Germany
In June 2023, the German government published a new National Security Strategy, in which it reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to ‘a secure world without nuclear weapons’. ‘To this end, the preconditions for disarmament steps must be created, especially within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but also in dialogue with the members of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,’ it said.[1]
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | 5 (40%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1983) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (21 Feb 1977) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ) |
| HEU stocks | 100–1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | <1 ton stored abroad |
Latest developments
Germany observed the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP) in November and December 2023, where it informed delegates that ‘Confronted with an openly aggressive Russia, the importance of nuclear deterrence has increased for many States, including for [Germany] … Germany, as a NATO member, is fully committed to NATO’s nuclear deterrence, the purpose of which is to preserve peace, deter aggression and prevent nuclear coercion. It also argued that ‘Neither the TPNW nor the NPT [has] stopped Russia walking away from its international commitments and spurning international arms control efforts. But international arms control fora, including this Meeting of States Parties, need to be explicit and call out Russia as a major obstacle to disarmament efforts.’ Finally, Germany reiterated that it ‘will not accede to the TPNW, which would collide with our national security interests and our membership in NATO including nuclear deterrence’. 2
Germany also noted that the Stockholm Initiative and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, of which it is a member, ‘illustrate that supporters and opponents of the TPNW can work together to achieve common goals’. It stressed, in particular, that ‘the provision of victim assistance and environmental remediation from the damages of nuclear testing deserve broader attention and engagement’.3
Germany may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
Recommendations
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Germany should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Germany should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Germany should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.