Türkiye
Türkiye boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to ensure the removal of the US nuclear weapons it hosts at Incirlik Air Base and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1980) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2000, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1981) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2001) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1974) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
Türkiye participated in NATO’s annual nuclear strike exercise, known as Steadfast Noon, in October 2025. Türkiye maintains F-16 dual-capable aircraft that could be used to deliver US nuclear weapons in a conflict.1
In a television interview in June 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, Hakan Fidan, criticized the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for being structurally unfair, questioning why his country had signed it in the first place. ‘How did those who signed this ever agree to it?’ he asked. ‘It’s essentially a document where non-nuclear States accept in perpetuity the military superiority of nuclear-armed nations.’2
Despite his criticisms, at the NPT Preparatory Committee in April 2025, Türkiye said that it ‘views the NPT as the bedrock of the global non-proliferation regime and a vital pillar for advancing nuclear disarmament’. ‘We remain fully dedicated to the Treaty’s goals and provisions, across its three pillars, as well as to its universalization and further reinforcement,’ it said.3
Türkiye emphasized that there ‘is no credible or viable alternative to the [NPT]’, while acknowledging that ‘achieving a world without nuclear weapons will be a long and difficult path’. ‘In the interim, even if not a substitute for disarmament, efforts towards nuclear risk reduction and further transparency measures are essential,’ it added.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Türkiye said that nuclear disarmament ‘demands realism, sustained engagement, and the active participation of nuclear-weapon States’. ‘The path towards a world without nuclear weapons is not easy, and even with the strongest political will of all States, could take years to achieve,’ it stressed.5
In the Conference on Disarmament in February 2025, Türkiye warned that the world ‘cannot afford the normalization of nuclear rhetoric’, and the ‘escalating risk of nuclear proliferation is a pressing concern that challenges international stability’.6
As part of its Universal Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council in 2025, Türkiye ‘noted’ a recommendation to consider ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and observing its Meetings of States Parties.7
A nationwide survey of 2,000 Turkish citizens conducted in July 2025 showed strong public support for the development of nuclear weapons by Türkiye in response to heightened regional tensions, with 71 per cent of respondents saying that Türkiye should start developing such weapons and only 18 per cent opposed.8
Recommendations
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Türkiye should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Türkiye should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Türkiye should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.