Democratic People's Republic of Korea
North Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Abstained |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Abstained |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | No |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | N/A |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Yes (Not implemented) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 700 kg |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | 40 kg/No |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | No |
| Party to the PTBT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the NPT | No (1985-2003) |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
North Korea is the only state to have tested a nuclear weapon in the 21st century.
After having abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018 and 2019, North Korea voted against in 2020 and 2021.
Recommendations
- North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- North Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- North Korea should return to the NPT regime. North Korea should implement its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol. North Korea should also adhere to the CTBT and the CWC.
The information below on North Korea's nuclear-weapons arsenal at the beginning of 2022 and nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021, has been compiled for the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor by Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda from country-specific editions of the Federation of American Scientists' 'Nuclear Notebook' series, which is published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and accessible via the Federation of American Scientists' website. Additional details and in-depth citations for each data point can be found in those publications. In certain cases, links to specific sources have been included.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
There is great uncertainty surrounding North Korea’s stockpile. North Korea is thought to have enough fissile material to produce between 40 and 50 warheads, but has probably produced considerably fewer, perhaps around 20. It is also currently unclear how many operational delivery vehicles North Korea possesses and which of these would be assigned a nuclear mission.
North Korea’s estimated 20 warheads are thought to be assigned to its arsenal of mobile landbased ballistic missiles. These potentially include the short-range, modernized Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6; the medium-range Hwasong-7, Hwasong-9, and Pukguksong-2; the intermediaterange Hwasong-10 and Hwasong-12; and the intercontinental Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, and Hwasong-17 ballistic missiles. The operational nuclear capability of these systems is uncertain.
North Korea has one ballistic missile submarine (SSB), which has been used for test launches of nuclear-capable missiles like the Pukguksong-1 and -3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), but it is not considered operational.
Development, production, or acquisition of nuclear-weapons systems in 2021
After developing a rudimentary long-range nuclear strike capability, North Korea now appears to be developing new types of shorter-range, solid-fuel missiles to potentially enable a strategy of regional nuclear warfighting. See the tabs below for North Korea's possible nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021, broken down by land-delivered and sea-delivered systems.
- North Korea is building new missile bases and modernizing existing ones to incorporate additional missile types.1
- In September 2021, North Korea launched two KN23 SRBMs using a rail-mobile launcher for the first time. Following the successful test, North Korea announced its intention to create a brigade of rail-mobile missiles.2 This would allow them to move missiles around the country quickly and conduct rapid strikes from hidden locations.
- In September 2021, North Korea tested a new missile called the Hwasong-8, which appeared to include a hypersonic glide vehicle. The Hwasong-8 is reportedly the first North Korean missile to be ‘ampoulized’, which allows pre-fuelled missiles to be stored in temperature-controlled canisters to facilitate faster launches.3
- In September 2021, North Korea tested a new land-attack cruise missile to a range of 1,500 kilometres. 4 Given that this system is designed to circumvent radars or missile defence systems, it could offer North Korea a new and unique capability to attack regional targets.
- North Korea is developing a new liquid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), known as the Hwasong-17, which is significantly larger than the country’s previous ICBMs. If it is eventually deployed, it is possible that the missile could deliver a large warhead – or potentially a small number of multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) with penetration aids – to the continental United States.
- North Korea is developing several new types of solid-fuelled SLBMs, including the Pukguksong-3, Pukguksong-4, and Pukguksong-5. The Pukguksong-5 was unveiled for the first time at a January 2021 military parade. The larger lengths and diameters of these missiles could indicate that North Korea is working towards the capability for its SLBMs to carry penetration aids or perhaps even multiple warheads to longer ranges.5
- In October 2021, North Korea tested a ‘new type’ of smaller SLBM with an unknown designation to a range of 590 kilometres. The missile appears to bear similar characteristics to North Korea’s newer SRBM designs.6
- North Korea is developing a new Sinpo-C submarine, which is expected to have at least three launch tubes. The UN Panel of Experts estimates that given the size of the new Sinpo-C and the expansion of the Sinpo South shipyard, three submarines could potentially be built concurrently. 7