Russian Federation
Russia has the world's largest nuclear arsenal. Along with all other nuclear-armed states, Russia boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 5449 | |
| Retired warheads | 1150 | |
| Warheads available for use | 4299 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 953 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 63532 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Withdrew 2023, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Voluntary offer agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | Partial (In force 2007) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Non-compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | 680 Mt (672 Mt available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 193 Mt (88 Mt available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In 2024, Russia continued to use the risk of escalation to use of nuclear weapons to prevent NATO involvement in the war in Ukraine. In November, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, signed a decree updating his country’s formal policy on the possible use of nuclear weapons. The revised nuclear doctrine outlines a wider range of contingencies that might trigger the use of Russian nuclear weapons, and appears to lower the threshold for such use.1
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, spoke of the aspiration of ‘Anglo-Saxon strategists’ to defeat Russia. ‘I will not dwell on the futility and danger of the very idea of trying to fight Russia, a nuclear power, to the bitter end,’ he said.2
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in November 2024, Russia reiterated its opposition to the TPNW. ‘We respect the incentives of those who seek a shortcut to “nuclear zero”, but we are convinced that progress is possible only on the basis of a realistic, calibrated and step-by-step approach that promotes international peace and stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all,’ it said. ‘In our view, the [TPNW] does not meet these criteria and cannot serve as a framework for the implementation of practical measures to reduce nuclear weapons.’ Russia also argued that the TPNW does not establish ‘universal norms’ or contribute to the development of customary international law. ‘Furthermore, we are convinced that the claims that the TPNW is closely related to and complementary to the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)] in promoting and encouraging nuclear disarmament are unfounded,’ it said, adding that ‘there is no reason for us to support the TPNW and other radical initiatives in this area’. It alleged that the ‘persistent promotion of such ideas’, under current circumstances, is counterproductive and provokes further splits among states with and without nuclear weapons, ‘threatening to cause irreversible damage to the NPT regime’.3
Recommendations
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Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Russia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Russia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Russia should reverse its withdrawal of its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).