Democratic People's Republic of Korea
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is the most recent State to develop nuclear weapons and is expanding its arsenal. Along with all other nuclear-armed States, it boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since 2020, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 50 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 50 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 4.6 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 307 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | No (Withdrew 2003) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (Not implemented) | |
| AP with the IAEA | No | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1987) | |
| Party to the CWC | No | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Did not vote |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Military) |
| HEU stocks | 0.7 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 0.04 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In the general debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025, North Korea noted that its status as a nuclear-armed State is now enshrined in its national Constitution, ‘to permanently maintain this state of balance and ensure everlasting peace on the Korean Peninsula’. ‘Imposition of “denuclearization” on [North Korea] is tantamount to demanding it to surrender sovereignty and [its] right to existence and [would] violate the Constitution,’ it said.1
It criticized the United States and its allies for conducting ‘bilateral and multilateral war exercises all year round’ in the Korean Peninsula and staging ‘real war drills simulating the use of nukes targeting a sovereign State, by mobilizing massive multi-national combined forces and the latest strategic assets’.
In October 2024, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, said that he ‘would use without hesitation all the offensive forces [North Korea] has in its possession, including nuclear weapons’ if South Korea were to encroach on his country’s sovereignty. His remarks followed a warning by the South Korean President, Yoon Suk Yeol, that North Korea would ‘face the end of its regime’ if it were ever to use nuclear weapons.2
In September 2024, Kim announced that his country was implementing a policy to ‘exponentially’ increase the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. North Korea must thoroughly prepare its ‘nuclear capability and its readiness to use it properly at any given time in ensuring the security rights of the State’, he said, noting ‘the various threats posed by the United States and its followers’.3
Recommendations
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North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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North Korea should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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North Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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North Korea should return to membership of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).