China
China boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | No |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | N/A |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes (Civilian, dual-use) |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 14 tons (m) |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | 2.9 tons/No |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, China, together with France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.1
Recommendations
- China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- China should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- China should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. China should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. China should also ratify the CTBT.
The information below on China's nuclear-weapons arsenal at the beginning of 2022 and nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021, has been compiled for the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor by Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda from country-specific editions of the Federation of American Scientists' 'Nuclear Notebook' series, which is published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and accessible via the Federation of American Scientists' website. Additional details and in-depth citations for each data point can be found in those publications. In certain cases, links to specific sources have been included.
China's inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
China keeps nearly all of its warheads at a central storage facility and likely does not normally mate them with their delivery vehicles during peacetime, although some missile training with warheads is thought to have begun recently. A breakdown is provided below of China’s warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned.
Approximately 60 warheads are assigned to China’s 20 siloed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including the DF-5A and DF-5B. The former is capable of carrying a single warhead to a range of up to 12,000 km, while the latter can carry up to five multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) to a range of up to 13,000 km.
Approximately 138 warheads are assigned to China’s mobile ICBMs, including the DF-4, DF-31/A/AG, and DF-41. These ICBMs can deliver warheads to distances between 5,500 km and 12,000 km.
Approximately 60 warheads are assigned to China’s sizable arsenal of dual-capable mobile medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21A/E and DF-26. These missiles can deliver warheads to ranges in excess of 2,100 kilometres and 4,000 kilometres, respectively.
Approximately 72 warheads are assigned to China’s six operational Jin-class Type 094/A ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each of which are capable of launching up to 12 JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Each missile can carry one warhead.
Approximately 20 gravity bombs and/or air-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads may be assigned to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force for delivery by China’s H-6 heavy bombers.
Development, production, or acquisition of nuclear-weapons systems in 2021
China’s nuclear stockpile is expected to increase significantly in the next decade, but is expected to remain significantly smaller than that of either Russia or the United States. The growth of China’s nuclear arsenal is dominated by the construction of more than 300 ballistic missiles silos, additional ballistic missile submarines, and new bombers. See the tabs below for China's nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021, broken down by land-delivered, sea-delivered, and air-delivered systems.
- Commercial satellite imagery indicates that China appears to be building more than 300 missile silos in three distinct complexes across northern China. This would constitute the most significant expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal ever. These silos could be filled with new DF-41 or DF-31A ICBMs, although it remains unclear how China intends to operationalize the silos, whether it intends to fill all of them with missiles, and how many warheads will be assigned to each missile.
- China is upgrading its older liquid-fuelled, silo-based DF-5 ICBMs; one version (known as the DF-5B) has been modified to carry up to five MIRVs, and China also appears to be developing a newer version, the DF-5C.
- In 2021, US officials announced that China might be building a new ‘long-range’ DF-27 ballistic missile, which could have a range between 5,000 and 8,000 kilometres.
- China is developing and deploying several new types of ICBM, including the DF-31AG and DF-41, the latter of which is likely to carry MIRVs.
- China is significantly increasing its arsenal of dual-capable medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21 and DF-26, although most of these are thought to serve a conventional role. A new missile carrying a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle – the DF-17 – is also being integrated into several brigades, although it is unclear at this stage whether the system will be assigned a nuclear mission.
- In addition to its fifth and sixth Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs added in 2021, China has begun construction of a quieter SSBN class, known as Type 096. This new class of submarine will eventually be deployed with a new type of SLBM, the JL-3, whose extended range would allow China to target the north-west of the continental United States and all of Europe from Chinese waters. US officials suggest that the JL-3 will be capable of carrying MIRVs.
- To replace its current bomber fleet, China is developing a new nuclear-capable bomber, the H-20, with enhanced range and stealth capabilities. Production on the new aircraft will likely begin within the next decade.
- China is developing at least one new – and possibly dual-capable – air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) for its newly-upgraded H-6N bomber. According to the US Department of Defense, this capability will ‘for the first time, provide China with a viable nuclear triad of delivery systems dispersed across land, sea, and air forces’.