Switzerland
In March 2024, Switzerland’s federal council decided that ‘Switzerland will not join the TPNW for the time being’ based on factors including ‘recent security policy developments in Europe and globally’. It reached similar decisions in 2018 and 2019.[1] In response to the decision, several non-governmental organisations based in Switzerland, including ICAN, launched a popular initiative to advance Switzerland’s accession to the TPNW.[2]
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Abstained (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | Yes |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | 4 (0%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Abstained |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1977) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1976) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (6 Sep 1978) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | <2 kg |
Latest developments
Switzerland voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2023. Switzerland maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, Switzerland expressed concern at ‘the continued erosion of the nuclear arms control architecture’, the lack of progress in disarmament and the modernisation of nuclear arsenals. ‘The norms against nuclear weapons must be further strengthened,’ it said. ‘This concerns firstly the norm against their use.’3
Switzerland observed the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in 2022 and the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) in 2023. At the 2MSP, Switzerland explained that its decision to observe was ‘motivated by the fact that we share the humanitarian and disarmament objectives of the Treaty, even if we have a number of outstanding questions regarding some of its aspects’. It said that it was ‘important to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Treaty and its stakeholders’ and that the meeting would ‘inform our evaluation related to a possible adhesion to this instrument’. It also expressed its hope that the TPNW would ‘be able to contribute effectively to the implementation of Article VI of the [NPT]’. ‘The centrality of the NPT and the fact that the aim of the TPNW should be to reinforce the NPT and its implementation play a central role in our assessment of this instrument,’ it said. ‘Regardless of the result of the forthcoming Swiss decision on possibly adhering to the TPNW, we intend to continue to engage constructively with the TPNW …’.4
According to a report by the Swiss newspaper Le Temps in April 2023, the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, met with Switzerland’s Defence Minister, Viola Amherd, to try to dissuade Switzerland from signing and ratifying the TPNW.5
Recommendations
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Switzerland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.