Greece
Greece boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
Greece may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
In October 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikolaos Dendias, elaborated on Greece’s opposition to the TPNW, noting that its membership of NATO ‘gives rise to allied obligations, which our country takes into account in formulating its positions in this regard’.1 Dendias’ comments were in response to parliamentary questions submitted by the MeRA25 political party,2 whose secretary-general, Yanis Varoufakis, has expressed support for Greece’s accession to the TPNW and has pledged to promote this goal.3
As part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, Greece declined to accept a recommendation in March 2022 to become a state party to the TPNW.4
The former Greek foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.5
Recommendations
- Greece should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Greece should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Greece should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.