United States of America
The United States has the world's second largest nuclear arsenal. Along with all other nuclear-armed states, the United States boycotted the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. It has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2024. It may sign and ratify the TPNW at any time but will have to destroy its nuclear weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan and make other changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
TPNW Status
| Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Total inventory of warheads | 5277 | |
| Retired warheads | 1577 | |
| Warheads available for use | 3700 | |
| Estimated yield (MT) | 894.7 | |
| Hiroshima-bomb equivalents | 59644 | |
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No (1 of 5 NSA protocols) | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Voluntary offer agreement | |
| AP with the IAEA | Partial (In force 2009) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Non-compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Non-compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Non-compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Non-compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted no |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | Yes (Civilian) |
| HEU stocks | 483 Mt (361 Mt available for weapons) |
| Plutonium stocks | 87.6 Mt (38.4 Mt available for weapons) |
| SQP with the IAEA | N/A |
Latest developments
In March 2024, the then-President of the United States, Joe Biden, approved a highly classified strategic plan, known as the ‘Nuclear Employment Guidance’, reorienting the country’s nuclear strategy to focus on China’s rapid expansion in its nuclear arsenal. The plan also directed US forces to prepare for possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia and North Korea.1
In July 2024, the United States disclosed for the first time since 2021 the total number of nuclear warheads in its military stockpile (3,748) and retired warheads awaiting dismantlement (approximately 2,000) as of September 2023. ‘Increasing the transparency of States’ nuclear stockpiles is important to non-proliferation and disarmament efforts,’ it said.2 The figures also revealed that the United States dismantled only 69 nuclear warheads in the 2023 fiscal year, representing the smallest annual reduction in the inventory since 1994.3
At a high-level UN event to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2024, the United States said that past achievements in the field of arms control are now ‘at risk as some turn away from the tools that have held back the possibility of nuclear war’. However, it also recognised the need ‘to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent’, and noted that it ‘extends deterrence to our allies and partners so they feel no need to pursue nuclear weapons in their own defence’.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in November 2024, the United States, France, andt the United Kingdom reiterated their opposition to the TPNW. ‘Our three countries do not consider the TPNW to be an effective disarmament measure,’ they said in a joint statement. ‘We stress that the TPNW does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any arguments that the TPNW reflects or in any way contributes to the development of customary international law.’5
Recommendations
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The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
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The United States should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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The United States should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
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The United States should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).