growing trend. When screening criteria are applied that exclude companies engaged in nuclear-weapons activities from investment, these companies could in the future be influenced to alter their practices.

Assistance with the Possession and Stockpiling of Nuclear Weapons

As discussed above, continuing non-compliance with the prohibition on assistance concerns the extensive nuclear cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States with respect to the Trident SLBM. The 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement is a bilateral treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons cooperation.¹³³ It has been renewed several times, most recently in 2014 covering the period through to 2024.¹³⁴ In 2017, it was reported that the United Kingdom's Trident missiles are in a "common pool" shared with the US and maintained at Kings Bay, in the US state of Georgia.¹³⁵

The cooperation between the United Kingdom and France for the maintenance of nuclear weapon stockpiles also amounts to prohibited assistance under the TPNW.¹³⁶ In June 2018, the Swedish Defence Research Agency reported that the United Kingdom and France were "closer to each other than ever on nuclear weapons cooperation".¹³⁷ The two states' cooperation on nuclear weapons' issues is supported by the 2010 Teutates Treaty to develop technologies for safe and effective maintenance of both states' nuclear stockpiles. The Teutates Treaty concerns

132 Don't bank on the Bomb, "Leonardo", Last updated January 2018, at: bit.ly/2WEsaqD.

133 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

134 See the UK Explanatory Memorandum of 2014, at: bit.ly/2Z0Qqj2.

135 B. Spence, "The UK now relies on Trump for our nuclear weapons – we need to spend more than ever to free ourselves", *The Independent*, 23 January 2017, at: bit.ly/301Huv2.

136 See, e.g., P. Ricketts, "National Security Relations with France after Brexit", Briefing Paper, RUSI, January 2018, at: bit.ly/2HLfyot.

137 FOI, "The United Kingdom and France closer to each other than ever on nuclear weapons cooperation", Press release, 19 June 2018, at: bit.ly/2Z2b2v5.

two main areas: simulation of nuclear detonations and simulation of nuclear warhead function.¹³⁸

The hosting of US nuclear warheads by five non-nuclear NATO allies (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) is explicitly prohibited by Article 1(1)(g), but also constitutes prohibited assistance with possession and stockpiling. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands also assist possession and stockpiling when they participate with nuclear-capable aircraft in NATO's annual nuclear drill, Steadfast Noon.

Allowing the Testing of Nuclear-Capable Missiles

When a state allows the testing of nuclear-capable missiles by foreign nuclear-armed states on a test site on its territory, this contravenes the prohibition on assistance (with respect to the development of nuclear weapons). Two non-nuclear-armed states host such sites: Kazakhstan hosts Russian missile tests at Sary Shagan test site, while the Marshall Islands hosts US missile tests at Kwajalein Atoll. In both cases, the tests are carried out on land that is leased to the respective nuclear-armed state through long-term contracts. The test site at Kwajalein Atoll is periodically used for testing of the intercontinental-range Minuteman and Trident (nuclear) missiles. Russian missile tests at Sary Shagan amount to prohibited assistance in contravention of Article 1(1)(e) where the missiles used are designed to carry nuclear warheads. In late July 2019, Russia's official news agency, TASS, reported that Russian strategic missile forces conducted a test launch of a Topol ICBL from the Kapustin Yar practice range in Astrakhan in Russia. The missile targeted and reportedly successfully hit the target at the Sary-Shagan range in Kazakhstan.¹³⁹

Kazakhstan is already obligated not to "assist" the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons through its adherence to the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty. Kazakhstan ratified the TPNW in August 2019. When the Treaty enters into force and Kazakhstan is fully bound by the obligations set out in the Treaty, the hosting of tests of nuclear-capable missiles would amount to assistance with development of nuclear weapons. It is not, however, the existence of the testing site itself that is the cause of the violation, but Russia's use of it to develop nuclear-weapon missile technology.

Now that Kazakhstan has ratified the TPNW it should submit a statement making it clear that it does not authorise the testing of nuclear-capable missiles on its territory and outline the steps it has taken to communicate

that position to Russia. Under international law, a state is required to act in good faith. The Kazakhstani government should remind Russia of Kazakhstan's obligations under the TPNW and formally request that as soon as the TPNW enters into force Russia must cease testing of missiles intended to deliver nuclear warheads.

If this does not occur, there will be a question of compliance to discuss among the states parties to the TPNW. Compliance issues arise in the implementation of almost every disarmament treaty. The TPNW has what has become a standard dispute settlement clause. Thus, Article 11(1) stipulates that when a dispute arises between two or more states parties relating to the interpretation or application of the treaty, the parties concerned must consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice. Under Article 11(2), the Meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute. This gives the opportunity to resolve the issue peacefully and to every state party's satisfaction.

More problematic are treaties such as the NPT, which has no dispute settlement clause or mechanism, and where there are serious compliance and interpretation concerns. (These include transfer of nuclear weapons between the United Kingdom and the United States and the US policy to transfer nuclear weapons on bases in Europe to use by non-nuclear weapon states in the event of major armed conflict.) In the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which does have dispute settlement provisions,¹⁴⁰ states parties have had to address use of chemical weapons in Syria since it became a state party, as well as use by Russian agents of a toxic chemical in the United Kingdom.

138 N. Granholm and J. Rydqvist, *Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces*, FOI doc. FOI-R-4587-SE, Stockholm, April 2018, p. 19, at: bit.ly/2KIFYHM, citing B. Tertrais: Entente Nucléaire: Options for UK-French Nuclear Cooperation, Discussion Paper 3 of the BASIC Trident Commission, London, BASIC (2012); and J. Lewis and B. Tertrais: "Deterrence at Three: US, UK and French Nuclear Cooperation", *Survival*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (2015).

139 TASS, "Russia test launches Topol intercontinental missile from Kapustin Yar range", 26 July 2019, at: bit.ly/2MZgvMZ.

140 See, e.g., Article XIV, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction; adopted at Geneva, 3 September 1992; entered into force, 29 April 1997.

Article 1(1)(e): The Prohibition on Encouraging or Inducing Prohibited Activities

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	34	Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Under Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, states party also undertake never under any circumstances to encourage or induce, “in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party” under the Treaty. *Encouragement* in the context of the TPNW means persuading or seeking to persuade any other state or any legal or natural person to carry out a violation or continue an ongoing violation of any of the Article 1 prohibitions. Encouragement could take the form of verbal, written, material, or institutional support, both from governments as a whole (such as by adoption of a particular policy) and from senior government or military officials. Where such support has been given, the encouragement is understood to be ongoing until the point at which it is clearly withdrawn.

Inducing a prohibited activity means offering someone something in exchange for the performance of that activity. Thus, inducing will always involve encouragement.

The prohibition on encouraging illegal activities is the provision of the TPNW which is most frequently contravened. Thirty-four states were found to currently encourage the continued possession and potential use of nuclear weapons.

Endorsement of Nuclear-Weapons Doctrines, Policies and Statements

The TPNW does not preclude participation in security alliances or joint military operations with nuclear-armed states as long as this does not involve assistance, encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities.¹⁴¹ While the TPNW does not contain an express licence to engage in cooperation with states not party to the Treaty, along the lines of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, there is nothing in the TPNW that suggests that such cooperation would be unlawful per se. The 1997

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 1971 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, and various protocols to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons similarly do not contain any such express formulations and have not been interpreted by their parties as proscribing participation in alliances with states that do not observe those agreements.

The main reason for concluding that the 34 states encourage activities prohibited by the TPNW is that they all subscribe to doctrines, policies, and/or statements that endorse one or more allies’ retention and potential use of nuclear weapons. The largest group of encouraging states are the 29 member states of NATO. NATO’s foundational document, the North Atlantic Treaty, does not mention nuclear weapons, but a number of the Alliance’s strategy documents do.

Combining alliance membership and adherence to the TPNW is entirely feasible. For example, NATO member states may adhere to the TPNW and remain within the Alliance as long as they explicitly distance themselves from specific statements or formulations in Alliance documents, particularly the Strategic Concept,¹⁴² which can be understood as an encouragement of the retention of nuclear weapons and their possible use.

It could be argued that a NATO member may, without having to explicitly “override” previous endorsement of extended nuclear deterrence, become compliant with the TPNW through the very acts of signing and ratifying the Treaty. However, having adhered to the TPNW, such a state would certainly be obliged to refrain from endorsing *future* Alliance language supporting the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons. This could be done either by adjusting the current language or by the state clearly rejecting possession or use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through “footnotes”, an interpretive or declaratory statement, or other unequivocal means of signalling disagreement.¹⁴³ NATO members are not obliged to endorse every line of Alliance language. Indeed, there is a tradition of member states “footnoting” or otherwise distancing themselves from specific statements in Alliance documents.

Beyond NATO, three states engaged in bilateral defence arrangements with the United States have expressed public support for extended nuclear deterrence: Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Finally, Belarus, which is allied to Russia through the CSTO and the Union State, has expressed public support for nuclear deterrence and is

¹⁴¹ See, e.g., S. Casey-Maslen, *The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: A Commentary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019), paras. 1.112, 1.113.

¹⁴² NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Brussels, 2010.

¹⁴³ Such footnotes or statements could be simple and for instance phrased as follows: “State X does not support the possession or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on its behalf and will not assist the development, possession, acquisition, or use of such weapons or devices in any way.”

therefore not in compliance with the TPNW’s prohibition on encouragement and inducement.¹⁴⁴ Armenia, the last CSTO member, has not explicitly endorsed the potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf. Armenia would, though, need to actively distance itself from nuclear deterrence in order to be considered compliant with Article 1(1)(e). See Chapter 2 and the section on extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangements for more information.

Conventional Participation in Nuclear Strike Exercises

Although military preparations to use nuclear weapons are not explicitly outlawed by the TPNW, participating in exercises that involve the simulated use of nuclear weapons is a violation of Article 1(1)(e) of the Treaty. This is the position, for example, of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC affirms that where conduct contributes significantly to a prohibited activity (or renders it more attractive), and where there is knowledge that the conduct would, in the ordinary course of events, result in assisting, encouraging, or inducing a prohibited activity, training with others specifically for the use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful for any state party to the TPNW.¹⁴⁵

Participation by non-nuclear-armed states in nuclear strike exercises amounts to encouragement to possess nuclear weapons. In October 2017, for instance, conventional aircraft from Czechia and Poland participated in the nuclear exercise known as Steadfast Noon as part of their SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics) role in NATO.¹⁴⁶ Of course, during a conflict, assisting nuclear bombing raids, such as through the provision of conventional air support, would clearly constitute unlawful assistance to use nuclear weapons.

Article 1(1)(f): The Prohibition on Seeking or Receiving Assistance to Engage in Prohibited Activities

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	4	France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.

Under Article 1(1)(f) of the TPNW, states parties undertake never under any circumstances to “[s]eek or receive assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party” under the Treaty. This precludes any state party from asking any other state or any legal or natural person to help it to develop, possess,

stockpile, test, produce, use, transfer, or receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

In contrast to Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, which prohibits states from assisting prohibited acts by others, Article 1(1)(f) prohibits states from seeking or receiving assistance to violate the Treaty themselves. A similar prohibition, imposed only on non-nuclear-weapon states, is contained in Article II of the NPT, though it only applies to manufacture: the undertaking is “not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

Most of the nuclear-armed states in the past received some form of assistance to develop their nuclear weapons. More recently, North Korea’s advances in ICBM technology also appear to have been fuelled by outside sources. Some have suggested that North Korea either stole information or received assistance to copy Ukrainian (ex-Soviet) missiles, but the reports have not been confirmed.¹⁴⁷

France and the United States continue to receive assistance to develop their nuclear arsenals from multinational companies. In the case of France, this concerns the Airbus Group (legally incorporated in the Netherlands) and specifically its subsidiary Airbus Defence and Space (headquartered in Germany).

The United Kingdom appears to be seeking more or less continuous assistance from the United States to maintain its nuclear capability. The United Kingdom also receives continuous assistance with stockpile stewardship from France and vice versa. The United States, for its part, receives assistance from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey to stockpile and deploy nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States also receives support for the development of nuclear weapons by the Italian company Leonardo. Further, the US missile-testing programme is indirectly assisted by the Marshall Islands. Russia, for its part, receives indirect assistance to test and develop nuclear ICBMs and anti-ballistic missiles from Kazakhstan. Russia also receives assistance to develop nuclear weapons by the Belarusian company Minsk Automotive Factory.

144 Ibid.

145 ICRC, “The prohibition to assist, encourage or induce prohibited activities under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, ICRC Briefing Note, Geneva, undated but 2019, p. 8.

146 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “United States nuclear forces, 2018”, 5 March 2018, at: bit.ly/33vDyoo.

147 S. Shuster, “How North Korea Built a Nuclear Arsenal on the Ashes of the Soviet Union”, *Time*, 1 February 2018, at: bit.ly/2JLVzs7.

Article 1(1)(g): The Prohibition on Allowing Stationing, Installation, or Deployment of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Compliance status	Total	List of states
Not compliant	5	Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey.

Article 1(1)(g) of the TPNW outlaws a particular form of assistance or encouragement of prohibited action: allowing any stationing, installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in a state party's territory or at any other place under its jurisdiction or control. The TPNW's prohibition against such hosting of nuclear weapons applies at all times, including during escalating tension or armed conflict. There is no corresponding prohibition in the NPT.

