Italy
Italy boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. Italy may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to ensure the removal of the US nuclear weapons it hosts at Ghedi Air Base and Aviano Air Base and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1977) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | 100-1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | Stored abroad |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
Italy participated in NATO’s nuclear strike exercise, known as Steadfast Noon, in October 2024. It maintains dual-capable aircraft that could be used to deliver US nuclear weapons.1
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in 2024, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands delivered a joint statement arguing that NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements are fully compatible with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and ‘have provided an element of stability to the NPT since its inception’. ‘This is because they provided allies with security guarantees that reduce incentives for them to develop their own nuclear capabilities,’ they asserted.2
In a national statement at the same meeting, Italy said that ‘nuclear weapons, for as long as they exist, should only serve defensive purposes, deter aggression and prevent war and coercion’.3 It expressed concern at ‘the gradual erosion of the disarmament architecture built over decades’, and said that ‘one country in particular is systematically attacking this architecture’, namely Russia.4
At the NPT Preparatory Committee session in July 2024, Italy said that the NPT ‘provides the only realistic legal framework’ to reach the objective of complete nuclear disarmament ‘in a way that promotes international stability based on the principle of undiminished security for all’.5
In March 2024, the city council of Rome, Italy’s capital, resolved unanimously to endorse an appeal coordinated by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons urging the Italian government to sign and ratify the TPNW.6 Around 100 other Italian cities have also subscribed to it.7
In 2023, the Foreign Affairs Committee of Italy’s Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution committing the Italian government to continue its evaluation of the TPNW, in particular the Treaty’s provisions on victim assistance environmental remediation, and to consider, in consultation with other NATO member states, observing the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) to the TPNW. (It did not observe the meeting.)8
Recommendations
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Italy should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Italy should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Italy should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.