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Opposed

United States of America

Nuclear-armed state (NATO)

The United States has the world's second largest nuclear arsenal. Along with all other nuclear-armed states, the United States boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Since then, it has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

TPNW Status

SIGNATURE
DEPOSIT WITH UNSG
ENTRY INTO FORCE
DECLARATION
Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024
Total inventory of warheads 5270
Retired warheads 1562
Warheads available for use 3708
Estimated yield (MT) 857.6
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents 57173
TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: compatibility in 2024
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Non-compatible
Test Non-compatible
Possess or stockpile Compatible
(b) Transfer Non-compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Non-compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Non-compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted no (2024)
Participated in 2MSP (2023) No
2MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted no
Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No (1 of 5 NSA protocols)
Party to the NPT Yes (Ratified 1970)
Ratified the CTBT No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1975)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1997)
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Voluntary offer agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol N/A
Additional Protocol Partial (In force 2009)
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants Yes (Civ)
HEU stocks 483 Mt (361 Mt for weapons)
Plutonium stocks 87.6 Mt (38.4 Mt for weapons)

Latest developments

In March 2024, the then-President of the United States, Joe Biden, approved a highly classified strategic plan, known as the ‘Nuclear Employment Guidance’, reorienting the country’s nuclear strategy to focus on China’s rapid expansion in its nuclear arsenal. The plan also directed US forces to prepare for possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia and North Korea.1

In July 2024, the United States disclosed for the first time since 2021 the total number of nuclear warheads in its military stockpile (3,748) and retired warheads awaiting dismantlement (approximately 2,000) as of September 2023. ‘Increasing the transparency of States’ nuclear stockpiles is important to non-proliferation and disarmament efforts,’ it said.2 The figures also revealed that the United States dismantled only 69 nuclear warheads in the 2023 fiscal year, representing the smallest annual reduction in the inventory since 1994.3

At a high-level UN event to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2024, the United States said that past achievements in the field of arms control are now ‘at risk as some turn away from the tools that have held back the possibility of nuclear war’. However, it also recognised the need ‘to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent’, and noted that it ‘extends deterrence to our allies and partners so they feel no need to pursue nuclear weapons in their own defence’.4

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in November 2024, the United States, France, andt the United Kingdom reiterated their opposition to the TPNW. ‘Our three countries do not consider the TPNW to be an effective disarmament measure,’ they said in a joint statement. ‘We stress that the TPNW does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any arguments that the TPNW reflects or in any way contributes to the development of customary international law.’5

Recommendations

  • The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.

  • The United States should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

  • The United States should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

  • The United States should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).


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