Slovenia
Slovenia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2023. Slovenia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1992) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (1 Sep 2006) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
At the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in August 2023, Slovenia emphasised the need for ‘concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI [of the NPT] with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons’. It voiced concern at ‘negative trends in the area of nuclear disarmament, such as endeavours to increase and modernise nuclear arsenals’ and argued that ‘a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament is the most viable way forward’.1
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Slovenia expressed regret that Russia ‘continued its rhetoric on the threat of using nuclear weapons’. ‘This is irresponsible and unacceptable,’ it said. ‘The same goes for the recent announcement of Russia on deploying nuclear weapons to the territory of Belarus, a non-nuclear-weapon State.’2
Recommendations
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Slovenia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Slovenia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Slovenia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.