The concept of jurisdiction refers primarily to a state's sovereign territory, while control extends to areas that the state party occupies or otherwise controls extraterritorially. This is irrespective of the legality of this control under international law.

Deployment is the broadest of the three types of prohibited conduct. A violation would not require any prolonged duration, agreement, or infrastructure. Thus, although transit of nuclear weapons is not explicitly prohibited by the TPNW, if movement into the sovereign territory of a state party is not swiftly followed by exit, this might amount to prohibited deployment.

All parties to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties have committed not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories. Certain states that are not members of such zones have made similar commitments not to host nuclear weapons, with some limiting their commitment only to times of peace.

The United States is the only state currently known to station nuclear weapons on the territory of another state. As of 1 October 2019, five states were hosting US nuclear bombs (type B-61): Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.

Comparison of the Key Provisions in the TPNW and the NPT

Table 17 summarises the key provisions in the TPNW and the NPT, highlighting in particular areas where the TPNW prohibits activities that the NPT does not.

Table 17: Comparison of the key provisions of the TPNW and NPT.

Activity	TPNW	NPT	
		"Nuclear-weapon states"	"Non-nuclear-weapon states"
	All states parties		
<i>Research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes</i>	● Permitted	● Permitted	● Permitted
<i>Develop nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Not addressed
<i>Manufacture nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Prohibited
<i>Test nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	
<i>Possess and stockpile nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Prohibited (implicitly)
<i>Transfer nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Prohibited	● Not addressed
<i>Receiving the transfer of nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	● Prohibited
<i>Use nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	● Prohibited (implicitly)
<i>Threaten to use nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	● Prohibited (implicitly)
<i>Assist, encourage, or induce "nuclear-weapon states" to engage in activities prohibited under the respective Treaty.</i>	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Permitted (implicitly)
<i>Assist, encourage, or induce "non-nuclear-weapon states" to carry out acts prohibited under the respective Treaty.</i>	● Prohibited	● Prohibited for "nuclear-weapon states" to assist, encourage, or induce "non-nuclear-weapon states" to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over these devices.	● Transfer of nuclear material is prohibited unless safeguarded. Otherwise not addressed.
<i>Seek or receive assistance from another state in the manufacture of nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Permitted (implicitly)	● Prohibited
<i>Seek or receive assistance from another state in the development, possession, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons</i>	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	
<i>Allow stationing, installation or deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory or at any place under its control</i>	● Prohibited	● Not addressed	
<i>Assist victims of nuclear use and testing</i>	● Obligation for all states parties in a position to do so.	● Not addressed	
<i>Remediate environmental damage caused by nuclear use and testing</i>	● Obligation for all states parties in a position to do so.	● Not addressed	
<i>Provide technical, material and financial assistance to states affected by nuclear weapons use or testing and victim assistance</i>	● Obligation for all states parties in a position to do so. States that have used or tested nuclear weapons have a responsibility to provide assistance to affected states.	● Not addressed	

6 Safeguards and Verification under the TPNW

Articles 3 and 4 of the TPNW concern safeguards agreements to be concluded with the IAEA. The objective of IAEA safeguards is to “deter the spread of nuclear weapons by the early detection of the misuse of nuclear material or technology”.¹⁴⁸ Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation.¹⁴⁹

A number of states and commentators have claimed that the verification provisions in the TPNW are weaker than those in the NPT. In fact, the reverse is true, as Figure 21 illustrates.

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

Every state party to the TPNW must either conclude and enter into force or maintain in force a specific IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)). This is the most recent version of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

Under the NPT, all non-nuclear-weapon states parties are obligated to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA (although the precise agreement to be concluded is not specified). This is required in order to verify the respect of that state’s NPT duties “with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.¹⁵⁰ Such a safeguards agreement must concern “source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility”.¹⁵¹ Further, the requisite safeguards must be applied on all such material that is being used in peaceful nuclear activities on any territory under the state’s jurisdiction or control.¹⁵²

As of March 2019, the IAEA had safeguards agreements in force with 183 states. The IAEA concludes three types of safeguards agreements:¹⁵³ Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT; “voluntary offer” safeguards agreements with

each of the five nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT recognised under that Treaty; and item-specific safeguards agreements with states not party to the NPT.¹⁵⁴

The IAEA carries out different types of on-site inspections and visits under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Routine inspections are the type most frequently used. These may be carried out according to a set schedule or may be “of an unannounced or short-notice character”. Ad hoc inspections are typically conducted to verify a state’s reports of its nuclear material or of nuclear material being transferred by one state to another. The Agency’s right to carry out routine inspections under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements is limited to those locations within a nuclear facility, or other locations containing nuclear material, through which nuclear material is expected to flow. These are known as strategic points.¹⁵⁵

The IAEA may carry out special inspections if it considers that information from a particular state is not adequate. Finally, safeguards visits may be made to declared facilities to verify design information pertaining to safeguards. For example, such visits may be carried out during construction to determine the completeness of the declared design information or during a facility decommissioning, to confirm that sensitive equipment was rendered unusable.¹⁵⁶ Activities that IAEA inspectors perform during and in connection with on-site inspections of, or visits to, facilities may include auditing the facility’s accounting and operating records and comparing these records with the state’s reports to the Agency; verifying the inventory of nuclear material and any changes to it; taking environmental samples; and applying “containment and surveillance” measures, such as seal application or the installation of surveillance equipment.¹⁵⁷

148 IAEA, “Basics of IAEA Safeguards”, 2018, at: bit.ly/2WJPdVc.

149 IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2q2kJGL.

150 Art. III(1), NPT.

151 *Ibid.*

152 *Ibid.*

153 IAEA, “Safeguards legal framework”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2KmJ9bl.

154 Safeguards are implemented in three states not party to the NPT – India, Israel, and Pakistan – on the basis of item-specific agreements they have concluded with the IAEA. IAEA, “Safeguards agreements”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2UvGxeL.

155 IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview”, 2019.

156 *Ibid.*

157 *Ibid.*

Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

The Additional Protocol¹⁵⁸ is a legally binding agreement with the IAEA that grants the Agency additional inspection authority to that provided in Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. A principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about the accuracy and completeness of declared activities and the absence of undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to both information and sites.¹⁵⁹

The Additional Protocol requires adhering states to provide information about, and grant the IAEA inspector access to, all parts of their nuclear fuel cycle – including uranium mines, fuel fabrication, enrichment plants, and nuclear waste sites – as well as to “any other location where nuclear material is or may be present”.¹⁶⁰ Activities carried out during complementary access may include examination of records, visual observation, environmental sampling, use of radiation detection and measurement devices, and the application of seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices.¹⁶¹ Under the Additional Protocol, each state is required to provide information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies.¹⁶²

The text of the TPNW does not make explicit reference to the IAEA Additional Protocol. Article 4 of the Treaty, however, requires that all current and former¹⁶³ nuclear-armed states that join the Treaty conclude and bring into force a safeguards agreement with the IAEA sufficient to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. In practice, this means at least an IAEA Additional Protocol as well as the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, Article 3(1) of the TPNW provides that if a state party already has an Additional Protocol in force when the TPNW enters into force, it must maintain it in force.¹⁶⁴ As of September 2019, Additional Protocols were in force with 134 states while a further 14 states had signed an Additional Protocol but had yet to bring it into force.¹⁶⁵ Article 3(1) also stipulates that the obligations to maintain existing safeguards agreements are “without prejudice to any additional

relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future”. During the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017, a Swedish proposal sought to make it an obligation for all states parties to conclude and enter into force not only a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but also an Additional Protocol. Regrettably, the negotiating states did not reach agreement to do so. It is, though, hoped that the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW will strongly encourage all states parties which have not yet done so to adopt and bring into force an Additional Protocol.

The NPT does not require that its states parties conclude and bring into force an IAEA Additional Protocol. The 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan contains a non-binding call to all states parties which have not yet done so to adopt and bring into force an Additional Protocol.¹⁶⁶ This means that, under the NPT, an Additional Protocol is voluntary for all states parties.

158 Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, IAEA doc. INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

159 IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview”, 2019.

160 *Ibid.*

161 *Ibid.*

162 *Ibid.*

163 This does not apply to states that disarmed before the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017, notably South Africa which disarmed at the end of the 1980s. However, South Africa already has an IAEA Additional Protocol in force.

164 By the terms of Article 3(1), any state party that has an Additional Protocol in force at the time of entry into force of the Treaty is obliged to maintain it along with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The obligation in paragraph 1 upon each state party is to “maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations”. See also E. Giorgou, “Safeguards Provisions in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, Blog entry, Arms Control Law, posted 11 April 2018, at: bit.ly/2R3bwK4.

165 IAEA, “Additional Protocol”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2leeg5W.

166 Action 28.

Fig 21: Verification in the NPT and the TPNW

VERIFICATION IN THE NPT AND THE TPNW		
	NPT	TPNW
VERIFICATION OF ELIMINATION		
Verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon programmes mandatory?	<p>✗ Not regulated by the NPT.</p>	<p>✓ All states that join the TPNW while still in possession of nuclear weapons must accept a time-bound plan providing for the verifiable elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon programmes. (Art. 4(2))</p> <p>✓ All states that have disarmed before joining the TPNW must demonstrate to the international authority designated by the States Parties to the Treaty that the weapons and programmes have been eliminated.¹ (Art. 4(1))</p>
VERIFICATION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL		
IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement mandatory?	<p>✓ Mandatory for non-nuclear-weapon states parties. (Art. III(1))</p> <p>✗ Not required and thus voluntary for the five "nuclear-weapon states".</p>	<p>✓ Mandatory for all states parties. (Art. 3(1) and (2) and 4(3))</p>
IAEA additional protocol (or instrument of similar or higher standard) mandatory?	<p>✗ Voluntary for all states parties.</p>	<p>✓ Mandatory for all nuclear-armed states that join the TPNW.² (Art. 4(2) and (3))</p> <p>✓ Mandatory for all former nuclear-armed states that join the TPNW.³ (Art. 4(1))</p> <p>✓ Mandatory for all states parties that had an IAEA additional protocol in force upon the entry into force of the TPNW (appx 70% of potential states parties). (Art. 3(1))</p> <p>✗ Voluntary for the remaining states parties.</p>
Non-binding recommendation to adopt IAEA additional protocol?	<p>✓ The 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan "encourages" all states parties which have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an IAEA additional protocol (Action 28).</p>	<p>? A first or subsequent meeting of states parties to the TPNW may consider adopting a non-binding recommendation similar to that adopted in the NPT urging all states parties to conclude and bring into force an IAEA additional protocol.</p>

1 This does not apply to states that disarmed before the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017, notably South Africa. However, South Africa already has an IAEA Additional Protocol in force.

2 The text of the TPNW does not make explicit reference to the IAEA Additional Protocol. It requires, however, that all current and former nuclear-armed states that join the TPNW conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA sufficient to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. In practice, this means at least an IAEA Additional Protocol as well as the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

3 See footnotes 1 and 2.

7 Recommendations to the First Meeting of States Parties

Article 8 of the TPNW provides for regular meetings of states parties, the first of which is to be held within one year of the Treaty's entry into force. Subsequent meetings will be convened every two years unless the states parties agree otherwise, with a review conference to be held after five years and then every six years thereafter. Extraordinary meetings of states parties will be convened if one third of the states parties support a written request by any state party.

The scope of work of the meetings is broad, with each meeting of states parties effectively mandated to consider any matters "pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of" the TPNW, including its status and implementation. The *Ban Monitor* has five recommendations for the First Meeting of States Parties.

1. The First Meeting of States Parties should elaborate and adopt a Declaration of the States Parties and a Plan of Action for promoting the full implementation and universalisation of the TPNW and stigmatising nuclear weapons. The role of civil society and international organisations as partners should be stressed throughout. All states parties are obligated to promote adherence to the Treaty by other states under its Article 12.
2. In accordance with Article 4, the First Meeting of States Parties is explicitly obligated to set the deadlines for the destruction of a state party's nuclear explosive devices and for the removal of a foreign state's nuclear weapons from any area under the jurisdiction or control of a state party. It should consider setting a deadline of ten years for the destruction of all nuclear weapons, renewable upon request to the other states parties where necessary. In ten years it may be feasible to achieve elimination of even the largest nuclear-weapon stockpiles (those of the United States and Russia).¹⁶⁷ Such a deadline is also consistent with practice in the disarmament treaties prohibiting anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions. A far shorter deadline for removal of foreign nuclear weapons (hosting arrangements) – for example, no more than three years – would seem appropriate.
3. The First Meeting of States Parties should strongly encourage each state party that has not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
4. The First Meeting of States Parties should establish standing committees to address issues related to victim assistance and environmental remediation, including needs assessments, programmatic responses, and international cooperation and assistance.
5. The First Meeting of States Parties may need to address issues of compliance, such as with respect to assisting or encouraging prohibited activities, and should consider establishing a standing committee for such matters.

¹⁶⁷ M. Kütt and Z. Mian (2019) Setting the Deadline for Nuclear Weapon Destruction Under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, at: bit.ly/2oh0fNd.

8 State Profiles

The following state profiles contain summary data on TPNW status and compliance for each of the world's 197 states. It also comprises information on their participation in the TPNW negotiations and voting related to the Treaty, and information on related treaties and mechanisms.

