Canada
Canada boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
---|---|---|
NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
Party to the TPNW | No | |
Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1969) | |
Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
Party to an NWFZ | No | |
CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1972) | |
AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2000) | |
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1972) | |
Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |
TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
---|---|---|
(a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
Test | Compatible | |
(b) | Transfer | Compatible |
(c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
(d) | Use | Compatible |
Threaten to use | Compatible | |
(e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
(f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
(g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
TPNW voting and participation | |
---|---|
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
Fissile material | |
---|---|
Nuclear facilities | Yes |
Fissile material production | No |
HEU stocks | 1-10 tons |
Plutonium stocks | No |
SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In December 2024, in recognition of the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Japanese organisation Nihon Hidankyo, the House of Commons of Canada unanimously resolved to ‘acknowledge that hibakusha [atomic bomb survivors] have worked tirelessly for decades to raise awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use’. The motion also encouraged the Canadian government to enhance its engagement with the TPNW.1
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee session in July 2024, Canada stressed that its commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world is steadfast. ‘Some may argue that, as a NATO ally, Canada cannot support both nuclear deterrence and disarmament. This is inaccurate,’ it said. ‘Our NATO commitment to deterrence for our collective security neither prevents us, nor discourages us, from simultaneously pursuing reciprocal, verifiable, step-by-step disarmament.’2
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Canada said that ‘[o]ur objective must be to reverse and counteract’ negative trends in international security ‘and return to a path towards global peace and disarmament, starting with a world free of nuclear weapons’.3 It urged states that possess or produce fissile material for nuclear weapons ‘to commence the long-overdue negotiations’ for a fissile material cut-off treaty.4
In 2023, in response to a parliamentary petition urging Canada to ‘sign and commit to ratifying the TPNW’, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Mélanie Joly, said: ‘Canada recognises that the entry into force of the [TPNW] reflects well-founded concerns about the slow pace of nuclear disarmament – concerns that Canada very much shares. While not a party to the TPNW, Canada has common ground with Treaty States and shares the ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear weapons.’5
Recommendations
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Canada should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Canada should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Canada should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.