Of the 68 states that were parties to the TPNW at the close of 2022, 47 (or 69%) had brought into force both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thus having committed to the current ‘gold standard’ of safeguards.
A further 20 TPNW states parties had brought a CSA into force, but not yet an AP. Of these, four had already signed an AP and need only to bring it into force, while the remaining 16 states had thus far not taken any steps towards an AP. Only one of the states parties—Timor-Leste—had not yet brought into force a CSA, although it had signed one already in 2009. Since Timor-Leste had not brought its CSA into force before becoming a state party to the TPNW in 2022, it must now do so within the 18-month deadline set by Article 3(2) of the TPNW, which for Timor-Leste is 18 March 2024.
The figure and tables below summarise the status at the end of 2022 of safeguards agreements among states parties to the TPNW, and among all of the world’s 188 non-nuclear-armed states.
Of the global total of 188 non-nuclear-armed states, 134 (or 71%) had brought both a CSA and an AP into force with the IAEA as of 31 December 2022, while 48 states (26%) had a CSA in force but not yet an AP. These 48 outliers on the AP are all states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences urged all states parties to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible. A quarter of these 48 outliers have, however, already taken steps towards an AP: 11 states have signed an AP and need only to bring it into force, and one state (Sri Lanka) has agreed upon a text for an AP which has also been approved by the Board of the IAEA. See the tables below for details.
Finally, six states (3%) did not yet have a CSA in force, and therefore also not an AP. As already discussed above, TPNW state party Timor-Leste was one of the outliers on the CSA in 2022. The remaining five outliers were Equatorial Guinea (TPNW signatory), Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe (TPNW signatory), Somalia, and South Sudan. All of these states apart from South Sudan are states parties to the NPT and have a pre-existing obligation under that Treaty to conclude and bring into force a CSA. If they also adhere to the TPNW they will, like Timor-Leste, have to comply with that Treaty’s 18-month deadline to bring their CSAs into force. Along with Timor-Leste, Guinea has already signed a CSA, while Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe have agreed upon texts for CSAs that have also been approved by the Board of the IAEA.
The only two non-nuclear-armed states in the world that have not taken any steps towards a CSA are Somalia and South Sudan.
Progress in 2022
The TPNW is an additional forum where diplomats, civil society, and the IAEA can advocate for the universal application of CSAs and APs. In the course of 2022, three new CSAs were brought into force with the IAEA, all by TPNW states parties that had deadlines to meet under Article 3(2) of the TPNW. Palestine brought into force a CSA approximately six weeks after its deadline on 22 July 2022, while Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau brought into force their CSAs well in advance of their respective deadlines of 18 March 2024 and 15 September 2023. With the three new CSAs in force, the global number of non-nuclear-armed states that are outliers on the CSA was reduced from nine at the end of 2021 to six at the end of 2022, indicating that Article 3(2) of the TPNW is valuable in efforts for universal application of the CSA.
The year 2022 also saw two new APs brought into force with the IAEA, as well as one that was signed. This progress similarly took place in states that, in addition to being states parties to the NPT, are either signatories or states parties to the TPNW: TPNW states parties Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau brought into force APs at the same time as they brought into force their CSAs, and TPNW signatory Sierra Leone signed an AP on 31 October.
At the close of 2022, a total of 101 of the non-nuclear-armed states had an operative Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), which suspends some of the provisions of their CSA. Of these, 77 were Modified SQPs while the other 24 states still retained operative Original SQPs. During the course of 2022, Namibia, Lao PDR, Suriname, and Tuvalu upgraded their Original SQPs to Modified SQPs, and Lithuania rescinded its Original SQP.
The state profiles in this report contain information on all states’ respective safeguards agreements or lack thereof, as well as recommended actions. States that have not brought into force both a CSA and an AP should do so as a matter of urgency. States that maintain an operative Original SQP should upgrade to a Modified SQP, or in those cases that no longer meet the criteria for scaled down safeguards, rescind it.
Safeguards agreements in states with nuclear facilities
It is in states with nuclear facilities that it is most critical to have a strengthened safeguards system through both a CSA and an AP. A total of 64 non-nuclear-armed states currently have nuclear facilities. The state profiles of this report specify whether or not a state has nuclear facilities. Of the 64 non-nuclear-armed states with nuclear facilities, ten have not yet brought into force an AP with the IAEA. The ten states are indicated in bold in the tables above. Four have already signed an AP: Algeria (TPNW signatory), Belarus, Iran, and Malaysia (TPNW state party). The remaining six states have not yet taken any steps towards an AP: Argentina, Brazil (TPNW signatory), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Venezuela (TPNW state party).
Safeguards agreements in nuclear-armed states
The NPT’s five nuclear-weapon-states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) have concluded so-called ‘voluntary offer’ safeguards agreements, based on the CSA model, which involve safeguards only on certain nuclear material and facilities in their nuclear fuel cycle. They have also concluded limited APs to their voluntary offer agreements. Three nuclear-armed states not party to the NPT (India, Israel, and Pakistan) have concluded item-specific safeguards agreements, which prohibit the use of specified items under safeguards for military purposes or the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. India has concluded a limited AP to its item-specific agreement. North Korea had originally brought into force a CSA, but the IAEA’s in-country verification activities ceased in April 2009.
As discussed above in the interpretation of the TPNW’s safeguards requirements, upon adherence to the Treaty nuclear-armed states will have, as a minimum, to upgrade their existing safeguards agreements to a full CSA over all nuclear material and upgrade to, or conclude and bring into force, a full AP.