|TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2021|
|(a)||Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire||Compatible|
|Possess or stockpile||Compatible|
|(c)||Receive transfer or control||Compatible|
|Threaten to use||Compatible|
|(e)||Assist, encourage or induce||Not compatible|
|(f)||Seek or receive assistance||Compatible|
|(g)||Allow stationing, installation, deployment||Compatible|
|IAEA safeguards and fissile material|
|TPNW Art 3(2) deadline||N/A|
|Small Quantities Protocol||No|
|Fissile material production facilities||No|
|Highly enriched uranium stocks||Cleared|
|Plutonium stocks (mil/civ)||No/No|
|Related treaties and regimes|
|Party to the BWC||Yes|
|Party to the CWC||Yes|
|Party to the PTBT||Yes|
|Ratified the CTBT||Yes (Annex 2 state)|
|Party to the NPT||Yes|
|Party to a NWFZ||No|
|Member of the CD||Yes|
Sweden maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.
In February 2021, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Ann Linde, informed the Swedish parliament that Sweden would attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022 as an observer.1 In November 2021, the governing Swedish Social Democratic Party adopted a platform in which it stated unequivocally that 'the goal is that Sweden will join' the TPNW.2 This followed the tabling of 48 motions in favour of Sweden's accesion to the TPNW and a public appeal by one hundred prominent members of the party.3 In July 2019, the Swedish government announced that it would 'refrain from signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the present time.'4 It has also indicated that Sweden might reassess its position following the NPT review conference, which is scheduled for 2022.
Sweden has launched the Stockholm Initiative, which is aimed at unlocking disarmament diplomacy through constructive engagement and a 'stepping stones' approach.
- Sweden should urgently adhere to the TPNW.