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United States of America

Nuclear-armed state (NATO)

The United States boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.

TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Not compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Not compatible
(b) Transfer Not compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage or induce Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Not compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible
TPNW voting and participation
2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW
2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW
2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW Voted no
Participated in TPNW negotiations No
Share of women in TPNW negotiations N/A
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards Agreement Voluntary offer agreement
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol Partial
Fissile material production facilities Yes (Civilian)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 483.4 tons (m), 16 tons (c) - alternativt 566 totalt
Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) 79.8 tons/8 tons
Related treaties and regimes
Party to the BWC Yes
Party to the CWC Yes
Party to the PTBT Yes
Ratified the CTBT No (Signed, Annex 2 state)
Party to the NPT Yes
Party to a NWFZ No (1 of 5 NSA protocols)
Member of the CD Yes

Latest developments

The change of the US administration in January 2021 led to the extension of the New START treaty with Russia and resumption of a strategic dialogue with Russia, a proposed dialogoe with China, and an effort to re-engage with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

In a joint statement in the First Committee ofthe 2021 UN General Assembly, the United States, together with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.1

Support, primarily through the Back from the Brink campaign, for the ICAN Cities Appeal continues to build in the US, with Boston, Minneapolis, and New York City among the latest endorsers. In December 2021, New York City resolved to pursue divestment of public funds from nuclear weapon makers.2


  • The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
  • The United States should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
  • The United States should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. The United States should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The United States should also ratify the CTBT, and return to compliance with the JCPOA.

Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022

Total inventory of warheads
Retired warheads
Usable stockpile of warheads
Total yield of usable stockpile
Hiroshima-bomb equivalents
USA silo

Approximately 800 strategic warheads are assigned to siloed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which can carry single warheads – either the W78 or W87 – to a range of approximately 13,000 kilometres. Around 400 of these warheads are currently deployed on alert across 400 silos, while an additional 50 silos are kept ‘warm’ to load stored missiles if necessary.

USA Ubat

Approximately 1,920 strategic warheads are assigned to 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each of which can carry up to 20 Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Each of these SLBMs can carry up to eight nuclear multiple independently- targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) warheads: either the 90 kiloton W76-1, the 8 kiloton W76-2, or the 455 kiloton W88. Around 945 of these warheads are currently deployed on 12 operational SSBNs, although only four or five of those are thought to be on constant ‘hard alert’ in their designated patrol areas.


Approximately 788 strategic warheads – including the B61 gravity bomb and the W80-1 carried by the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) – are assigned for delivery by B-2A and B52-H heavy bombers. Around 300 of these warheads are currently deployed at long-range strategic air bases in the United States.

Another 200 or so non-strategic B61 gravity bombs are assigned for delivery by NATO and US dual-capable aircraft. Approximately 100 of these warheads are currently deployed at air bases in Europe.

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