Brazil
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was submitted to the Brazilian National Congress in 2018 with a view to its ratification.1 In 2025, however, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence of the lower house of the Congress resolved, for political reasons, not to advance the Treaty’s ratification. This is despite the fact that the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has described the ratification as a priority.2
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No (Signed 2017) | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1998) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 1968, Tlatelolco) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1994) | |
| AP with the IAEA | No | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant | |
| Test | Compliant | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) | Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compliant |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes (observer) |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 4.67 (7%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
At the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in March 2025, Brazil said that the ‘TPNW has brought new impetus to disarmament discussions’. ‘Nuclear use by any actor, of any size, would lead both to further escalation and to irreversible damage to mankind and to our environment, the extent of which is becoming clearer thanks to the work of this Treaty and its members,’ it said.3
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Brazil expressed concern that ‘the role of nuclear weapons in defence doctrines has continued to grow, with all nuclear-armed States modernizing their nuclear arsenals’. It criticized the increased salience of ‘extended nuclear deterrence, including calls for new so-called “nuclear sharing” arrangements’, noting that such arrangements are inconsistent with Articles I and II of the NPT.4
At a high-level event on 26 September 2025 marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Brazil said: ‘Today, we are witnessing backsliding, as nuclear-armed States expand and modernize their arsenals with rising budgets and little transparency. Doctrines are being broadened, previously rejected policies such as explosive testing and new nuclear-sharing arrangements are resurfacing, and arms control commitments are being disregarded.’ It called on States ‘to return to the negotiating table’ and implement their obligations in good faith.5
In the general debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, expressed pride in Latin America’s status as a nuclear-weapon-free zone: ‘In Latin America and the Caribbean, we are experiencing a period of growing polarization and instability. Maintaining the region as a zone of peace is our priority. We are a continent free of weapons of mass destruction, without ethnic or religious conflicts.’6
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Brazil said: ‘Nuclear disarmament is a priority for the vast majority of member States of the UN … Yet, for over a decade now, it is the cluster [in the First Committee] on which we have seen the least progress.’7
Brazil co-sponsored the 2025 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which welcomed the Treaty’s entry into force and called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.8
At a Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima in 2023, President Lula da Silva said that his country ‘was actively engaged in the negotiations of the [TPNW], which we hope to be able to ratify soon’. His government subsequently described ratification of the Treaty as ‘a priority’.9
Recommendations
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Brazil should urgently ratify the TPNW.
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Brazil should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).