Norway
Norway boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1969) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1972) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2000) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes (observer) |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 1.5 (25%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | 2 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
Norway opted not to attend the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in March 2025 as an observer, having attended 1MSP in 2022 and 2MSP in 2023.
In 2024, the Prime Minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, said that his country supports the goal of the TPNW, ‘but due to the obligations inherent in our membership in the NATO alliance, it is not appropriate to sign it now’. He also noted that Norway’s initiative in 2013 to convene the first-ever intergovernmental conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had paved the way to the TPNW’s adoption.1
The Norwegian Labour Party, which is currently in government, has offered qualified support for the TPNW, declaring in 2021 that ‘it should be a goal for Norway and other NATO countries to sign the nuclear ban treaty’, while emphasizing the political challenges in doing so.2
In March 2026, Norway expressed an openness to nuclear-weapon-related cooperation with France, while reaffirming its long-standing position against the hosting of nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime.3
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Norway argued, in response to criticisms of ‘extended nuclear deterrence’, that NATO’s ‘nuclear-sharing arrangements precede the NPT and are in line with the Treaty. This is also one of the reasons why non-proliferation has been so successful.’4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Norway said: ‘It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons never be used again. The humanitarian and environmental consequences would be catastrophic. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Our common goal is clear: the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.’5
As part of its Universal Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council in 2025, Norway ‘noted’ a recommendation to consider ratifying the TPNW.6
At the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) to the TPNW in 2023, Norway emphasized that ‘[t]his is not a step towards signing nor ratifying the TPNW, which would be incompatible with our NATO obligations’. It reiterated that it ‘stands fully behind NATO’s nuclear deterrence and posture, including the established nuclear-sharing arrangements’.7
Recommendations
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Norway should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Norway should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Norway should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.