France
France has the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2023, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 290 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 290 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 29 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 1993 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Non-compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1984) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ) |
| HEU stocks | 29 MT (incl 24 MT available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 4.9 tons (Mil)/79.4 tons (Civ) |
Latest developments
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, France reiterated its opposition to the TPNW in a joint statement with the United States and the United Kingdom: ‘Our three countries have made clear many times why we do not view the [TPNW] as an effective disarmament measure. We stress that this Treaty does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW reflects, or in any way contributes to, the development of customary international law.’1
In September 2023, the Assembly of French Polynesia (Ma’ohi Nui), an overseas collectivity of France, adopted a resolution urging France to observe the second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP) in November and December 2023 and to ‘work towards France’s adherence to this new international standard’.2 France opted not to attend the meeting. French Polynesia was the site of 193 nuclear test explosions between 1966 and 1996, at Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls.
In November 2023, 69 French parliamentarians signed an open letter to the French President, Emmanuel Macron, urging him to engage with the TPNW. ‘Faced with a global situation where the nuclear risk is increasing, it is necessary, Mr President, to rise to the height of the risk,’ they wrote. ‘France's participation as an observer State in the second meeting of the TPNW is essential to the multilateralism that you advocate. It is urgent to restore France to its progressive role. By not making this diplomatic gesture, you are harming it.’3
Recommendations
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France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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France should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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France should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.