China
China is rapidly expanding is nuclear arsenal. Along with all other nuclear-armed States, it boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 600 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 600 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 279.5 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 18630 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Voluntary offer agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | Partial (In force 2002) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1984) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian/Dual-Use) |
| HEU stocks | 14 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 3 Mt (2.9 Mt available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
China continued to expand its nuclear arsenal rapidly in 2025, rejecting calls to join trilateral nuclear arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia on the basis that its arsenal is considerably smaller than the US and Russian arsenals.
In the Conference on Disarmament in February 2025, China said: ‘The States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should fulfil their special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament by further substantially reducing their nuclear arsenals and creating the necessary conditions for other nuclear-weapon States to join the nuclear disarmament process.’1
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, China accused other nations of taking actions that ‘undermine mutual trust and cooperation among major countries, raise the risks of nuclear arms races and nuclear conflicts, deteriorate the international strategic security environment, and undermine global strategic balance and stability’.2
In particular, it criticized the nuclear-powered submarine agreement among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, which ‘involves the transfer of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) from nuclear-weapon States to a non-nuclear-weapon State for the first time and constitutes severe risks of nuclear proliferation’.
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, China reiterated its opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). ‘Regarding the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, China believes that the disarmament process cannot be divorced from the realities of international security, and must adhere to the principle of maintaining global security and undiminished security for all,’ it said.3
As part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, China received a recommendation in 2024 to adhere to the TPNW, which it ‘noted’. ‘China understands non-nuclear-weapon States’ desires and aspirations to take forward the nuclear disarmament process, and will continue to maintain constructive communication with non-nuclear-weapon States in this regard,’ it said.4
In February 2026, the United States accused China of having conducted a nuclear test explosion in 2020 and preparing to conduct further tests. China described the US accusation as ‘completely groundless’ and a ‘fabrication of pretexts for its own resumption of nuclear tests’. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, which operates an International Monitoring System to detect nuclear test explosions, was unable to validate the US claims.5
Recommendations
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China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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China should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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China should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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China should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).