Belgium
Belgium boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It observed the First and Second Meeting of States Parties (1MSP and 2MSP) to the TPNW in 2022 and 2023, respectively. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to ensure the removal of the US nuclear weapons that it hosts at Kleine Brogel Air Base and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1977) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1979) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes (observer) |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 2 (75%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | 100-1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | <50 kg |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In October 2024, Belgium participated in NATO's nuclear strike exercise, known as 'Steadfast Noon'. It maintains dual-capable aircraft that could be used to deliver US nuclear weapons.1
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee session in July 2024, Belgium criticised certain states for displaying ‘a mantric vision of nuclear disarmament, hoping for a revolutionary breakthrough, oblivious of the wider security context and its inextricable impact’.2 It also argued that NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements – whereby Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye host US nuclear weapons on their territories – ‘respect the provisions of the NPT’.3
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Belgium repeated this argument in a joint statement with Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. ‘Far from being in violation of the NPT, nuclear-sharing arrangements have provided an element of stability to the NPT since its inception … and remain beneficial to the NPT,’ they claimed. ‘Nuclear-sharing arrangements have prevented proliferation.’4 At the same meeting, Belgium argued that the proliferation crises caused by Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ‘put the NPT more to the test than the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, although we must move forward on both fronts. Nuclear disarmament is a requirement under Article VI, but it should not become a mantra in an echo chamber.’5
Belgium observed the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) to the TPNW in 2023, while stressing that its presence should not ‘be interpreted as a first step towards Belgium’s adherence to the TPNW’, as joining the Treaty would not be in line with its disarmament approach and, furthermore, would be ‘incompatible with our commitments as a NATO member’. It reiterated its full support for NATO’s ‘nuclear deterrence posture’.6
Four former prime ministers and foreign ministers of Belgium – Willy Claes, Erik Derycke, Yves Leterme and Guy Verhofstadt – were among the signatories to an open letter in 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.7
Recommendations
-
Belgium should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
-
Belgium should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
-
Belgium should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.