The obligation to have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA
Two states parties — Guinea-Bissau and Palestine — did not already have in force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) when they adhered to the TPNW. They had both, however, already concluded and signed such agreements. Guinea- Bissau’s deadline under the TPNW to bring its CSA into force is 15 September 2023, while Palestine’s deadline is 22 July 2022.
All of the other 57 states parties to the TPNW had a CSA in force, as required by both the NPT and the TPNW, as well as by the respective NWFZ treaties. The status of safeguards agreements among the states parties to the TPNW as of 31 December 2021 is shown in the chart and table below. Of the 59 states parties, 39 had brought into force both a CSA and an Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA, thereby committing to the current ‘gold standard’ of safeguards. These obligations must be maintained in force consonant with Article 3 of the TPNW. A total of 20 states parties, however, had not yet brought into force an AP. Five of these states — Bolivia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), and Malaysia — had concluded and signed an AP. The remaining 15 states parties to the TPNW had thus far not taken any formal steps towards an AP.
In total, 38 of the states parties to the TPNW as of end 2021 had brought into force a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to their CSA: 23 states had Modified SQPs, while 15 states retained Original SQPs. The state profiles in this report contain information on all states’ respective safeguards agreements or lack thereof, as well as recommended actions. States that have not brought into force both a CSA and an AP should do so as a matter of urgency; and states that maintain an Original SQP should upgrade to a Modified SQP, or in case the state no longer meets the criteria for scaled down safeguards, rescind it.
The TPNW is an additional forum where diplomats, civil society, and the IAEA can advocate for the universal application of CSAs and APs. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor calls on the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW to adopt a recommendation similar to that agreed on in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan, urging all states parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP.
Safeguards agreements in states parties to the TPNW (as of end 2021)
| Safeguards agreements | Number | States |
|---|---|---|
| CSA and an AP in force | 39 states | Antigua and Barbuda,* Austria, Bangladesh, Benin,* Botswana, Cambodia,* Chile, Comoros,* Costa Rica,* Cuba, Ecuador,* El Salvador,* Fiji,† Gambia,* Holy See,* Honduras,* Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lesotho,* Malta, Mexico, Mongolia,† Namibia,† New Zealand,* Nicaragua,* Nigeria, Palau,* Panama,* Paraguay,* Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis,* Seychelles,* South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, Vanuatu,* Viet Nam. |
| CSA in force, AP signed | 4 states | Bolivia†, Kiribati†, Lao PDR†, Malaysia. |
| CSA in force, no steps towards AP | 14 states | Belize,* Cook Islands,†§ Dominica,† Guyana,† Maldives,* Nauru,† Niue,†§ Saint Lucia,* Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,† Samoa,† San Marino,* Trinidad and Tobago,† Tuvalu,† Venezuela. |
| CSA signed, AP signed | 1 state | Guinea-Bissau |
| CSA signed, no steps towards AP | 1 state | Palestine |
*States with a CSA in force that have also brought into force a Modified SQP (23 states)
†States with a CSA in force that also retain in force an Original SQP (15 states),
§ New Zealand’s CSA and Original SQP also apply to Cook Islands and Niue.
Source: IAEA, ‘Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols’, as of 31 December 2021.
- It is mandatory for all non-nuclear-armed states parties to the TPNW to maintain in force or conclude and bring into force (and thereafter maintain) a CSA with the IAEA. The TPNW specifies that the CSA must be based on INFCIRC 153 (Corrected).
- An Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA, or an instrument of equivalent or higher standard, is also mandatory for all non-nuclear-armed states parties that had one in force upon the entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021.
- These are only minimum requirements, and the TPNW implicitly encourages states parties to adhere to the highest safeguards standard. At present, this is the above-mentioned CSA and an AP.
- If a nuclear-armed state eliminates its nuclear-weapons programme and then adheres to the TPNW it will be obliged to conclude a safeguards agreement that provides ‘credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole’. (Article 4(1)). This formulation equates to, at least, a CSA and a full AP. This means that the state in question will have to upgrade its existing safeguards agreement to a CSA and the requisite AP. Negotiations on these safeguards must start within 180 days, with the resultant treaty entering into force within 18 months, of the TPNW’s entry into force for the state in question. These states must maintain, as a minimum, these safeguards, but may adopt more far-reaching safeguards in the future.
