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Nuclear-armed state

India has the world's seventh largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

TPNW Status

Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023
Total inventory of warheads 164
Retired warheads 0
Stockpiled warheads 164
Estimated yield (MT) 4.1
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents 273
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Not compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Not compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted no (2023)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Abstained
Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No
Party to the NPT No
Ratified the CTBT No (Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1974)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1996)
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol Partial
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants Yes (Mil, Dual-Use)
HEU stocks 4.5 tons (Mil)
Plutonium stocks 8.8 tons (Mil)/400 kg (Civ)

Latest developments

India has a longstanding and frequently referenced policy in favour of global nuclear disarmament, formulated in similar terms to those of the NPT nuclear-weapon states.1 In 2022, however, India continued to fail to comply with this policy and demonstrated that it does not have the will to purposefully pursue nuclear disarmament.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, India reiterated that the TPNW does not create any obligations for it and that the Treaty ‘in no way constitutes or contributes to the development of any customary international law,’ but added that ‘India stands ready to work with all countries to achieve our shared goal of nuclear disarmament.’2


  • India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.

  • India should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

  • India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

  • India should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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