The 197 states are categorised according to their basic nuclear-weapon policy, with separate sections for the 135 TPNW supporters, the 22 other non-nuclear armed states, the 31 nuclear-weapon-implicit states, and the 9 nuclear-armed states. See Figure 2 in Chapter 2 for more information

on this categorization. Within each of the four categories, the state profiles are presented in alphabetical order.

For the nuclear-armed states, an additional page is included with data on the status of its nuclear forces, main nuclear weapons delivery systems, and doctrine, policies and practices. The main source for this information is Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris' nuclear notebooks, published by the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.

Afghanistan



Afghanistan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Afghanistan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Afghanistan did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Afghanistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Did not vote	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Algeria



Algeria has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 26 September 2019, at the UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Algeria's Foreign Minister Sabri Bouakdoun announced the intention of Algeria to ratify the TPNW "as soon as possible". He also said: "We must work together to ramp up the entry-into-force of the TPNW." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Algeria should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Andorra



Andorra participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Andorra has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Andorra voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Andorra should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (100%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Angola



Angola has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Angola participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Angola should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (27 Sep 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Antigua and Barbuda



Antigua and Barbuda has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Antigua and Barbuda participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Antigua and Barbuda should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Austria



Austria was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Austria has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Speaking at the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Alexander Schallenberg, Austria's Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, said about the TPNW: "With every additional signature and ratification, states send a very powerful signal that having a say on nuclear weapons is not exclusive to states who possess them. The security of all our citizens is equally important and equally at risk. We are of course under no illusion. We are under no illusion that the treaty will immediately reduce risk or decimate nuclear weapons stockpiles, but it is and remains an essential step. Let us not lose heart." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Austria should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Austria should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (8 May 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (21%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Azerbaijan



Azerbaijan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Azerbaijan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Azerbaijan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Azerbaijan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Bahamas



The Bahamas voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. The Bahamas has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Bahamas voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Bahamas should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed		Adhered	
No		No	

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (75%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Bahrain



Bahrain voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Bahrain has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bahrain voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bahrain should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (100%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Bangladesh



Bangladesh has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bangladesh' Minister for Foreign Affairs, A. K. Abdul Momen, deposited the government's instrument of ratification on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking at a plenary session of the UN General Assembly the same day, Minister Momen said: "The TPNW, once entered into force, can serve as an important international instrument for stigmatizing nuclear weapons and sending an unequivocal message about the inhumane and indiscriminate impact of use of nuclear weapons. We encourage other member states to join us as one of the first 50 ratifying states on the road towards the Treaty's entry into force. We see success of TPNW as a critical building block". (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bangladesh should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Bangladesh should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Barbados



Barbados participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Barbados has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Barbados voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Barbados should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (75%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No



Belize voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Belize has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Belize voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. On 19-20 June 2019, Belize participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Belize should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Benin



Benin has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Benin participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Benin should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	No (amended SQP in force)
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Bhutan



Bhutan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Bhutan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bhutan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bhutan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Bolivia



Bolivia has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bolivia ratified the TPNW on 6 August 2019, after which the "Bolivian Ambassador to the United Nations Sacha Llorenti told reporters that he chose the date, which coincides with the 74th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima, so as not to forget those who lost their lives in the attack." (bit.ly/2oUFvuB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bolivia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Bolivia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (16 Apr 2018)	Ratified (6 Aug 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Botswana



Botswana has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Botswana's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Unity Dow, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Botswana should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (25%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Brazil



Brazil was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Brazil was the first state to sign the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In September 2018, the previous president of Brazil submitted the TPNW to congress for approval, but there is no news about the progress in this process. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Brazil stated that the "adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017 represents an evolutionary leap for the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. While the TPNW will not bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons on its own, it has significantly raised the moral barrier against these weapons." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Brazil should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (30%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	0
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	Yes (LEU)

Brunei



Brunei has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Brunei voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Brunei should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Burkina Faso



Burkina Faso voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Burkina Faso has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Burkina Faso voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Burkina Faso participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Burkina Faso should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (40%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Burundi



Burundi voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Burundi has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Burundi voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Burundi participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Burundi should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Cabo Verde



Cabo Verde has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Cabo Verde voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cabo Verde should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)	Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	No (amended SQP in force)
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Cambodia



Cambodia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Cambodia's Secretary of State, Ouch Borit, made the following statement: "Today represents a timely opportunity for the global community to come together in its commitment to promote the universality of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by joining the treaty and implementing its prohibition. Having signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Cambodia is a strong supporter of general and complete nuclear disarmament and we are fully engaged in commitment to ratify and implement this treaty." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cambodia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (9 Jan 2019)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (25%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Cameroon



Cameroon participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Cameroon has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Cameroon voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Cameroon participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cameroon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Central African Republic



The Central African Republic has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with the all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Central African Republic participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Central African Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Chad



Chad voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Chad has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Chad voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Chad should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	No

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Chile



Chile has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Chile voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Chile should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (14%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Colombia



Colombia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Colombia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Colombia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (3 Aug 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Comoros



Comoros has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Comoros voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Comoros should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Congo



Congo has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Congo voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Congo should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Cook Islands



The Cook Islands has acceded to the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Cook Islands participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Cook Islands should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Cook Islands should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
N/A	Acceded (4 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	N/A
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	N/A (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	N/A

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Costa Rica



Costa Rica was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, and Costa Rica's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez, chaired the negotiations in 2017 that resulted in the adoption of the TPNW. Costa Rica has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty..

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 26 September 2019 Costa Rica's President, Carlos Alvarado Quesada, made the following statement about the TPNW in the UN: "We have embarked on a path in seeking prohibition and elimination of these terrible weapons. We must fill the existing legal vacuum and add a chapter to international law that should have been written many years ago." He also encouraged states who have not yet done so to sign and speed up the ratification process, and added: "The treaty bolsters the political standard-setting, humanitarian and legal imperatives of nuclear disarmament which are the prime objective of this organization." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Costa Rica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Costa Rica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (5 Jul 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (75%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Côte d'Ivoire



Côte d'Ivoire has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Côte d'Ivoire participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m3doYI). At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Côte d'Ivoire said: "[O]ur country is fully committed to nonproliferation and disarmament and intends to bolster its commitment as soon as possible by depositing its instruments of ratification for the TPNW." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Côte d'Ivoire should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Cuba



Cuba has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Cuba voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cuba should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cuba should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (30 Jan 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (43%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Cyprus



Cyprus voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Cyprus has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Cyprus voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cyprus should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Democratic Republic of the Congo



The DRC has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The DRC voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The DRC should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (29%)	Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Djibouti



Djibouti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Djibouti has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Djibouti voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Djibouti should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (25%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No

Dominica



Dominica has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Dominica's Minister for Foreign and CARICOM Affairs, Francine Baron, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Dominica should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote	Ratified the CTBT	No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Dominican Republic



The Dominican Republic has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Dominican Republic voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Dominican Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (7 Jun 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Ecuador



Ecuador has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Ecuador voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ecuador should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Ecuador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (25 Sep 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Egypt



Egypt voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Egypt has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Egypt voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Egypt should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	No
Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

El Salvador



El Salvador has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, El Salvador said: “[B]earing in mind that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are a clear threat to peace, El Salvador, which adheres strictly to Article VI of the NPT, has participated in the negotiation process of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and ratified it in its entirety on the 30th of January 2019. This is the first international instrument that is legally binding prohibiting the use, threat of use, possession, development, acquisition of this type of weapon of indiscriminate effect, the only weapons that not have been prohibited under other international legislation.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- El Salvador should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- El Salvador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (30 Jan 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Equatorial Guinea



Equatorial Guinea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Equatorial Guinea has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Equatorial Guinea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Equatorial Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Eritrea



Eritrea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Eritrea has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Eritrea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Eritrea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)	Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	No
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	No

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Eswatini



Eswatini participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Eswatini has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Eswatini voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Eswatini should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Ethiopia



Ethiopia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Ethiopia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Ethiopia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ethiopia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No



Fiji has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, the Minister for Defense, Inia Seruiratu, indicated that Fiji is in the process of ratifying the TPNW. He also said that the TPNW (and the CTBT) need to come into force, and that “Fiji urges all member states to ratify these important treaties. The world does not need nuclear weapons.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Fiji should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Gabon



Gabon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Gabon has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Gabon voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Gabon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No



The Gambia has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Gambia participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYl)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Gambia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW
- The Gambia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (25%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Ghana



Ghana has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Ghana's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Shirley Ayorkor Botchwey, said that the country's "internal mechanisms are well advanced towards ratification" of the TPNW. She also said that Ghana believes that a world without nuclear weapons would be in our collective interest and that the only guarantee to ensuring total elimination of such weapons is to completely prohibit them. (bit.ly/2obi545) Ghana participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ghana should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (18%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Grenada



Grenada has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Grenada's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Labour, Peter David, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Grenada should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (100%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Guatemala



Guatemala has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In October 2019, the Congress in Guatemala was expected to soon approve ratification of the TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Guatemala should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (60%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Guinea



Guinea participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Guinea has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Guinea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Guinea participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the Treaty. (bit.ly/2m3doYl)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	No
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Guinea-Bissau



Guinea-Bissau has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Guinea-Bissau participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Guinea-Bissau should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	No
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No



Guyana has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Guyana and ICAN co-hosted a regional forum in Georgetown to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R) Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Guyana's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Karen Cummings, said that the TPNW "aims to transform the regional norm of the Caribbean against the possession of nuclear weapons into a global norm." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Guyana should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Guyana should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (20 Sep 2017)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Haiti



Haiti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Haiti has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Haiti did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. On 19-20 June 2019, Haiti participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Haiti should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (25%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Did not vote	Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No



The Holy See has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Holy See has on multiple occasions expressed grave concern over the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons. In November 2017, Pope Francis maintained that “the possession of nuclear weapons should be firmly condemned.” He also said that the existence of nuclear weapons “creates a false sense of security that holds international relations hostage and stifles peaceful coexistence” (bit.ly/2kLINA7). On 26 September 2019, Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin, said in the UN that the Holy See “acknowledges with satisfaction the increasing number of states who have ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and encourages those states who have already signed it to ratify it as soon as possible. We believe that the treaty is an important step towards a nuclear-weapons-free world and complements the NPT.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Holy See should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Holy See should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (20 Sep 2017)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	N/A
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (22%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	N/A

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Honduras



Honduras has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Congress in Honduras approved ratification of the TPNW on 13 September 2019.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Honduras should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (75%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Indonesia



Indonesia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Indonesia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Succ)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Indonesia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Iran



Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Iran has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Iran voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. According to Iran, the adoption of the TPNW was a “step forward” in the direction of confronting “bullying policies” (bit.ly/2mjID1U). Iran has recently restarted uranium enrichment (albeit not to a level sufficient for use in a nuclear explosive device) and has threatened to no longer comply with its obligations under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The United States had previously withdrawn its support for the agreement and re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Iran should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No (provisional impl. under the JCPOA)
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<0.01 t (0 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	Yes (LEU)



Iraq voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Iraq has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Iraq voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Iraq said: "The international community must work together in order to guarantee the universality of relevant agreements and in a manner that would guarantee the final elimination of such lethal weapons and in a manner that bolsters international peace and security. Therefore, Iraq voted in favor of the treaty to ban nuclear weapons which was adopted by the General Assembly in July 2017." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Iraq should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Ireland



Ireland was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Ireland has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The legislation to ratify the TPNW is currently before the Irish Parliament. On 26 September 2019, Ireland said in the UN General Assembly: "While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of international disarmament and the nonproliferation regime, it was always envisaged that a separate legal instrument would be designed to give particular effect to Article VI's disarmament provisions. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first multilateral legal instrument on nuclear disarmament to be adopted in over 20 years, is the complementary instrument that the NPT anticipated and it conveys a powerful vision of a world free from these weapons of mass destruction. Ireland is currently taking the necessary steps to ensure that domestic legislation is enacted to allow Ireland to ratify the TPNW and we hope this will be completed before the end of this year." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ireland should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Jamaica



Jamaica has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Jamaica participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Jamaica should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (8 Dec 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Jordan



Jordan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Jordan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Jordan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Jordan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Kazakhstan



Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union but renounced them and has since advocated for nuclear disarmament. Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the TPNW. Its hosting of Russian missile tests at the Sary Shagan test site means that it is not in compliance with the TPNW's prohibition on assisting development of nuclear weapons.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Kazakhstan, which has suffered the consequences of Soviet nuclear testing, deposited its instrument of ratification of the TPNW to the UN Secretariat on the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 30 August 2019. Those gathered at the ceremony observed a one-minute silence in memory of and to honour the victims of nuclear tests. (bit.ly/2YzeB8R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kazakhstan should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Kazakhstan should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
- Kazakhstan should request that Russia as soon as the TPNW enters into force must cease the testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Sary Shagan. It should submit a statement making it clear that it does not authorise the testing of nuclear-capable missiles on its territory and outline the steps it has taken to communicate that position to Russia.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (2 Mar 2018)	Ratified (29 Aug 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<10 t (~350 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Kenya



Kenya voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Kenya has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Kenya voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Kenya participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kenya should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (20%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Kiribati



Kiribati has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

President Taneti Maamau deposited Kiribati's instrument of ratification on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kiribati should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Kiribati should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Kuwait



