France
France has announced plans to expand its nuclear arsenal. Along with all other nuclear-armed States, it boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 290 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 290 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 29 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 1993 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Voluntary offer agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | Partial (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1984) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | 29 Mt (25 Mt available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 98 Mt (6 Mt available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In March 2026, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, announced a new nuclear strategy that would see the temporary deployment of French nuclear forces on the territories of other NATO States and an expansion of the French arsenal for the first time in decades. ‘I have ordered an increase in the number of nuclear warheads in our arsenal,’ he said. ‘We will no longer communicate on the figures of our nuclear arsenal, unlike what may have been the case in the past.’1
On previous occasions, President Macron had spoken of France’s willingness to play a greater role in defending Europe with its nuclear weapons, given the increasing threat posed by Russia and increasing uncertainty over the United States’ commitment to the security of the continent. ‘[N]uclear deterrence is at the heart of France’s defence strategy,’ he said in 2024. ‘It is therefore an essential element in the defence of the European continent. It is thanks to this credible defence that we will be able to build the security guarantees expected by all our partners, throughout Europe.’2
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in May 2025, France highlighted ‘the major unilateral disarmament measures’ that it had undertaken since the 1990s, namely, ‘halving the size of our nuclear arsenal, the complete dismantlement of our ground-launched component, a one-third reduction in our sea-based and airborne components, the irreversible dismantlement of our fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons, and the dismantlement of our nuclear test site in the Pacific’.3 Under its new nuclear strategy, some of these achievements will be undone.
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, France said that it ‘refuses to consider nuclear weapons as battlefield weapons; our deterrent will remain strictly defensive’.4
In 2024, France reiterated its opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), emphasizing that it ‘is neither complementary nor compatible with the NPT, and that it is not an effective measure within the meaning of its Article VI’. ‘Nuclear disarmament, to be realistic and credible, cannot ignore the strategic context in which we operate,’ it said.5
Recommendations
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France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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France should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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France should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.