Sweden
Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty until 2021, but changed to a no vote in 2022 after having applied for NATO membership and embraced the alliance's nuclear doctrine. In 2023, Sweden acceded to NATO.
TPNW Status
| TPNW Article 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2023 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible | |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2023) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| 2MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties | |
|---|---|
| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1976) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1993) |
| IAEA safeguards and fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Safeguards agreement | Yes (1 Jun 1995) |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Latest developments
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2023, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Tobias Billström, said: ‘Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons, its declared readiness to conduct a nuclear test and its announcement about deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus are all deeply irresponsible.’ He added that multilateralism is ‘our best chance’ to address the ‘expansion of nuclear arsenals without transparency, the abandonment of arms control agreements and regional proliferation threats’.1
In a letter sent to ICAN the same month, Foreign Minister Billström reiterated his country’s ‘longstanding commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation’ but said that Sweden would maintain its ‘established policy of not signing the TPNW, as the Treaty, in our view, suffers from several key shortcomings and does not provide for a credible or effective path towards nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation or the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology.’2
Having observed the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022, Sweden opted not to attend the second such meeting held in November and December 2023
Sweden has launched the Stockholm Initiative, which is aimed at unlocking disarmament diplomacy through constructive engagement and a 'stepping stones' approach.
Recommendations
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Sweden should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
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Sweden should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Sweden should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.