Kuwait voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Kuwait has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Kuwait voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kuwait should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Lao People's Democratic Republic



Lao PDR has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saleumxay Kommasith, deposited Lao PDR's instrument of ratification on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lao PDR should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Lao PDR should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (21 Sep 2017)	Ratified (26 Sep 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Lebanon



Lebanon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Lebanon has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Lebanon voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Lebanon stated: "We must transfer from a narrow security approach to a comprehensive humanitarian approach. [...] "Activating the international instruments that exist must not distract us from looking for a new and complementary instrument. The adoption of the TPNW in 2017 [...] is an important step". (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lebanon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (40%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Lesotho



Lesotho has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Lesotho's Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Relations, Lesego Makghoti, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lesotho should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (75%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Liberia



Liberia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Liberia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Liberia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Liberia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)	Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	No (SQP in force)
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Libya



Libya has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Libya voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Libya should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Liechtenstein



Liechtenstein has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Preparatory work for Liechtenstein's ratification of the TPNW is ongoing. Speaking in the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Liechtenstein said: "Along with many other states, Liechtenstein sees important potential in the TPNW to restore the original balance enshrined in the NPT. [...] Most importantly, it draws a legal line against all attempts to justify the use of nuclear weapons. The horrendous and indiscriminate suffering these weapons infallibly inflict on civilians leaves no room for such justification. In a time of eroding international norms, the TPNW is a sole beacon of hope and a lesson for multilateralism in a world increasingly suffering from unsustainable big power politics." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Liechtenstein should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Party to the NPT
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Party to a NWFZ
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Ratified the CTBT
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Party to the PTBT
	Member of the CD
	IAEA CSA in force
	IAEA AP in force
	Party to the CWC
	Party to the BWC

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Madagascar



Madagascar has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Madagascar voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Madagascar should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Malawi



Malawi has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Malawi voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Malawi should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Malaysia



Malaysia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Malaysia said that the TPNW "complements and strengthens the nuclear disarmament architecture and we urge all states to have an open and focused approach towards this treaty" (bit.ly/2obwUU6). Malaysia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Succ)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Malaysia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (40%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Maldives



The Maldives has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Maldives's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdulla Shahid, signed and deposited the country's instrument of ratification for the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking at a plenary session of the UN General Assembly on the same day, Minister Shahid said that the Maldives ratified the TPNW because it strongly believes in "our shared commitment as a member state to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and also because the well-being, prosperity and advancement of humanity is a collective responsibility of all." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Maldives should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Maldives should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019)	Ratified (26 Sep 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote*	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

* After the vote on the TPNW on 7 July 2017, "the delegation of Maldives informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour." (A/72/206, note 2).

Malta



Malta voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Malta has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Malta voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Malta should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Mauritania



Mauritania voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mauritania has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mauritania voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mauritania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Mauritius



Mauritius voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mauritius has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mauritius voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Mauritius participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mauritius should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (20%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Mexico



Mexico was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Mexico has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 8 July 2017, the Mexican government published a statement in which it welcomed the TPNW and stated that the adoption of the treaty was “in line with Mexico’s longstanding and well-known diplomatic tradition of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation”. At the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Mexico said that it invited all those that have not signed or ratified the TPNW “to speed up their respective processes.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mexico should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Mexico should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (16 Jan 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (38%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Mongolia



Mongolia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mongolia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mongolia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Mongolia said that its internal process towards ratifying the TPNW is underway. (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mongolia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (unilateral)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Morocco



Morocco voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Morocco has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Morocco voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Morocco should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Mozambique



Mozambique voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mozambique has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mozambique voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mozambique should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Myanmar



Myanmar has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Myanmar participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Succ)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Myanmar should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Namibia



Namibia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Namibia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Namibia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (8 Dec 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (20%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Nepal



Nepal has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pradeep Kumar Gyawali said that Nepal has initiated its process of ratification for the TPNW. He added: "We call upon all countries to sign and ratify it for its early entry into force." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nepal should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (25%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

New Zealand



New Zealand was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. New Zealand has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 5–7 December 2018, New Zealand hosted a regional workshop in Auckland, to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2mnZJfd). Together with Thailand and UNODA, Thailand also hosted a regional workshop on the TPNW in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 (bit.ly/2m2Sudc). In the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, New Zealand said that the TPNW significantly strengthens the norm against any use of nuclear weapons. It also said: "As a member of the core group of supporters, New Zealand will continue to work closely, including with our valued civil society partners, to advance the Treaty and give reality to its object and purpose." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- New Zealand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- New Zealand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (31 Jul 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (83%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Nicaragua



Nicaragua has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Nicaragua voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nicaragua should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nicaragua should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (22 Sep 2017)	Ratified (19 Jul 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Niger



Niger participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Niger has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Niger voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Niger participated in a regional workshop cohosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Niger should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Nigeria



Nigeria was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Nigeria has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Nigeria participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m3doYI). At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Nigeria said that “Prohibiting and completely eliminating nuclear weapons remains the reasonable guarantee against their possession or usage in order to ensure global peace. [...] Nigeria will continue to engage other nations on the need for the treaty to be taken as an important global instrument for the promotion of international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.” (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nigeria should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Oman



Oman voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Oman has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Oman voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Oman should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Palau



Palau has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Palau participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Palau should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Palau should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (3 May 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Panama



Panama has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Panama voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Panama should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Panama should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (11 Apr 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (60%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Papua New Guinea



Papua New Guinea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Papua New Guinea has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Papua New Guinea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Papua New Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Paraguay



Paraguay has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Paraguay voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018, and in August 2018, the senate foreign affairs committee made a positive recommendation for ratification (<https://bit.ly/2McgJ1l>). No progress has been reported since then, however.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Paraguay should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Peru



Peru has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, Peru said: "The only guarantee against the grave threat inherent in nuclear weapons for mankind is the pressing need to achieve the prohibition and total elimination. [...] [W]e hope that all countries will one day accede and particularly those with nuclear arsenals. This legally binding instrument will not detract from the current disarmament and nonproliferation regime, on the contrary it will strengthen and complement it and will contribute to implementation of Article VI of the NPT." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Peru should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Philippines



The Philippines has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

At the UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, the Philippines made the following statement: "While we see the importance of building trust and confidence, particularly among nuclear weapons states, we believe that we should proceed with the pursuit of disarmament without delay to honor our commitments under the NPT. The Philippines is a signatory to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a landmark agreement that fortifies the nuclear disarmament architecture. This treaty represents the universalisation of the Philippines' hope for the elimination of nuclear weapons in line with the specific provision of our constitution and the treaty on the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapons-free zone. The treaty also fulfills the goals set out in the NPT. It delegitimises once and for all the use of nuclear weapons." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Philippines should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (53%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Qatar



Qatar voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Qatar has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Qatar voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Qatar should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Republic of Moldova



Moldova voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Moldova has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Moldova voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Moldova should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (40%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Rwanda



Rwanda did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Rwanda maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Rwanda voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Rwanda should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Saint Kitts and Nevis



Saint Kitts and Nevis has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mark Anthony Brantley, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saint Kitts and Nevis should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Saint Lucia



Saint Lucia has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Saint Lucia participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saint Lucia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Saint Lucia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (27 Sep 2018)	Ratified (23 Jan 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (75%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines



Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 19-20 June 2019, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2kRrE6R). Speaking in the UN on 26 September 2019, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves encouraged states which have not yet signed and ratified the TPNW "to do so in our collective pursuit to bring peace to every corner of the globe." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (8 Dec 2017)	Ratified (31 Jul 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Samoa



Samoa has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 26 September 2019, Samoa's Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi said in the UN that his country had signed and rapidly ratified the TPNW to underscore its commitment to the NPT goals. He also said that the Treaty's "success over time will depend on the commitment of each and every UN member state. Each new signature and ratification of the treaty ban will strengthen global norms against these weapons of terror and move us closer to a nuclear-weapon-free world. And the only guarantee humankind has against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons is through the non-possession and total elimination of all nuclear weapons." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Samoa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Samoa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (60%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

San Marino



San Marino has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

San Marino voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- San Marino should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- San Marino should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Sao Tome and Principe



Sao Tome and Principe has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Sao Tome and Principe voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sao Tome and Principe should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	No
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Saudi Arabia



Saudi Arabia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Saudi Arabia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Saudi Arabia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Saudi Arabia wants to extract and enrich uranium for its new nuclear energy programme, including construction of two nuclear reactors. It is already in talks with companies from China, France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States for the project, but is, so far, unwilling to agree to an associated ban on enriching uranium and on reusing nuclear material. It has pledged to acquire nuclear weapons should Iran do so.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saudi Arabia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (25%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Senegal



Senegal voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Senegal has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Senegal voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Senegal should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Seychelles



Seychelles has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Seychelles voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Seychelles should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Sierra Leone



Sierra Leone voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Sierra Leone has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Sierra Leone voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sierra Leone should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Solomon Islands



Solomon Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Solomon Islands has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Solomon Islands voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Solomon Islands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

South Africa



South Africa produced nuclear weapons in the late 1970s but decided in 1989 to give them up and has since advocated for nuclear disarmament. It was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. South Africa has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 16–17 August 2018, South Africa and ICAN co-hosted a regional workshop in Pretoria, to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2kHK228). Speaking in the UN on 26 September 2019, South Africa said it was pleased to be among the first 25 member states of the TPNW. It urged all states that have not signed the TPNW to do so as soon as possible, and added: "South Africa reaffirms our view that the TPNW is a bold and positive step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons as it strengthens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- South Africa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- South Africa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (25 Feb 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (30%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Sri Lanka



Sri Lanka voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Sri Lanka has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Sri Lanka voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sri Lanka should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

State of Palestine



Palestine has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Palestine signed the TPNW on 20 September 2017 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 22 March 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Palestine should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Palestine should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (22 Mar 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	N/A	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (60%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	N/A	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	No (SQP approved)
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Sudan



Sudan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Sudan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Sudan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sudan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed		Adhered	
No		No	

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Suriname



Suriname voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Suriname has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Suriname voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Suriname should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Thailand



Thailand was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Thailand has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

On 31 August 2018, Thailand, together with New Zealand and UNODA, hosted a regional workshop in Bangkok, to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m2Sudc). On 26 September 2019, Thailand stated at the UN General Assembly that the TPNW "truly reflects a global call to rid the world of these terrible weapons. It is now the time we turn the momentum into concrete actions. Therefore, as a ratifying state to the treaty, Thailand calls on all states to sign and ratify the treaty at the earliest opportunities." (bit.ly/2obwJU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Thailand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Thailand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (20 Sep 2017)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (46%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Timor-Leste



Timor-Leste has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Timor-Leste participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Sudc)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Timor-Leste should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (100%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	No (SQP signed)
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Togo



Togo has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Togo participated in a regional forum hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Togo should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Tonga



Tonga voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Tonga has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Tonga did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tonga should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Did not vote	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Trinidad and Tobago



Trinidad and Tobago has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Trinidad and Tobago's Minister for Foreign Affairs and CARICOM, Dennis Moses, signed the TPNW and deposited the government's instrument of ratification on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking at a plenary session at the UN General Assembly on the same day, he said: "We view this treaty as an option for immediate action on nuclear disarmament, which is necessary in this challenging international security environment. We therefore encourage states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons." He added that the TPNW is part of Trinidad and Tobago's efforts towards a sustainable development agenda. (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Trinidad and Tobago should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Trinidad and Tobago should also ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019)	Ratified (26 Sep 2019)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (75%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Tunisia



Tunisia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Tunisia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Tunisia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tunisia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Turkmenistan



Turkmenistan did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Turkmenistan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Turkmenistan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Turkmenistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Tuvalu



Tuvalu has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Tuvalu participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tuvalu should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	No

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Uganda



Uganda voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Uganda has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Uganda voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Uganda participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Uganda should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (29%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

United Arab Emirates



The United Arab Emirates (UAE) voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. The UAE has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The UAE voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The UAE should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (14%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

United Republic of Tanzania



Tanzania has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, Palamagamba J.A.M. Kabudi, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking about the TPNW in a plenary session of the UN General Assembly on the same day, the Minister said: "The treaty is important, not only because it complements existing international instruments on nuclear weapons, but also because it places those weapons on the same legal footing as other weapons of mass destruction. In order to make the treaty enter into force, I encourage those countries that have not yet signed the treaty to do so as soon as practicable." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tanzania should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (25%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Uruguay



Uruguay has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Speaking about the TPNW at the UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, Uruguay said: "[A]s in previous years, we urge all states who have not yet done so to accede and ratify." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Uruguay should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Uruguay should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (25 Jul 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Vanuatu



Vanuatu has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Vanuatu participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Vanuatu should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Vanuatu should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (26 Sep 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Venezuela



Venezuela has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Venezuela voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Venezuela should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Venezuela should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017)	Ratified (27 Mar 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (25%)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Viet Nam



Viet Nam has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Viet Nam participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m2Sudc).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Viet Nam should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Viet Nam should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (22 Sep 2017)	Ratified (17 May 2018)

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Yemen



Yemen voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Yemen has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Yemen voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Yemen should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Zambia



Zambia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Zambia's Foreign Minister Joseph Malanji signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.

