Iran
If Iran were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the Treaty's prohibition on development of nuclear weapons, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Of concern |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (15 May 1974) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No (Signed 2003) |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ) |
| HEU stocks | 100-1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2023.
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2023, the President of Iran, Ebrahim Raisi, said that nuclear weapons ‘have no place in the defence doctrine’ of his country. ‘Official reports of relevant international authorities and even Western intelligence communities have repeatedly emphasised the truth of this claim,’ he said. He criticised the United States – ‘the world’s only nuclear criminal’ – for failing to ‘fulfil its obligations under the NPT to disarm’ and for withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 in ‘violation of the Muslim principle of faithfulness to the covenant’. He also accused the European partners of the JCPOA of violating their obligations and warned that they ‘must understand that they will lose if they speed up the costly path of confrontation’.1
As Iran continued to stockpile highly enriched uranium in 2023, many states reiterated their concerns that its nuclear programme, rather than being exclusively peaceful in nature, is aimed at eventually developing nuclear weapons. Exacerbating these concerns, Iran barred entry of several senior inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September 2023.2
At the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in August 2023, Iran complained that, despite the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA five years ago, ‘illegal sanctions’ against Iran continue. ‘It is time to reverse course, end political and psychological pressure on Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, and lift unfounded allegations,’ it said.3
In a statement marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2023, Iran said that the ‘survival of humanity depends on a firm consensus: nuclear weapons must never again be tested, developed or deployed, and their total elimination is the ultimate but pressing goal’. It warned that a ‘troubling nuclear arms race is underway, with all nuclear-weapon States upgrading their arsenals’. It strongly criticised the ‘Israeli regime’ for consistently opposing all initiatives aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. ‘The possession of hundreds of nuclear weapons by this regime poses a severe threat to the security of the Middle East region and beyond,’ it said.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Iran said that ‘[n]uclear disarmament is of paramount importance to the international community’ and expressed regret at the lack of ‘any implementation’ of Article VI by the nuclear-weapon States after five decades, describing the United States, the United Kingdom and other NATO members as ‘the main culprits for weakening and even preventing any progress towards nuclear disarmament’.5
Recommendations
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Iran should return to implementation of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
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Iran should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
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Iran should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
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Iran should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).