Italy
Italy boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2023. Italy may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
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(a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
Test | Compatible | |
Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
(b) | Transfer | Compatible |
(c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
(d) | Use | Compatible |
Threaten to use | Compatible | |
(e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
(f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
(g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
TPNW voting and participation | |
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UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
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Party to an NWFZ | No |
Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) |
Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |
IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
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Safeguards agreement | Yes (21 Feb 1977) |
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
Small Quantities Protocol | No |
Additional Protocol | Yes |
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
HEU stocks | 100–1000 kg |
Plutonium stocks | Stored abroad |
Latest developments
At the Aviano Air Base, Italy hosts an estimated 20–30 US B61 nuclear bombs for delivery by US aircraft, and at the Ghedi Air Base, it hosts an estimated 10–15 US B61 nuclear bombs for delivery by Italian aircraft.1 In July 2023, the Foreign Affairs Committee of Italy’s Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution committing the Italian government to continue its evaluation of the TPNW, in particular the Treaty’s provisions on victim assistance environmental remediation, and to consider, in consultation with other NATO members, observing the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP), which it opted not to do.2
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Italy said that it shared the view ‘that nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity and they must be eliminated’.3 It reiterated its firm commitment ‘to strengthening the multilateral disarmament machinery and all the relevant treaties and conventions with the aim of their universalisation’.4
Recommendations
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Italy should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Italy should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Italy should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.