Japan
Japan opted not to observe the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP) in November and December 2023, despite repeated calls for it to do so by hibakusha, the Komeito political party (which is part of the coalition government), and the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (who attended the meeting in their individual capacity).[1] Japan may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1976) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1997, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1982) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (2 Dec 1977) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ) |
| HEU stocks | 1-10 tons |
| Plutonium stocks | 46.1 tons (incl 37.t tons stored abroad) |
Latest developments
Japan boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, including in 2022. Japan may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2023, the Japanese Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, called on the leaders of nuclear-weapon States and other States ‘to step up their engagement on nuclear disarmament’ and take concrete action ‘not despite of, but because of, the challenging security environment’. He said that Japan would ‘continue to bolster realistic and practical efforts’ to advance this goal. An example, he added, was Japan’s plan to contribute 3 billion yen (US$20 million) for the establishment of positions at overseas research institutes and think tanks in an effort ‘[t]o overcome the divisive debate among academia and government over whether we should be choosing deterrence or disarmament’. 2 Japan has faced mounting criticism domestically for claiming reliance on the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ and refusing to join the TPNW.
In May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida hosted in Hiroshima a summit of leaders of G7 nations, all of which either possess nuclear weapons or claim protection from US nuclear weapons. Ahead of the meeting, the government expressed its hope that the gathering would ‘solidify steps toward achieving a world without nuclear weapons’.3 But many atomic bomb survivors, known as hibakusha, criticised the summit for failing to promote the TPNW and for upholding the theory of nuclear deterrence.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Japan reiterated its longstanding position in relation to the TPNW. ‘The TPNW is an important Treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons,’ it said. ‘However, in order to change the reality, engagement with the nuclear-weapon States is necessary.’5
Recommendations
-
Japan should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
-
Japan should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
-
Japan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.