Compliance and compatibility with the prohibitions of the TPNW
The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor finds that 96 of the 97 states parties and signatories to the TPNW in 2023 were compliant with all of the Treaty’s ten principal prohibitions. One state party—Kazakhstan—was found compliant with nine prohibitions and non-compliant with the tenth – the prohibition on assisting a prohibited activity. The conduct of 54 of the 100 non-parties was also fully compatible with all of the Treaty prohibitions, while 44 non-parties—the same as in 2022—engaged in conduct that was not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions. Non-parties Iran and Saudi Arabia were again recorded as states of concern.
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor assesses whether all 197 states that can adhere to the TPNW—regardless of whether they have consented to be bound by the Treaty—act in accordance with its prohibitions. On the basis of their policies and practices, states parties and signatories are categorised as either ‘compliant’ or ‘non-compliant’, whereas nonparties are categorised as either ‘compatible’ or ‘non-compatible’. Where a state has been assessed to be ‘of concern’, this means that worrying developments in the state warrant close attention as a possible breach of the standards is on the horizon.
Every state may lawfully sign and ratify the TPNW, but those 54 states not yet party whose conduct is fully compatible with all of the prohibitions can adhere in the knowledge that they already meet its obligations without the need to make any changes to their existing policies and practices. States not party that engage in conduct that is not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions would have to make varying degrees of changes to their existing policies and practices to fulfil the obligations set forth in the Treaty.
Assessments of all states’ compliance or compatibility with each of the prohibitions of the TPNW are detailed in ten separate subsections in the menu and the findings are summarised here.
Compliance and compatibility by prohibition
The figure below disaggregates the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor’s findings for 2023 by each of the prohibitions. As they show, the large majority of states in the world already abide by all of the prohibitive norms that the TPNW has established. But a sizeable minority of states engage in a range of activities that in different ways stand between the international community and the fulfilment of the United Nations’ long-standing goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. In fact, the only two TPNW norms that no state currently contravenes are the prohibitions on testing and use of nuclear weapons. This speaks volumes about the urgent need to reject and roll back the policies and activities that are conflicting with the other prohibitions, because this is conduct that compounds the risks of new testing or use of nuclear weapons.
The TPNW does not explicitly prohibit or even mention ‘nuclear deterrence’. The reason for this is that deterrence is not a specific act or behaviour, but a psychological state that may or may not exist inside an adversary’s head. However, the TPNW prohibits a range of specific actions that are typically performed with the aim of fostering deterrence, including possessing nuclear weapons, hosting nuclear weapons, threatening to use nuclear weapons, or assisting or encouraging other states to engage in such behaviour. Crucially, these behaviours are prohibited irrespective of whether they succeed in fostering ‘deterrence’ in the minds of potential adversaries.
Compliance and compatibility by region
The figure below breaks down the compliance and compatibility findings for 2023 by region. As it shows, compliance and compatibility with the TPNW are generally high. As has been the case in every year since 2018, when the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor first began to assess compliance and compatibility with the TPNW, Europe is the region with the most states whose conduct conflicts with the Treaty. Of the global total of 45 states deemed non- compliant or non-compatible, 32 (71%) are in Europe – 3 nuclear-armed states (France, Russia, and United Kingdom) and 29 umbrella states.
In Asia, where 5 of the world’s nuclear-armed states are located, 9 of the total of 45 states were found to be non-compliant or non-compatible. In addition, the only two states listed as being ‘of concern’—Iran and Saudi Arabia—are both in Asia. They do not possess nuclear weapons, but both have latent nuclear breakout capabilities. In the Americas, only 2 states (Canada and the United States) of the 35 across the region engage in conduct which is not compatible with the Treaty. Among the 16 states in Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands are the only two states with policies and practices that are not fully compatible with the TPNW.
For more information, see this website's sections on the respective prohibitions, and the state profiles.
