Poland
Poland boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. Poland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1969) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (In force 2007) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes (In force 2007) |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
In April 2024, the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, said that his country stood ‘ready’ to host US nuclear weapons on its territory if NATO allies deemed it necessary for strengthening the alliance’s eastern flank in the face of Russian aggression. The topic of ‘nuclear sharing’ had been raised bilaterally with the US ‘several times’, he said in a newspaper interview. ‘I must admit that when asked about it, I declared our readiness.’1
Poland participated in NATO's nuclear strike exercise, known as Steadfast Noon, in October 2024. Poland contributes to NATO’s Conventional Support to Nuclear Operations (CSNO) mission and maintains F-16 aircraft for this purpose.2
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee session in July 2024, Poland argued that today’s security environment does not ‘create real incentives for nuclear disarmament efforts’ and that ‘nuclear deterrence remains a legitimate measure’ and ‘one of the tools in preventing nuclear conflict under the current security circumstances worldwide’.3 It also emphasised ‘the uniqueness of the NPT as the only credible instrument’ to reach the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, asserting that recent negative developments with respect to nuclear weapons ‘expose further the obvious weaknesses of the [TPNW] when compared with the balanced approach of the NPT’. Moreover, Poland said that ‘the TPNW seeks to undermine deterrence as a legitimate means to guarantee security’ and that NATO’s nuclear deterrent ‘very much matters for the security of Poland’.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Poland expressed concern that the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is in an especially ‘precarious state due to the erosion of the global security architecture’.5
The former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former prime minister Hanna Suchocka, and former foreign ministers Andrzej Olechowski and Dariusz Rosati were among the signatories to an open letter in 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.6
Recommendations
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Poland should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Poland should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Poland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.