Belarus
Belarus did not participate in the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. Accordingly, Belarus meets the criteria set by the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor for inclusion in the undecided category, despite its recent actions and statements that demonstrate support for nuclear weapons. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to ensure the removal of any Russian nuclear weapons deployed on its territory and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1993) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2000) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1995) | |
| AP with the IAEA | No (Signed 2005) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Abstained (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | 100-1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In 2023, the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, announced that his country had started taking delivery of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. ‘We have missiles and bombs that we have received from Russia,’ he said in a television interview.1 Many states, particularly members of NATO, condemned the deployment.2 Some accused Belarus of breaching its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, Belarus argued that the deployment ‘is carried out within the framework of international law and in strict accordance with the provisions of the NPT’. ‘Such cooperation is not new, but has long been practised within NATO, both in the form of so-called “joint nuclear missions” and the deployment of US nuclear weapons on the territory of the five non-nuclear member countries of the alliance in Europe,’ it said, referring to Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Türkiye.3
At the NPT Preparatory Committee session in July 2024, Belarus and Russia delivered a joint statement urging members of the international community to ‘work hard to create a climate conducive to disarmament’. ‘We are forced to state that at present the situation in the field of international security and strategic stability is not conducive to disarmament activities,’ they said, citing the expansion of NATO and ‘hostile actions by NATO countries’, among other things.4
In a national statement, Belarus noted that more than 30 years ago, ‘guided by a sense of deep responsibility’, it had abandoned ‘its own nuclear weapons and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State’. Its recent decision to host Russian nuclear weapons, it said, was a ‘defensive response to the growth of NATO military activity in Eastern Europe’.5
In 2024, Belarus participated in a series of Russian tactical nuclear weapon drills. The Russian Ministry of Defence said that Russian and Belarusian troops would undergo joint training for the possible use of nuclear weapons in combat.6 In December 2024, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, visited the Belarusian capital, Minsk, where he signed a bilateral treaty providing security guarantees to Belarus, including a commitment to use of nuclear weapons in its defence.7
Recommendations
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Belarus should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Belarus should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Belarus should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Belarus should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).