Zambia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m9WdFB).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Zambia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019)	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (33%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Zimbabwe



Zimbabwe voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Zimbabwe has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Zimbabwe voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Zimbabwe participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Zimbabwe should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (20%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted yes

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Argentina



Argentina voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Argentina has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Argentina abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Speaking about the TPNW in the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Argentina said that "The spirit underlying the treaty is shared by Argentina, for which reason we voted for its adoption. Argentina is analyzing the impact of the treaty in other important spheres of the current regime in regards to nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the cornerstone of which is the NPT." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Argentina should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (40%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Tlatelolco)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	0
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	Yes (LEU)

Bosnia and Herzegovina



Bosnia and Herzegovina did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Bosnia and Herzegovina maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Bosnia and Herzegovina voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bosnia and Herzegovina should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed		Adhered	
No		No	

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Finland



Finland did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Finland maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Finnish Parliament gave a statement on the TPNW in June 2018. According to the Committee, the TPNW “supports and complements” the NPT and CTBT. The TPNW “could lead to changed expectations, priorities and views also in states outside of the treaty.” The Committee argued that Finland should “continue to analyse the contents of the treaty and compare it to other central initiatives in the area.” The Committee did not offer a straightforward recommendation with respect to adherence or not, but concluded that Finland should cooperate with Sweden and monitor the Swedish stance on the TPNW (bit.ly/2mkxaz9). Finland abstained on the UN General Assembly’s resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Finland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Georgia



Georgia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Georgia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Georgia abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Georgia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Kyrgyzstan



Kyrgyzstan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Kyrgyzstan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Kyrgyzstan abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, Kyrgyzstan among other issues spoke about the importance of remediating areas impacted by uranium mining. (bit.ly/2obwUU6)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Kyrgyzstan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Mali



Mali participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Mali has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Mali abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Mali participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mali should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Marshall Islands



The Marshall Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but has not yet signed or ratified it. The Marshall Islands' hosting of US missile tests at Kwajalein Atoll means that it is not in compliance with the TPNW's prohibition on assisting illegal activities relating to nuclear weapons.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Marshall Islands abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. The Marshall Islands' foreign minister John Silk has said that his government cannot back the TPNW without US involvement, but has also communicated that ongoing internal consultations have prompted the government to take more time for consideration before joining the Treaty (The Marshall Islands Journal, vol. 49, no. 44 (2 November 2018)).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Marshall Islands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- The Marshall Islands should request that the United States cease the testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Kwajalein Atoll.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Micronesia



Micronesia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Micronesia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Micronesia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Micronesia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No (SQP signed)
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Monaco



Monaco participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Monaco has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Monaco voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Monaco should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (67%)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Nauru



Nauru did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Nauru maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Nauru did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Nauru is expected to soon sign the TPNW. It participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nauru should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Did not vote

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Niue



Niue is not a member or observer of the UN and was therefore not entitled to participate in the TPNW negotiations. Niue has not yet adhered to the Treaty, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. Niue can therefore accede to the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Niue is party to the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone (Treaty of Rarotonga), but has not signalled whether it intends to sign and ratify the TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Niue should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	N/A	Party to the NPT	No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	N/A (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	N/A	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

North Macedonia



North Macedonia participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. North Macedonia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but it currently maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty and can therefore sign and ratify without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

North Macedonia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution in 2018. As of writing, North Macedonia was in the process of joining NATO, and if it does so without repudiating the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, it will be deemed to be encouraging assistance with acts prohibited by the TPNW and not in compliance with Art 1(1)(e).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- North Macedonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future NATO statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- North Macedonia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty, and until it is in a position to do so, it should - in line with its obligations under the NPT - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (50%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Serbia



Serbia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Serbia maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Serbia abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Serbia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Singapore



Singapore participated in the TPNW negotiations, but was the only state to abstain on the vote when the Treaty was adopted. Singapore has not adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Singapore is categorized by the Ban Monitor as "undecided" on the TPNW. In First Committee of the UN General Assembly in 2018, the representative of Singapore said his country is committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, the only guarantee against their use. Singapore regretted that concerns it has about the TPNW were not taken into account when the instrument was negotiated. "While there are multiple pathways towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, all parties must be involved in the process," he said, adding that Singapore will continue to work constructively toward that goal. (bit.ly/2nOeKYC)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Singapore should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (17%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Abstained
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Bangkok)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Somalia



Somalia participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Somalia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Somalia did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Somalia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)	Party to a NWFZ	No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote	Ratified the CTBT	No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Did not vote	Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
		Member of the CD	No
		IAEA CSA in force	No
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

South Sudan



South Sudan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. South Sudan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

South Sudan did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- South Sudan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Did not vote

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	No
Party to a NWFZ	No (Pelindaba)
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	No
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	No
Party to the BWC	No

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Sweden



Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but the government has decided to not adhere to the Treaty for the time being. Sweden maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Sweden abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution in 2018, before announcing in July 2019 that it would "refrain from signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the present time." The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also indicated, however, that Sweden might reassess its position following the NPT review conference in 2020, and that Sweden will participate in the first meeting of states parties to the TPNW as an observer. There has been extensive debate in the Swedish Parliament and in the media about the government's decision to not adhere to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kr6r3l)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sweden should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (45%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Switzerland



Switzerland voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but has not yet adhered to the Treaty. Switzerland maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In June 2018, the Swiss Government published an interdepartmental working group (IDAG) report on the implications of accession to the TPNW. "At the current stage", the report concluded, "the reasons against an accession of Switzerland outweigh the potential opportunities accompanying a signature and ratification of this treaty" (bit.ly/2nGIhQr). Both houses of the Swiss Parliament subsequently instructed the government to sign and ratify without delay (bit.ly/2kTeiql). The Swiss Government plans to update the IDAG report and review its decision by the end of 2020, and contends that this fulfills the mandate given by Parliament (bit.ly/2ktnTQF). Parliament and NGOs disagree. Bern and Geneva have signed ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Switzerland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (14%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Syrian Arab Republic



Syria participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Syria has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Syria did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Syria should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (11%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Did not vote

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	No
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	No (Signatory)

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<0.001 t
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Tajikistan



Tajikistan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Tajikistan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Tajikistan abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tajikistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Ukraine



Ukraine boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. Ukraine maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Ukraine abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ukraine should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Uzbekistan



Uzbekistan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Uzbekistan has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Uzbekistan abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Uzbekistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.

Signed		Adhered	
No		No	

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (No data)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Albania



Albania boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Albania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Albania voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Albania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Albania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Armenia



Armenia participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. It is deemed to be a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. It may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to renounce Russian retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf in order to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Armenia abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Armenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Armenia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Did not vote
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Australia



Australia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Australia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Australian government has opposed the idea of a ban on nuclear weapons since the beginning. It has argued that a key problem with the TPNW is that it "seeks to delegitimise extended deterrence" (bit.ly/2mX63ek). In December 2018, the Labor Party committed to "sign and ratify the Ban Treaty" after taking into account the need to ensure complementarity with the NPT and an effective verification and enforcement architecture (bit.ly/2mmfEdT). Melbourne and Sydney are among 20 cities in Australia that have committed to ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Australia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Australia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Belarus



Belarus did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Belarus may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Belarus abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Speaking at the UN General Assembly's High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Belarus stated that "The NPT must remain a cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament regime. Trying to replace it with other international agreements is counterproductive." (bit.ly/2obi545)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Belarus should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Belarus should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	No
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Belgium



Belgium boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Belgium may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In September 2019, 152 Belgian mayors signed an open letter urging Belgium to join the TPNW (bit.ly/2kKIHC0). 22 cities in Belgium have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Belgium should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Belgium should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Not compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Bulgaria



Bulgaria boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Bulgaria may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2017, the Bulgarian government said that "simply prohibiting" nuclear weapons will not bring about a world without nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament "is only possible within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", the Bulgarian government maintained. (bit.ly/2IXIRMf)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bulgaria should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Bulgaria should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Canada



Canada boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Canada may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, Canada's Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland stated: "Over the past year, we have seen leaders from the global disarmament community drive the negotiation and signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The popularity of this initiative speaks to the desire of countries, activists and communities to accelerate the work toward disarmament. It also reflects frustration and disappointment at the pace of global efforts so far. We believe that this is a legitimate criticism" (bit.ly/2FFEoDD). Toronto and Vancouver are among five Canadian cities that have committed to ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Canada should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Canada should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<10 t (~350 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Croatia



Croatia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-competent state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Croatia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Croatia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Croatia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Croatia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Czechia



Czechia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Czechia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, the Czech delegation to the UN General Assembly's First Committee stated that it was "not convinced" that the TPNW "will help to enhance the security of any country or diminish nuclear arsenals. In contrary, we see risks that it is posing to the nuclear disarmament." (bit.ly/2nQocuy)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Czechia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Czechia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Denmark



Denmark boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicating state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Denmark may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

A ban on nuclear weapons would conflict with NATO commitments, said Denmark's foreign minister in 2017. (bit.ly/2krOgux). In 2018, Denmark voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Denmark should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Denmark should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Estonia



Estonia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-compact state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Estonia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Estonia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Estonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Estonia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Germany



Germany boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicating state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Germany may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The German government has consistently opposed the idea of a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Opposition parties Grüne and Linke favour German adherence (bit.ly/2krGFfn), and support for TPNW keeps growing in the German Parliament. 166 federal parliamentarians have signed the ICAN Parliamentary Appeal. A new cross-party working group on the TPNW (Parlamentarischer Atomwaffenverbot) was established in September 2019 (bit.ly/2ojf2GU). Three federal states and almost 50 cities have signed ICAN's Cities Appeal, including Berlin and Munich.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Germany should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Germany should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Not compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	Yes (LEU)

Greece



Greece boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Greece may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Greece voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Greece should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Greece should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Hungary



Hungary boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Hungary may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

According to the Hungarian government, the TPNW may "intentionally or unintentionally ... lead to the erosion of the NPT regime." (bit.ly/2kwHFz2)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Hungary should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Hungary should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed		Adhered	
No		No	

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	Yes
Fissile material production	No

Iceland



Iceland boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-compact state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Iceland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Iceland is undertaking an inquiry into the TPNW. The Icelandic Foreign Ministry made an official submission to the inquiry in April 2018. The Ministry argued that the TPNW conflicted with NATO's nuclear policy and that Iceland should not join the treaty. (bit.ly/2m1uRRt)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Iceland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Iceland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No



Italy boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Italy may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In September 2017, the Italian parliament adopted a resolution committing the government to “pursue a nuclear weapon free world” and “in a way compatible with its NATO obligations and with the positioning of allied states, to explore the possibility of becoming a party to the legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons” (bit.ly/2lY88FY). According to the government, the NPT “provides the only realistic legal framework to attain a world without nuclear weapons, in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.” (bit.ly/2kKjldb)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Italy should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Italy should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Not compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Japan



Japan boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Japan may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2017, the Japanese government stated that the “ban treaty concept has been unable to obtain understanding and involvement of nuclear-weapon states”, and that it would therefore “be difficult for Japan to participate” (bit.ly/2kKsSAW). In October 2018, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Taro Kono, asserted: “As for the promotion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Japan has still not decided anything. However, Japan is not thinking of signing the TPNW, so our response will be based on that (bit.ly/35hYv74)”. Hiroshima, Nagasaki and many more Japanese cities have signed ICAN’s Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Japan should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Japan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<10 t (~350 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	47 t (~9,400 weapon equivalents)
Fissile material production	Yes (LEU and Pu)



Latvia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicating state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Latvia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Latvia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Latvia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Latvia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	No
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Lithuania



Lithuania boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Lithuania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, the Lithuanian delegation to the UNGA First Committee declared that, "Given the current geopolitical context, we do not agree that delegitimization of nuclear weapons is a realistic addition to the harmonization of the disarmament and security ends." (bit.ly/2m4sUne)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lithuania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Lithuania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Luxembourg



Luxembourg boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Luxembourg may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Luxembourg voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Luxembourg should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Luxembourg should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Montenegro



Montenegro boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Montenegro may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Montenegro voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Montenegro should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Montenegro should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Netherlands



The Netherlands was the only nuclear-weapon-implicit state to participate in the negotiations of the TPNW, but also the only state that voted against the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017. The Netherlands has not adhered to the TPNW, and is not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty. The Netherlands may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In November 2018, the Dutch House of Representatives adopted a series of motions calling on the government to intensify its advocacy for nuclear disarmament, including to champion the TPNW within NATO and investigate the compatibility of the TPNW with existing Dutch legislation. The Dutch foreign and defence ministers responded that there are no fundamental obstacles within the Dutch law preventing the Netherlands from joining. (bit.ly/2P730d7)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Netherlands should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of nuclear weapons.
- The Netherlands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Not compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	Yes (30%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	Voted no
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<1 t (~35 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	Yes (LEU)

Norway



Norway started the initiative on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which resulted in a majority of states negotiating and adopting the TPNW. But Norway boycotted the negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-licit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Norway may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In February 2018, the Norwegian Parliament asked the Government to do an inquiry into the consequences of joining the TPNW. In the resulting report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that because of weaknesses in the TPNW's nuclear disarmament verification arrangements and the fact that Norway "cannot join the TPNW without coming into conflict with our membership in NATO" the government deems that Norway should not join the TPNW (bit.ly/2pmTcTH). Norway's capital Oslo and 15 other Norwegian cities have endorsed ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Norway should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Norway should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to it. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	<0.01 t (0 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Poland



