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Iran

If Iran were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the Treaty's prohibition on development of nuclear weapons, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor has therefore listed Iran as a state of concern.

SIGNATURE
DEPOSIT WITH UNSG
ENTRY INTO FORCE
DECLARATION
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Of concern
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted yes
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted yes
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted yes
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations Yes
Share of women in TPNW negotiations 0%
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards Agreement Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol No (Signed 2003)
Fissile material production facilities Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks 100-1000 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) No/No
Related treaties and regimes
Party to the BWC Yes
Party to the CWC Yes
Party to the PTBT Yes
Ratified the CTBT No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT Yes
Party to a NWFZ No
Member of the CD Yes

Latest developments

Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the treaty, including in 2021.

Following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran restarted uranium enrichment beyond levels previously permitted by the agreement. As of the end of 2021, Iran had effectively reduced its potential nuclear breakout time from approximately a year under the JCPOA to just a couple of months, although there is currently little public indication that Tehran intends to take that highly consequential step at this time. It is particularly concerning, however, that since February 2021 Iran has refused to allow the IAEA access to a facility where advanced centrifuge components are being produced. As of writing, the United States and the remaining parties to the JCPOA were in the midst of negotiations over a potential US return to the deal (or perhaps the conclusion of a new interim deal).

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Iran said of the TPNW: 'The adoption of this treaty was a right step in the right direction. As such, we continue to support its overall objective. The TPNW complements the NPT. However, the TPNW should also be complemented by the urgent commencement of negotiations and the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner. The entry into force of the treaty from 2021, is considered a successful achievement for the global movement towards nuclear disarmament.'1

Recommendations

  • Iran should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
  • Iran should return to compliance with the JCPOA, and bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Iran should also ratify the CTBT.
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