|TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021|
|(a)||Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire||Not compatible|
|Possess or stockpile||Not compatible|
|(c)||Receive transfer or control||Compatible|
|Threaten to use||Compatible|
|(e)||Assist, encourage or induce||Compatible|
|(f)||Seek or receive assistance||Compatible|
|(g)||Allow stationing, installation, deployment||Compatible|
|IAEA safeguards and fissile material|
|Safeguards Agreement||Item-specific agreement|
|TPNW Art 3(2) deadline||N/A|
|Small Quantities Protocol||No|
|Fissile material production facilities||Yes|
|Highly enriched uranium stocks||300 kg|
|Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)||900 kg/No|
|Related treaties and regimes|
|Party to the BWC||No|
|Party to the CWC||No (Signatory)|
|Party to the PTBT||Yes|
|Ratified the CTBT||No (Signed, Annex 2 state)|
|Party to the NPT||No|
|Party to a NWFZ||No|
|Member of the CD||Yes|
In a statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Israel spoke of the TPNW and said that it has 'deep reservations regarding this initiative ... based on substantive as well as procedural considerations'. It emphasised that the TPNW's entry into force 'is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it, hence Israel is not obliged by it in any way'.1
- Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Israel should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Israel should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and conclude and bring into force and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Israel should also ratify the CTBT and the CWC, and adhere to the BWC.
Approximately 50 warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel’s arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, including the medium-range Jericho II and intermediate-range Jericho III.
Approximately 10 warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel’s fleet of two Dolphin II-class attack submarines, for delivery by sea-launched cruise missiles.
Approximately 30 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel’s F-16I and/or F-15I fighter-bomber aircraft.