Australia
Australia boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, but has adopted a more favourable attitude towards the Treaty since 2022, following a change in government. It switched its vote on the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW from a ‘no’ to an abstention.1 The government has said that it ‘is considering the TPNW systematically and methodically as part of our ambitious agenda to advance nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament’.2
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1973) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 1986, Rarotonga) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1974) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1997) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1977) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Abstained (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes (observer) |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 3.33 (89%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | 2.7 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
Australia attended the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in March 2025 as an observer.
In a television interview in November 2025, Australia’s Minister for Defence, Richard Marles, was questioned on why his government had not yet signed and ratified the TPNW, despite the Australian Labor Party’s long-standing policy commitment to do so. He said that it was a decision for the government to take, and ‘[t]he decision that Labor has made in government has been to follow the non-proliferation treaty’, or the NPT.1
His comment prompted the government to clarify that its ‘position hasn’t changed’. ‘We continue to actively support disarmament and non-proliferation measures as part of our commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, and Australia recognizes and values the contribution that the TPNW has made to that vital cause in terms of global focus and momentum,’ it said. ‘The Albanese government has engaged as an observer with the TPNW process, and continues to consider how the TPNW can interact with and reinforce foundation agreements like the NPT.’2
In December 2025, a government official indicated that, as part of its AUKUS partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom, US Virginia-class submarines entering Australian waters and ports could carry nuclear weapons, and Australia would respect the US policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of such weapons. The official argued that this would be compatible with Australia’s existing international legal obligations.3
In 2024, Australia released a Defence Strategic Review, which stated: ‘Australia’s best protection against the increasing risk of nuclear escalation is US extended nuclear deterrence and the pursuit of new avenues of arms control.’4 Australia is the only State Party to a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaty in any region of the world that claims to be protected by nuclear weapons.
When Australia observed the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) to the TPNW in 2023, it said that it hoped to gain insights into how States Parties intend to address questions relating to verification and enforcement under the Treaty, how the Treaty will interact with the NPT, and how States Parties ‘will work to achieve universal support’ for the Treaty.5 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Penny Wong, said in an interview that the TPNW has ‘substantial normative value’, but she declined to offer a timeline for Australia’s signature and ratification.6
The Australian Labor Party, which has been in power since 2022, adopted a resolution in 2018 committing it to sign and ratify the TPNW in government, after taking account of a number of factors.7 The motion was moved by Anthony Albanese, the current Prime Minister, who said at the time: ‘Our commitment to sign and ratify the nuclear weapon ban treaty in government is Labor at its best.’8 The party reaffirmed this position in 2021 and 2023, and is expected to do so again in 2026.
Recommendations
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Australia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Australia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Australia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.