Undecided
Belarus
Umbrella state (bilateral arrangement with Russia)
Belarus did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 but has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2021. Although Belarus therefore meets the criteria set by the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor for inclusion in the undecided category, the statements in 2021 of its president Alexander Lukashenko clearly demonstrate support for nuclear weapons.
SIGNATURE
DEPOSIT WITH UNSG
ENTRY INTO FORCE
DECLARATION
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Not compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Abstained |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Abstained |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Abstained |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Abstained |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | No |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | N/A |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No (Signed 2005) |
| Fissile material production facilities | No |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 100–1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | No/No |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes |
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
In an interview on 30 November 2021, Lukashenko said that Belarus is willing to host Russian nuclear weapons.1
As an umbrella state, Belarus may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
Recommendations
- Belarus should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Belarus should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Belarus should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
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