Germany
Germany boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to ensure the removal of the US nuclear weapons that it hosts at Büchel Air Base and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1977) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1983) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes (observer) |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 4 (20%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | 100-1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | <1 ton stored abroad |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
Germany opted not to observe the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in March 2025, having observed 1MSP in 2022 and 2MSP in 2023. The decision was criticized by civil society organizations.1
In October 2025, Germany participated in NATO’s annual nuclear strike exercise, known as Steadfast Noon. Germany maintains dual-capable aircraft that could be used to deliver US nuclear weapons. In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, Germany highlighted NATO’s transparency in relation to the exercise and argued: ‘NATO’s deterrence and defence posture remains defensive, proportionate, and fully in line with the UN Charter and international law.’2
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Germany described the NPT as ‘a success story’. ‘Without the NPT, there would certainly be more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon States around the globe by now,’ it said. ‘We can hardly imagine the severe security implications had an unhindered spread of nuclear weapons taken place throughout the last 50 years.’3
It asserted that NATO, including its nuclear-sharing arrangements, ‘has largely contributed to stability, security, and nuclear non-proliferation since its foundation’. ‘Nuclear-sharing arrangements have been in place during times of major progress in nuclear disarmament after the end of the Cold War and they would certainly not stand in the way for further progress,’ it said.
In 2025, a number of German parliamentarians from the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU) and far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) parties argued that Germany should consider acquiring its own nuclear arsenal. However, according to opinion polls, the German public remains strongly opposed to such a move.4
When Germany observed the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) to the TPNW in 2023, it reiterated that it ‘will not accede to the TPNW, which would collide with our national security interests and our membership in NATO, including nuclear deterrence’. Moreover, it emphasized that it is not bound by the TPNW’s provisions, ‘nor do we accept the claim that its provisions are applicable under customary law—neither now nor in the future’.5
Recommendations
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Germany should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Germany should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Germany should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.