|TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021|
|(a)||Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire||Not compatible|
|Possess or stockpile||Not compatible|
|(c)||Receive transfer or control||Compatible|
|Threaten to use||Not compatible|
|(e)||Assist, encourage or induce||Compatible|
|(f)||Seek or receive assistance||Compatible|
|(g)||Allow stationing, installation, deployment||Compatible|
|IAEA safeguards and fissile material|
|Safeguards Agreement||Yes (Not implemented)|
|TPNW Art 3(2) deadline||N/A|
|Small Quantities Protocol||No|
|Fissile material production facilities||Yes (Military, uncertain)|
|Highly enriched uranium stocks||700 kg|
|Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)||40 kg/No|
|Related treaties and regimes|
|Party to the BWC||Yes|
|Party to the CWC||No|
|Party to the PTBT||No|
|Ratified the CTBT||No (Annex 2 state)|
|Party to the NPT||No (1985-2003)|
|Party to a NWFZ||No|
|Member of the CD||Yes|
North Korea is the only state to have tested a nuclear weapon in the 21st century.
After having abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018 and 2019, North Korea voted against in 2020 and 2021.
- North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- North Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- North Korea should return to the NPT regime. North Korea should implement its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol. North Korea should also adhere to the CTBT and the CWC.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
North Korea’s estimated 20 warheads are thought to be assigned to its arsenal of mobile landbased ballistic missiles. These potentially include the short-range, modernized Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6; the medium-range Hwasong-7, Hwasong-9, and Pukguksong-2; the intermediaterange Hwasong-10 and Hwasong-12; and the intercontinental Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, and Hwasong-17 ballistic missiles. The operational nuclear capability of these systems is uncertain.
North Korea has one ballistic missile submarine (SSB), which has been used for test launches of nuclear-capable missiles like the Pukguksong-1 and -3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), but it is not considered operational.