|TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021|
|(a)||Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire||Not compatible|
|Possess or stockpile||Not compatible|
|(c)||Receive transfer or control||Compatible|
|Threaten to use||Compatible|
|(e)||Assist, encourage or induce||Not compatible|
|(f)||Seek or receive assistance||Not compatible|
|(g)||Allow stationing, installation, deployment||Compatible|
|IAEA safeguards and fissile material|
|Safeguards Agreement||Voluntary offer agreement|
|TPNW Art 3(2) deadline||N/A|
|Small Quantities Protocol||Yes (Modified)|
|Fissile material production facilities||Yes|
|Highly enriched uranium stocks||30 000 kg|
|Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)||6000 kg/74 700 kg|
|Related treaties and regimes|
|Party to the BWC||Yes|
|Party to the CWC||Yes|
|Party to the PTBT||No|
|Ratified the CTBT||Yes (Annex 2 state)|
|Party to the NPT||Yes|
|Party to a NWFZ||No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)|
|Member of the CD||Yes|
In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, France, together with China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.1
In July 2018, an information mission set up by the parliamentary foreign affairs commission concluded that France should ‘mitigate its criticism’ of the TPNW ‘and the countries that have contributed to its adoption, to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of States and their desire for more balanced global governance.’2
Paris and a dozen other French cities have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal.
- France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- France should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- France should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. France should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Approximately 240 TNO warheads are assigned to France’s four ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) for delivery by a total of 48 M51.2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). France maintains a policy of continuous at-sea deterrence, meaning that at least one of its SSBNs – capable of carrying up to 16 missiles – is on deterrence patrol with nuclear weapons on alert status at all times. One or two other operational boats can deploy on relatively short notice, while the fourth boat is in refit.
An estimated 10 TNA warheads on medium-range ASMP-A air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) are assigned to the Rafale MF3 aircraft on the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier. Under normal circumstances these warheads are stored on land.
Approximately 40 TNA warheads on ASMP-A ALCMs are assigned to two squadrons of Rafale BF3 aircraft of the French Air and Space Force.