The obligation to have Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol with the IAEA

In 2023, one Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and two Additional Protocols (APs) were brought into force with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and one AP was approved. All of this progress took place in states that were parties or signatories to the TPNW: Sao Tome and Principe brought into force a CSA and an AP on the same day; Bolivia brought into force its AP; and Nauru had an AP approved.

NWBM 2023 NTB xgm Q Jd I Gr D0 — An employee of the IAEA changes the country plates at the speaker’s desk from Iran to Saudi Arabia during the 67th IAEA General Conference in Vienna, Austria, 25 September 2023. **Photo:** Christian Bruna, EPA/NTB

At the close of 2023, 136 states, 72% of the global total of 188 non-nuclear-armed states had brought into force both a CSA and an AP, thus committing to the current ‘gold standard’ of safeguards. A total of 47 states (25% of the total) had a CSA in force but not yet an AP. Finally, five states did not yet have a CSA in force, and therefore also not an AP. The figure and table below summarise the status at the end of 2023 of safeguards agreements among non-nuclear-armed states as a whole and among states parties to the TPNW.

To support further progress in this area, the state profiles on this website contain information on all states’ respective safeguards agreements or lack thereof, as well as recommended actions. States that have not brought into force both a CSA and an AP should do so as a matter of urgency. Furthermore, states that maintain an operative original Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) should upgrade to a modified SQP, or in those cases that no longer meet the criteria for scaled down safeguards, rescind it.

For more information, see the 2023 edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor.

Status of safeguards agreements in non-nuclear-armed states, as of 31.12.20232¹

ARTICLES 3(1), 3(2), 4(1), and 4(3) - INTERPRETATION

It is mandatory for all non-nuclear-armed states parties to the TPNW to maintain in force or to conclude and bring into force (and thereafter maintain) a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA. The TPNW specifies that the CSA must be based on the most recent CSA model in IAEA doc. INFCIRC 153 (Corrected). If a non-nuclear-armed state has not brought into force a CSA upon adhering to the TPNW, Article 3(2) stipulates that it must do so within a deadline of 18 months from the date of entry into force of the TPNW for the state in question.

An Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA, or an instrument of equivalent or higher standard, is also mandatory for all non- nuclear-armed states parties that had one in force upon the entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021.

These are only minimum requirements, and the TPNW implicitly encourages states parties to adhere to the highest standard of safeguards. At present, this is the above-mentioned CSA and an AP.

If a nuclear-armed state eliminates its nuclear-weapons programme and then adheres to the TPNW it will be obliged to conclude a safeguards agreement that provides ‘credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole’. (Article 4(1)). This formulation equates to, at least, a CSA and a full AP. This means that the state in question will have to upgrade its existing safeguards agreement to a CSA and the requisite AP. Negotiations on these safeguards must start within 180 days, with the resultant treaty entering into force within 18 months of the TPNW’s entry into force for the state in question. These states must maintain, as a minimum, these safeguards, but may adopt more far-reaching safeguards in the future.

If a nuclear-armed state adheres to the TPNW before eliminating its nuclear-weapons programme it will also be obliged to conclude a safeguards agreement that provides ‘credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole’. (Article 4(3)). Again, this formulation equates to, at least, a CSA and an AP. Negotiations on these safeguards are mandated to start no later than the completion of nuclear elimination, with the resultant treaty entering into force within 18 months. These states must maintain, as a minimum, these safeguards but may adopt further safeguards in the future. The Treaty does not specify safeguards that should be applied between entry into force and the completion of nuclear elimination for these states, but these may be agreed in the legally-binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of these states’ nuclear-weapons programmes that is required, and which includes the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities.