Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has explicitly threatened to swiftly acquire nuclear weapons should Iran do so. Thus, if Saudi Arabia were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the Treaty's prohibition on development of nuclear weapons, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor has therefore listed Saudi Arabia as a state of concern.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Of concern |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted yes |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | Yes |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | 25% |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | Voted yes |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Original) |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Fissile material production facilities | No |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | No/No |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Member of the CD | No |
Latest developments
Saudi Arabia possesses a sizable stockpile of mineable uranium ore; has announced an intention to build several nuclear reactors across the country; and possesses several types of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. While these factors do not necessarily indicate the country’s interest in developing nuclear weapons at this time, Saudi Arabia’s Small Quantities Protocol exempts the country from IAEA monitoring and inspections obligations, which increases ambiguity around the country’s nuclear intentions and capabilities.
Saudi Arabia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. After having voted in favour of the previous annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, Saudi Arabia abstained on the vote in 2021.
Recommendations
- Saudi Arabia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Saudi Arabia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and rescind its Small Quantities Protocol. Saudi Arabia should also sign and ratify the CTBT.