Norway
Norway boycotted the negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022. Norway may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | 2 (50%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1969) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (1 Mar 1972) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | 1–10 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
When Norway observed the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP) in November and December 2023 it emphasised that ‘[t]his is not a step towards signing nor ratifying the TPNW, which would be incompatible with our NATO obligations’. It reiterated that it ‘stands fully behind NATO’s nuclear deterrence and posture, including the established nuclear-sharing arrangements’. Norway also stated: ‘We seek a constructive dialogue between all States to advance nuclear disarmament and counter polarisation in this area, even though we may have chosen different paths and tools to move towards zero. … ‘We need to update our insights and are seeking to establish a fact-based understanding of the effects of a nuclear detonation. This includes both immediate and long-term effects on human health, critical infrastructure, the environment, soil and air.’1
In 2013, Norway organised the first-ever intergovernmental conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Together with subsequent conferences in Nayarit and Vienna, it was seen as an important step towards the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017.2
In June 2022, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, the most influential umbrella organisation of labour unions in Norway, resolved to work for Norway’s signature and ratification of the TPNW and for the integration of the TPNW into NATO’s disarmament strategy.3
Recommendations
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Norway should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Norway should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Norway should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.