China
China has the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. Along with all other nuclear-armed states, China boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 600 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 600 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 279.5 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 18630 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Voluntary offer agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | Partial (In force 2002) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1984) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian/Dual-Use) |
| HEU stocks | 14 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 3 Mt (2.9 Mt available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
At a ministerial-level meeting of the UN Security Council on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in March 2024, China warned that ‘the risk of a nuclear arms race and nuclear conflict is rising’, and that the ‘road to nuclear disarmament remains long and arduous’. It said that its President, Xi Jinping, ‘has repeatedly made it clear that nuclear weapons must never be used and a nuclear war never fought’. China also argued that the United States has the ‘primary responsibility to further reduce its nuclear arsenals in a drastic and substantive manner, so as to create the conditions for other nuclear-weapon States to join the nuclear disarmament process’, and it called for an end to the practice of nuclear-sharing and ‘so-called extended deterrence’. ‘China has always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons,’ it added.1
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, underscored that China is ‘the only country among the five nuclear-weapon States [under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)] to pledge no-first-use of nuclear weapons’.2 The government in July encouraged the negotiation of a treaty or political statement on 'mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons'. It presented draft elements for such a treaty.3
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in November 2024, China once again outlined its position on the TPNW. ‘As for the ultimate goal of completely and thoroughly destroying nuclear weapons, China’s position is consistent with the [TPNW],’ it said. ‘At the same time, China believes that the nuclear disarmament process cannot be separated from the reality of national security, and must be promoted step by step in accordance with the principles of “maintaining global strategic stability” and “no reduction in the security of all countries”.’ On this basis, it voted against the annual resolution on the TPNW.4
As part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, China received a recommendation in 2024 to adhere to the TPNW, which it ‘noted’. ‘China understands non-nuclear-weapon States’ desires and aspirations to take forward the nuclear disarmament process, and will continue to maintain constructive communication with non-nuclear-weapon States in this regard,’ it said.5
Recommendations
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China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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China should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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China should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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China should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).