Spain
Spain boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. Spain may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1987) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1989) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1979) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | Stored abroad |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In August 2024, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, José Manuel Albares, outlined his country’s position on the TPNW in a letter to the Spanish civil society coalition Alianza por el Desarme Nuclear. ‘We fully share with the States parties to the [TPNW] the goal of a world without nuclear weapons,’ he wrote. ‘However, the TPNW risks fragmenting the community built up over decades around the NPT, has no system for verifying compliance, making it difficult to monitor its implementation, and was concluded without the participation of any of the nuclear-weapon States, so it is not likely to achieve its objectives.’1 He also stated that his government was not considering observing the Third Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in March 2025.
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee session in July 2024, Spain said that it ‘is closely following the debate on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and considers it necessary to continue advancing discussions on this issue’.2 It also reiterated its view that NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements – which involve the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye – are lawful.3
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Spain said that ‘[m]aintaining and strengthening the architecture of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime is our immediate objective and a priority shared with many States’.4
The Sumar political party, which is the minor partner in Spain’s Socialist-led coalition government, indicated its support for the TPNW ahead of the general election in 2023, pledging: ‘We will lead international efforts to abolish nuclear weapons, promoting the ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.’5
Recommendations
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Spain should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Spain should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Spain should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.