The obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons
Events in 2023 again showed that the conduct of all the nine nuclear-armed states is incompatible with the TPNW’s obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. No nuclear disarmament initiatives are currently under consideration by these states, and the existing arms control architecture designed to constrain nuclear arsenals is under considerable stress.
The five nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—continued to fail to comply with the obligation under Article VI of the NPT to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith’ on nuclear disarmament. While all nuclear-armed states have expressed their support for nuclear disarmament, they are not pursuing this goal. They argue that this process requires creating a suitable environment first.
Even though the nuclear arms control and disarmament process has stalled, efforts to develop a framework for the verified elimination of nuclear weapons have continued. In 2023, the Group of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification released a consensus report that outlined principles that could guide the process. Although the group did not examine nuclear disarmament in the TPNW context, it concluded that verification measures will be determined by specific obligations of a disarmament agreement. This conclusion is compatible with the understanding that TPNW verification arrangements can differ significantly from those of the disarmament agreements developed in an adversarial context.
This aspect of TPNW verification was further explored in the report of the Scientific Advisory Group to the Second Meeting of TPNW States Parties. The report acknowledged the work on technical aspects of verification that has been achieved by nuclear-weapon states, often in cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states. At the same time, it underscored the importance of developing approaches to verification that could take advantage of the unique nature of the TPNW. It can be assumed that a state joining the TPNW has made a voluntary commitment to full elimination of its nuclear weapon programme and that a high degree of cooperation with the verification process therefore can be expected.
For more information on the TPNW’s obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons, see the 2023 edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor.
- In accordance with Article 4(6) of the TPNW, the states parties are explicitly obligated to designate a ‘competent international authority or authorities’ to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons programmes.
- The TPNW provides two pathways to the future adherence of nuclear-armed states: one for so-called destroy-and-join states (‘Article 4(1) states’) and a second for so-called join-and-destroy states (‘Article 4(2) states’).
- Article 4(1) obligates each nuclear-armed state that destroys its nuclear weapons and eliminates its nuclear-weapons programme before adhering to the TPNW, to cooperate with the ‘competent international authority’ that states parties will designate to verify nuclear disarmament, in order to ascertain that its nuclear-weapon programme has been irreversibly eliminated.
- Article 4(2) obligates those nuclear-armed states that decide to adhere to the Treaty before completing nuclear disarmament to immediately remove the weapons or devices from operational status and to destroy them as soon as possible but not later than the deadline of ten years determined by the First Meeting of States Parties in 2022. The process of destruction must be detailed in a legally-binding, time-bound plan that provides for the verified and irreversible elimination of that state party’s nuclear-weapons programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. Such a state must submit a draft of the plan to the other states parties or to the competent international authority within 60 days of becoming a party. The plan must then be negotiated with this authority and submitted to the next meeting of states parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval.
- Article VI of the NPT requires that the states parties to the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon states parties ‘pursue negotiations in good faith’ on nuclear disarmament. The TPNW is one avenue by which any nuclear-armed state can effectively pursue nuclear disarmament.