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Opposed

India

Nuclear-armed state

India boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

SIGNATURE
DEPOSIT WITH UNSG
ENTRY INTO FORCE
DECLARATION
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Not compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Not compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards Agreement Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol Partial
Fissile material production facilities Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks 5200 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) 600 kg/8200 kg
Related treaties and regimes
Party to the BWC Yes
Party to the CWC Yes
Party to the PTBT Yes
Ratified the CTBT No (Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT No
Party to a NWFZ No
Member of the CD Yes

Latest developments

In First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, India said that it did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and therefore will not join the Treaty or be bound by its obligations. It further said that the TPNW does not constitute or contribute to customary international law.1

Recommendations

  • India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
  • India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
  • India should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. India should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. India should also sign and ratify the CTBT.

Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022

160↑
Total inventory of warheads
0
Retired warheads
160↑
Usable stockpile of warheads
3.9MT
Total yield of usable stockpile
260
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents
India mobile

Approximately 64 warheads are assigned to India’s operational arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, including the short-range Prithvi-II and Agni-I, the medium-range Agni-II, and the intermediate-range Agni-III.

India ubat

Approximately 12 warheads are assigned to India’s one operational ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) – INS Arihant – which is capable of carrying up to 12 K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

India krigsskip

The Indian Navy also operates a small number of short-range ballistic missiles (perhaps four) for two surface ships, although this system is expected to be retired as the SSBN fleet matures.

India fly

Approximately 48 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are assigned to India’s Mirage and Jaguar fighter-bomber aircraft.


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