Skip to main content


Nuclear-armed state

Israel has the world's second smallest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament, and remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

TPNW Status

Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023
Total inventory of warheads 90
Retired warheads 0
Stockpiled warheads 90
Estimated yield (MT) 2.5
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents 165
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Not compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Not compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted no (2023)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted no
Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No
Party to the NPT No
Ratified the CTBT No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC No
Party to the CWC No (Signed 1993)
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol No
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants Yes (Mil)
HEU stocks 300 kg
Plutonium stocks 830 kg (Mil)

Latest developments

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Israel noted that it did not participate in the negotiation of the TPNW and has voted no on all UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, because it has ‘deep reservations’ regarding the Treaty ‘based on substantive as well as procedural considerations’. It also argued that the TPNW fails to give due regard to security and stability considerations. Furthermore, Israel outlined issues that stand in the way of Israel's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which included 'significant gaps' in the verification regime and the status of adherence and compliance in the Middle East region.1


  • Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.

  • Israel should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

  • Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

  • Israel should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Can you help us update this state profile? Send e-mail
Did you find this interesting?
Print state profile