- If a nuclear-armed state adheres to the TPNW before eliminating its nuclear-weapons programme it will also be obliged to conclude a safeguards agreement that provides ‘credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole’. (Article 4(3)). Again, this formulation equates to, at least, a CSA and an AP. Negotiation on these safeguards are mandated to start no later than the completion of nuclear elimination, with the resultant treaty entering into force within 18 months. These states must maintain, as a minimum, these safeguards but may adopt further safeguards in the future. The Treaty does not specify safeguards that should be applied between entry into force and the completion of nuclear elimination for these states, but these may be agreed in the legally-binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of these states’ nuclear-weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear- weapons-related facilities.
- The NPT, NWFZ treaties and the TPNW oblige non-nuclear-armed states parties to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards agreements are important both to prevent further states from developing nuclear weapons and to maintain a nuclear-weapons free world once nuclear disarmament has been achieved.
- Under these agreements, the IAEA applies safeguards to nuclear facilities and material in order to verify that those facilities are not misused, and that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The IAEA analyses state declarations, data derived from IAEA safeguards activities in-country (such as visits and inspections) and at IAEA headquarters, and other sources of information in order to reach a safeguards conclusion. If positive, this is intended to provide credible assurance to the international community that states are abiding by their safeguards obligations.
- There are three types of safeguards agreements: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) with NPT non-nuclear- weapon states; voluntary offer safeguards agreements with NPT nuclear-weapon states; and item-specific safeguards agreements with NPT states not party.
- The CSA provides for safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful activities in non-nuclear-armed states, to verify that it is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The objective is to ensure the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.
- The IAEA Board of Governors approved a Model Additional Protocol (AP) to safeguards agreements in 1997, which expands the Agency’s access to information and sites, including to undeclared facilities, and authority to investigate inconsistencies in states’ declarations. According to the IAEA, it is only in countries with both a CSA and an AP in force that the Agency has sufficient information and access to provide credible assurances of both the non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
- Non-nuclear-armed states with minimal quantities of nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility may conclude a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to their CSA, which suspends certain CSA safeguards under specific conditions, to reduce their safeguards burden while still enabling effective verification of their non-proliferation obligations. The IAEA Board of Governors approved a Modified SQP in 2005 to reduce the number of suspended provisions of the CSA, and strengthen declaration and inspection procedures. Many states are yet to upgrade their SQP to this new standard, and some of these are yet to conclude an AP, meaning the IAEA’s authority to conduct activities to detect any undeclared material and facilities is reduced.
- For more information, see: IAEA, ‘Safeguards explained’ and ‘Safeguards Basics’.
Safeguards agreements in nuclear-armed states
The NPT’s five nuclear-weapon-states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) have concluded so-called ‘voluntary offer’ safeguards agreements, based on the CSA model, which involve safeguards only on certain nuclear material and facilities in their nuclear fuel cycle. They have also concluded limited APs to their voluntary offer agreements.
Three nuclear-armed states not party to the NPT (India, Israel, and Pakistan) have concluded item-specific safeguards agreements, which prohibit the use of specified items under safeguards for military purposes or the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. India has concluded a limited AP to its item-specific agreement. North Korea had originally brought into force a CSA, but the IAEA’s in-country verification activities ceased in April 2009.
As discussed in the above interpretation of the TPNW’s safeguards requirements, upon adherence to the Treaty nuclear-armed states will have, as a minimum, to upgrade their existing safeguards agreements to a CSA and the requisite AP.
Safeguards-agreements in all non-nuclear-armed states
The chart and table below summarize the status of safeguards agreements in all of the 188 non-nuclear-armed states as of 31 December 2021. In total, 132 of the non-nuclear-armed states, or 70%, had both a CSA and an AP in force, while 47 states (25%) had a CSA in force but not yet an AP. These outliers on the AP are all states parties to the NPT. The 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences urged all states parties to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible. A quarter of the 47 outliers have, however, already concluded or signed an AP and need only bring it into force.
