Brazil
The TPNW was submitted to the Brazilian National Congress in 2018 with a view to its ratification.[1] In 2023, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) examined the Treaty, and its rapporteur issued a favourable report.[2] At a G7 summit in Hiroshima in 2023, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, said that his country ‘was actively engaged in the negotiations of the [TPNW], which we hope to be able to ratify soon’.[3] His government subsequently described ratification of the Treaty as ‘a priority’.[4] However, no further steps were taken to advance the ratification in 2024.
TPNW Status
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2023 | ||
---|---|---|
(a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
Test | Compliant | |
Possess or stockpile | Compliant | |
(b) | Transfer | Compliant |
(c) | Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
(d) | Use | Compliant |
Threaten to use | Compliant | |
(e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compliant |
(f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
(g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |
TPNW voting and participation | |
---|---|
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2024) |
Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
2MSP delegation size (% women) | 3 (0%) |
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
---|---|
Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 1968, Tlatelolco) |
Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1998) |
Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) |
Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) |
Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) |
IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
---|---|
Safeguards agreement | Yes (4 Mar 1994) |
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
Small Quantities Protocol | No |
Additional Protocol | No |
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ) |
HEU stocks | No |
Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
At the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in July 2024, Brazil noted that the vast majority of States endorse ‘the notion that nuclear weapons are destined to share the fate of their chemical and biological siblings – prohibition and elimination. Such is the message conveyed by the adoption of the TPNW in 2017.’5
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, expressed regret that more than US$90 billion had been mobilised in the past year for nuclear arsenals globally. ‘These resources could have been used to fight hunger and tackle climate change,’ he said.6
At a high-level UN event to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2024, Brazil said that ‘our future depends on our ability to talk to our competitors, establish multilateral rules and get back on the path of a world free of nuclear weapons’. It noted that the recently adopted Pact for the Future, while falling short of Brazil’s expectations, ‘avoided backsliding on our legal and political commitments to disarmament’.7
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Brazil said: ‘We are keenly aware that the challenges to nuclear disarmament have not decreased. They continue to grow daily. Yet, for this very reason, we believe it is time to shift our focus: from sounding the alarm to thinking concretely and proactively on what can be done to improve things.’8
Brazil was one of the co-sponsors for the 2024 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which welcomed the Treaty’s entry into force and called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.9
Recommendations
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Brazil should urgently ratify the TPNW.
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Brazil should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.