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If Iran were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the Treaty's prohibition on development of nuclear weapons, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties.

TPNW Status

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Of concern
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2023)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes
Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No
Party to the NPT Yes (Ratified 1970)
Ratified the CTBT No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1973)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1997)
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Yes (15 May 1974)
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol No (Signed 2003)
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants Yes (Civ)
HEU stocks 100-1000 kg
Plutonium stocks No

Latest developments

Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 2022, Iran described itself ‘as a steadfast supporter of nuclear disarmament’ and ‘equally committed to nuclear non-proliferation’.1 However, it continued to increase its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, prompting concern and criticism from many members of the international community. As this report was going to print in March 2023, the IAEA had raised concern that Iran’s uranium enrichment might even have gone beyond 60% U-235.2

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Iran said that it is of the view that ‘the use of nuclear weapons anywhere, in any way and under any circumstances, is a grave violation of international law and a crime against humanity’.3

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Iran said: ‘The adoption of the TPNW was a right step in the right direction. It complements the NPT. However, the TPNW should also be complemented by the urgent commencement of negotiations and conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner.’4


  • Iran should return to implementation of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

  • Iran should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

  • Iran should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

  • Iran should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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