Russian Federation
Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, similar in size to the United States’. Along with all other nuclear-armed States, Russia boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 5449 | |
| Retired warheads | 1150 | |
| Warheads available for use | 4299 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 953 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 63532 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Ratification withdrawn 2023, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Voluntary offer agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | Partial (In force 2007) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | 680 Mt (672 Mt available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 193 Mt (88 Mt available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In August 2025, Russia announced that it would no longer uphold its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1987. Its decision followed an announcement by the United States to redeploy two nuclear-armed submarines close to Russia.1
In October and November 2025, Russia tested two of its novel nuclear-weapons delivery vehicles, the nuclear-powered Burevestnik missile and the Poseidon nuclear-powered uninhabited underwater vehicle. The tests coincided with NATO’s annual nuclear strike exercise, Steadfast Noon, and Russia’s own routine nuclear drills.2
Responding to an announcement by US President Donald J. Trump to ‘immediately’ resume US nuclear testing, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, said in November 2025 that his country would ‘respond in kind’ if the United States were to conduct ‘an actual nuclear test’.3
In a joint statement with Belarus at the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Russia argued that NATO countries’ ‘hostile actions’ and the alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangement have had a ‘severe negative influence on [the] politico-military and strategic environment’, posing the risk of ‘a direct military confrontation between the nuclear powers’.4
In a national statement to the meeting, Russia accused Western States of seeking to secure ‘global dominance and overwhelming military and strategic superiority’ instead of searching ‘for mutually acceptable solutions in the spirit of genuine multilateralism and taking into account each other’s concerns’. This has ‘brought about a dangerous increase in conflicts between the countries possessing both major military capabilities and nuclear weapons’, it argued, warning of ‘the potentially disastrous threat of a direct armed confrontation between nuclear-weapon States’.5
In February 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia expired, without any plans for a successor treaty. New START was the last-remaining bilateral arms control agreement in place between the two States that possess by far the largest nuclear arsenals. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, had proposed in September 2025 that both parties continue observing the Treaty’s central quantitative limits for at least one year, but the United States did not accept this proposal.6
In 2024, President Putin signed a decree updating Russia’s formal policy on the possible use of nuclear weapons. The revised nuclear doctrine outlines a wider range of contingencies that might trigger the use of Russian nuclear weapons, and appears to lower the threshold for such use.7
Recommendations
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Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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Russia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Russia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Russia should reverse its withdrawal of its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).