Slovenia
Slovenia boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2006) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2006) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1992) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Slovenia acknowledged that ‘the prospects for nuclear arms control and disarmament’ are diminishing. At the same time, it emphasized that ‘there is no alternative to the NPT, [which] we consider the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential component of our nuclear disarmament efforts’.1
Slovenia also asserted that the ‘deterrence and defensive posture’ of NATO—a military alliance of which it is a member—‘are defensive, proportionate, and fully in line with the UN Charter and international law’. In particular, it claimed that ‘NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements respect the provisions of the NPT’.
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Slovenia called on nuclear-weapon States ‘to meet their disarmament obligations [under the NPT], enhance transparency and risk reduction measures, and re-engage in a substantive arms control dialogue’.2 It said that ‘[p]reventing any use of nuclear weapons must remain our highest priority’.3
Recommendations
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Slovenia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Slovenia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Slovenia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.