|TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021|
|(a)||Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire||Not compatible|
|Possess or stockpile||Not compatible|
|(c)||Receive transfer or control||Compatible|
|Threaten to use||Compatible|
|(e)||Assist, encourage or induce||Compatible|
|(f)||Seek or receive assistance||Compatible|
|(g)||Allow stationing, installation, deployment||Compatible|
|IAEA safeguards and fissile material|
|Safeguards Agreement||Item-specific agreement|
|TPNW Art 3(2) deadline||N/A|
|Small Quantities Protocol||No|
|Fissile material production facilities||Yes (Military)|
|Highly enriched uranium stocks||4 tons (m)|
|Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)||0.46 tons/No|
|Related treaties and regimes|
|Party to the BWC||Yes|
|Party to the CWC||Yes|
|Party to the PTBT||Yes|
|Ratified the CTBT||No (Annex 2 state)|
|Party to the NPT||No|
|Party to a NWFZ||No|
|Member of the CD||Yes|
In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Pakistan explained that it voted against the TPNW resolution because 'progress on nuclear disarmament and arms control can't be divorced from security challenges'.1
- Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Pakistan should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Pakistan should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and conclude and bring into force and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It should also sign and ratify the CTBT.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Approximately 106 warheads are assigned to Pakistan’s operational arsenal of mobile landbased ballistic missiles, including the short-range Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, and NASR, and the medium-range Ghauri and Shaheen-II.
Approximately 12 warheads are assigned to Pakistan’s family of Babur ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which can be launched by transporter-erector-launchers.
Approximately 36 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are thought to be assigned to Pakistan’s Mirage fighter-bomber aircraft.