India
India boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | No |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | N/A |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes (Military, dual-use) |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 4.5 tons (m) |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | 8.8 tons/400 kg |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
In First Committee of the 2019 UN General Assembly, India said that it did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and therefore will not join the Treaty or be bound by its obligations. It further said that the TPNW does not constitute or contribute to customary international law.1
Recommendations
- India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- India should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. India should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. India should also sign and ratify the CTBT.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Of India’s stockpile, approximately 128 warheads are thought to be available for use by operational delivery vehicles, but kept in central storage under normal circumstances. A breakdown is provided below of the delivery vehicles to which they are assigned. The remaining 32 warheads are thought to have been produced to eventually arm India’s newer land- and submarine-launched ballistic missile systems, which are nearing deployment.
Approximately 64 warheads are assigned to India’s operational arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, including the short-range Prithvi-II and Agni-I, the medium-range Agni-II, and the intermediate-range Agni-III.
Approximately 12 warheads are assigned to India’s one operational ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) – INS Arihant – which is capable of carrying up to 12 K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
The Indian Navy also operates a small number of short-range ballistic missiles (perhaps four) for two surface ships, although this system is expected to be retired as the SSBN fleet matures.
Approximately 48 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are assigned to India’s Mirage and Jaguar fighter-bomber aircraft.
Development, production, or acquisition of nuclear-weapons systems in 2021
India is in the midst of completing and operationalizing its nascent nuclear triad, and is modernizing its existing nuclear forces to place increased emphasis on prompt missile launches. See the tabs below for India's nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021, broken down by land-delivered, sea-delivered, and air-delivered systems.
- India is in the process of developing several longer-range ballistic missiles that will increase coverage of Pakistan and China from deeper inside India.
- Deployment of the intermedium-range rail-mobile Agni III has begun. It will be followed by the intermediate-range road-mobile Agni V, which is nearing operational status and will be capable of targeting most of China.1 Unlike earlier versions of Agni missiles, Agni V will be deployed in a new mobile canister system, which will reduce the time required to launch the missile in a crisis because it can be transported with the warhead installed.
- India is also developing a new canistered medium-range road-mobile missile, known as Agni-P, which the Indian Ministry of Defence calls a ‘Next-Generation Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile’.2
- The Agni P might eventually replace India’s current Agni I and Agni II missiles.3 India is also thought to be developing an intercontinental-range missile known as the Agni VI.
- India is further developing the naval component of its nascent nuclear triad, as it prepared to commission its second SSBN – the INS Arighat – in early 2022.4 The second SSBN will also be able to carry up to 12 K-15 SLBMs (3 missiles in each tube), but a third SSBN launched in 2021 has eight launch tubes.
- To replace the short-range K-15, India is developing a new series of SLBMs, including the 3,500- kilometre-range K-4, the 5,000-kilometre-range K-5, and potentially even a longer range K-6.
- India is in the process of receiving 36 Rafale aircraft from France; the final aircraft was scheduled in January 2022.5 The Rafale is used for the nuclear strike mission in the French Air Force and might eventually take over the nuclear strike role in the Indian Air Force.