France
France boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Not compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | No |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | N/A |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 30 000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | 6000 kg/74 700 kg |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, France, together with China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.1
In July 2018, an information mission set up by the parliamentary foreign affairs commission concluded that France should ‘mitigate its criticism’ of the TPNW ‘and the countries that have contributed to its adoption, to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of States and their desire for more balanced global governance.’2
Paris and a dozen other French cities have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal.
Recommendations
- France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- France should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- France should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. France should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Of France’s stockpile, 280 warheads are thought to be operationally available for deployment, while the remaining 10 are in storage. A breakdown is provided below of France’s warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned.
Approximately 240 TNO warheads are assigned to France’s four ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) for delivery by a total of 48 M51.2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). France maintains a policy of continuous at-sea deterrence, meaning that at least one of its SSBNs – capable of carrying up to 16 missiles – is on deterrence patrol with nuclear weapons on alert status at all times. One or two other operational boats can deploy on relatively short notice, while the fourth boat is in refit.
An estimated 10 TNA warheads on medium-range ASMP-A air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) are assigned to the Rafale MF3 aircraft on the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier. Under normal circumstances these warheads are stored on land.
Approximately 40 TNA warheads on ASMP-A ALCMs are assigned to two squadrons of Rafale BF3 aircraft of the French Air and Space Force.
Development, production, or acquisition of nuclear-weapons systems in 2021
France is modernizing both of its nuclear delivery systems – its SLBMs and ALCMs – and has also recently begun a programme to build a new fleet of SSBNs. This programme is expected to keep nuclear weapons in the French arsenal until at least 2070. See the tabs below for France's nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021, broken down by sea-delivered and air-delivered systems.
- France’s programme to replace its current SSBNs with a new class (currently known as the SNLE 3G) was officially launched in early 2021. Construction of the first submarine is scheduled to begin in 2023.1
- France is modernizing its SLBMs and associated warheads, and has just completed the replacement of its older M45 and M51.1 SLBMs with newer M51.2 SLBMs, which are designed to carry TNO warheads.
- France is also planning to replace the newer M51.2 SLBMs with an enhanced version (the M51.3) in 2025.
- France is conducting a mid-life refurbishment programme for its medium-range air-to-surface ASMP-A cruise missiles, which will be completed in the early 2020s. A replacement missile, the ASN4G, is scheduled to replace the ASMP-A in 2035.2