The prohibitions of the TPNW
In 2020, 153 states maintained policies and practices that were consistent with all the prohibitions of the TPNW, including all of the 88 states that at the end of the year were either states parties or signatories to the Treaty. A total of 42 states not party, however, engaged in conduct that was not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions. In addition, Iran and Saudi Arabia are recorded as states of concern.
The heart of the TPNW is its Article 1, which contains the Treaty’s prohibitions. These prohibitions apply at all places and in all circumstances, including during armed conflict. In the sections in the menu, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor sets out clear interpretations of each of the prohibitions and evaluates the extent to which all states – regardless of whether they have consented to be bound by the Treaty – act in accordance with them or not.
States parties and signatories are categorised as either ‘compliant’ or ‘not compliant’, whereas states not party are categorised as either ‘compatible’ or ‘not compatible’. Where a state has been assessed to be ‘of concern’, this means that worrying developments in the state warrant close attention.
Overall compliance or compatibility with the TPNW prohibitions among all states
Every state may lawfully sign and ratify the TPNW, but states that are categorised as not compliant or not compatible would have to make varying degrees of changes to their policies and practices in order to respect the obligations and norms of the Treaty. The figure above and the table below summarise the overall compliance and compatibility findings for all states. The 42 states shown in red are first and foremost the nine nuclear-armed states and the thirty-two umbrella states, but also includes one state that has a nuclear-weapon-free security policy (Marshall Islands).
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
| Status of overall compliance/compatibility | Total | States |
|---|---|---|
| Not compliant/Not compatible | 42 | Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Korea, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. |
| Compliant/Compatible | 153 | Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Oman, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. |
| Of concern | 2 | Iran, Saudi Arabia. |
Compliance and compatibility by prohibition
The figure below disaggregates compliance and compatibility for each of the Article 1 prohibitions. Most importantly, the conduct of the nine nuclear-armed states was not compatible with either the prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or acquiring nuclear weapons, or the prohibition on possessing or stockpiling them.
The prohibition in Article 1(1)(e) on assisting, encouraging, or inducing prohibited acts, however, stands out as the one where the greatest number of states have policies and practices that are not compatible. The nuclear-armed states’ retention of nuclear weapons is aided and abetted in many ways. We find that a total of 36 states assisted, encouraged, or induced acts in 2020 that are prohibited by the TPNW:
Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The specific prohibition on allowing the ‘hosting’ (stationing, installation, or deployment) of nuclear weapons belonging to another state is contradicted by five states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey).
Compliance and compatibility for each of the Article 1(1)(e) prohibitions
Compliance and compatibility by region
As set out in the chart above, Europe is the region with the most states whose conduct conflicts with the TPNW. A total of 30 of the 47 states in Europe (63%) currently maintain policies and practices that are not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW.
In the other regions, compliance and compatibility with the TPNW is generally high. In Africa, all states have been found to be fully compliant or compatible. In the Americas, only 2 of the 35 states across the region (Canada and the United States) engage in conduct which is not compatible with the Treaty.
In Asia, where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of the 45 states maintain policies and practices that are not compatible: Armenia, China, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Korea. Two states in Asia – Iran and Saudi Arabia – are listed as of concern.
In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands are the 2 states with policies and practices that are not fully compatible with the TPNW among the 16 states in the region.
An overview of individual states’ compliance or compatibility with respect to each of the prohibitions is contained in the tables below, broken down by region. Details for each respective state are also in the state profiles.
Africa
The Americas
Asia
Europe
Oceania
