India
India has the world's seventh largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 164 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Stockpiled warheads | 164 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 4.1 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 273 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1974) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Mil, Dual-Use) |
| HEU stocks | 4.5 tons (Mil) |
| Plutonium stocks | 8.8 tons (Mil)/400 kg (Civ) |
Latest developments
India has a longstanding and frequently referenced policy in favour of global nuclear disarmament, formulated in similar terms to those of the NPT nuclear-weapon states.1 In 2022, however, India continued to fail to comply with this policy and demonstrated that it does not have the will to purposefully pursue nuclear disarmament.
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, India reiterated that the TPNW does not create any obligations for it and that the Treaty ‘in no way constitutes or contributes to the development of any customary international law,’ but added that ‘India stands ready to work with all countries to achieve our shared goal of nuclear disarmament.’2
Recommendations
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India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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India should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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India should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
1) See, e.g.: https://bit.ly/3kNGBzG