Democratic People's Republic of Korea
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has the world's smallest nuclear arsenal, but is believed to be increasing it. North Korea, along with all other nuclear-armed states, boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since 2020, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 50 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 50 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 4.6 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 307 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Non-compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Non-compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Did not vote |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | No (Ratification withdrawn 2003) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1987) |
| Party to the CWC | No |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (Not implemented) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | N/A |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Military) |
| HEU stocks | 0.7 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 0.04 Mt (all available for weapons) |
Latest developments
In October 2024, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, said that he ‘would use without hesitation all the offensive forces [North Korea] has in its possession, including nuclear weapons’ if South Korea were to encroach on his country’s sovereignty. His remarks followed a warning by the South Korean President, Yoon Suk Yeol, that North Korea would ‘face the end of its regime’ if it were ever to use nuclear weapons.1
In September 2024, Kim announced that his country was implementing a policy to ‘exponentially’ increase the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. North Korea must thoroughly prepare its ‘nuclear capability and its readiness to use it properly at any given time in ensuring the security rights of the State’, he said, noting ‘the various threats posed by the United States and its followers’.2
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, North Korea said that ‘the US hostility and nuclear threat to the DPRK for over 70 years compelled us to make a historic decision to possess nuclear weapons’. Moreover, it described the Nuclear Consultative Group established by the United States and South Korea in 2023 as ‘the anti-DPRK nuclear war machine’, noting that it ‘is now in full operation and simulation nuclear war drills are conducted to put into practice an actual attempt to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK’.3
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, North Korea said that ‘those States with the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in nuclear disarmament’, particularly the United States as ‘the only user of nuclear weapons’. It also urged the United States to ‘refrain from sharing nuclear weapons with, and proliferating nuclear technology to, its allies’.4
In 2023, the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea voted to enshrine the country’s pursuit of nuclear weapons into its constitution. ‘This is a historic event that provided a powerful political lever for remarkably strengthening the national defence capabilities,’ Kim said.5
Recommendations
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North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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North Korea should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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North Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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North Korea should return to membership of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).