Kazakhstan Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan

TPNW supporters

Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union but renounced them and has since advocated for nuclear disarmament. Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the TPNW. Its hosting of Russian missile tests at the Sary Shagan test site means that it is not in compliance with the TPNW’s prohibition on assisting development of nuclear weapons.

Latest developments and background

Kazakhstan, which has suffered the consequences of Soviet nuclear testing, deposited its instrument of ratification of the TPNW to the UN Secretariat on the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 30 August 2019. Those gathered at the ceremony observed a one-minute silence in memory of and to honour the victims of nuclear tests. (bit.ly/2YzeB8R)

Recommendations

  • Kazakhstan should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
  • Kazakhstan should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
  • Kazakhstan should request that Russia as soon as the TPNW enters into force must cease the testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Sary Shagan. It should submit a statement making it clear that it does not authorise the testing of nuclear-capable missiles on its territory and outline the steps it has taken to communicate that position to Russia.
Signed
Yes (2 Mar 2018)
Adhered
Ratified (29 Aug 2019)
Compliance with article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(f) The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes
Fissile material
Highly enriched uranium stocks <10 t (~350 weapon equivalents)
Civilian plutonium stocks
Fissile material production No
Related treaties and mechanisms
Party to the NPT Yes
Party to a NWFZ Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Ratified the CTBT Yes
Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD Yes
IAEA CSA in force Yes
IAEA AP in force Yes
Party to the CWC Yes
Party to the BWC Yes