Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea (South Korea) boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. South Korea may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant. In recent years, several senior government officials, including the President, have openly discussed the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.1
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1975) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1987) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
At a ministerial-level meeting of the UN Security Council on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in March 2024, South Korea expressed regret that the ‘hard-fought and hard-won architecture’ for nuclear non-proliferation ‘is now being challenged more than ever before’, and described North Korea as ‘the world’s pre-eminent proliferator’.2
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, Cho Tae-yul, said that ‘North Korea continues to pose threats to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond with its ongoing development of nuclear and missile capabilities’. Moreover, it condemned Russia for its military cooperation with North Korea.3
In 2023, the South Korean President, Yoon Suk Yeol, said that, if the threat posed by North Korea increases, his country might consider developing its own nuclear weapons or asking the US to redeploy such weapons to the Korean Peninsula. ‘It’s possible that the problem gets worse and our country will introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own,’ he said. ‘If that’s the case, we can have our own nuclear weapons pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities.’4
The US withdrew all of its nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991. As a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), South Korea is legally barred from ever manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.
In 2023, South Korea and the United States issued the Washington Declaration, deepening cooperation between the two countries on nuclear-weapons planning in the region. The United States stated that its ‘commitment to extend deterrence to [South Korea] is backed by the full range of US capabilities, including nuclear’.5
Recommendations
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South Korea should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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South Korea should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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South Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.