Opposed
India
Nuclear-armed state (150 nuclear warheads)
India boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. India may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
| TPNW status |
|---|
| Not signed, not ratified, not acceded |
| Compatibility with prohibitions in TPNW Article 1(1) | ||
|---|---|---|
| Art 1(1)(a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| Art 1(1)(b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| Art 1(1)(c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| Art 1(1)(d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| Art 1(1)(e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| Art 1(1)(f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| Art 1(1)(g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) | No (N/A) |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Last vote on UNGA resolution | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 4,400 kg |
| Plutonium stocks (military/civilian) | 600 kg/6,900 kg |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
| IAEA CSA in force | Item-specific agreement |
| IAEA AP in force | Partial |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
Latest developments
India voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, India said that it did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and therefore will not join the Treaty or be bound by its obligations. It further said that the TPNW does not constitute or contribute to customary international law. See: bit.ly/3kX0fsZ.
Recommendations
- India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- India should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- India should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. India should conclude and bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. It should also sign and ratify the CTBT.
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