Israel
Israel has the world's second smallest nuclear arsenal. In 2023, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament, and remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 90 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 90 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 2.5 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 165 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | No |
| Party to the CWC | No (Signed 1993) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Mil) |
| HEU stocks | 300 kg available for weapons |
| Plutonium stocks | 830 kg (Mil) |
Latest developments
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2023, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, accused Iran of engaging ‘in nuclear blackmail’. He pledged to do everything in his power ‘to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons’ and urged states to reimpose sanctions on Iran. ‘[A]bove all, Iran must face a credible military threat,’ he added.1
In the context of Israel’s ongoing assault against Gaza, which began in October 2023, a number of Israeli politicians have suggested that nuclear weapons, or ‘doomsday weapons’, should be used against the people of Palestine. In November 2023, for example, the Heritage Minister, Amihay Eliyahu, described the use of nuclear weapons by Israel as an option in the conflict,2 prompting a sharp rebuke from the League of Arab States.3 The minister’s comments were cited in South Africa’s application to the International Court of Justice in December 2023 accusing Israel of committing genocide in Gaza.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Israel reiterated its opposition to the TPNW. ‘Israel’s deep reservations regarding this Treaty are based on substantive as well as procedural considerations,’ it said. ‘Israel is concerned by arms control and disarmament processes which fail to give due regard to the security and stability context. Israel also firmly believes that negotiations on such a Treaty should have been undertaken in the appropriate forum, under the appropriate rules of procedure, which would not undermine the inclusiveness of any processes.’ It also emphasised ‘that the Treaty does not create, contribute to the development of, nor indicate the existence of customary international law related to the subject of or the content of the Treaty. Moreover, the Treaty does not reflect legal norms that apply to states that are not party to the Treaty, and it does not alter in any way existing rights or obligations upon States that have not joined it. The Treaty’s entry into force is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it, hence Israel is not obliged by it in any way.’ 5
Recommendations
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Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Israel should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Israel should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).