Israel
Israel has the world's second smallest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament, and remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 90 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Stockpiled warheads | 90 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 2.5 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 165 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | No |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | No |
| Party to the CWC | No (Signed 1993) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Item-specific agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Mil) |
| HEU stocks | 300 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | 830 kg (Mil) |
Latest developments
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Israel noted that it did not participate in the negotiation of the TPNW and has voted no on all UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, because it has ‘deep reservations’ regarding the Treaty ‘based on substantive as well as procedural considerations’. It also argued that the TPNW fails to give due regard to security and stability considerations. Furthermore, Israel outlined issues that stand in the way of Israel's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which included 'significant gaps' in the verification regime and the status of adherence and compliance in the Middle East region.1
Recommendations
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Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Israel should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Israel should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).