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The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment

In 2023, Belarus was added as a sixth state that engaged in conduct that was not compatible with the TPNW’s prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons. While the presence of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory has not been confirmed, it is clear that both countries took significant steps to advance a nuclear-sharing mission. NATO members Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye continued to host a total of approximately 100 US B61 gravity nuclear bombs for NATO’s nuclear sharing mission.

NWBM 2023 Getty Images 1252207918
A woman holds a sign with a representation of Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko with a nuclear missile during a rally in Warsaw, Poland on 26 April 2023. Photo: Photo by Jaap Arriens/NurPhoto via Getty Images

As shown in the map below, forward-deployed US nuclear weapons are believed to be located at six air bases in Europe: Kleine Brogel in Belgium, Büchel in Germany, Aviano and Ghedi in Italy, Volkel in the Netherlands, and Incirlik in Türkiye. Several unknowns still surround the status and logistical challenges of the announced deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Ukraine. Open sources have not provided conclusive visual evidence to suggest where Russian nuclear warheads and related personnel are deployed in Belarus, if indeed they are in the country at all. The Asipovichy depot is the most likely candidate for nuclear storage given new security features observed at the site via satellite imagery.

For more information, see the 2023 edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor.

Locations of known and likely foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe, 2023

Figure 24
ARTICLE 1(1)(g) - INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: ‘Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.’

  • This provision outlaws a particular form of assistance or encouragement of prohibited action: allowing any stationing, installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in a state party’s territory or at any other place under its jurisdiction or control.
  • The TPNW’s prohibition against such hosting of nuclear weapons applies at all times, including during escalating tension or armed conflict.
  • The concept of jurisdiction refers primarily to a state’s sovereign territory, while control extends to areas that the state party occupies or otherwise controls extraterritorially. This is irrespective of the legality of this control under international law.
  • Deployment is the broadest of the three types of prohibited conduct. A violation would not require any prolonged duration, agreement, or infrastructure. Thus, although transit of nuclear weapons is not explicitly prohibited by the TPNW, if movement into the sovereign territory of a state party is not swiftly followed by exit, this might amount to assistance and encouragement to possess nuclear weapons as well as a violation of 1(1)(g).
  • The duration of stay necessary to constitute deployment would depend on the surrounding circumstances—a shorter stay would suffice at a moment of high tension—but in normal circumstances would probably require at least 72 hours to contravene the prohibition in Article 1(1)(g).
  • The NPT does not formally prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon states by any of the five designated nuclear-weapon states as long as it retains control over their use at all times. Many states consider nuclear sharing to pose a significant challenge to broader nuclear non-proliferation efforts.