Lithuania
Lithuania boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1991) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2000) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2008) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2008) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1998) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1998) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No (Rescinded 2022) |
Latest developments
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, the three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—argued in a joint statement that NATO’s ‘nuclear deterrence arrangements [are] a necessity and a stabilizing factor in European and global security, particularly in the context of Russia’s dangerous and irresponsible behaviour and nuclear rhetoric’.1
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Lithuania said: ‘For us, NATO’s nuclear deterrence is a necessity—a vital safeguard against aggression. NATO’s posture has always been fully compliant with the NPT and contributes to stability. Let us not be misled: the real threats to the NPT come from those who engage in irresponsible rhetoric, expand arsenals opaquely, and develop nuclear weapons and missile programmes in violation of international law—not from NATO, whose doctrines remain transparent and consistent for decades.’2
It asserted that there is ‘a clear distinction between States that take legitimate actions fully aligned with the NPT such as those supporting non-proliferation and strategic stability—like NATO allies’ efforts—and those States that issue unfounded accusations to deflect attention from their illegal wars of aggression and opaque military, including nuclear, build-up’.3
Responding to a recommendation in 2022 to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process, Lithuania said that its ‘position of non-acceptance of the [TPNW] has not changed and will remain unchanged for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance’.4
Recommendations
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Lithuania should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Lithuania should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Lithuania should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.