Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is an example to be followed by other States, as it has adhered to all of the seven key treaties in the legal architecture on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in addition to being party to a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaty.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | Yes (Ratified 2019) | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1994) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2002) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 2008, Semipalatinsk) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1995) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2007) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 2007) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 2000) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant | |
| Test | Compliant | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) | Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compliant |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | Yes |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 13.67 (10%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | 1-10 tons |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
Ambassador Akan Rakhmetullin of Kazakhstan served as President of the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in March 2025.
At the meeting, Kazakhstan underscored the severe humanitarian consequences of Soviet-era nuclear testing on its territory, including ‘skyrocketing cancer rates, birth defects, genetic disorders, and persistent environmental degradation’. ‘This is not just Kazakhstan’s tragedy—it is a global warning,’ it said. ‘The international community must work to stigmatize and delegitimize nuclear weapons as unacceptable and inhumane tools of ultimate destruction.’1
Kazakhstan called for ‘the establishment of mechanisms to assist victims, rehabilitate affected areas, and ensure accountability for nuclear harm’. ‘Those who have suffered the consequences of nuclear testing must not be forgotten,’ it said. ‘Based on positive examples in other disarmament treaties, one such possible and fitting solution would be the establishment of an international trust fund.’
Kazakhstan was re-appointed as a co-chair, together with Kiribati, of the TPNW’s informal working group on victim assistance and environmental remediation.
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Kazakhstan warned that ‘the lack of tangible progress under Article VI’ of the NPT has ‘raised doubts about the Treaty’s long-term viability’. It also emphasized that ‘the emergence and strengthening of the TPNW should be perceived as a wake-up call for the nuclear-weapon States’.2
In the general debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025, the President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, called for the relaunching of ‘high-level dialogue among nuclear powers and stronger multilateral action to drastically reduce the looming threat of nuclear weapons’.3
Kazakhstan co-sponsored the 2025 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which welcomed the Treaty’s entry into force and called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.4
Kazakhstan hosts the Sary-Shagan testing range, which was established by the Soviet government in 1956, and which is intermittently used as a destination point for flight-tests with Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). No such tests were conducted in 2025.5 The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor considers this practice incompatible with the TPNW’s prohibition on assisting with the development and possession of nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan has said that the flight tests do not constitute a breach of the TPNW.6
Recommendations
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Kazakhstan should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
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Kazakhstan should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures, including by requesting that Russia refrain from all testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Sary Shagan.