Opposed
Monaco
Monaco participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.
TPNW Status
SIGNATURE
DEPOSIT WITH UNSG
ENTRY INTO FORCE
DECLARATION
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Did not vote |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1995) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1999) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
Monaco has a nuclear-weapons-free defence posture and maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. It can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.
Recommendations
- Monaco should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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