|TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021|
|(a)||Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire||Not compatible|
|Possess or stockpile||Not compatible|
|(c)||Receive transfer or control||Compatible|
|Threaten to use||Compatible|
|(e)||Assist, encourage or induce||Compatible|
|(f)||Seek or receive assistance||Compatible|
|(g)||Allow stationing, installation, deployment||Compatible|
|IAEA safeguards and fissile material|
|Safeguards Agreement||Item-specific agreement|
|TPNW Art 3(2) deadline||N/A|
|Small Quantities Protocol||No|
|Fissile material production facilities||Yes|
|Highly enriched uranium stocks||5200 kg|
|Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)||600 kg/8200 kg|
|Related treaties and regimes|
|Party to the BWC||Yes|
|Party to the CWC||Yes|
|Party to the PTBT||Yes|
|Ratified the CTBT||No (Annex 2 state)|
|Party to the NPT||No|
|Party to a NWFZ||No|
|Member of the CD||Yes|
In First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, India said that it did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and therefore will not join the Treaty or be bound by its obligations. It further said that the TPNW does not constitute or contribute to customary international law.1
- India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- India should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. India should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. India should also sign and ratify the CTBT.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Approximately 64 warheads are assigned to India’s operational arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, including the short-range Prithvi-II and Agni-I, the medium-range Agni-II, and the intermediate-range Agni-III.
Approximately 12 warheads are assigned to India’s one operational ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) – INS Arihant – which is capable of carrying up to 12 K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
The Indian Navy also operates a small number of short-range ballistic missiles (perhaps four) for two surface ships, although this system is expected to be retired as the SSBN fleet matures.
Approximately 48 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are assigned to India’s Mirage and Jaguar fighter-bomber aircraft.