United States of America
The United States boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and remains unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the Treaty.
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Not compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Not compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Not compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| 2021 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2020 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2019 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| 2018 UNGA resolution on TPNW | Voted no |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations | No |
| Share of women in TPNW negotiations | N/A |
| Vote on adoption of treaty text | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards Agreement | Voluntary offer agreement |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | Partial |
| Fissile material production facilities | Yes |
| Highly enriched uranium stocks | 562 000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks (mil/civ) | 79 700 kg/8000 kg |
| Related treaties and regimes | |
|---|---|
| Party to the BWC | Yes |
| Party to the CWC | Yes |
| Party to the PTBT | Yes |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes |
| Party to a NWFZ | No (1 of 5 NSA protocols) |
| Member of the CD | Yes |
Latest developments
The change of the US administration in January 2021 led to the extension of the New START treaty with Russia and resumption of a strategic dialogue with Russia, a proposed dialogoe with China, and an effort to re-engage with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
In a joint statement in the First Committee ofthe 2021 UN General Assembly, the United States, together with China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, reiterated its opposition to the TPNW.1
Support, primarily through the Back from the Brink campaign, for the ICAN Cities Appeal continues to build in the US, with Boston, Minneapolis, and New York City among the latest endorsers. In December 2021, New York City resolved to pursue divestment of public funds from nuclear weapon makers.2
Recommendations
- The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
- The United States should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- The United States should implement in good faith its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. The United States should upgrade to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and requisite Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The United States should also ratify the CTBT, and return to compliance with the JCPOA.
Inventory of nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2022
Approximately 1,644 strategic and 100 non-strategic warheads in the United States’ usable stockpile are deployed, and 1,964 strategic and non-strategic warheads are in storage. Both the United States’ and Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenals are capped by the New START treaty, which limits the number of warheads and launchers that each country is allowed to deploy (though not possess). A breakdown is provided below of the United States’ usable stockpile of warheads by the type of delivery vehicles to which they are assigned.
Approximately 800 strategic warheads are assigned to siloed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which can carry single warheads – either the W78 or W87 – to a range of approximately 13,000 kilometres. Around 400 of these warheads are currently deployed on alert across 400 silos, while an additional 50 silos are kept ‘warm’ to load stored missiles if necessary.
Approximately 1,920 strategic warheads are assigned to 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each of which can carry up to 20 Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Each of these SLBMs can carry up to eight nuclear multiple independently- targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) warheads: either the 90 kiloton W76-1, the 8 kiloton W76-2, or the 455 kiloton W88. Around 945 of these warheads are currently deployed on 12 operational SSBNs, although only four or five of those are thought to be on constant ‘hard alert’ in their designated patrol areas.
Approximately 788 strategic warheads – including the B61 gravity bomb and the W80-1 carried by the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) – are assigned for delivery by B-2A and B52-H heavy bombers. Around 300 of these warheads are currently deployed at long-range strategic air bases in the United States.
Another 200 or so non-strategic B61 gravity bombs are assigned for delivery by NATO and US dual-capable aircraft. Approximately 100 of these warheads are currently deployed at air bases in Europe.
Development, production, or acquisition of nuclear-weapons systems in 2021
The United States is in the midst of a wide-ranging modernization campaign to upgrade or replace every nuclear warhead and delivery system in the US nuclear arsenal. It is expected that the cost of this campaign could reach up to $2 trillion, and it will serve to keep nuclear weapons in the US nuclear arsenal until at least 2080. See the tabs below for the United States' nuclear-weapon systems under development, production, or acquisition in 2021, broken down by land-delivered, sea-delivered, and air-delivered systems.
- The United States is replacing its current force of Minuteman III ICBMs with a brand-new ICBM fleet known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). This is so, despite the fact that the GBSD imposes significant budgetary and logistical strains on the Pentagon, and that there is no public evidence indicating that the Minuteman III ICBMs could not be life-extended at a much lower cost.1
- The United States is upgrading its Weapons Storage Areas at its ICBM bases; construction at the first base, F. E. Warren, is underway and was due to be completed in the course of 2022.2
- The United States is developing a new class of SSBNs, known as the Columbia-class, which will be significantly quieter than the current Ohio-class. Each Columbia SSBN will be equipped with 16 missile tubes, four less than Ohio SSBNs.3
- The US Navy is currently replacing the original Trident II D5 SLBM with a life-extended and upgraded version known as Trident II D5LE, which will reportedly have greater range and accuracy than the original system. A second modification is in development.
- The National Nuclear Security Administration is currently life-extending one of its Trident warheads (the W88) and completed the First Production Unit of the new W88 Alt 370 in 2021.4
- The United States plans to build a new warhead (the W93) to supplement its current sea-launched nuclear weapon capability. This warhead programme would support a parallel warhead replacement programme in the United Kingdom.
- At the behest of the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is developing a non-strategic submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), a capability that was previously retired in 2011. However, it remains unclear at this stage whether the Biden administration will continue the project.
- The United States is developing a new heavy bomber, the B-21 Raider, which is expected to enter service in the mid-2020s. The new bomber will result in an increase in the total number of US nuclear bomber bases.5
- The United States is in the final stage of certifying its F-35A stealth fighters for a nuclear strike role.
- The US Air Force is developing a new nuclear ALCM known as the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), which will carry the W80-4 warhead, replacing the Air Force’s current AGM-86B ALCM.
- In 2021, the US Air Force completed its final inert drop test of the new B61-12 gravity bomb using the F-35A.6 The B61-12 will have a variable yield, as well as a guided tail kit to increase accuracy, and will be integrated onto the B-2 and B-21 bombers and F-35A, F-15E, F-16C/D, and PA-200 fighters.
- The United States is upgrading the arming, fuzing, and firing component for its ballistic missile warheads to improve their targeting effectiveness. The Navy’s W76-1/Mk4A warhead recently completed the upgrade,7 which will also be added to the Air Force’s ICBM warheads.
- The United States is upgrading and adding nuclear weapons production facilities to increase production of plutonium cores (pits) for new nuclear warheads.