China
China has the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 410 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Stockpiled warheads | 410 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 126.5 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 8433 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1984) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ, Dual-Use) |
| HEU stocks | 14 tons (Mil) |
| Plutonium stocks | 2.9 tons (Mil) |
Latest developments
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, China said that it ‘endorses the purpose of the TPNW and understands the aspirations and demands of non-nuclear-weapon states to advance nuclear disarmament… Nevertheless, the nuclear disarmament process advocated in this resolution [on the TPNW] is divorced from the international security reality and runs counter to the principles of maintaining global strategic stability, undiminished security for all, and gradual nuclear disarmament … China cannot accept this.’1
Recommendations
- China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
- China should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- China should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer. @China should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).