Republic of Korea
South Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2023. South Korea may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1987) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (14 Nov 1975) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
In January 2023, the South Korean President, Yoon Suk Yeol, said that, if the threat posed by North Korea increases, his country might consider developing its own nuclear weapons or asking the United States to redeploy such weapons to the Korean Peninsula. ‘It’s possible that the problem gets worse and our country will introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own,’ he said. ‘If that’s the case, we can have our own nuclear weapons pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities.’1 As a State party to the NPT, South Korea is legally barred from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.
In April 2023, South Korea and the United States issued the ‘Washington Declaration’, which deepened cooperation between the two countries on nuclear-weapons related planning in the region, including by establishing two new bodies: the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which will discuss nuclear and strategic planning, and the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, which will operationalise those discussions through simulations, including planning nuclear weapons use.
The United States agreed in the Declaration to meet any nuclear attack from North Korea against the South with a ‘a swift, overwhelming and decisive response’, adding that ‘the US commitment to extend deterrence to [South Korea] is backed by the full range of US capabilities, including nuclear’.3
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2023, President Yoon said that North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes pose ‘a direct and existential threat’ to South Korea and ‘a serious challenge to peace in the Indo-Pacific region and across the globe’. He criticised Russia receiving ‘arms and ammunition’ from the North Korean regime, which ‘blatantly violates UN Security Council resolutions.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, South Korea said that it is ‘strengthening extended deterrence cooperation with the US’ in response to North Korea’s ‘ever-growing unlawful nuclear and missile threats’.5 It called on North Korea ‘to choose the path of dialogue and complete denuclearisation’.6
Recommendations
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South Korea should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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South Korea should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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South Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.