Slovakia
Slovakia boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1993) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2005) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2005) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1993) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In the Conference on Disarmament in February 2025, the Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Juraj Blanár, warned: ‘The current arms control architecture—or, I should say, its remnants—no longer provides the stability and predictability that are needed. Under such circumstances, States are inclined to focus on their own security by building up military forces and developing new types of weapons, thereby risking new arms races, including in the nuclear domain.’1
In the general debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025, the President of Slovakia, Peter Pellegrini, referred to a recent visit to Hiroshima. ‘It was a deeply moving experience and a painful reminder of the destruction in a single, brief moment,’ he said. ‘All this teaches us important lessons of the past. Hiroshima and Nagasaki must be the last places where nuclear bombs were used. It obliges us to denounce any threats of nuclear destruction.’2
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Slovakia said: ‘The global arms control system is eroding. Disarmament fora remain paralysed. And international institutions are being challenged. We must use all available tools to reverse these dangerous trends.’3
Recommendations
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Slovakia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Slovakia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Slovakia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.