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Russian Federation

Nuclear-armed state

Russia has the world's largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, Russia used the threat of escalation to use of nuclear weapons to prevent NATO involvement in the war in Ukraine. It again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament, and remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

TPNW Status

Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023
Total inventory of warheads 5889
Retired warheads 1400
Stockpiled warheads 4489
Estimated yield (MT) 978.6
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents 65240
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Not compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Not compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Not compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Not compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted no (2023)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted no
Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)
Party to the NPT Yes (Ratified 1970)
Ratified the CTBT No (Withdrew 2023, Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1975)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1997)
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Voluntary offer agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol Partial
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants Yes (Civ)
HEU stocks 672 tons (Mil)/6 tons (Civ)
Plutonium stocks 128.8 tons (Mil)/63.3 tons (Civ)

Latest developments

In August 2022, Russia blocked consensus for adoption of an outcome document at the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).1

Russia, like the other nuclear-armed states, opted not to attend as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. Nevertheless, it issued a statement at the conclusion of the meeting criticising the outcomes. ‘In connection with the desire to put on a permanent basis the efforts to universalise the TPNW, as recorded in the final documents of the conference, we emphasise: Russia does not intend to join this agreement and believes that the Treaty does not establish any universal standards,’ said the statement.2


  • Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.

  • Russia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

  • Russia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

  • Russia should reverse its withdrawal of its ratification of the CTBT.

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