Iran
Iran voted in favour of adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at the UN negotiating conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW at any time, but it will need to take steps to ensure its full compliance with the Treaty, in particular the prohibition on the development of nuclear weapons. Any concerns by TPNW states parties in relation to Iran’s nuclear activities could be addressed at Meetings of States Parties.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1974) | |
| AP with the IAEA | No (Signed 2003) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Of concern |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | >1 ton |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In June 2025, Israel initiated a bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities and assassinated a number of its nuclear scientists, along with other prominent figures in its government, in a war that lasted for 12 days. The United States also participated in the attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, ostensibly with the aim of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. However, there was no evidence to suggest that Iran had weaponized its nuclear programme or enriched its uranium to weapons-grade.
Israel and the United States resumed their attacks against Iran in February 2026, repeating their claims about the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
In the general debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025, the President of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, said that his country has ‘been among the staunchest advocates of establishing a region free of weapons of mass destruction [in the Middle East], yet those [nations] who themselves possess the largest nuclear arsenals—and who, in flagrant breach of the NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], make their weapons even deadlier and more destructive—have for years subjected our people to pressures on the basis of spurious allegations’.1
He reiterated that Iran has no intention of ever acquiring nuclear weapons. ‘I hereby declare once more, before this Assembly, that Iran has never sought and will never seek to build a nuclear bomb. We do not seek nuclear weapons. This is our belief based on the edict issued by the Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] and by religious authorities,’ he said.
In the Conference on Disarmament in February 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Abbas Araghch, described nuclear weapons as ‘an existential threat to humanity’. ‘The world stands at a critical juncture, where peace, disarmament, and international cooperation must prevail over the destructive forces of armed violence and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,’ he said.2
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Iran voted in favour of the annual resolution on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), describing it as ‘consistent with our principled position on nuclear disarmament’. ‘The TPNW’s adoption and entry into force marked important progress, complementing the NPT,’ it said. ‘However, further comprehensive, verifiable, and irreversible measures are essential for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.’3
Recommendations
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Iran should return to implementation of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
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Iran should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
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Iran should bring into force its Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
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Iran should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).