Sweden
Sweden voted in favour of adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at the UN negotiating conference in 2017. However, it has voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty since 2022. (It abstained from voting on the resolutions from 2018 to 2021.) After applying for NATO membership in 2022, Sweden formally informed the alliance that it ‘accepts NATO’s approach to security and defence, including the essential role of nuclear weapons’.1 It became a NATO member in March 2024.
TPNW Status
| Key weapons of mass destruction treaties | ||
|---|---|---|
| NUCLEAR WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the TPNW | No | |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) | |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) | |
| Party to an NWFZ | No | |
| CSA with the IAEA | Yes (In force 1995) | |
| AP with the IAEA | Yes (In force 2004) | |
| BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS | ||
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1976) | |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1993) | |
| TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2024 | ||
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible | |
| Test | Compatible | |
| (b) | Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) | Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) | Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible | |
| (e) | Assist, encourage or induce | Non-compatible |
| (f) | Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) | Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |
| TPNW voting and participation | |
|---|---|
| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2024) |
| Participated in 2MSP (2023) | No |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes (observer) |
| Average MSP delegation size (% women) | 3 (33%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |
| Fissile material | |
|---|---|
| Nuclear facilities | Yes |
| Fissile material production | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
| SQP with the IAEA | No |
Latest developments
In May 2024, soon after acceding to NATO, Sweden’s Prime Minister, Ulf Kristersson, said that his country would not rule out the possibility of hosting US nuclear weapons on its territory in wartime. His comments came ahead of a parliamentary vote on a Defence Cooperation Agreement between Sweden and the United States, which stated that there was ‘no reason’ for Sweden to host US nuclear weapons in peacetime.2
At the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Preparatory Committee session in July 2024, Sweden said: ‘If we are to achieve our common goal of a world free from nuclear weapons, multilateralism is our best chance. But faith in multilateralism is built on progress. This goes for the NPT as well. In order to uphold and strengthen this regime, we must see concrete progress.’3 It also said that ‘efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use are more urgent than ever’.4
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2024, Sweden stressed that ‘NATO is a defensive alliance and its nuclear capability has the fundamental purpose to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression’. ‘NATO’s vision is to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons,’ it said.5
In 2023, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Tobias Billström, wrote in a letter to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons that his country would maintain its ‘established policy of not signing the TPNW, as the Treaty, in our view, suffers from several key shortcomings and does not provide for a credible or effective path towards nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation or the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology’.6
Having observed the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW in 2022, Sweden opted not to attend the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) in 2023.
Recommendations
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Sweden should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
-
Sweden should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
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Sweden should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
6) Letter to ICAN from Tobias Billström, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, 26 September 2023.