Opposed
Russian Federation
Nuclear-armed state (6,372 nuclear warheads)
Russia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Russia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
| TPNW status |
|---|
| Not signed, not ratified, not acceded |
| Compatibility with prohibitions in TPNW Article 1(1) | ||
|---|---|---|
| Art 1(1)(a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| Art 1(1)(b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| Art 1(1)(c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| Art 1(1)(d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| Art 1(1)(e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| Art 1(1)(f) | Seek or receive assistance | Not compatible |
| Art 1(1)(g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| Vote on negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) | No (N/A) |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Last vote on UNGA resolution | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 679,000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks (military/civilian) | 128,000 kg/61,300 kg |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
| IAEA CSA in force | Voluntary offer agreement |
| IAEA AP in force | Partial |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
Latest developments
Russia voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2019, and 2020. In First Committee of the 2020 UN General Assembly Russia delivered a statement attacking the TPNW for potentially 'destroying' the non-proliferation regime, asserting that it is not based on the principles of the NPT and 'cannot' achieve nuclear disarmament. See: bit.ly/3nNYbpb.
Recommendations
- Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. Russia should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- Russia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
- Russia should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Russia should bring into force a full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA. It should also extend New START.
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