Philippines
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, the Philippines said that ‘[w]e must abandon the concept of deterrence and steadfastly work towards decreasing the global stockpile of nuclear weapons’, adding that ‘[n]o goal can justify using weapons that cause total and indiscriminate destruction’. The TPNW ‘aligns with our commitment to humanitarian principles and reinforces Article VI of the NPT’, the Philippines said.[1] It also called on States that have not yet ratified it to do so.[2]
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) | Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compliant |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | 4 (50%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 2001, Bangkok) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1972) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2001) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1973) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (16 Oct 1974) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
The Philippines participated in the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP) in November and December 2023, where it called for the integration of ‘humanitarian principles into our disarmament policies’. ‘Such an integration, emphasising the human cost of nuclear weapons, compels us to actively mitigate harm and prioritise the safeguarding of human life and our environment,’ it said. The Philippines also noted that, guided by the Vienna Action Plan, TPNW States parties had ‘achieved significant milestones’ since the First Meeting of States Parties. In the face of ‘mounting challenges’ to peace and international security, ‘the imperative for the universalisation of the [TPNW] has never been more pressing,’ it said.3
The Philippines was one of the co-sponsors for the 2023 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.4
The Philippines is an interesting example of how TPNW membership and US security guarantees are not as incompatible as is often alleged. In November 2022, US Vice President Kamala Harris travelled to the Philippines to launch ‘new initiatives to strengthen the US-Philippines Alliance’. Washington will defend the Philippines if it comes under attack in the South China Sea, pledged Harris, reaffirming the United States’ ‘unwavering’ commitment.5 A White House statement issued on the occasion said: ‘Now and always, the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Philippines is ironclad.’6
Recommendations
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The Philippines should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
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The Philippines should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.