Iran
Iran voted in favour of adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at the UN negotiating conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. Iran may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW at any time, but it will need to take steps to ensure its full compliance with the Treaty, in particular the prohibition on the development of nuclear weapons. Any concerns by TPNW states parties in relation to Iran’s nuclear activities could be addressed at meetings of states parties.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1974) | |
| AP with the IAEA | No (Signed 2003) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Of concern |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | >1 ton |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
As Iran continued to stockpile highly enriched uranium in 2024, many states expressed concerns that its nuclear programme, rather than being exclusively peaceful in nature as it claims, could be aimed at eventually developing nuclear weapons. These concerns grew louder throughout the year as Iran’s conflict with Israel escalated, with a series of direct confrontations between the two countries. According to the US government, however, there was no evidence as of October 2024 that Iran had decided to build nuclear weapons.1
In November 2024, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Abbas Araghchi, said that ‘[n]uclear weapons have no place in our security calculations’. However, he warned that, if Western countries were to impose sanctions on Iran as they had done in the past, the debate within his country would shift towards developing nuclear weapons. Ultimately, it would be up to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, to decide whether to rescind the long-standing fatwa against the possession of nuclear weapons, he noted.2
At a high-level UN event to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2024, Iran criticised nuclear-armed states for their failure to pursue nuclear disarmament. ‘Based on past performance and present plans, nuclear-weapon states appear to treat the disarmament directive of Article VI [of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)] as merely a feel-good suggestion,’ it said.3
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Iran accused all states that ‘rely on the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US’, including those that host US nuclear weapons on their territories, of ‘violating their legally binding obligations under the NPT’. Furthermore, it said that the AUKUS partnership among the US, the UK and Australia makes a ‘mockery of the international non-proliferation regime’.4
At the same meeting, Iran said that the TPNW ‘aligns with our principled stance on nuclear disarmament’. ‘The adoption of this Treaty [in 2017] is a positive step forward and we continue to support its objective,’ it added. ‘The TPNW complements the NPT, but it must be followed by urgent negotiations for a comprehensive convention to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner.’5
Recommendations
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Iran should return to implementation of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
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Iran should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
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Iran should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
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Iran should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).