Sweden
Sweden voted in favour of adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at the UN negotiating conference in 2017. However, since 2022, it has voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty. (From 2018 to 2021, it abstained from voting on the resolutions.) After applying for NATO membership in 2022, Sweden formally informed the alliance that it ‘accepts NATO’s approach to security and defence, including the essential role of nuclear weapons’.1 It became a NATO member in 2024.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1995) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1976) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1993) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2025 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2025) |
| Participated in 3MSP (2025) | No |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes (observer) |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 3 (33%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In October 2025, Sweden participated in NATO's nuclear strike exercise, known as Steadfast Noon, for the first time, providing combat aircraft (Jas 39 Gripen) and military personnel. ‘In an increasingly uncertain world, NATO needs a credible nuclear capability to prevent attacks against the Alliance. Steadfast Noon contributes to ensuring this,’ said the Prime Minister of Sweden, Ulf Kristersson.2
In May 2024, soon after acceding to NATO, Prime Minister Kristersson said that his country would not rule out the possibility of hosting US nuclear weapons on its territory in wartime. His comments came ahead of a parliamentary vote on a Defence Cooperation Agreement between Sweden and the United States, which stated that there was ‘no reason’ for Sweden to host US nuclear weapons in peacetime.3
In 2023, Sweden said that it would maintain its ‘established policy of not signing the TPNW [Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons], as the Treaty, in our view, suffers from several key shortcomings and does not provide for a credible or effective path towards nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, or the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology’.4 Having observed the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW in 2022, Sweden opted not to observe 2MSP in 2023 or 3MSP in March 2025.
In the Conference on Disarmament in February 2025, Sweden said: ‘Reducing the risk of nuclear conflict is urgent and of utmost importance … Concrete progress is needed more than ever to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.’5
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in April 2025, Sweden said: ‘Nuclear deterrence is a core part of NATO’s collective security since the birth of the alliance. NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, which preceded the NPT, were taken into account when the Treaty was concluded and are consistent with Articles I and II of the Treaty, [and] have contributed to nuclear non-proliferation.’6
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2025, Sweden said that the NPT ‘remains the cornerstone of global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts’ and it is ‘committed to promoting its full implementation’.7
Recommendations
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Sweden should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Sweden should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Sweden should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
1) https://bit.ly/40fUYDU 2) https://bit.ly/4bjijLB 3) https://bit.ly/4gLgjMf 4) Letter to ICAN from Tobias Billström, then-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, 26 September 2023.