Israel
Israel is the only nuclear-armed State in the Middle East and the only such State that has not formally confirmed its possession of nuclear weapons. It boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 90 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 90 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 2.5 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 165 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | No | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Item-specific agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | No | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | No | |
| Party to the CWC | No (Signed 1993) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Military) |
| HEU stocks | 0.3 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 0.9 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In June 2025, Israel initiated a bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities and assassinated a number of its nuclear scientists, along with other prominent figures in its government, in a war that lasted for 12 days. The United States also participated in the attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, ostensibly with the aim of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. However, there was no evidence to suggest that Iran had weaponized its nuclear programme or enriched its uranium to weapons-grade.
In the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, said: ‘[US] President [Donald] Trump and I promised to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. And we delivered on that promise. We removed an existential threat to Israel, and a mortal threat to the civilized world.’ He claimed that the attacks had ‘devastated Iran’s atomic weapons and ballistic missile programmes’.1
Israel and the United States resumed their attacks against Iran in February 2026, repeating their claims about the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
In the context of Israel’s attacks against Gaza, which began in 2023, a number of Israeli politicians have suggested that nuclear weapons, or ‘doomsday weapons’, could be used to achieve Israel’s military objectives.2 Most notably, the Heritage Minister, Amihay Eliyahu, in 2023 described the use of nuclear weapons by Israel against the people of Gaza as an option in the war, prompting a sharp rebuke from Arab States, China, and Iran, among others.3
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Israel reiterated its opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). ‘Israel’s deep reservations regarding this Treaty are based on substantive, as well as procedural, considerations,’ it said. ‘Israel is concerned by arms control and disarmament processes which fail to give due regard to the relevant security and stability context. Israel also firmly believes that negotiations on such a treaty should have been undertaken in the appropriate forum, under the appropriate rules of procedure, which would not undermine the inclusiveness of the process.’4
It also emphasized that ‘the Treaty does not create, contribute to the development of, nor indicate the existence of customary international law related to the subject of or the content of the Treaty. Moreover, the Treaty does not create legal norms that apply to States that are not party to the Treaty, and it does not alter in any way existing rights and obligations upon States that have not joined it. The Treaty’s entry into force is relevant only to those States that signed or ratified it. Hence, Israel is not obliged by it in any way.’
Recommendations
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Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Israel should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Israel should adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).