Kazakhstan
States with nuclear-free security strategies
Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union but renounced them and has since advocated for nuclear disarmament. Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the TPNW. Its hosting of Russian missile tests at the Sary Shagan test site means that it is not in compliance with the TPNW’s prohibition on assisting development of nuclear weapons.
Latest developments and background
Kazakhstan, which has suffered the consequences of Soviet nuclear testing, deposited its instrument of ratification of the TPNW to the UN Secretariat on the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 30 August 2019. Those gathered at the ceremony observed a one-minute silence in memory of and to honour the victims of nuclear tests. (bit.ly/2YzeB8R)
Recommendations
- Kazakhstan should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Kazakhstan should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
- Kazakhstan should request that Russia as soon as the TPNW enters into force must cease the testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Sary Shagan. It should submit a statement making it clear that it does not authorise the testing of nuclear-capable missiles on its territory and outline the steps it has taken to communicate that position to Russia.
| Signed |
|---|
| Yes (2 Mar 2018) |
| Adhered |
|---|
| Ratified (29 Aug 2019) |
| Compliance with article 1(1) of the TPNW | ||
|---|---|---|
| Art 1(1)(a) | The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring | Compliant |
| The prohibition on testing | Compliant | |
| The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling | Compliant | |
| Art 1(1)(b) | The prohibition on transferring | Compliant |
| Art 1(1)(c) | The prohibition on receiving transfer or control | Compliant |
| Art 1(1)(d) | The prohibition on using | Compliant |
| The prohibition on threatening to use | Compliant | |
| Art 1(1)(e) | The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities | Not compliant |
| The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities | Compliant | |
| Art 1(1)(f) | The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities | Compliant |
| Art 1(1)(g) | The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment | Compliant |
| TPNW process | |
|---|---|
| Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) | Yes (0%) |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | Voted yes |
| Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | <10 t (~350 weapon equivalents) |
| Civilian plutonium stocks | |
| Fissile material production | No |
| Related treaties and mechanisms | |
|---|---|
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | Yes (Semipalatinsk) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | No |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
| IAEA CSA in force | Yes |
| IAEA AP in force | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the BWC | Yes |