Iran
If Iran were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the Treaty's prohibition on development of nuclear weapons, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor has therefore listed Iran as a state of concern.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Of concern |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted yes |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | Yes |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | 0% |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | Voted yes |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No (Signed 2003) |
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes (Civilian) |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 100-1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | No/No |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the treaty, including in 2021.
Following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran restarted uranium enrichment beyond levels previously permitted by the agreement. As of the end of 2021, Iran had effectively reduced its potential nuclear breakout time from approximately a year under the JCPOA to just a couple of months, although there is currently little public indication that Tehran intends to take that highly consequential step at this time. It is particularly concerning, however, that since February 2021 Iran has refused to allow the IAEA access to a facility where advanced centrifuge components are being produced. As of writing, the United States and the remaining parties to the JCPOA were in the midst of negotiations over a potential US return to the deal (or perhaps the conclusion of a new interim deal).
In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Iran said of the TPNW: 'The adoption of this treaty was a right step in the right direction. As such, we continue to support its overall objective. The TPNW complements the NPT. However, the TPNW should also be complemented by the urgent commencement of negotiations and the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner. The entry into force of the treaty from 2021, is considered a successful achievement for the global movement towards nuclear disarmament.'1
Recommendations
- Iran should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Iran should return to compliance with the JCPOA, and bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Iran should also ratify the CTBT.