Germany
Germany boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It observed the First and Second Meeting of States Parties (1MSP and 2MSP) to the TPNW in 2022 and 2023, respectively. Germany may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to ensure the removal of the US nuclear weapons that it hosts at Büchel Air Base and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1977) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1983) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes (observer) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes (observer) |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 4 (20%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | 100-1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | <1 ton stored abroad |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In February 2024, the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Annalena Baerbock, said in an interview that ‘nuclear sharing within NATO is an indispensable part of our security’, referring to the practice of hosting US nuclear weapons on the territory of Germany and other NATO member states.1
Germany participated in NATO’s annual nuclear strike exercise, known as Steadfast Noon, in October 2024. It maintains dual-capable aircraft that could be used to deliver US nuclear weapons.2
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands delivered a joint statement arguing that NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements are fully compatible with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and ‘have provided an element of stability to the NPT since its inception’. ‘This is because they provided allies with security guarantees that reduce incentives for them to develop their own nuclear capabilities,’ they asserted.3
In a national statement at the same meeting, Germany said that its aim ‘remains a safe world without nuclear weapons’. ‘We are convinced that only concrete and effective steps, supported by the largest possible and cross-regional majority of NPT States parties, can result in real, tangible progress on nuclear disarmament,’ it said,4 while acknowledging that the ‘challenges for arms control and disarmament are enormous’.5
In 2023, the German government published a new National Security Strategy, which reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to ‘a secure world without nuclear weapons’. ‘To this end, the preconditions for disarmament steps must be created, especially within the framework of the [NPT], but also in dialogue with the members of the [TPNW],’ it said.6
When Germany observed the 2MSP in 2023 it said that ‘Confronted with an openly aggressive Russia, the importance of nuclear deterrence has increased for many States, including for [Germany],’ and reiterated that it ‘will not accede to the TPNW, which would collide with our national security interests and our membership in NATO including nuclear deterrence’. Moreover, it emphasised that it is not bound by the TPNW’s provisions, ‘nor do we accept the claim that its provisions are applicable under customary law – neither now nor in the future’.7
Recommendations
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Germany should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Germany should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Germany should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.