United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has the world's fifth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2023, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 225 | |
| Retired warheads | 0 | |
| Warheads available for use | 225 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 22.5 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 1500 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Non-compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No (4 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1968) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Civ) |
| HEU stocks | 23 MT (incl 22 MT available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 3.2 tons (Mil)/116.1 tons (Civ) |
Latest developments
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, the United Kingdom said that it remained ‘committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all’, noting that it had made ‘a significant contribution’ to the reduction in global nuclear stockpiles and had ‘de-targeted and de-alerted’ its weapons. ‘Only gradual multilateral disarmament, negotiated within the framework of the NPT, will get us to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons,’ it argued.1
In a joint statement with France and the United States, the United Kingdom explained its continued opposition to the TPNW: ‘Our three countries have made clear many times why we do not view the [TPNW] as an effective disarmament measure. We stress that this Treaty does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW reflects, or in any way contributes to, the development of customary international law.’2
All of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons are currently based in Scotland, where political support for the abolition of nuclear weapons remains strong. In June 2023, the Scottish government wrote that it ‘is committed to supporting and promoting nuclear disarmament’ and proposed that, should Scotland gain independence from the United Kingdom, its permanent written constitution would contain ‘a constitutional prohibition on nuclear weapons being based in Scotland’.3
Recommendations
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The United Kingdom should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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The United Kingdom should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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The United Kingdom should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.