Poland boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Poland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Poland voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Poland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Poland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed		Adhered	
No		No	

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Portugal



Portugal boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon complicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Portugal may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Portugal voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Portugal should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Portugal should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	No (Signatory)
		Member of the CD	No (Observer)
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Republic of Korea



South Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. South Korea may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In the words of the South Korean delegation to the NPT PrepCom in 2018, the TPNW, "crafted without the participation of nuclear-weapon states cannot but bear intrinsic limitation." (bit.ly/2mqPAYq)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- South Korea should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- South Korea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Romania



Romania boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Romania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

According to the Romanian delegation to the 2018 NPT PrepCom, "A viable road to nuclear disarmament in the current security environment should concentrate first and foremost on improving the geopolitical conditions" (bit.ly/2mnh6N6).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Romania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Romania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Slovakia



Slovakia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Slovakia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, Slovakia's state secretary for foreign affairs declared that "we do not believe that the mere existence of a legally binding international instrument banning nuclear weapons will attain the goal of zero. No shortcuts can lead us toward this direction. That is the reason, why Slovakia is not in the position to support the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" (bit.ly/2mjLzvs).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Slovakia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Slovakia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Slovenia



Slovenia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Slovenia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Slovenia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Slovenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Slovenia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	No (Observer)
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Spain



Spain boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Spain may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

The Spanish government agreed in September 2018 to sign the TPNW. The agreement was made during negotiations on the 2019 budget, when left-wing party Podemos obtained a commitment from the government to sign the Treaty in exchange for Podemos' support for the 2019 budget. The government has not commented on whether or when it will implement this decision (bit.ly/2koiOgA). The city of Granollers and five other Spanish cities have signed ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Spain should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Spain should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no

Related treaties and mechanisms	
Party to the NPT	Yes
Party to a NWFZ	No
Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Party to the PTBT	Yes
Member of the CD	Yes
IAEA CSA in force	Yes
IAEA AP in force	Yes
Party to the CWC	Yes
Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

Turkey



Turkey boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-implicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Turkey may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Turkey voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Turkey should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Turkey should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Not compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes
		IAEA AP in force	Yes
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	No
Civilian plutonium stocks	No
Fissile material production	No

China



China boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. China may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In a joint statement with France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 2018, China said: "The TPNW will not be binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms. We call on all countries that are considering supporting the TPNW to reflect seriously on its implications for international peace and security." (bit.ly/2mrUHhO) (bit.ly/2pyMY2S)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- China should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Not compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	No (Voluntary offer agreement)
		IAEA AP in force	Yes (Modified)
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	14 t (~933 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	0.04 t (~8 weapon equivalents)
Military plutonium stocks	2.9 t (~967 weapon equivalents)

Dongfeng 21A



A Chinese DF-21A transporter erector vehicle on display at the Beijing Military Museum, 2007 (Max Smith)

Nuclear arsenal*

Deployed	0
Stockpiled	290
<i>TOTAL ACTIVE</i>	290
Retired	0
TOTAL	290

Nuclear testing**

Number of nuclear explosive tests	45
Last explosive test	1996

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***

NAME	TYPE	DELIVERY PLATFORM	NO.	WARHEADS (AVAILABLE)	YIELD PER WARHEAD	RANGE	WEIGHT	LENGTH	DIAMETER
DF-4	ICBM	Silo	5	10	3,300 kt	5,500+ km	82 t	28 m	2.25 m
DF-5 A/B	ICBM	Silo	20	40	200–5,000 kt	13,000 km	183 t	32.6 m	3.35 m
DF-21/26	M/IRBM	Road-mobile	108	114	200–300 kt	2,150–4,000 km	14.7 t	10.7 m	1.4 m
DF-31 (A/AG)	ICBM	Silo/Road-mobile	54	54	200–300 kt	7,200–11,200 km	42 t	13 m	2.25 m
JL-t2	SLBM	Submarine	48	48	200–300 kt	7,000–8,000 km	42 t	13 m	?

The Chinese nuclear weapons arsenal also includes strategic bombers and possibly cruise missiles.

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

China maintains a so-called no-first-use policy, meaning that the Chinese government has declared that it will only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack. China has long claimed to rely on a "minimum deterrent", but recent developments suggest that China might be in the process of altering its policy. China has traditionally maintained that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and states in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Having ratified the relevant protocols to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Semipalatinsk, China has legally committed not to use nuclear weapons against the members of the Latin American and Caribbean, South Pacific, African, and Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. China has not ratified the equivalent protocol for the South-East Asian zone.

China is believed not to deploy nuclear warheads on missiles in normal circumstances, but some believe that China has already fitted, or will soon fit, nuclear warheads to missiles on its nascent submarine force. There have also been reports that some Chinese officials are advocating "increasing the readiness of China's nuclear missiles".¹ China routinely conducts nuclear readiness drills. In January 2019, Chinese state media reported that Chinese forces had simulated the launch of a nuclear-armed ICBM against "an imaginary enemy".² In a bid to enhance its second-strike capability, China has positioned much of its land-based strategic forces in hardened bunkers deep inside mountains. That said, China does not appear to have yet adopted a "launch on warning" posture, retaining its traditional "ready the forces on warning" posture.³

Since the 1990s, China's approach to multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy has been one of caution. At the UN, China often chooses to abstain on controversial resolutions instead of picking a side, a stance that is probably informed by China's shared history and close relationships with the non-aligned world. In 2016, China was the only permanent member of the UN Security Council to abstain on the vote in the General Assembly that mandated the 2017 negotiation of the TPNW; France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States all voted against.

1 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2019", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019), at: bit.ly/2ZuCOYx.

2 Liu Xuanzun, "China's Rocket Force conducts mock ICBM strike exercise", Global Times (22 January 2019), at: bit.ly/34dA0HY.

3 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "The Pentagon's 2019 China Report", Federation of American Scientists (6 May 2019), at: fas.org/category/china/.

* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.

** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.

*** Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea



North Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. North Korea may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2017, the delegation of North Korea to the UN General Assembly First Committee stated that the North Korean government could not support the TPNW. North Korea "consistently supports the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the efforts for denuclearization of the entire world. However as long as the U.S. who constantly threatens and blackmails the [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] with nuclear weapons rejects the NBT [Nuclear Ban treaty] the DPRK is not in position to accede to the treaty".

RECOMMENDATIONS

- North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- North Korea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Not compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Did not vote	Party to the NPT	No (1985-2003)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	No (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Abstained	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	Yes (not implemented)
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	No
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	0 t (~0 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	-
Military plutonium stocks	0.04 t (~13 weapon equivalents)

Hwasong-15



North Korea's new road mobile Hwasong-15 (HS-15) intercontinental ballistic missile (unknown)

Nuclear arsenal*

Deployed	0
Stockpiled	20–30
TOTAL ACTIVE	20–30
Retired	0
TOTAL	20–30

Nuclear testing**

Number of nuclear explosive tests	6
Last explosive test	2017

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***

NAME	TYPE	DELIVERY PLATFORM	NO.	WARHEADS (AVAILABLE)	YIELD PER WARHEAD	RANGE	WEIGHT	LENGTH	DIAMETER
Hwasong 14	ICBM	Road-mobile (TEL)	?	?	?	6,700–10,400 km	33.8 t	19.5 m	1.7 m
Hwasong 15	ICBM	Road-mobile (TEL)	?	?	?	8,500–13,000 km	~71–21 t	~22.5 m	~2.4 m
Taepodong 2	ICBM	Launch pad	?	?	?	12,000 km	~80 t	~30 m	2.0–2.2 m

Most of the North Korean nuclear weapons delivery system is under development. In addition to the list above, it includes IRBMs (Hwasong 10/12), MRBMs (Hwasong 6/7) and possibly an SLBM (Bukkeukseong).

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

North Korean officials have occasionally made statements that have been interpreted to go in the direction of a no-first-use policy. For example, in May 2016, the North Korean news agency quoted Kim Jong-un, the supreme leader of North Korea, as having averred that North Korea will not use a nuclear weapon unless North Korea's sovereignty is "encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes".¹ Other statements have suggested that North Korea might be willing to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively. In March 2016, for example, in reaction to the commencement of a US–South Korean military exercise, North Korea threatened a "pre-emptive nuclear strike of justice" and to turn Washington and Seoul into "flames and ashes".² Most analysts believe that the North Korean regime will use nuclear weapons to protect itself against any perceived threat to its survival.

In August 2017, US President Donald Trump contended that North Korea "best not make any more threats to the United States", adding that "they [North Korea] will be met with fire and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen before."³ Many feared war was imminent. Instead, Trump and Kim met for a high-level summit in Singapore on 12 June 2018. North Korea committed to "work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula". The US administration represented this as a significant diplomatic victory. In reality, the summit declaration added little if anything to North Korea's standing policy.

North Korea has executed a number of nuclear and missile tests in recent years, attracting widespread criticism from other governments. Over the course of 2018 and 2019, North Korea has conducted at least 9 ballistic missile tests, some of them involving multiple missiles (i.e. multiple missiles launched on a single day). North Korea has not carried out any nuclear or long-range ballistic missile tests since 2017, focusing instead on developing its short-range missiles. North Korea's nuclear-weapon programme should be considered as a nuclear weapon and missile development programme rather than a programme to "modernise" existing forces. Unlike other nuclear-armed states that have used bomber aircraft as their initial delivery means, North Korea has so far concentrated its efforts on the development of ballistic missiles (short, medium, and long-range).

1 BBC, "North Korea 'will not use nuclear weapons' unless threatened" (8 May 2016), at: bbc.in/32flvjY.

2 The Guardian (AP), "North Korea threatens to reduce US and South Korea to 'Flames and Ash'" (7 March 2016), at: bit.ly/2ZomwKp.

3 Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, "Trump Threatens 'Fire and Fury' Against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.", New York Times (8 August 2017), at: nyti.ms/2Htl02s.

* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.

** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.

*** Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.

France



France boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. France may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In July 2018, an information mission set up by the parliamentary foreign affairs commission concluded that France should “mitigate its criticism of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and the countries that have contributed to its adoption, to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of States and their desire for more balanced global governance” (bit.ly/2krrvX). Paris and a dozen other French cities have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- France should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Not compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	No
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	No (Voluntary offer agreement)
		IAEA AP in force	Yes (Modified)
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	30.6 t (~2,040 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	65.4 t (~13,080 weapon equivalents)
Military plutonium stocks	6 t (~2,000 weapon equivalents)

Mirage 2000N



The Mirage 2000N, designed to carry a 300 kt nuclear armed air-to-surface cruise missile (photo: Jerry Gunner)

Nuclear arsenal*

Deployed	280
Stockpiled	20
<i>TOTAL ACTIVE</i>	300
Retired	0
TOTAL	300

Nuclear testing**

Number of nuclear explosive tests	210
Last explosive test	1996

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***

NAME	TYPE	DELIVERY PLATFORM	NO.	WARHEADS (AVAILABLE)	YIELD PER WARHEAD	RANGE	WEIGHT	LENGTH	DIAMETER
M51 (1/2)	SLBM	Submarine	32	?	100–150 kt	6,000 km	52 t	12 m	2.3 m
ASMP (A)	Cruise Missile	Strategic bomber / fighter plane	?	?	300 kt	300–500 km	860 kg	5.38 m	0.38 m

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

In a 2013 White Paper on defence and national security, the French government asserted that use of nuclear weapons by France "would only be conceivable in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defence." The White Paper further postulates that nuclear deterrence protects the country from "any State-led aggression against its vital interests, of whatever origin and in whatever form. It rules out any threat of blackmail that might paralyse its freedom of decision and action."¹

France does not participate in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, but the French nuclear arsenal has been claimed to contribute to general NATO deterrence since 1974. Like the United Kingdom, France maintains a "continuous at sea deterrent" mission, whereby at least one of the country's four ballistic missile submarines will always be on patrol. When at sea, the submarines carry 16 SLBMs with six nuclear warheads on each missile. As other nuclear-armed states, France routinely prepares for the use of nuclear weapons. In February 2019, the French Air Force conducted an 11-hour nuclear exercise, practicing "to sneak a nuclear-capable cruise missile through simulated enemy air defences."²

France has issued non-binding assurances that it will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT (provided that the aggressor is not allied to a nuclear-armed state). In ratifying the relevant protocols to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk, France has committed not to use nuclear weapons against the members of the Latin American and Caribbean, South Pacific, African or Central Asian NWFZ treaties.

France was long antipathetic towards the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Taking a firm stance against the concept of nuclear non-proliferation in the late 1950s (when France was still a non-nuclear state), France did not accede to the NPT until 1992. Today, official French policy states that "France has not given up on the goal of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament." At the 2018 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee, France claimed to remain "committed to the objective of a world without nuclear weapons", but qualified its statement by adding "when conditions allow". France has actively sought to discredit disarmament initiatives such as the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW, lobbying other states not to sign and ratify the Treaty.

¹ Government of France, "French White Paper: Defence and National Security" (2013), pp. 67, 73.

