Italy
Italy boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to ensure the removal of the US nuclear weapons it hosts at Ghedi Air Base and Aviano Air Base and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1977) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Non-compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | 100-1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | Stored abroad |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
Italy participated in NATO’s nuclear strike exercise, known as Steadfast Noon, in October 2025. It maintains dual-capable aircraft that could be used to deliver US nuclear weapons.1
In November 2025, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italy’s Chamber of Deputies rejected a draft resolution expressing support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and other measures aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use. In opposing the resolution, the government noted Italy’s participation in NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission.2
In March 2025, the President of Italy, Sergio Mattarella, visited Hiroshima, where he met with atomic bomb survivors. He remarked that the ‘horrific’ atrocities committed against the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 ‘gave new momentum to the debate on disarmament’ and ‘contributed to forming an international consensus around a moral imperative: that atomic bombs should never be used again’.3
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Italy called for a ‘pragmatic and responsible approach’ to advancing nuclear disarmament, emphasizing that the NPT ‘provides the only realistic legal framework to reach this objective, in a way that promotes international stability based on the principle of undiminished security for all’.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Italy said: ‘Far from being against the spirit or even the letter of the NPT, extended nuclear deterrence has over the decades prevented proliferation in that it has removed incentives for States in a nuclear alliance to develop their own arsenals.’5
As part of its Universal Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council in 2025, Italy ‘noted’ recommendations by other States to join the TPNW.6
In 2024, the city council of Rome, Italy’s capital, resolved unanimously to endorse an appeal coordinated by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons urging the Italian government to sign and ratify the TPNW.7 Around 100 other Italian cities have also subscribed to it.8
Recommendations
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Italy should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Italy should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Italy should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.