Russian Federation
Russia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Not compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | No |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | N/A |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 678 000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | 128 000 kg/63 000 kg |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
In a joint statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Russia, together with China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.1
In a national statement in the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Russia said: 'We understand the views of those who advocate for an immediate and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons. We share the noble goal of achieving a nuclear-free world. At the same time, attempts to impose on the states that possess nuclear weapons a complete and unconditional elimination of their arsenals are hardly practicable without taking into account current strategic realities and legitimate security interests. For these reasons, we consider the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as misguided and counter-productive in its essence. It only aggravates the situation provoking deep divisions in the international community and undermining the foundations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).'2
Recommendations
- Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. Russia should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Russia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Russia should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Russia should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Approximately 1,588 strategic warheads in Russia’s useable stockpile are deployed, and 2,889 strategic and non-strategic warheads are in storage. Both the United States’ and Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenals are capped by the New START treaty, which limits the number of strategic warheads and launchers that each country is allowed to deploy (though not possess). A breakdown is provided below of Russia’s usable stockpile of warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned. In contrast to many other nuclear-armed states, Russia has a significant number of nuclear-capable non-strategic delivery systems.
Approximately 546 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s 126 siloed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including the SS-18, SS-19 Mod 4, and SS-27 Mods 1 and 2. These siloed missiles can carry single or multiple warheads to ranges greater than 10,000 kilometres. It is assumed that nearly all of Russia’s siloed ICBMs are on alert.
Approximately 639 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s roughly 180 mobile ICBMs, including the SS-25 and SS-27 Mods 1 and 2. These mobile missiles can carry single or multiple warheads to ranges greater than 10,000 kilometres. It is assumed that nearly all of Russia’s mobile ICBMs are on alert.
Approximately 90 non-strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s mobile short-range dual-capable ground-launched delivery systems, including the Iskander-M short-range groundlaunched ballistic missile and the 9M729 intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed but kept in central storage.
Approximately 800 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s 10 operational ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), including the Delta IV-, Borei-, and Borei-A-classes. Each SSBN can carry 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), each of which can carry multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). About 576 of these warheads are currently deployed.
A large portion of Russia’s 935 non-strategic navy warheads (possibly about 410) are assigned to Russia’s eight operational cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), including the Antey- (Oscar) and Yasen- (Severodvinsk) classes, as well as Russia’s sizable attack submarine fleet, including Shchuka- (Akula), Barrakuda- (Sierra) and Paltus/Varshavyanka- (Kilo) classes.
The remainder of Russia’s 935 non-strategic navy warheads (possibly 525) are assigned to Russia’s surface ships and naval aircraft, including Kirov- and Slava-class cruisers, Udaloy- and Admiral Gorshkov-class destroyers, Gepard- and Admiral Gregorovich-class frigates, and Buyan-M and Tarantul-class corvettes. Weapons include cruise missiles such as the Kalibr anti-ship and land-attack systems, depth bombs, and torpedoes. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed on the launchers but are kept on land in storage depots.
Approximately 580 strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s two types of long-range heavy bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95MS Bear. About 200 of these warheads are thought to be deployed at Russia’s two strategic air bases at Engels and Ukrainka.
Approximately 500 non-strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s various types of Tu-22M3 Backfire-C intermediate-range bombers, and fighter-bombers such as the Su-24M Fencer-D and Su-34 Fullback. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed, but are kept in central storage.
Approximately 387 non-strategic warheads are assigned to Russia’s air, coast, and missile defence systems, including the A-135, P-800, and the S-300 and S-400. It is believed that these warheads are not currently deployed, but are kept in central storage.
Development, production, or acquisition of nuclear-weapons systems in 2021
Russia is currently in the late stages of a decades-long modernization programme to replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear systems with more modern ones. In December 2021, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu declared that modern weapons and equipment now make up 89% of Russia’s nuclear triad. See the tabs below for Russia's nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021, broken down by land-delivered, sea-delivered, and air-delivered systems.
- Russia has started preparing silos to replace the SS-18 with the SS-29 (Sarmat) heavy ICBM. Test launches have been delayed but, once completed, will be followed by series production. Sarmat will be able to carry a large number of MIRVs, possibly 10 each, as well as penetration aids in order to evade adversarial missile defences.2
- Russia is in the midst of deploying the new Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle atop modified SS-19 ICBMs at Dombarovsky, where the first six-missile regiment became operational in 2021.3 A second regiment will reportedly be completed by the end of 2027.
- In 2021, the Russian Navy accepted its fifth improved Borei SSBN – the Knyaz Oleg – for sea trials.4 The Navy is expected to receive the remainder of a total of 10 Borei boats over the coming years. These new SSBNs, along with their new Bulava (SS-N-32) SLBMs, will eventually replace Russia’s Soviet-era Delta IV SSBNs.
- Russia is developing its new Poseidon long-range nuclear-powered torpedo, which is designed to deliver nuclear warheads to intercontinental distances. In 2021, commercial satellite imagery showed new infrastructure under construction that is possibly meant to store and test the Poseidon.5 The first submarine to carry these weapons – the special-purpose K-329 Belgorod – underwent sea trials in 2021.6 Subsequent submarines to carry the Poseidon will be of the Khabarovsk class.
- After several years of delay, in 2021 the Russian Navy accepted the lead ship of its improved Yasen-M-class attack submarine – known as Kazan – into service.7 These submarines will be able to launch several different types of non-strategic naval nuclear weapons, including the Kalibr land-attack cruise missile.
- Russia is upgrading its aging Tu-160 and Tu-95MS strategic bombers with new engines, avionics, and in some cases, entirely new airframes. The first upgraded Tu-160M with a new NK-32-02 engine began its flight-testing programme in March 2021.8 The upgraded bombers are capable of launching a new nuclear air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), the AS-23B (Kh-102).
- Russia is developing a next-generation nuclear-capable bomber, known as PAK-DA; a demonstration model of the new aircraft is expected to be ready in 2023, with initial production beginning in 2027.9
- The Russian Aerospace Force is in the midst of receiving its first batch of nuclear-capable Su-57 fighter jets, the full complement of which is expected to be delivered by the end of 2024. These aircraft will be able to launch hypersonic missiles similar to the Kinzhal, a new air-launched ballistic missile that can be launched from specially-modified MiG-31K aircraft.10