France
France has the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal. Along with all other nuclear-armed states, France boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 290 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 290 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 29 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 1993 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Voluntary offer agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | Partial (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1984) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | 29 Mt (25 Mt available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 98 Mt (6 Mt available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In April 2024, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, indicated France’s willingness to play a greater role in defending Europe with its nuclear weapons, amid increasing uncertainty over the United States’ commitment to do so. ‘[N]uclear deterrence is at the heart of France’s defence strategy,’ he said. ‘It is therefore an essential element in the defence of the European continent. It is thanks to this credible defence that we will be able to build the security guarantees expected by all our partners, throughout Europe.’ He highlighted, in particular, the nuclear threat posed by Russia.1
At a ministerial-level meeting of the UN Security Council on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in March 2024, France expressed regret at the ‘unprecedented weakening of arms control and non-proliferation instruments’, noting ‘Russia’s irresponsible rhetoric in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine’. ‘France is determined to work to achieve the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all,’ it said, adding that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 'remains the essential instrument for that purpose.’2
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in November 2024, France, the United Kingdom and the United States reiterated their opposition to the TPNW. ‘Our three countries do not consider the TPNW to be an effective disarmament measure,’ they said in a joint statement. ‘We stress that the TPNW does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any arguments that the TPNW reflects or in any way contributes to the development of customary international law.’3 In a national statement at the same meeting, France said that it ‘considers that the TPNW is neither complementary nor compatible with the NPT, and that it is not an effective measure within the meaning of its Article VI. Nuclear disarmament, to be realistic and credible, cannot ignore the strategic context in which we operate.’4
Recommendations
-
France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
-
France should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
-
France should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.