Russian Federation
Russia has the world's largest nuclear arsenal. In 2023, Russia continued to use the risk of escalation to use of nuclear weapons to prevent NATO involvement in the war in Ukraine. It again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament, and remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 5580 | |
| Retired warheads | 1200 | |
| Warheads available for use | 4380 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 957.4 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 63825 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Ratification withdrawn 2023, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ) |
| HEU stocks | 680 MT (incl 672 MT available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 128.8 tons (Mil)/63.3 tons (Civ) |
Latest developments
In February 2023, Russia formally suspended its participation in New START, the US-Russian nuclear arms control treaty that limited the number of deployed strategic weapons and delivery vehicles. In November 2023, Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
In March 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus, prompting a rebuke from his US counterpart, Joe Biden. But Russia dismissed the criticism, arguing that ‘[t]he measures we undertake are fully consistent with our international legal obligations’ and noting that, for decades, the United States has deployed its nuclear weapons on the territories of other NATO members.2 According to the Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, the shipments of Russian nuclear weapons were completed in October 2023, but it has not been confirmed that nuclear warheads have been deployed.3
In a media interview in August 2023, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, said: ‘The possession of nuclear arms is today the only possible response to some of the significant external threats to the security of our country.’ In order to avoid a situation of ‘direct armed confrontation’ between ‘nuclear powers’, Russia must remind the United States and its NATO allies ‘about the existence of high military and political risks and send sobering signals’, he said.4
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2023, Foreign Minister Lavrov criticised NATO members for having recently concluded a series of joint exercises ‘including scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons on the territory of the Russian Federation’. ‘The declared task of inflicting on Russia the “strategic defeat” has finally blinded the eyes of irresponsible politicians obsessed with their own impunity and who have lost their elementary sense of self-preservation,’ he said.5
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Russia reiterated its opposition to the TPNW, arguing that it ‘worsens confrontation among States and further escalates tensions around the NPT, thereby making the nuclear non-proliferation regime all the less resilient’. ‘We believe that advancement of the notion of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons leads to equivocation fallacy, when the main goal of nuclear disarmament is not reinforcing international peace and security, but rather the achievement of certain abstract humanitarian standards,’ it said.6
Recommendations
-
Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
-
Russia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
-
Russia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
-
Russia should reverse its withdrawal of its ratification of the CTBT.