India
India has the world's seventh largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 172 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 172 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 4.4 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 294 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1974) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Mil, Dual-Use) |
| HEU stocks | 5 MT |
| Plutonium stocks | 8.8 tons (Mil)/400 kg (Civ) |
Latest developments
In a statement marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2023, India said: ‘We are all cognisant of the fact that any use of nuclear weapons will have catastrophic consequences for humanity.’ It reiterated its call for negotiations to begin on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention and described itself as ‘a responsible nuclear-weapon State’ whose nuclear doctrine is based on maintaining ‘credible minimum deterrence’.1
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, India noted that ‘it did not participate in the negotiations on the TPNW, therefore will not become a party to the Treaty, and shall not be bound by any of the obligations that arise from it’. It added that, in its view, the Treaty ‘does not constitute or contribute to the development of any customary international law’.2
Recommendations
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India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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India should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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India should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).