India
India has the world's seventh largest nuclear arsenal, and is believed to be increasing it. Along with all other nuclear-armed states, India boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its existing policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 180 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 180 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 4.5 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 301 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | No | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Item-specific agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | Partial (In force 2014) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1974) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Military/Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | 5 Mt |
| Plutonium stocks | 10 Mt (0.7 Mt available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, India once again stated its opposition to the TPNW. ‘India did not participate in the negotiations on TPNW. Therefore, it is not bound by obligations that arise from it,’ it said. ‘India believes that this Treaty does not constitute or contribute to the development of customary international law,' reiterating its support for ‘the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament’.1
At a high-level UN event to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2024, India claimed that it ‘is a responsible nuclear-weapon State and, as per its nuclear doctrine, is committed to maintain credible minimum deterrence with a posture of no first use and no use against non-nuclear-weapon States’.2
Recommendations
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India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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India should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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India should adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).