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Opposed

Pakistan

Nuclear-armed state

Pakistan has the world's sixth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2023, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

TPNW Status

SIGNATURE
DEPOSIT WITH UNSG
ENTRY INTO FORCE
DECLARATION
Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024
Total inventory of warheads 170
Retired warheads 0
Warheads available for use 170
Estimated yield (MT) 3.4
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents 226
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Non-compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Non-compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted no (2023)
Participated in 2MSP (2023) No
2MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Abstained
Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No
Party to the NPT No
Ratified the CTBT No (Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1974)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1997)
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol No
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants Yes (Mil)
HEU stocks m MT available for weapons
Plutonium stocks 0.46 tons (Mil)

Latest developments

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Pakistan criticised ‘the largest nuclear States’, which have amassed several tonnes of fissile material and thousands of nuclear weapons, for failing ‘to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments’. It rejected renewed calls by some states for the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. ‘We see the messianic zeal to insist on cost-free proposals such as quantitative capping of fissile material as “the next logical step”, while resisting inclusion of thousands of tonnes of fissile material stocks in the scope of international treaty,’ it said. ‘Time to pursue this fundamentally flawed approach has long passed.’1

In the First Committee, Pakistan also explained its opposition to the TPNW, noting that it did not take part in the Treaty’s negotiation in 2017 ‘due to its various conspicuous procedural and substantive shortcomings’. ‘It reduces the discourse only to humanitarian dimensions while ignoring the legitimate security concerns of the States. ... The Treaty was also negotiated outside the established machinery of disarmament. Pakistan therefore does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations arising from this Treaty.,’ it said.2

Recommendations

  • Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.

  • Pakistan should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

  • Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

  • Pakistan should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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