United States of America
The United States has the world’s second-largest nuclear arsenal, similar in size to Russia’s. Along with all other nuclear-armed States, the United States boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. It has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2025. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 5277 | |
| Retired warheads | 1577 | |
| Warheads available for use | 3700 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 894.7 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 59644 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No (1 of 5 NSA protocols) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Voluntary offer agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | Partial (In force 2009) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Non-compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | 481 Mt (361 Mt available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 87.6 Mt (38.4 Mt available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In January 2025, the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, expressed support for nuclear arms control negotiations with China and Russia. ‘Tremendous amounts of money are being spent on nuclear, and the destructive capability is something that we don’t even want to talk about,’ he said. ‘So, we want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible.’ Russia responded that it wanted to resume a nuclear dialogue ‘as soon as possible’.1
In June 2025, the United States joined Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities in a war that lasted for 12 days, ostensibly with the aim of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. However, there was no evidence to suggest that Iran had weaponized its nuclear programme or enriched its uranium to weapons-grade. Attacks on Iran resumed February 2026, with Israel and the United States repeating their claims about the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
In the general debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2025, President Trump said: ‘We want to have a cessation of the development of nuclear weapons … If we ever use them, the world literally might come to an end. There would be no United Nations to be talking about. There would be no nothing.’2
‘There is no more serious danger to our planet today than the most powerful and destructive weapons ever devised by man, of which the United States, as you know, has many,’ he said. ‘Just as I did in my first term, I’ve made containing these threats a top priority, starting with the nation of Iran.’
In October 2025, President Trump announced that the United States would resume nuclear testing for the first time since the 1990s. ‘Because of other countries’ testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately,’ he wrote on social media. However, no nuclear test explosions have since been conducted.3
In February 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia expired with no plans for a successor treaty. New START was the last-remaining bilateral arms control agreement in place between the two States that possess by far the largest nuclear arsenals.4
Recommendations
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The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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The United States should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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The United States should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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The United States should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).