|TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021|
|(a)||Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire||Not compatible|
|Possess or stockpile||Not compatible|
|(c)||Receive transfer or control||Compatible|
|Threaten to use||Compatible|
|(e)||Assist, encourage or induce||Compatible|
|(f)||Seek or receive assistance||Compatible|
|(g)||Allow stationing, installation, deployment||Compatible|
|IAEA safeguards and fissile material|
|Safeguards Agreement||Voluntary offer agreement|
|TPNW Art 3(2) deadline||N/A|
|Small Quantities Protocol||No|
|Fissile material production facilities||Yes|
|Highly enriched uranium stocks||14 000 kg|
|Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)||2900 kg/40 kg|
|Related treaties and regimes|
|Party to the BWC||Yes|
|Party to the CWC||Yes|
|Party to the PTBT||No|
|Ratified the CTBT||No (Signed, Annex 2 state)|
|Party to the NPT||Yes|
|Party to a NWFZ||No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)|
|Member of the CD||Yes|
In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, China, together with France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.1
- China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- China should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- China should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. China should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. China should also ratify the CTBT.
China's inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Approximately 60 warheads are assigned to China’s 20 siloed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including the DF-5A and DF-5B. The former is capable of carrying a single warhead to a range of up to 12,000 km, while the latter can carry up to five multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) to a range of up to 13,000 km.
Approximately 138 warheads are assigned to China’s mobile ICBMs, including the DF-4, DF-31/A/AG, and DF-41. These ICBMs can deliver warheads to distances between 5,500 km and 12,000 km.
Approximately 60 warheads are assigned to China’s sizable arsenal of dual-capable mobile medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21A/E and DF-26. These missiles can deliver warheads to ranges in excess of 2,100 kilometres and 4,000 kilometres, respectively.
Approximately 72 warheads are assigned to China’s six operational Jin-class Type 094/A ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each of which are capable of launching up to 12 JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Each missile can carry one warhead.
Approximately 20 gravity bombs and/or air-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads may be assigned to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force for delivery by China’s H-6 heavy bombers.