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Nuclear-armed state

Pakistan boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Not compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Not compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards Agreement Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol No
Fissile material production facilities Yes (Military)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 4 tons (m)
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) 0.46 tons/No
Related treaties and regimes
Party to the BWC Yes
Party to the CWC Yes
Party to the PTBT Yes
Ratified the CTBT No (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT No
Party to a NWFZ No
Member of the CD Yes

Latest developments

In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Pakistan explained that it voted against the TPNW resolution because 'progress on nuclear disarmament and arms control can't be divorced from security challenges'.1


  • Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
  • Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
  • Pakistan should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Pakistan should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and conclude and bring into force and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022

Total inventory of warheads
Retired warheads
Usable stockpile of warheads
Total yield of usable stockpile
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents
Pakistan mobile

Approximately 106 warheads are assigned to Pakistan’s operational arsenal of mobile landbased ballistic missiles, including the short-range Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, and NASR, and the medium-range Ghauri and Shaheen-II.

Approximately 12 warheads are assigned to Pakistan’s family of Babur ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which can be launched by transporter-erector-launchers.

Pakistan fly

Approximately 36 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are thought to be assigned to Pakistan’s Mirage fighter-bomber aircraft.

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