Belgium
Belgium boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It observed the First and Second Meetings of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022 and 2023, respectively. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | 2 (100%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1979) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (21 Feb 1977) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
At its Kleine Brogel Air Base, Belgium hosts an estimated 10–15 US B61 nuclear bombs for delivery by Belgian F-16 aircraft, as part of a NATO nuclear-sharing arrangement.1 It has argued that this practice is fully compatible with its obligations under the NPT. In October 2024, Belgium was one of 13 NATO member States to participate in NATO’s annual tactical nuclear weapons exercise known as Steadfast Noon.2
At the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in July 2024, Belgium criticised certain States for displaying ‘a mantric vision of nuclear disarmament, hoping for a revolutionary breakthrough, oblivious of the wider security context and its inextricable impact’.3 It also argued that NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements – whereby Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Türkiye host US nuclear weapons on their territories – ‘respect the provisions of the NPT’.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Belgium repeated this argument in a joint statement with Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. ‘Far from being in violation of the NPT, nuclear-sharing arrangements have provided an element of stability to the NPT since its inception … and remain beneficial to the NPT,’ they claimed. ‘Nuclear-sharing arrangements have prevented proliferation.’5
At the same meeting, Belgium argued that the proliferation crises caused by Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ‘put the NPT more to the test than the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, although we must move forward on both fronts. Nuclear disarmament is a requirement under Article VI, but it should not become a mantra in an echo chamber.’6
Belgium observed the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2023, while stressing that its presence should not ‘be interpreted as a first step towards Belgium’s adherence to the TPNW’, as joining the Treaty would not be in line with its disarmament approach and, furthermore, would be ‘incompatible with our commitments as a NATO member’. It reiterated its full support for NATO’s ‘nuclear deterrence posture’.7
Four former prime ministers and foreign ministers of Belgium – Willy Claes, Erik Derycke, Yves Leterme and Guy Verhofstadt – were among the signatories to an open letter in 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella States to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.8
Recommendations
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Belgium should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Belgium should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Belgium should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.