Undecided
Armenia
Umbrella state (bilateral arrangement with Russia)
Armenia is deemed to be part of an arrangement of extended nuclear deterrence. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
SIGNATURE
DEPOSIT WITH UNSG
ENTRY INTO FORCE
DECLARATION
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Abstained |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Abstained |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | Yes |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | 0% |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | Did not vote |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Did not vote |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Fissile material production facilities | No |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | No/No |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes |
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Member of the CD | No (Observer) |
Latest developments
Armenia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2021.
Armenian officials have indicated that the issue of adhering to the TPNW is not currently on the government's political agenda.
Recommendations
- Armenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Armenia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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