Pakistan
Pakistan boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | No |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | N/A |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes (Military) |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 4 tons (m) |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | 0.46 tons/No |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
In the First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly, Pakistan explained that it voted against the TPNW resolution because 'progress on nuclear disarmament and arms control can't be divorced from security challenges'.1
Recommendations
- Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Pakistan should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Pakistan should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and conclude and bring into force and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It should also sign and ratify the CTBT.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Of Pakistan’s stockpile, approximately 154 warheads are thought to be assigned to operational missiles and aircraft, but under normal circumstances are kept in central storage. A breakdown is provided below of these warheads by type of delivery vehicle. The remaining 11 or so warheads are thought to have been produced to eventually arm Pakistan’s newer ballistic and cruise missile systems, which are nearing deployment.
Approximately 106 warheads are assigned to Pakistan’s operational arsenal of mobile landbased ballistic missiles, including the short-range Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, and NASR, and the medium-range Ghauri and Shaheen-II.
Approximately 12 warheads are assigned to Pakistan’s family of Babur ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which can be launched by transporter-erector-launchers.
Approximately 36 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are thought to be assigned to Pakistan’s Mirage fighter-bomber aircraft.
Development, production, or acquisition of nuclear-weapons systems in 2021
Pakistan’s nuclear modernization programme places particular emphasis on developing several short-range, tactical nuclear-capable weapon systems, which, according to Pakistan, are specifically designed to deter India from launching large-scale conventional strikes or incursions against Pakistani territory. See the tabs below for Pakistan's nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021, broken down by land-delivered, sea-delivered, and air-delivered systems.
- Pakistan is developing a new medium-range, solid-fuelled ballistic missile known as Ababeel, which might be capable of carrying multiple warheads – possibly even multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) – to a distance of up to 2,200 kilometres.
- In recent years, Pakistan has improved its ability to conduct salvo- and night-launches of its dual-capable ballistic missiles, including the Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, and NASR short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and the Ghauri and Shaheen-II medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).
- Pakistan is developing a new two-stage, solid-fuelled MRBM, known as the Shaheen-III, which would be capable of delivering either a single nuclear or conventional warhead to a range of up to 2,750 kilometres.
- In December 2021, Pakistan tested an extended-range version of its dual-capable Babur GLCM. This was the system’s first successful test since a failure in 2020.
- Pakistan is developing its Babur-3 dual-capable sea-launched cruise missile. Once it becomes operational, they will most likely be deployed on existing Agosta-class attack submarines or the future Hangor-class attack submarines.
- Pakistan is developing and testing a dual-capable Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) to reach targets at a distance of up to 350 kilometres, and a follow-on Ra’ad II system to reach targets up to 600 kilometres.