² Sebastian Sprenger, "French Air Force rehearses a long-range nuclear strike", Defense News (5 February 2019), at: bit.ly/30JFNCJ.

* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.

** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.

*** Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "French nuclear forces, 2019", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2MKhqBr. See also Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.

India



India boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. India may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2018, the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly First Committee stated that "the "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, negotiated outside the CD, does not create any obligations for India." (bit.ly/2kTNEhi)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- India should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Not compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained	Party to the NPT	No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	No (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	No (Item-specific agreement)
		IAEA AP in force	Yes (Modified)
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	4 t (~267 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	0.4 t (~80 weapon equivalents)
Military plutonium stocks	7.07 t (~2,357 weapon equivalents)

Agni 2



An Agni-2 intermediate range ballistic missile on a road-mobile launcher (TEL), New Delhi, 2004 (Photo: Antônio Milena)

Nuclear arsenal*

Deployed	0
Stockpiled	130–140
TOTAL ACTIVE	130–140
Retired	0
TOTAL	130–140

Nuclear testing**

Number of nuclear explosive tests	3
Last explosive test	1998

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***

NAME	TYPE	DELIVERY PLATFORM	NO.	WARHEADS (AVAILABLE)	YIELD PER WARHEAD	RANGE	WEIGHT	LENGTH	DIAMETER
Prithvi 2	SRBM	Road-mobile (TEL)	24	24	12 kt	350 km	4,600 kg	8.56 m	1.1 m
Agni 1	SRBM	Rail/Road-mobile (TEL)	20	20	40 kt	700–900 km	12 t	15 m	1.0 m
Agni 2	MRBM	Rail/Road-mobile (TEL)	8	8	40 kt	2,000–3,500 km	16 t	21 m	1.3 m
Agni 3	IRBM	Rail/Road-mobile (TEL)	8	8	40 kt	3,500–5,000 km	50 t	17 m	2.0 m
Dhanush	SRBM	Ship	2	4	12 kt	400 km	4,500 kg	8.53 m	0.9 m

India also has nuclear-capable fighter planes, and is reported to develop SLBM capability.

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

India has traditionally maintained a no-first-use policy. According to the Indian government, India will only contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack,¹ and India's force structure is based on the principle of a "credible minimum deterrent" designed to provide an "adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail." It has therefore usually been assumed that any use of nuclear weapons by India would be retaliatory rather than pre-emptive, and that it will be focused on "counter-value targets" (i.e. the adversary's cities) rather than "counter-force targets" (the adversary's nuclear forces). However, according to certain commentators, India may now be in the process of altering its doctrine. India might attempt a counter-force strike against Pakistan should it believe the latter to be contemplating a nuclear attack against India.² According to one set of observers, "India is developing a suite of capabilities and increasingly making statements about preemption and counterforce."³

India has not offered legally binding security assurances to any state. The protocols to the various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties containing such assurances for zone members are not open for Indian accession. India has not signed or ratified the NPT, CTBT, or TPNW, but has on numerous occasions stated that it supports global nuclear disarmament.

While successive Indian governments have claimed to favour nuclear disarmament also after 1998 – the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly First Committee in 2017 asserted that "India remains committed to the goal of a nuclear weapons free world"⁴ – India has gradually expanded its nuclear capabilities. India formally supports the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, but has been reluctant to discuss existing stocks of such material, preferring a treaty that would only ban future production. In contrast to Pakistan, which possesses a much smaller stock of fissile material and has opposed negotiations on a treaty that only prohibits future production, India retains enough fissile material to produce thousands of new nuclear warheads.⁵ The Indian government did not participate in the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017.

¹ Arms Control Association, "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: India" (January 2018), at: bit.ly/2UdLblo.

² Rajesh Rajagopalan, "India's nuclear strategy: A shift to counterforce?", Observer Research Foundation (30 March 2017). at: bit.ly/32dAw6W.

³ Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, "India's Counterforce Temptations", *International Security* 43, no. 3 (2019), p. 7.

⁴ Statement by India to the UN General Assembly First Committee (9 October 2017), at: bit.ly/32beUrz.

⁵ International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Fissile material stocks" (January 2017), at: <http://fissilematerials.org/>.

* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.

** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.

*** Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.

Israel



Israel boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Israel may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Israel opposes the TPNW. In 2017, the Israeli delegation to the UN General Assembly First Committee stated that "Israel wishes to emphasize its view that the treaty does not create, contribute to the development of, or indicate the existence of customary law related to the subject or the content of the Treaty." (bit.ly/2lXKnhp)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Israel should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Not compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	No (Item-specific agreement)
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	No (Signatory)
		Party to the BWC	No

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	0.3 t (~20 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	-
Military plutonium stocks	0.9 t (~300 weapon equivalents)

Jericho 3



The launch of a Jericho 3 missile (photo: unknown)

Nuclear arsenal*

Deployed	0
Stockpiled	80
TOTAL ACTIVE	80
Retired	0
TOTAL	80

Nuclear testing**

Number of nuclear explosive tests	?
Last explosive test	?

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***

NAME	TYPE	DELIVERY PLATFORM	NO.	WARHEADS (AVAILABLE)	YIELD PER WARHEAD	RANGE	WEIGHT	LENGTH	DIAMETER
Jericho 2	MRBM	Silo/rail/TEL	25	?	?	1,500–1,800 km	22 t	15 m	1.35 m
Jericho 3	IRBM	Silo/rail/TEL	25	?	?	4,000+ km	29 t	15.5-16 m	1.56 m

Israel is also believed to have SLCM capability, and that the country maintains 30 nuclear gravity bombs to be delivered by aircraft.

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

Israel is believed to have acquired nuclear weapons in 1967, and to have slowly expanded its stockpile ever since. Although Israel has never confirmed the existence of a nuclear arsenal, experts estimate that it reached a level of around 80 nuclear warheads for delivery by aircraft, ground-based missiles and, possibly, sea-launched cruise missiles by 2004 and that this number has remained stable since that date. Kristensen and Norris estimate that Israel stores its nuclear warheads at five locations across the country.¹

Israel is not confirmed to have conducted any nuclear tests. However, Israel is believed to have received access to early French testing data, and is believed by some to have conducted a nuclear test near the Prince Edward Islands off Antarctica in 1979 (the so-called Vela incident), possibly in cooperation with South Africa. There is no reliable public estimate of Israel's spending on nuclear weapons.

Maintaining a policy of nuclear "opacity", Israel has never made its nuclear doctrine public. Instead, Israeli officials have insisted that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. Writing in 2017, Kristensen maintained that Israel's nuclear warheads were not on alert in normal circumstances, increasing the amount of time needed to launch a nuclear strike.² Israel has not officially admitted to possessing nuclear weapons, and has thus not offered legally binding security assurances to any state. The protocols to the various NWFZ treaties are not open for Israeli accession.

Israel officially "supports a vision of the Middle East free from war and hostility, and from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery."³ However, Israel has resisted calls to negotiate a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, claiming its security interests are not being sufficiently accommodated. Israel reportedly "values the NPT and recognizes its contribution to the non-proliferation regime",⁴ but has not acceded to the agreement. Israel has not ratified the CTBT, but contributes to the CTBT verification scheme by supplying data from its national seismic stations to the International Data Centre.

1 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5 (2017), at: bit.ly/2NEA1yL.

2 Hans M. Kristensen, "Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons", AIP Conference Proceedings 1898 (2017), p. 1.

3 Statement of Israel to the UNGA First Committee (13 October 2016), at: bit.ly/348sGx5.

4 Statement of Israel to the UNGA First Committee (13 October 2017), at: bit.ly/30JcsL.

* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.

** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.

*** Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.

Pakistan



Pakistan boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Pakistan may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

An official spokesperson of the Pakistani government stated in August 2017 that Pakistan "cannot become a party" to the TPNW. "Pakistan does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations enshrined in this Treaty." (bit.ly/2msHhIP)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Pakistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Not compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Abstained	Party to the NPT	No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	No (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	No (Item-specific agreement)
		IAEA AP in force	No
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	3.4 t (~227 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	-
Military plutonium stocks	0.28 t (~93 weapon equivalents)

HATF 3, 4 & 5



Pakistani nuclear-capable missiles on display in Karachi, 2008 (photo: unknown)

Nuclear arsenal*

Deployed	0
Stockpiled	140–150
TOTAL ACTIVE	140–150
Retired	0
TOTAL	140–150

Nuclear testing**

Number of nuclear explosive tests	2
Last explosive test	1998

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***

NAME	TYPE	DELIVERY PLATFORM	NO.	WARHEADS (AVAILABLE)	YIELD PER WARHEAD	RANGE	WEIGHT	LENGTH	DIAMETER
Ghaznavi (Hatf 3)	SRBM	Road-mobile	~16	~16	5-12 kt	290 km	700 kg	8.5 m	0.8 m
Ghauri (Hatf 5)	MRBM	Road-mobile	~24	~24	5-12 kt	1,250–1,500 km	700 kg	15.9 m	1.35 m
Shaheen 2 (Hatf 6)	MRBM	Road-mobile	~12	~12	5-12 kt	1,500–2,000 km	700 kg	17.2 m	1.4 m
Babur (Hatf 7)	GLCM	Ground launched	~12	~12	5-12 kt	350-700 km	~500 kg	6.2 m	0.52 m
Nasr (Hatf 9)	SRBM	Road-mobile	~24	~24	low kt	60 km	1,200 kg	6 m	0.4 m

Pakistan is also believed to be able to deliver nuclear weapons by aircraft (F-16 / Mirage III), and there are indications that the country is developing weapons for use on ships or submarines.

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

The government of Pakistan has pledged "no first use against non-nuclear weapons states", but "Pakistan's policy on first use against states that possess nuclear weapons, particularly India, remains vague."¹ Pakistan has traditionally kept its nuclear warheads "de-mated", meaning that the fissile cores are stored separately from the rest of the warheads. This practice increases the time required to employ the weapons, likely reducing the risk of nuclear strikes following miscalculation or accidents. In recent years, a number of commentators have expressed concern about Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons, which they fear will lower the nuclear threshold.²

Pakistan has not offered legally binding security assurances to any state. The protocols to the various nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties containing such assurances are not open for Pakistani accession. Since 1990, however, Pakistan has advocated the negotiation of a global treaty containing negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states.

Pakistan frequently conducts nuclear drills and tests of nuclear-capable missiles. Over the course of 2018 and the first nine months of 2019, Pakistan carried out at least seven nuclear missile tests, including of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (Hatf-5 and Shaheen II), short-range ballistic missiles (Nasr), and a sea-launched cruise missile that likely had nuclear capacity.

Pakistan has long claimed to favour global nuclear disarmament, even after its acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1990s. In practice, however, Pakistan has expanded its nuclear capabilities and blocked the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty. Pakistan did not participate in the negotiation of the 2017 TPNW.

¹ Arms Control Association, "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan" (April 2017), at: bit.ly/2NFE3H8.

² Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Julia Diamond, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 5 (2018), at: bit.ly/30K9B1Z.

* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.

** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.

*** Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.

Russian Federation



Russia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Russia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Russia is opposed the TPNW. In a 2017 statement to the UNGA First Committee, the Russian government said it "cannot assess this Treaty the TPNW positively." (bit.ly/2kwgHrg)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Russia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Not compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	No (Voluntary offer agreement)
		IAEA AP in force	Yes (Modified)
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	679 t (~45,267 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	59 t (~11,800 weapon equivalents)
Military plutonium stocks	128 t (~42,667 weapon equivalents)

SS-18 M6 SATAN



The R-36 missile (NATO reporting name: SS-18 Satan) is the largest of all the ICBMs, here pictured at the Museum of Strategic Rocket Forces, Ukraine (Photo: Clay Gilliland)

Nuclear arsenal*

Deployed	1,600
Stockpiled	2,730
<i>TOTAL ACTIVE</i>	4,330
Retired	2,170
TOTAL	6,500

Nuclear testing**

Number of nuclear explosive tests	715
Last explosive test	1990

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***

NAME	TYPE	DELIVERY PLATFORM	NO.	WARHEADS (AVAILABLE)	YIELD PER WARHEAD	RANGE	WEIGHT	LENGTH	DIAMETER
SS-18 M6 Satan	ICBM	Silo	46	460	500/800 kt	11,000 km	211.1 t	34.3 m	3 m
SS-19 M3 Stiletto	ICBM	Silo	20	120	400 kt	10,000 km	105.6 t	27 m	2.5 m
SS-25 Sickle	ICBM	Mobile	90	90	800 kt	11,000 km	45 t	23 m	1.8 m
SS-27 Mod 1/2	ICBM	Silo/Mobile	160	522	100–800 kt	10,500–11,000 km	47.2 t	22.7 m	1.86 m
SS-N-18 M1 Stingray	SLBM	Submarine	16	48	200 kt	6,500 km	35.3 t	14.6 m	1.8 m
SS-N-23 M1	SLBM	Submarine	96	384	500 kt	11,000 km	47 t	21.9 m	1.9 m
SS-N-32	SLBM	Submarine	48	288	100–150 kt	8,300 km	36.8 t	12.1 m	2.0 m
AS-15A/23B	ALCM	Bomber	68	786	200–250 kt	6,500–13,200 km	1,210 kg	6.04 m	0.514 m

The Russian nuclear weapons arsenal also includes a number of nonstrategic and defensive weapon systems, including short-range ballistic missiles. The range listed for the ALCMs is the range of the delivery platform (Tupolev bombers).

