Brazil
In May 2023, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, said at a G7 Summit in Hiroshima: ‘As long as nuclear weapons exist, there will always be the possibility of their use. It was for this reason that Brazil was actively engaged in the negotiations of the [TPNW], which we hope to be able to ratify soon.’[1] According to the government of Brazil, ratification of the Treaty is being pursued as ‘a priority’.[2]
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) | Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compliant |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | 3 (0%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 1968, Tlatelolco) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1998) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (4 Mar 1994) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ) |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
The TPNW was submitted to the National Congress of Brazil in 2018, but no progress was achieved towards ratification under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022). In May 2023, following Lula’s inauguration, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Congress) appointed Jonas Donizette as rapporteur on the matter. He published a favourable opinion in August 2023. Another deputy, Luiz Philippe de Orleans e Bragança, published a dissenting opinion. A public hearing to debate the ratification is still pending.3
In a statement marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2023, Brazil said: ‘The only true defence against nuclear weapons is their elimination.’ It also said that it was ‘encouraged by the growing number of States that recognise the need for a full prohibition of nuclear weapons’ and the ‘ever more robust consensus’ regarding the importance of the TPNW.4
Brazil observed the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP) in November and December 2023. In its general statement, it celebrated the fact that ‘membership in the TPNW has continued to grow at a time when other aspects of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime are struggling to make advances or even hold together’. It also remarked that ‘nuclear tensions over the past few years … underscored the need for prohibition, much like the rising nuclear tension of the early 1960s drove home the need for the NPT’.5
Brazil was one of the co-sponsors for the 2023 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.6
Recommendations
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Brazil should urgently ratify the TPNW.
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Brazil should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.