Poland
Poland boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2023. Poland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1969) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (1 Mar 2007) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
In June 2023, it was reported in the Polish press that Poland was seeking to receive US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory at Polish armed forces bases. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said that the request to NATO to participate in the Nuclear Sharing programme was in response to Russian deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.1
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Poland criticised Russia’s continued threats to use nuclear weapons against other States and its recent deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus. ‘This is yet another evidence of Russia’s deliberately applied strategy to undermine the NPT and the rest of the world’s non-proliferation regime,’ it said with reference to the deployment. Poland also described the NPT as ‘the anchor on the whole non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control architecture’ and said that ‘[t]his principle is universally shared even by the supporters of the TPNW.’ ‘In this context, [Poland] would like to underscore the legitimate right of countries to profit from nuclear deterrence in pursuit of their security policy, including as members of freely chosen defensive alliances,’ it added.2
The former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former prime minister Hanna Suchocka, and former foreign ministers Andrzej Olechowski and Dariusz Rosati were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.3
Recommendations
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Poland should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Poland should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Poland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.