Norway
Norway boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. Norway may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1969) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1972) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2000) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes (observer) |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 1.5 (25%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | 2 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In December 2024, the Prime Minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, said at a press conference that his country supports the goal of the TPNW, ‘but due to the obligations inherent in our membership in the NATO alliance, it is not appropriate to sign it now’. He also noted that Norway’s initiative in 2013 to convene the first-ever intergovernmental conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had paved the way to the TPNW’s adoption.1
In the same week, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Espen Barth Eide, informed the United Nations’ top disarmament official: ‘There is no contradiction between fulfilling our obligations as a NATO member State and seriously pursuing nuclear disarmament.’2
The ministers’ remarks coincided with the awarding of the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo to the Japanese organisation Nihon Hidankyo, whose members are survivors of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the award ceremony, the Chair of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Jørgen Watne Frydnes, implored more countries to ratify the TPNW and said that ‘Political action is crucial.’3
The Norwegian Labour Party, which is currently in government, has offered qualified support for the TPNW, declaring in 2021 that ‘it should be a goal for Norway and other NATO countries to sign the nuclear ban treaty’, while emphasising the political challenges in doing so.4
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee session in July 2024, Norway argued that NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements – which involve the stationing of US nuclear weapons on the territories of Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye – ‘are in full compliance with the NPT’.5
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Norway said that it remains committed to working for a world free of nuclear weapons, and ‘it is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons never be used again’.6
When it observed the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) to the TPNW in 2023, Norway emphasised that ‘[t]his is not a step towards signing nor ratifying the TPNW, which would be incompatible with our NATO obligations’. It reiterated that it ‘stands fully behind NATO’s nuclear deterrence and posture, including the established nuclear-sharing arrangements’.7
As part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process, Norway received a recommendation in 2024 to ‘[c]onsider signing and ratifying’ the TPNW.8 It is expected to respond to this recommendation in 2025.
Recommendations
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Norway should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Norway should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Norway should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.