Finally, nine states (5%) did not yet have a CSA in force, and therefore also not an AP: Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Palestine, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, South Sudan, and Timor Leste. This is so, despite the fact that all of these states apart from South Sudan are states parties to the NPT and have a pre-existing obligation under Article III of that Treaty — and arguably also under customary law — to conclude and bring into force a CSA. Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau are also obligated under the Pelindaba NWFZ Treaty to conclude and bring into force a CSA. Of the outliers on the CSA, however, all but Somalia and South Sudan have already concluded or even signed CSAs with the IAEA, and all that remains is for them to bring the agreement into force.
As noted above, Guinea-Bissau and Palestine are now also states parties to the TPNW and must therefore comply with this Treaty’s 18-month deadline to bring their CSAs into force. The remaining seven non-nuclear-armed states without a CSA in force are all signatories to or other supporters of the TPNW and will also have to meet the TPNW’s deadline for a CSA upon their adherence to the Treaty.
In total, 179 non-nuclear-armed states had a CSA in force at the end of 2021. Of these, 99 states had brought into force an SQP, of which 70 were Modified SQPs while the other 29 states retained Original SQPs.
Safeguards agreements in all non-nuclear-armed states (as of end 2021)
| Safeguards agreements | Number | States |
|---|---|---|
| CSA and AP in force | 132 states | Afghanistan,* Albania, Andorra,* Angola,* Antigua and Barbuda,* Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,* Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin,* Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,* Burundi,* Cambodia,* Cameroon,* Canada, Central African Republic,* Chad,* Chile, Colombia, Comoros,* Congo,* Costa Rica,* Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti,* Dominican Republic,* DR Congo, Ecuador,* El Salvador,* Eritrea,* Estonia, Eswatini,* Ethiopia,* Fiji,† Finland, Gabon,* Gambia,* Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,* Haiti,* Holy See,* Honduras,* Hungary, Iceland,* Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,* Kuwait,* Kyrgyzstan,† Latvia, Lesotho,* Liberia,* Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,* Malawi,* Mali,* Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania,* Mauritius,* Mexico, Moldova,* Monaco,* Mongolia,† Montenegro,* Morocco, Mozambique,* Namibia,† Netherlands,† New Zealand,* Nicaragua,* Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia,* Norway, Palau,* Panama,* Paraguay,* Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda,* Saint Kitts and Nevis,* Senegal,* Serbia, Seychelles,* Singapore,* Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania,* Thailand, Togo,* Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,* Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,* Viet Nam, Zimbabwe.* |
| CSA in force, AP signed | 10 states | Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia,† Iran,# Kiribati,† Lao PDR,† Malaysia, Myanmar,† Tunisia, Zambia.† |
| CSA in force, AP concluded | 2 states | Sierra Leone,† Sri Lanka. |
| CSA in force, no steps towards AP | 35 states | Argentina, Bahamas,* Barbados,† Belize,* Bhutan,† Brazil, Brunei,* Cook Islands,†§ Dominica,† Egypt, Grenada,† Guyana,† Lebanon,* Maldives,* Micronesia,* Nauru,† Nepal,† Niue,†§ Oman,† Papua New Guinea,* Qatar,* Saint Lucia,* Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,† Samoa,† San Marino,* Saudi Arabia,† Solomon Islands,† Sudan,* Suriname,† Syria, Tonga,* Trinidad and Tobago,† Tuvalu,† Venezuela, Yemen.† |
| CSA signed, AP signed | 4 states | Cabo Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste. |
| CSA signed, no steps towards AP | 1 state | Palestine |
| CSA concluded, AP concluded | 1 state | Sao Tome and Principe. |
| CSA concluded, no steps towards AP | 1 state | Equatorial Guinea. |
| No steps towards CSA or AP | 2 states | Somalia, South Sudan |
* States with a CSA in force that have also brought into force a Modified SQP (70 states).
† States with a CSA in force that also retain in force an Original SQP (29 states).
§ New Zealand’s CSA and Original SQP also apply to Cook Islands and Niue.
# Iran was implementing its AP provisionally but suspended this in February 2021.
Source: IAEA, ‘Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols’, as of 31 December 2021.