Pakistan
Pakistan is believed to be expanding its nuclear arsenal. Along with all other nuclear-armed States, it boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 170 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 170 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 3.4 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 226 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | No | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Item-specific agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | No | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1974) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Military) |
| HEU stocks | 5 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 0.54 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
Nuclear-armed neighbours Pakistan and India waged a brief war in May 2025, with each side firing ballistic missiles at the other. Scores of people, including civilians, were killed.
In the general debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, argued that India’s recent aggression ‘serves as a stark reminder of the dangerous flashpoint between two nuclear-armed rivals—the Jammu and Kashmir dispute’.1
In September 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, which commits each party to treat an attack on the other as an attack on both. The full text of the agreement has not been made publicly available. When asked if it includes the potential use of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, a Saudi official responded: ‘This is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means.’2
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Pakistan reiterated its opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). ‘Pakistan did not take part in the negotiations of the TPNW due to its various conspicuous procedural and substantive shortcomings. It reduces the discourse only to humanitarian dimensions while ignoring the legitimate security concerns of States,’ it argued.3
‘The Treaty was also negotiated outside the established machinery of disarmament. Pakistan, therefore, does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations arising from this Treaty. We reiterate our view that this Treaty neither forms a part of nor contributes to the development of customary international law in any manner.’
Recommendations
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Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Pakistan should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Pakistan should adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).