Canada
Responding to a parliamentary petition urging the Canadian government ‘to break with NATO’s nuclear policy and immediately sign and commit to ratifying the TPNW’, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mélanie Joly, wrote in August 2022 that ‘Canada recognises that the entry into force of the [TPNW] reflects well-founded concerns about the unacceptable pace of nuclear disarmament – concerns that Canada very much shares.’[1]
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1969) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1972) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (21 Feb 1972) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | 1-10 tons |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
Canada may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
Responding to criticism for Canada's decision to not attend as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022 (unlike NATO member states Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway), Robert Oliphant, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in October 2022: ‘We understand and appreciate the sentiment behind the TPNW, but I will reiterate tonight that Canada is not a state party to this Treaty, as several of its provisions are incompatible with our NATO commitments. NATO is a defensive alliance and, whether we like it or not, nuclear deterrence is currently a reality.’1
Recommendations
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Canada should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Canada should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Canada should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.