Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia voted in favour of adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at the UN negotiating conference in 2017, but since 2021 it has abstained from voting on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty. In 2023, the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, expressed concern about ‘any country getting a nuclear weapon’, adding that if Iran were to get one ‘we will have to get one’.1 He and other Saudi officials have made similar remarks in the past, while emphasizing that they have no plans at present to develop nuclear weapons.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1988) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2009) | |
| AP with the IAEA | No | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1972) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Of concern |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Abstained (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 2 (0%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No (Rescinded 2024) |
Latest developments
Saudi Arabia attended the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in March 2025 as an observer.
In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, which commits each party to treat an attack on the other as an attack on both. The text of the agreement has not been made publicly available. When asked if it includes the potential use of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, a Saudi official said: ‘This is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means.’2
On 31 December 2024, Saudi Arabia rescinded its Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), allowing for implementation of a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and more stringent monitoring of its nuclear facilities. When Saudi Arabia submitted its request to rescind the SQP in July 2024, it said that it ‘continues to stand by its legally binding international commitments related to its national nuclear energy project’.3
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Saudi Arabia said that ‘the full implementation of the provisions of this Treaty and the achievement of its universality will lead to the realization of its foundations globally, effectively contributing to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons’.4
In the general debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, emphasized the importance of ‘preventing a nuclear arms race in our region’ and the ‘necessity of adhering to the non-proliferation regime’. He also affirmed ‘that the diplomatic path is the way to address the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme’.5
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Saudi Arabia underscored that ‘security and stability will not be achieved through the possession of deadly weapons or the development of deterrent systems’.6
Recommendations
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Saudi Arabia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Saudi Arabia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA.
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Saudi Arabia should adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).