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

Measured by the sheer number of nuclear warheads in its possession, Russia retains the world's largest nuclear arsenal. According to the current Russian doctrine, Russia reserves "the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy".¹ Russia possesses a larger arsenal of "tactical" or "non-strategic" nuclear weapons than other nuclear-armed states, suggesting that Russia retains a comparatively greater role for the battlefield use of nuclear weapons (as opposed to "strategic" use against cities or nuclear assets) than other nuclear-armed states.

The Russian Federation has ratified the protocols containing negative security assurances for members of the Latin American and Caribbean, South Pacific, African, and Central Asian NWFZs. Russia has thereby committed not to use nuclear weapons against members of these zones. Russia/the Soviet Union has offered a number of non-binding security assurances over the years, but Russia does not have a no-first-use policy.

Russian officials often assert that Russia is committed to the creation of a world without nuclear weapons. In practice, however, Russia has snubbed offers of multilateral arms control negotiations, including proposals to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, and sought to discredit diplomatic efforts such as the humanitarian initiative for nuclear disarmament. At the same time, Russia has reportedly approached the United States to discuss the extension of the New START agreement, but has apparently not found a willing interlocutor.

¹ Russian Embassy to the United Kingdom, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" (2014), at: <https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029>.

* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>.

** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.

*** Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Russian nuclear forces, 2019", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 2 (2019), at: bit.ly/2L518U8. See also Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB18c06.pdf>.

United Kingdom



The United Kingdom boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. The United Kingdom may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In 2017, the UK government said that the UK “does not intend to sign, ratify or become party to” the TPNW. It further stated that “The unpredictable international security environment we face today demands the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future” (bit.ly/2mp3twV). The cities of Edinburgh and Manchester have joined ICAN’s Cities Appeal. In July 2018, the governing body of the Church of England, the Synod, adopted a motion calling on the UK government to “respond positively” to the TPNW and bring about nuclear disarmament. (bit.ly/2ms2psg)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The United Kingdom should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- The United Kingdom should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Not compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	No (Voluntary offer agreement)
		IAEA AP in force	Yes (Modified)
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	21.2 t (~1,413 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	110.3 t (~22,060 weapon equivalents)
Military plutonium stocks	3.2 t (~1,067 weapon equivalents)



Royal Navy Vanguard Class submarine HMS Vigilant returning to HMNB Clyde after her extended deployment (CPOA(Phot) Thomas McDonald/MOD)

Nuclear arsenal*	
Deployed	120
Stockpiled	95
TOTAL ACTIVE	215
Retired	0
TOTAL	215

Nuclear testing**	
Number of nuclear explosive tests	45
Last explosive test	1991

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***									
NAME	TYPE	DELIVERY PLATFORM	NO.	WARHEADS (AVAILABLE)	YIELD PER WARHEAD	RANGE	WEIGHT	LENGTH	DIAMETER
UGM-133A Trident II D5	SLBM	Submarines	?	215	100 kt	7,400+ km	59 t	13.58 m	2.11 m

The United Kingdom draws its missiles from the "commingled US/UK pool of missiles". These Trident II missiles are serviced and maintained to precisely the same standards as those of the United States (bit.ly/2p6GM20).

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

The United Kingdom espouses a first-use posture and a so-called continuous-at-sea deterrence (CASD) policy, meaning that at least one nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine will always be on patrol. The UK government claims that its nuclear arsenal offers a credible and independent minimum deterrent,¹ but critics have questioned not only whether UK nuclear use is credible, but also whether the UK nuclear arsenal is really independent from the United States, and whether UK nuclear weapons are actually deterring anyone from doing something they want to do. The British nuclear-weapon programme has traditionally been justified by UK government officials as a deterrent against Soviet/Russian aggression. And as the UK nuclear force is by all accounts not large enough to threaten the nuclear forces or infrastructure ("counterforce targets") of Russia, any deterrence relies on an implicit threat to use nuclear weapons against Russian population centres ("counter-value" targets). From the late 1960s onwards, British nuclear doctrine and procurement have ostensibly been centred on the so-called Moscow criterion, that is, the ability to demolish the Russian capital and its inhabitants.²

Successive British governments have framed the United Kingdom as a "responsible nuclear-weapon state" and expressed support for the goal of nuclear disarmament. At the 2018 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee in Geneva, the UK delegation stated that "[w]e firmly believe a consensus, step-by-step approach to multilateral disarmament is the best way of making progress towards our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons."³ However, as discussed above, British policy makers often make quite different statements to their domestic audiences, representing disarmament as irresponsible, effeminate, or humiliating. For example, in a 2015 op-ed, then UK Foreign Secretary (now Prime Minister), Boris Johnson, likened nuclear disarmament to castration.⁴

The United Kingdom formally supports the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty, but has been reluctant to discuss existing stocks of such material, preferring a treaty that would only ban future production. The United Kingdom retains enough fissile material to produce thousands of new nuclear warheads.⁵ And despite being a party to the NPT, which commits the United Kingdom to pursue negotiations "in good faith" on nuclear disarmament, the United Kingdom has never participated in any nuclear disarmament negotiations.

¹ UK Ministry of Defence, "The UK's Nuclear Deterrent" (19 February 2018), at: bit.ly/2Zq4LKL.

² John Baylis, "British Nuclear Doctrine", *Contemporary British History* 19, no. 1 (2005).

³ Statement by the United Kingdom to the 2018 NPT PrepCom (26 April 2018), at: bit.ly/2zw86bW.

⁴ Boris Johnson, "If we want to be taken seriously, we have to defend ourselves", *The Telegraph* (16 February 2015), at: bit.ly/30K9sLZ.

⁵ International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Fissile material stocks" (January 2017), at: <http://fissilematerials.org/>.

* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", *Federation of American Scientists*, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.

** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.

*** Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces", *SIPRI Yearbook 2018*, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.

United States of America



The United States boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. The United States may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

In a 2017 statement about the TPNW, the United States declared that it “will not support the treaty”. Nuclear disarmament “will require a transformation of the international security environment.” (bit.ly/2kwlcCa) In August 2018, the California Senate approved resolutions urging the United States to embrace the TPNW and restrict the US president’s unchecked authority to launch a first nuclear strike. The states of Oregon and New Jersey have also approved legislation supporting the TPNW. Washington D.C., Los Angeles, and seven other U.S. cities have committed to ICAN’s Cities Appeal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- The United States should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.

Signed	Adhered
No	No

Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW		
Art 1(1)(a)	The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring	Not compliant
	The prohibition on testing	Compliant
	The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b)	The prohibition on transferring	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(c)	The prohibition on receiving transfer or control	Compliant
Art 1(1)(d)	The prohibition on using	Compliant
	The prohibition on threatening to use	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(e)	The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities	Not compliant
	The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(f)	The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities	Not compliant
Art 1(1)(g)	The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment	Compliant

TPNW process		Related treaties and mechanisms	
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258)	Voted no	Party to the NPT	Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women)	No (N/A)	Party to a NWFZ	No
Vote on adoption of treaty text	N/A	Ratified the CTBT	No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018	Voted no	Party to the PTBT	Yes
		Member of the CD	Yes
		IAEA CSA in force	No (Voluntary offer agreement)
		IAEA AP in force	Yes (Modified)
		Party to the CWC	Yes
		Party to the BWC	Yes

Fissile material	
Highly enriched uranium stocks	574.5 t (~38,300 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks	8 t (~1,600 weapon equivalents)
Military plutonium stocks	79.8 t (~26,600 weapon equivalents)

AGM-86B



AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile dropped from a B-52H Stratofortress, Utah, 2014 (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Roidan Carlson)

Nuclear arsenal*

Deployed	1,750
Stockpiled	2,050
<i>TOTAL ACTIVE</i>	3,800
Retired	2,385
TOTAL	6,185

Nuclear testing**

Number of nuclear explosive tests	1,030
Last explosive test	1992

Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***

NAME	TYPE	DELIVERY PLATFORM	NO.	WARHEADS (AVAILABLE)	YIELD PER WARHEAD	RANGE	WEIGHT	LENGTH	DIAMETER
LGM-30G Minuteman III	ICBM	Silo	400	800	300kt–335kt	13,000 km	34.4 t	18.2 m	1.85 m
UGM-133A Trident II D5	SLBM	Submarines	240	1,920	100kt–475kt	7,400+ km	59 t	13.58 m	2.11 m
AGM-86B	Cruise missile	Strategic bombers	44	528	5-150 kt	2,500/16,000 km	1,450 kg	6.32 m	0.62 m
B61/B83	Gravity bombs	Strategic bombers/ fighter planes	16	282	0.3-340 kt	11,000 km	320 kg	3.56 m	0.33 m

DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE

The United States maintains a first use policy and significant "counter-force" capabilities. According to the Trump administration's "Nuclear Posture Review" of February 2018, the United States will "only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of the United States, its allies, and partners."¹ The United States has long maintained that it will not use nuclear weapons "against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations." However, this assurance is not legally binding and it is not clear how the United States defines "in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations". The United States has only offered legally binding assurances not to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco. Washington has refused to ratify the protocols containing such assurances for members of the South Pacific, South-East Asian, African, and Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In 2018, the United States abandoned its longstanding policy of seeking disarmament through a "step-by-step" approach and launched instead an initiative to "create the conditions for nuclear disarmament" (later renamed "creating the environment for nuclear disarmament" (CEND)). According to the US government, the security environment is currently not auspicious for nuclear reductions or implementation of Article VI of the NPT. Consequently, the international community should focus not on further disarmament steps, but rather on creating an environment in which the United States, Russia, and other nuclear-armed major powers would feel secure enough to reduce and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction. For the US government, necessary changes include, inter alia, the verified unilateral disarmament of DPR Korea, universal application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols in non-nuclear-weapon states, a guarantee that Iran "is never again able to position itself dangerously close to nuclear weaponization", and an improvement in "transparency about nuclear policies, plans, and doctrines". In 2019, the United States decided not to disclose the current number of nuclear weapons in the Defense Department's nuclear weapons stockpile, walking back close to a decade of US nuclear transparency policy.²

¹ US Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review" (February 2018), p. 21.

² Hans M. Kristensen, "Pentagon Slams Door On Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Transparency", Federation of American Scientists (17 April 2019), at: bit.ly/2PnjHoA.

* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.

** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.

*** Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "World Nuclear Forces", SIPRI Yearbook 2018, Chapter 6, at: bit.ly/2mLZ9si.

Text of the Treaty

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Determined to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the consequent need to completely eliminate such weapons, which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances,

Mindful of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including from any nuclear-weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons,

Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation,

Acknowledging the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is a global public good of the highest order, serving both national and collective security interests,

Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples,

Reaffirming the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law,

Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, the rule of distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment,

Considering that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law,

Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Recalling also the first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Concerned by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste of economic and human resources on programmes for the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and determined to act towards that end,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security,

Recognizing the vital importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime,

Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Recognizing that the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is an essential factor for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security, and committed to supporting and strengthening the effective participation of women in nuclear disarmament,

Recognizing also the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations, and committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this Treaty,

Stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, other international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians, academics and the hibakusha,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1 Prohibitions

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

- (a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- (c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- (d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 2 Declarations

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration in which it shall:

- (a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party;
- (b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns, possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations received to the States Parties.

Article 3

Safeguards

1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INF-CIRC/153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

Article 4

Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

1. Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme. The competent international authority shall report to the States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

2. Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party's nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure.

3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.

4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.

5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled.

6. The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.

Article 5

National implementation

1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty.

2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 6

Victim assistance and environmental remediation

1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age-and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.

2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.

3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under international law or bilateral agreements.

Article 7

International cooperation and assistance

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis.

6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

Article 8

Meeting of States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear disarmament, including:

- (a) The implementation and status of this Treaty;
- (b) Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including additional protocols to this Treaty;
- (c) Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, shall apply.

3. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least one third of the States Parties.

4. After a period of five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the Treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene further review conferences at intervals of six years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties.

5. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant entities of the United Nations system, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of States Parties and the review conferences as observers.

Article 9

Costs

1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the circulation of declarations under Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

3. The cost related to the implementation of verification measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including the elimination or conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.

Article 10

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views

on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first.

2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.

3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment 90 days following the deposit of such instruments of ratification or acceptance by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party 90 days following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment.

Article 11

Settlement of disputes

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 12

Universality

Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.

Article 13

Signature

This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.

Article 14

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for accession.

Article 15

Entry into force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 16

Reservations

The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 17

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.

Article 18

Relationship with other agreements

The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.

Article 19

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.

Article 20

Authentic texts

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic.

DONE at New York, this seventh day of July, two thousand and seventeen.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ALCM	Air-launched cruise missile
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (Treaty).
ASCM	Anti-ship cruise missile
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
GLCM	Ground-launched cruise missile
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INFCIRC	Information Circular
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile
Lao PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
LEU	Low enriched uranium
MIRV	Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWCS	Nuclear-weapon-compact states
NWFZ	Nuclear-weapon-free zone
Pu	Plutonium
SNOWCAT	Support of nuclear operations with conventional air tactics
SLBM	Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM	Submarine-launched cruise missile
SRBM	Short-range ballistic missile
SSBN	Submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear powered
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction



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