Malaysia
In a statement marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2023, Malaysia said that its ‘firm position on nuclear disarmament’ is reflected in its support for the TPNW, which ‘complements the NPT and places the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons at the forefront’. It further emphasised the TPNW’s important role ‘in strengthening … the global norm against nuclear weapons’.[1]
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) | Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compliant |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | 14 (36%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 1996, Bangkok) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2008) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1991) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 2000) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (29 Feb 1972) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No (Rescinded 2018) |
| Additional Protocol | No (Signed 2005) |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
Malaysia participated in the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP) in November and December 2023. It said that ‘The insistence of a select group of states in maintaining nuclear arsenals, purportedly for their own self-defence, jeopardises peace, security and sustainable development for the global community as a whole, … The TPNW encapsulates the political will of the international community to free the world from the sword of Damocles that nuclear weapons represent … [It] provides a clear path to this goal, underpinned by principle and practicality.’ Malaysia also said that it was ‘pleased with the steady advancements of this landmark instrument’. 2
As a co-chair, together with South Africa, of an informal working group on universalisation of the TPNW between the First and Second meetings of States parties, it ‘facilitated initiatives to increase the Treaty’s membership and consolidate its overarching narrative’. The two co-chairs reported on their activities to the 2MSP.3
Leading up to the third Meeting of States Parties in 2025, Malaysia will co-chair, together with New Zealand, an informal working group on implementation of article 4, in particular work related to the future designation of a competent international authority or authorities that would negotiate and verify the elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes.
Malaysia was one of the co-sponsors for the 2023 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.4
Recommendations
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Malaysia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
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Malaysia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
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Malaysia should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.