Croatia
Croatia boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. Croatia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2001) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2017) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2017) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1993) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | No |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Croatia said that it remains ‘firmly committed’ to international non-proliferation agreements. However, it believes that the ‘policy of nuclear deterrence, as it exists within a framework of collective defence, has a special importance in preserving peace and preventing war’. It argued that NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements ‘provide responsible deterrence’ and ‘reassurance’.1
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Croatia asserted that ‘nuclear deterrence within NATO’s collective defence posture remains a key to strategic stability and peace’, describing it as ‘defensive, proportionate, and consistent with the UN Charter and international law’.2
In the general debate of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković, said: ‘[W]e must not falter when it comes to strengthening the international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation architecture. This is essential not just to avoid conflict, instability, or even greater tragedies, but to reduce the already heightened risks of escalations—either deliberate or as a result of a misunderstanding.’3
Recommendations
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Croatia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Croatia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Croatia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.