United States of America
The United States has the world's second largest nuclear arsenal. In 2023, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 5270 | |
| Retired warheads | 1562 | |
| Warheads available for use | 3708 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 857.6 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 57173 | |
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Non-compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No (1 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Mil, Civ) |
| HEU stocks | 483.4 MT (incl 361 MT available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 79.8 tons (Mil)/8 tons (Civ) |
Latest developments
In May 2023, the US President, Joe Biden, visited the Japanese city of Hiroshima for a G7 Summit, but offered no apology for his country’s decision to attack the city with an atomic bomb in 1945, which claimed more than 140,000 lives. ‘Being in this city and visiting the memorial … was a powerful reminder of the devastating reality of nuclear war and our shared responsibility to never cease our efforts to build for peace,’ he told reporters, adding that G7 leaders had reiterated their ‘commitment to continuing to work toward a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons’.1
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2023, the United States reiterated its opposition to the TPNW in a joint statement with France and the United Kingdom: ‘Our three countries have made clear many times why we do not view the [TPNW] as an effective disarmament measure. We stress that this Treaty does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW reflects, or in any way contributes to, the development of customary international law.’2
In April 2023, the US Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton introduced the Nuclear Weapons Abolition and Conversion Act of 2023, a proposed law to ‘direct the United States to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and convert nuclear weapons industry resources and personnel to purposes relating to addressing the climate crisis, and for other purposes’. It was co-sponsored by 11 Members of Congress and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs but not passed by the House of Representatives or Senate.3
Recommendations
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The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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The United States should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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The United States should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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The United States should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).