Ukraine
Ukraine boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty since 2023. From 2018 to 2022, it abstained from voting on the resolutions. It maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without the need for a change in conduct.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1994) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2001, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1998) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2006) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1998) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Did not vote |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in May 2025, Ukraine recalled its decision in 1994 ‘to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State’. ‘We placed all our nuclear facilities under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] comprehensive safeguards. In return, we received solemn security assurances,’ it said.1
Those assurances, however, ‘have been fundamentally breached’ by Russia with its occupation of Crimea in 2014 and ‘full-scale war of aggression’ in 2022, which has been accompanied by ‘explicit nuclear threats’. It urged all NPT States Parties to ‘condemn any threats of nuclear weapons use’.
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Ukraine criticized Russia for revoking its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), for announcing the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus, and for suspending its participation in New START. ‘Such actions pose a major threat to global disarmament efforts,’ Ukraine said, noting that ‘nuclear arsenals are increasingly being used as instruments of coercion and intimidation against neighbouring States that do not possess nuclear weapons’.2
In the Conference on Disarmament in February 2025, Ukraine described disarmament as ‘not merely the absence of arms—it is also the presence of security’. ‘No nation will relinquish its means of defence without first securing its right to exist in safety and sovereignty,’ it said.3
Following accusations in February 2026 by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service that the United Kingdom and France were working to supply Ukraine with nuclear weapons, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said that he would accept such weapons ‘with pleasure’. He emphasized, however, that no offer of the kind had been made. ‘It’s not happening,’ he said.4
In 2024, President Zelenskyy said that, given Russia’s continued aggression, Ukraine was left with two options: ‘Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons—and then it will be a defence for us—or Ukraine will be in NATO.’5 He later stressed that Ukraine had no intention of developing nuclear weapons.6
Recommendations
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Ukraine should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.