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Nuclear-armed state

India has the world's seventh largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

TPNW Status

Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024
Total inventory of warheads 172
Retired warheads 0
Warheads available for use 172
Estimated yield (MT) 4.4
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents 294
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Non-compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Non-compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted no (2023)
Participated in 2MSP (2023) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Abstained
Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No
Party to the NPT No
Ratified the CTBT No (Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1974)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1996)
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol Partial
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants Yes (Mil, Dual-Use)
HEU stocks 5 MT
Plutonium stocks 8.8 tons (Mil)/400 kg (Civ)

Latest developments

In a statement marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2023, India said: ‘We are all cognisant of the fact that any use of nuclear weapons will have catastrophic consequences for humanity.’ It reiterated its call for negotiations to begin on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention and described itself as ‘a responsible nuclear-weapon State’ whose nuclear doctrine is based on maintaining ‘credible minimum deterrence’.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, India noted that ‘it did not participate in the negotiations on the TPNW, therefore will not become a party to the Treaty, and shall not be bound by any of the obligations that arise from it’. It added that, in its view, the Treaty ‘does not constitute or contribute to the development of any customary international law’.2


  • India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.

  • India should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

  • India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

  • India should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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