Pakistan
Pakistan has the world's sixth largest nuclear arsenal, and is believed to be increasing it. Along with all other nuclear-armed states, Pakistan boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 170 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 170 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 3.4 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 226 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Non-compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1974) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | N/A |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Military) |
| HEU stocks | 5 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 0.54 Mt (all available for weapons) |
Latest developments
At a high-level UN event to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2024, Pakistan sought to justify its decision in the 1990s to develop and test nuclear weapons. ‘Pakistan was compelled to follow suit in order to restore strategic stability and deter the aggression with which Pakistan was threatened immediately after [India’s] nuclear weapons explosion in May 1998,’ it said.1
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Pakistan said that it ‘remains committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world that is achieved in a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory manner’, and reiterated its call ‘for negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention without further delay’. It criticised the ‘largest nuclear-weapon States’ for ‘disregarding their nuclear disarmament obligations’ and continuing to modernise their arsenals. It also rejected the proposal for the negotiation of a treaty cutting off the future production of fissile material ‘without including existing stocks in its scope’. Such a treaty ‘would perpetuate asymmetries’ and ‘have no added value for nuclear disarmament’, it argued.2
At the same meeting, Pakistan reiterated its objections to the TPNW. ‘Pakistan did not take part in the negotiations of the TPNW due to its various conspicuous procedural and substantive shortcomings,’ it said. ‘It reduces the discourse only to humanitarian dimensions while ignoring the legitimate security concerns of States. The Treaty was also negotiated outside the established machinery of disarmament. Pakistan does not therefore consider itself bound by any of the obligations arising from this Treaty.’3
In an interview in December 2024, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Munir Akram, said that his country could not support the TPNW so long as India maintained a nuclear arsenal. ‘While we need our nuclear capability to prevent aggression, we cannot support the ban treaty,’ he said.4
Recommendations
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Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Pakistan should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Pakistan should adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).