Norway
Norway started the initiative on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which resulted in a majority of states negotiating and adopting the TPNW. But Norway boycotted the negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Norway may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
Latest developments and background
In February 2018, the Norwegian Parliament asked the Government to do an inquiry into the consequences of joining the TPNW. In the resulting report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that because of weaknesses in the TPNW's nuclear disarmament verification arrangements and the fact that Norway "cannot join the TPNW without coming into conflict with our membership in NATO" the government deems that Norway should not join the TPNW (bit.ly/2pmTcTH). Norway’s capital Oslo and 15 other Norwegian cities have endorsed ICAN's Cities Appeal.
Recommendations
- Norway should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Norway should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to it. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meeting of states parties as an observer, and work with its parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
| Signed |
|---|
| No |
| Adhered |
|---|
| No |
| Compliance with article 1(1) of the TPNW | ||
|---|---|---|
| Art 1(1)(a) | The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring | Compliant |
| The prohibition on testing | Compliant | |
| The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling | Compliant | |
| Art 1(1)(b) | The prohibition on transferring | Compliant |
| Art 1(1)(c) | The prohibition on receiving transfer or control | Compliant |
| Art 1(1)(d) | The prohibition on using | Compliant |
| The prohibition on threatening to use | Compliant | |
| Art 1(1)(e) | The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities | Compliant |
| The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities | Not compliant | |
| Art 1(1)(f) | The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities | Compliant |
| Art 1(1)(g) | The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment | Compliant |
| TPNW process | |
|---|---|
| Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) | No (N/A) |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | <0.01 t (0 weapon equivalents) |
| Civilian plutonium stocks | |
| Fissile material production | No |
| Related treaties and mechanisms | |
|---|---|
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
| IAEA CSA in force | Yes |
| IAEA AP in force | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the BWC | Yes |