Poland
Poland boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1969) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2007) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2007) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In March 2025, the Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk, said in a speech to the national parliament: ‘Today, it is clear that we would be safer if we had our own nuclear arsenal, that is beyond doubt. In any case, the road to that would be very long and there would have to be a consensus too.’ He also noted that his government was ‘carefully examining’ a French proposal to include Europe under its nuclear umbrella.1
On previous occasions, Poland had indicated that it stood ‘ready’ to host US nuclear weapons on its territory if NATO allies deemed it necessary for strengthening the alliance’s eastern flank in the face of Russian aggression.2
Poland participated in NATO's nuclear strike exercise, known as Steadfast Noon, in October 2025. Poland contributes to NATO’s Conventional Support to Nuclear Operations (CSNO) mission and maintains F-16 aircraft for this purpose.3
Despite openly entertaining the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons, Poland claims to remain committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At the NPT Preparatory Committee in April 2025, it said: ‘While nuclear disarmament remains a long-term goal, the current security environment demands continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, complemented by risk-reduction measures and transparency initiatives.’4
It emphasized that, in its view, ‘a progressive step-by-step approach remains the only realistic way to achieve nuclear disarmament … Other potential approaches and instruments, incompatible with the NPT, will not bring us any closer to our goal and will not enhance the overall security’. It added that ‘an effective deterrence provided by the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, which is fully in line with the obligations under the NPT treaty, is essential for the security of Poland as well as other NATO members in the region’.5
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Poland said: ‘The NPT must be upheld, nuclear risks must be reduced, and transparency must be restored. Poland remains committed to working with all partners to ensure a safer, more secure world—free from the threat of nuclear weapons.’6
The former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former prime minister Hanna Suchocka, and former foreign ministers Andrzej Olechowski and Dariusz Rosati were among the signatories to an open letter in 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).7
Recommendations
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Poland should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Poland should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Poland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.