|TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021|
|(a)||Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire||Compatible|
|Possess or stockpile||Compatible|
|(c)||Receive transfer or control||Compatible|
|Threaten to use||Compatible|
|(e)||Assist, encourage or induce||Not compatible|
|(f)||Seek or receive assistance||Compatible|
|(g)||Allow stationing, installation, deployment||Compatible|
|IAEA safeguards and fissile material|
|TPNW Art 3(2) deadline||N/A|
|Small Quantities Protocol||No|
|Fissile material production facilities||Yes (Civilian)|
|Highly enriched uranium stocks||1000–10 000 kg|
|Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)||No/46.1 tons (incl. 37.2 tons stored abroad)|
|Related treaties and regimes|
|Party to the BWC||Yes|
|Party to the CWC||Yes|
|Party to the PTBT||Yes|
|Ratified the CTBT||Yes (Annex 2 state)|
|Party to the NPT||Yes|
|Party to a NWFZ||No|
|Member of the CD||Yes|
Japan may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
Japan's new prime minister, Fumio Kishida, a parliamentarian elected in Hiroshima, has stated a number of times that ‘the TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons’.1 The question of observing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW was highly debated before and during the general election which took place in October 2021 and subsequent Diet sessions, including by members of the coalition government.2
More than 600 local assemblies of some 1,700 municipalities throughout the country have adopted opinions urging the government to sign and ratify the treaty.
- Japan should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from endorsing future statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
- Japan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.