Israel
Israel boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | No |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | N/A |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 300 kg |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | 900 kg/No |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | No |
| Party to the CWC | No (Signatory) |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Party to a NWFZ | No |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
In a statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Israel spoke of the TPNW and said that it has 'deep reservations regarding this initiative ... based on substantive as well as procedural considerations'. It emphasised that the TPNW's entry into force 'is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it, hence Israel is not obliged by it in any way'.1
Recommendations
- Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Israel should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Israel should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and conclude and bring into force and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Israel should also ratify the CTBT and the CWC, and adhere to the BWC.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Unlike the other eight nuclear-armed states, Israel has not acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons. It is believed that Israel’s warheads are stored partially disassembled without the nuclear cores and separate from the military, but the warheads could be assembled quickly in a nuclear crisis. A breakdown is provided below of Israel's warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned.
Approximately 50 warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel’s arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, including the medium-range Jericho II and intermediate-range Jericho III.
Approximately 10 warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel’s fleet of two Dolphin II-class attack submarines, for delivery by sea-launched cruise missiles.
Approximately 30 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel’s F-16I and/or F-15I fighter-bomber aircraft.
Development, production, or acquisition of nuclear-weapons systems in 2021
Although it is thought that the size of Israel’s nuclear arsenal is largely stable, the country is modernizing its arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles and may be upgrading its plutonium and warhead production facility. See the tabs below for Israel's nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021.
- Israel is thought to be upgrading its Jericho II ballistic missile force to the Jericho III with construction visible at its missile base southwest of Jerusalem. Israel has conducted several rocket engine propulsion tests in recent years – including a likely test in 2021 – which could be related to the Jericho modernization programme.
- As of September 2021, Israel had received 30 of its planned purchase of 50 F-35 aircraft from the United States, becoming the first non-US country to operate the aircraft.2 The United States is upgrading its F-35s to carry nuclear weapons, although it is unclear whether the F-35 will eventually have a nuclear strike role in the Israeli Air Force.
- Commercial satellite imagery indicates that Israel has begun a major construction project at its Negev Nuclear Research Center. The Dimona plutonium production reactor at the Center is nearing the end of its useful life and the construction could potentially be part of a life-extension programme.