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Nuclear-armed state

Israel boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Not compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Not compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards Agreement Item-specific agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol No
Fissile material production facilities Yes (Military)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 300 kg
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) 830 kg/No
Related treaties and regimes
Party to the BWC No
Party to the CWC No (Signatory)
Party to the PTBT Yes
Ratified the CTBT No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT No
Party to a NWFZ No
Member of the CD Yes

Latest developments

In a statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Israel spoke of the TPNW and said that it has 'deep reservations regarding this initiative ... based on substantive as well as procedural considerations'. It emphasised that the TPNW's entry into force 'is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it, hence Israel is not obliged by it in any way'.1


  • Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
  • Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
  • Israel should join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Israel should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and conclude and bring into force and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Israel should also ratify the CTBT and the CWC, and adhere to the BWC.

Estimated total inventory of warheads
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement
Usable stockpile of warheads
Total yield of usable stockpile
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents
Israel mobile

Approximately 50 warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel’s arsenal of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, including the medium-range Jericho II and intermediate-range Jericho III.

Israel ubat

Approximately 10 warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel’s fleet of two Dolphin II-class attack submarines, for delivery by sea-launched cruise missiles.

Israel fly

Approximately 30 gravity bombs with nuclear warheads are thought to be assigned to Israel’s F-16I and/or F-15I fighter-bomber aircraft.

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