Israel
Israel has the world's second smallest nuclear arsenal. It is the only nuclear-armed state that has not formally confirmed its possession of nuclear weapons. Along with all other nuclear-armed states, Israel boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 90 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 90 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 2.5 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 165 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | No | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Item-specific agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | No | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | No | |
| Party to the CWC | No (Signed 1993) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Military) |
| HEU stocks | 0.3 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 0.9 Mt (all available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In the context of Israel’s attacks in Gaza, which began in 2023, and its conflict with Iran, which intensified significantly in 2024, a number of Israeli politicians have suggested that nuclear weapons, or ‘doomsday weapons’, should be used to achieve Israel’s military objectives.1 Most notably, the Heritage Minister, Amihay Eliyahu, in 2023 described the use of nuclear weapons by Israel against the people of Gaza as an option in the war, prompting a sharp rebuke from Arab states, China and Iran, among others.2 In January 2024, Eliyahu again stated that a nuclear attack on Gaza was an option.3
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, accused Iran of seeking ‘to weaponise its nuclear programme’. ‘It builds ballistic missiles for nuclear warheads to threaten the entire world,’ he said. ‘For too long, the world has appeased Iran.’ He added that ‘responsible governments’ should ‘join Israel in stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons programme’, and called on the UN Security Council to reimpose sanctions on Iran.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Israel reiterated its opposition to the TPNW. ‘Israel’s deep reservations regarding this Treaty are based on substantive as well as procedural considerations, ... Israel is concerned by arms control and disarmament processes which fail to give due regard to the security and stability context,’ it said. Israel also emphasised ‘that the Treaty does not create, contribute to the development of, nor indicate the existence of customary international law related to the subject of or the content of the Treaty. Moreover, the Treaty does not reflect legal norms that apply to States that are not party to the Treaty, and it does not alter in any way existing rights or obligations upon States that have not joined it. The Treaty’s entry into force is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it, hence Israel is not obliged by it in any way.’5
Recommendations
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Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Israel should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Israel should adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).