Pakistan
Pakistan has the world's sixth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2023, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 170 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 170 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 3.4 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 226 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1974) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Mil) |
| HEU stocks | m MT available for weapons |
| Plutonium stocks | 0.46 tons (Mil) |
Latest developments
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Pakistan criticised ‘the largest nuclear States’, which have amassed several tonnes of fissile material and thousands of nuclear weapons, for failing ‘to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments’. It rejected renewed calls by some states for the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. ‘We see the messianic zeal to insist on cost-free proposals such as quantitative capping of fissile material as “the next logical step”, while resisting inclusion of thousands of tonnes of fissile material stocks in the scope of international treaty,’ it said. ‘Time to pursue this fundamentally flawed approach has long passed.’1
In the First Committee, Pakistan also explained its opposition to the TPNW, noting that it did not take part in the Treaty’s negotiation in 2017 ‘due to its various conspicuous procedural and substantive shortcomings’. ‘It reduces the discourse only to humanitarian dimensions while ignoring the legitimate security concerns of the States. ... The Treaty was also negotiated outside the established machinery of disarmament. Pakistan therefore does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations arising from this Treaty.,’ it said.2
Recommendations
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Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Pakistan should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Pakistan should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).