Russian Federation
Russia has the world's largest nuclear arsenal. In 2023, Russia continued to use the threat of escalation to use of nuclear weapons to prevent NATO involvement in the war in Ukraine. It again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament, and remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 5580 | |
| Retired warheads | 1200 | |
| Warheads available for use | 4380 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 957.4 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 63825 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Ratification withdrawn 2023, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ) |
| HEU stocks | 680 MT (incl 672 MT available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 128.8 tons (Mil)/63.3 tons (Civ) |
Recommendations
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Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Russia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Russia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Russia should reverse its withdrawal of its ratification of the CTBT.