Pakistan
Pakistan has the world's sixth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 170 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Stockpiled warheads | 170 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 3.4 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 226 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1974) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Mil) |
| HEU stocks | 4 tons (Mil) |
| Plutonium stocks | 0.46 tons (Mil) |
Latest developments
Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Pakistan warned that the risk of nuclear war is higher today than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis. ‘The largest nuclear powers have failed to fulfil their disarmament obligations,’ it said.1
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Pakistan opined that the TPNW ‘fails to take on board our legitimate security concerns’, adding that it ‘does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations arising from this Treaty’ and asserting that the Treaty ‘neither forms a part of nor contributes to the development of customary international law in any manner’.2
Pakistan also said that it ‘remains firmly committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, achieved in a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory manner’, and called for the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention.3
Recommendations
- Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
- Pakistan should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer. @Pakistan should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).