Syrian Arab Republic
The Syrian Arab Republic participated in the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. It has also never cast a vote on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW. It maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1969) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1992) | |
| AP with the IAEA | No | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | No (Signed 1972) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Acceded 2013) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Never voted |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Did not vote |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Did not vote |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | At least 1 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No (Terminated) |
Latest developments
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee session in July 2024, Syria said that the ‘nuclear non-proliferation regime will remain in jeopardy until the universality of the NPT is achieved’. It voiced concern about Israel’s nuclear weapons and its threats to use them, ‘without accountability, pressure or even clear condemnation from the international community’.1
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Syria, Bassam al-Sabbagh, said that Israel must ‘be compelled to eliminate its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, join relevant international treaties and conventions, and place its installations under international monitoring’.2
At a high-level UN event to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2024, Syria delivered a statement on behalf of the Arab Group expressing deep concern at the continued possession and development of nuclear weapons by certain states and calling for the full implementation of the NPT.3
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Syria said that ‘the elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use or threat of use’.4
Recommendations
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Syria should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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Syria should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
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Syria should adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and ratify the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).