|TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021|
|(a)||Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire||Not compatible|
|Possess or stockpile||Not compatible|
|(c)||Receive transfer or control||Compatible|
|Threaten to use||Not compatible|
|(e)||Assist, encourage or induce||Compatible|
|(f)||Seek or receive assistance||Not compatible|
|(g)||Allow stationing, installation, deployment||Compatible|
|IAEA safeguards and fissile material|
|Safeguards Agreement||Voluntary offer agreement|
|TPNW Art 3(2) deadline||N/A|
|Small Quantities Protocol||No|
|Fissile material production facilities||Yes (Civilian)|
|Highly enriched uranium stocks||672 tons (m), 6 tons (c)|
|Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)||128.8 tons/63.3 tons|
|Related treaties and regimes|
|Party to the BWC||Yes|
|Party to the CWC||Yes|
|Party to the PTBT||Yes|
|Ratified the CTBT||Yes (Annex 2 state)|
|Party to the NPT||Yes|
|Party to a NWFZ||No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)|
|Member of the CD||Yes|
In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Russia, together with China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.1
In a national statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Russia said: 'We understand the views of those who advocate for an immediate and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons. We share the noble goal of achieving a nuclear-free world. At the same time, attempts to impose on the states that possess nuclear weapons a complete and unconditional elimination of their arsenals are hardly practicable without taking into account current strategic realities and legitimate security interests. For these reasons, we consider the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as misguided and counter-productive in its essence. It only aggravates the situation provoking deep divisions in the international community and undermining the foundations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).'2
- Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. Russia should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Russia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Russia should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Russia should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Approximately 546 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s 126 siloed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including the SS-18, SS-19 Mod 4, and SS-27 Mods 1 and 2. These siloed missiles can carry single or multiple warheads to ranges greater than 10,000 kilometres. It is assumed that nearly all of Russia’s siloed ICBMs are on alert.
Approximately 639 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s roughly 180 mobile ICBMs, including the SS-25 and SS-27 Mods 1 and 2. These mobile missiles can carry single or multiple warheads to ranges greater than 10,000 kilometres. It is assumed that nearly all of Russia’s mobile ICBMs are on alert.
Approximately 90 non-strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s mobile short-range dual-capable ground-launched delivery systems, including the Iskander-M short-range groundlaunched ballistic missile and the 9M729 intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed but kept in central storage.
Approximately 800 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s 10 operational ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), including the Delta IV-, Borei-, and Borei-A-classes. Each SSBN can carry 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), each of which can carry multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). About 576 of these warheads are currently deployed.
A large portion of Russia’s 935 non-strategic navy warheads (possibly about 410) are assigned to Russia’s eight operational cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), including the Antey- (Oscar) and Yasen- (Severodvinsk) classes, as well as Russia’s sizable attack submarine fleet, including Shchuka- (Akula), Barrakuda- (Sierra) and Paltus/Varshavyanka- (Kilo) classes.
The remainder of Russia’s 935 non-strategic navy warheads (possibly 525) are assigned to Russia’s surface ships and naval aircraft, including Kirov- and Slava-class cruisers, Udaloy- and Admiral Gorshkov-class destroyers, Gepard- and Admiral Gregorovich-class frigates, and Buyan-M and Tarantul-class corvettes. Weapons include cruise missiles such as the Kalibr anti-ship and land-attack systems, depth bombs, and torpedoes. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed on the launchers but are kept on land in storage depots.
Approximately 580 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s two types of long-range heavy bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95MS Bear. About 200 of these warheads are thought to be deployed at Russia’s two strategic air bases at Engels and Ukrainka.
Approximately 500 non-strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s various types of Tu-22M3 Backfire-C intermediate-range bombers, and fighter-bombers such as the Su-24M Fencer-D and Su-34 Fullback. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed, but are kept in central storage.
Approximately 387 non-strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s air, coast, and missile defence systems, including the A-135, P-800, and the S-300 and S-400. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed, but are kept in central storage.